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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Statutes of Limitations and Fatfinding in Administrative Government
In Lofland v. Montgomery County' the Court of Appeals held that
an independent fire company's employee was entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine the timeliness of the filing of his griev-
ance.' Finding that the county administrative agency erred in
denying Lofland a hearing, the court remanded the case for addi-
tional evidence and factfinding by the agency.3 The court held that
under the circumstances, an evidentiary hearing was required as a
matter of law to resolve the issue of when the twenty-day limitations
period began to run.4
Although the court decided the case on this narrow ground, it
raised several other administrative law issues that it was not in a po-
sition to explain or resolve adequately. First, the court suggested
that an employee might be able to file a grievance in a timely man-
ner, based solely on a new policy adopted by the Montgomery
County Merit System Protection Board (Board).5 This suggestion's
broader implication is that a new policy adopted in an administra-
tive adjudication may give rise to a timely claim based on facts in
existence before the policy's announcement. This would reactivate
the limitations period for all employees on a particular issue, giving
retroactive effect to all Board policy decisions.6 Second, although
the Court of Appeals in this case did not explicitly adopt the discov-
ery rule in resolving the issue of knowledge of a claim's existence, it
utilized language identical to that of the rule,7 and did not condemn
the circuit court's application of it.' Third, the court cited the Mary-
land Administrative Procedure Act,' but beyond using the Act to
1. 319 Md. 265, 572 A.2d 163 (1990).
2. See id. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
3. See id.
4. See id.; infra notes 61-65, 68-71 and accompanying text.
5. See 319 Md. at 272, 572 A.2d at 166.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
7. See 319 Md. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
8. See Joint Record Extract at E.63, Lofland v. Montgomery County, No. 89-105
(opinion of Cir. Ct. Sept. 20, 1988) [hereinafter Joint Record Extract].
9. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-215 (1984); see infra notes 78-80 and accompa-
nying text.
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establish jurisdiction over the case,' ° the court did not make clear
whether its holding was based on the Act's provisions. Finally, the
absence of citation in the opinion might also suggest that the court
relied heavily for its reasoning on the parties' briefs. Therefore,
Lofland's claim that his due process rights were violated may have
persuaded the court."
In light of these uncertainties, the most conservative interpreta-
tion of the court's holding is that it merely requires the agency to
produce a more detailed factual record so that a reviewing court can
determine the legality of the agency's actions. The case's ambiguity
warrants an exploration of the other possibilities, however, to deter-
mine its precedential value for Maryland administrative law and re-
veal the potential burdens that the ambiguities might impose on
administrative agencies.
1. The Case.-The Wheaton Volunteer Rescue Squad (WRS)
operates in Montgomery County, Maryland. On December 30,
1985, it hired Larry Lofland as a firefighter. 12 When Lofland was
hired he was a state-certified paramedic,'" and spent most of his
time performing paramedic duties rather than firefighting. 14 As an
independent fire company, WRS operated under the Montgomery
County Merit System Protection Board's jurisdiction.' 5 The
Board's personnel regulations stipulate that a merit system em-
ployee performing paramedic duties is entitled to a ten percent pay
differential over the basic pay.'" The paramedic employee must sat-
isfactorily complete a one-year probationary period in order to re-
ceive this extra pay."
By January 1987, Lofland had completed his probationary pe-
riod, and received a recommendation that the WRS grant him "per-
10. See 319 Md. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
11. See Brief of Petitioner at 21-22, 24, Lofland (No. 89-105).
12. Joint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E.37 (Decision on Appeal of L. Lofland,
Jan. 26, 1988).
13. See Lofland, 319 Md. at 267, 572 A.2d at 163; see Joint Record Extract, supra note
8, at E.I 1 (Weber's Recommendation, Jan. 19, 1987).
14. See 319 Md. at 267, 572 A.2d at 164.
15. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY FIRE AND RESCUE COMMISSION, PERSONNEL REGULA-
TIONS FOR FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE MERIT SYSTEM EMPLOYEES OF THE INDEPENDENT
FIRE AND RESCUE CORPORATIONS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY § 1 (Apr. 1, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter MONTGOMERY FIRE PERSONNEL REGULATIONS].
16. See id. at app. § 3(c)(1).
17. 319 Md. at 267, 572 A.2d at 164. An individual must also be assigned to
paramedic duty for more than 50% of the time before becoming eligible for the special
pay differential. Id.
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manent" or merit system status as a firefighter/paramedic.' 8 But
WRS's Board of Directors never acted upon this recommendation.' 9
Throughout Lofland's employment with WRS, the Board main-
tained its one-year probationary policy as it applied to the
paramedic pay differential, but Lofland never received additional
compensation for performing his paramedic duties, before or after
he completed his probationary period.2"
On August 25, 1987, three months after Lofland transferred to
another fire department, the Board reviewed another firefighter's
appeal.' Harold Isbell also was hired as a firefighter, but as a state-
certified paramedic, he spent seventy-four percent of his time per-
forming paramedic duties.22 The Board resolved Isbell's case by
voiding its one-year probationary requirement and awarding Isbell
the ten percent pay differential retroactive to the date he was
hired. 3
The Board issued the Isbell decision in late August, 1987.
Forty-two days later, Lofland filed a grievance claiming that he was
entitled to the pay differential retroactive to the date he was hired,
which would encompass his probationary period and the five
months following it, before he transferred to the other fire depart-
ment.24 Lofland claimed he spent more than fifty percent of his
time performing paramedic duties during and after his probationary
period, and he had never received the ten percent pay differential.25
He also explained that he only recently learned about the Board's
decision in the Isbell case and believed it applied to his own situa-
tion, and this entitled him to the pay differential from his hiring date
through the date of his transfer. 6
The personnel director determined that Lofland did not file his
grievance in a timely manner.2 7 Under the controlling administra-
tive procedures, an employee must submit a written grievance
"'within 20 calendar days from the date of occurrence of the griev-
18. See Joint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E. 11 (Weber's Recommendation, Jan.
19, 1987).
19. Id. at E.54 (Opinion of Cir. Ct., Sept. 20, 1988).
20. Lofland, 319 Md. at 267, 572 A.2d at 164.
21. Id. at 267-68, 572 A.2d at 164.
22. Id. at 267, 572 A.2d at 164.
23. Id. The Board based its decision on the fact that it is the state's function to
accredit individuals and "a pay differential must be based on competence and profi-
ciency, as measured by State certification, and not solely on longevity." Id.
24. See 319 Md. at 268, 572 A.2d at 164.
25. See id.
26. See Joint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E.9 (Employee Grievance Statement).
27. Lofland, 319 Md. at 268, 572 A.2d at 164.
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ance or knowledge of the same.' ",28 Accordingly, the director de-
termined that Lofland should have filed his grievance, at the very
latest, within twenty days after the day he received his final WRS
paycheck without the differential. 29 Lofland appealed to the Board,
requesting a hearing.3"
The Board sustained the personnel director's decision and de-
nied Lofland a hearing, 3' concluding that the grievance was not
timely filed because "Lofland had, or should have had knowledge of
the grievable issue in early 1987. ''32 On appeal, the circuit court
reversed the Board's decision, holding that a reasonable person
could not be expected to know of a potential grievance when an
adopted policy specifically prohibited the compensation sought.
The court remanded the case to the Board, and instructed it to con-
duct a factual hearing on the limitations issue.33 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals reviewed the circuit court's decision and reversed it in
an unpublished opinion, holding that the Board's Isbell decision
was not promulgated as a broad policy, nor did it intend to apply the
policy retroactively.3 4 The court also noted that the agency has dis-
cretion over whether to conduct a hearing. 5 Lofland petitioned for
certiorari to the Court of Appeals. 6
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether
the agency erred in refusing to grant Lofland a factual hearing on
the timeliness of his grievance.3 7 The court stated that only after
the appropriate administrative body made sufficient factual findings
could it determine the legal issue of "when Lofland reasonably
should have known he had a right to file a grievance on a claim for
additional compensation entitlement. '3 8 The court held that as a
matter of law, Lofland was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and if
this resulted in a finding that his grievance was timely filed, the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Joint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E.38 (Decision of Appeal of L. Lofland, Jan.
26, 1988). The Board believed that Lofland would have been a merit system employee
by this time, and he was therefore entitled to the differential described in the regula-
tions. Id.
33. See 319 Md. at 268-69, 572 A.2d at 164.
34. See Montgomery County v. Lofland, No. 88-1511, slip op. at 3 (Md. App. Sept. 4,
1988).
35. See id. at 3-4.
36. See Loftand, 319 Md. at 269, 572 A.2d at 164.
37. See id. at 271, 572 A.2d at 166.
38. Id. at 272, 572 A.2d at 166.
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Board must then consider on the merits his claim for the pay
differential.39
2. Legal Background.-
a. Retrospective Application of Agency Policies.- The legislature
gives administrative agencies the power to promulgate rules and
policies for carrying out their administrative functions.4' If adopted
pursuant to statutory authority, these rules and policies have the
force and effect of law, and courts interpret agency regulations in
the same manner as they interpret statutes. 41 Agencies must apply
their policies in a manner consistent with the regulations they have
established; an administrative agency's rules and regulations cannot
be waived, suspended, or disregarded as long as they remain in
force.42
According to Maryland case law, a statute affecting substantive
matters or rights will not be given retrospective operation "unless
its words are so clear, strong and imperative in their retrospective
expression that no other meaning can be attached to them."'43 The
court presumes that new policies or laws apply prospectively unless
the legislature's retrospective intent is clear, and its application will
39. See id. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
40. See, e.g., MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-101(b)(2)(ii) (1988), which pro-
vides that the Board of Public Works may adopt regulations to carry out provisions in
the state procurement statute. See also MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-101(e) (1990
Supp.).
41. Cf. Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 60,
492 A.2d 281, 289 (1985) (the rules for interpreting statutes are the same as those for
interpreting rules); see, e.g., Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel,
295 Md. 586, 592-93, 457 A.2d 1146, 1149 (1983) (although the standards for interpret-
ing a rule are the same as those for interpreting a statute, the agency's expertise is more
relevant to the rule's interpretation than to statutory interpretation because an agency is
best able to discern its own intent in promulgating a regulation); Pappas v. Pappas, 287
Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980) (in a divorce case the court noted that the same
standards are used for interpreting rules as are used for interpreting statutes); Messitte
v. Colonial Mortgage Serv., 287 Md. 289, 293, 411 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1980) (in a class
action against a lender, rules are interpreted in the same manner as statutes); Bartell v.
Bartell, 278 Md. 12, 17, 357 A.2d 343, 346 (1976) (in a divorce case, the method of
interpreting a statute applies equally to interpreting a rule).
42. See Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance Comm'n, 40 Md. App. 329, 335, 391
A.2d 1213, 1216 (1978) (although due process was not violated, convictions on alleged
institutional infractions could not stand if the agency departed from its own procedural
rules).
43. Janda v. General Motors, 237 Md. 161, 168-69, 205 A.2d 228, 232 (1964)
(amendment to unemployment insurance law operated retrospectively to allow for re-
covery of benefits (quoting State Tax Comm'n v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 182 Md.
111, 117, 32 A.2d 382, 384 (1943))).
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not violate the constitution.4 4
b. The Discovery Rule.-Historically in Maryland, the statute of
limitations for tort actions began to run from the date the wrong
occurred.4 5 Over time, the "discovery rule" replaced this earlier
rule, and allowed plaintiffs the full statutory period to file an action,
taking into consideration latent injuries that were not apparent until
several years after the event. 46 The court established that in tort
actions the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff "in
fact knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong. ' 47 Fur-
thermore, actual knowledge or at least inquiry notice is required.48
The Court of Appeals has used the discovery rule in products liabil-
ity cases,49 but it has not yet applied the rule to administrative law
cases.
c. The Administrative Procedure Act.-The Maryland Administra-
tive Procedure Act 5° permits courts to review administrative agency
decisions in particular circumstances. The statute provides that a
court may:
reverse or modify the decision if any substantive right of
the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding,
44. See Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc.,
278 Md. 120, 123-24, 360 A.2d 1, 4 (1976) (a law affecting substantive matters may
operate retrospectively as long as it does not offend constitutional limitations (citing
Janda, 237 Md. at 169, 205 A.2d at 233)).
45. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 438, 550 A.2d 1155, 1158 (1988)
(citing Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 182, 100 A. 83, 85 (1917) (in an action alleging
silver poisoning, the court adopted the English rule that the statute begins to run from
the time the right of action accrues)).
46. See Pennwalt, 314 Md. at 439, 550 A.2d at 1159. The court clearly articulated this
exception in Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 142, 215 A.2d 825, 829 (1966) (in
the medical malpractice context, the plaintiff's inexpertise prevents the statute of limita-
tions from running on the date of the wrong).
47. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (under the
discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not run until the claimant knew or should
have known, of the negligence or defect; the discovery rule is now generally applicable).
48. See id. at 637, 431 A.2d at 681. The Poffenberger court noted that if constructive
notice were deemed sufficient to activate the running of limitations, it would recreate the
very inequity the discovery rule was designed to eradicate. Id.
49. See Pennwalt, 314 Md. at 452, 550 A.2d at 1165. The court held that a partially
paralyzed mother's cause of action in a medical products liability case accrued when she
knew or should have known of the manufacturer's wrongdoing or product defect. The
court considered three factors in its decision to apply the discovery rule: "1) the interest
of diligent plaintiffs to bring suit; 2) the interest of defendants to enjoy repose after an
unreasonable delay by plaintiffs; and 3) the interest of society in promoting judicial
economy." Id. at 455-56, 550 A.2d at 1165.
50. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-101 to -405 (1984).
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conclusion, or decision of the agency: (i) is unconstitu-
tional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the agency; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is
affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of
the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or
capricious."
A court first reviews an administrative agency's decision for its legal-
ity, and then for substantial evidence in the record to support the
decision.52 The court grants great deference to agency decisions, as
they carry a legal presumption of validity." In applying the sub-
stantial evidence test, the court may not "substitute its judgment for
that of the agency."54
d. Due Process.-Courts utilize a two-pronged analysis when
considering whether an administrative law proceeding violates due
process. 55 The first question is whether the individual has a prop-
erty interest or right protected by the fourteenth amendment. 56
Property includes any benefits for which a person has a legitimate
claim of entitlement.5 7 Once the court recognizes a property inter-
est, it must determine the type of hearing required, by weighing the
individual's interests against those of the agency.58
Applying this test, Maryland courts have determined that em-
ployees have a protected interest in agency adherence to merit sys-
51. Id. at § 10-215(g)(3).
52. See Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass'n v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md.
649, 662, 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985) (refusing to make independent findings of fact or
substitute its judgment for the agency's).
53. See id. at 662-63, 490 A.2d at 708.
54. Id. at 662, 490 A.2d at 708; see Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md.
505, 512-13, 390 A.2d 1119, 1123-24 (1978) (discussing the meaning and application of
"substantial evidence").
55. See Andre v. Montgomery County Personnel Bd., 37 Md. App. 48, 63, 375 A.2d
1149, 1157 (1977) (adopting and applying the standard set out by the Supreme Court in
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972), in determining that procedural due
process applies to liberty and property interests protected by the fourteenth
amendment).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 63-64, 375 A.2d at 1157. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]o have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it." Roth, 408 U.S. at
577.
58. See Riger v. L. & B. Ltd., 278 Md. 281, 289, 363 A.2d 481, 486 (1976) (adopting
and applying the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldidge, 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976), for determining procedural due process requirements when state ac-
tion deprives a person of a property interest).
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tern procedures.5 9 After it balances the interests involved, however,
the court may find that a full judicial hearing is not required, and
that existing administrative procedures satisfy the constitutional
right to be heard.6°
3. Analysis.-
a. Retrospective Application of Agency Policy and Regulations.-The
Court of Appeals remanded the case because it had insufficient facts
to determine when the twenty-day limitations period began to run.
The court suggested that there were at least two different points
from which the twenty days could run: the date of the occurrence,
and the date Lofland had knowledge of it.6 But the court did not
adequately explain how to resolve the distinct issues presented by
Lofland's grievance: the probationary period pay differential and the
post-probationary pay differential.
The Board identified "early 1987" as the time Lofland had the
requisite knowledge to file a grievance.62 Early 1987 refers to Lof-
land's completion of the probationary period; thus the Board only
resolved the post-probationary period issue and ignored the possi-
ble implications of the Isbell decision. The circuit court, on the
other hand, addressed only the broader policy issue of applying the
Isbell decision to Lofland's probationary period pay differential.63
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the circuit court as to
both the issue and the result. It considered only the post-probation-
ary period, and denied any application of the Isbell decision to Lof-
land's case.'
The Court of Appeals did not discuss these inconsistencies
among the lower courts, or explain its own holding with reference
59. See Andre, 37 Md. App. at 64, 375 A.2d at 1158. In Andre, two unsuccessful appli-
cants for vacancies in the county department of recreation sought judicial review of the
personnel board's decision refusing to appoint them, despite the board's finding that
the merit system procedures were violated in filling the vacancies. Although it refused
to enjoin such promotions, the court nevertheless determined that the applicants have a
"property right to the County's abiding by the merit system regulations," and "to the
extent that the Montgomery County Code sets forth procedures for promotion, the ap-
pellants are entitled to its fair and accurate application." Id. at 63-64, 375 A.2d at 1157-
58.
60. See id.
61. See Lofland, 319 Md. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
62. Joint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E.38 (Decision of Appeal of L. Lofland,Jan.
26, 1988).
63. See id. at E.64-65 (Opinion of Cir. Ct., Sept. 20, 1988).
64. See Montgomery County v. Lofland, No. 88-1511, slip op. at 2-4 (Md. App. Sept.
4, 1988).
1036 [VOL. 50:1029
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to these distinct issues. The court simply required that the agency
conduct a factual hearing to resolve the "knowledge" issue.65 Ap-
plying this holding to the probationary period pay differential ar-
guably means that the agency must determine when Lofland should
reasonably have known of his right to file a grievance, or rather,
when he became aware of the Isbell decision. Such a holding also
implies that the Isbell decision has retrospective effect, and could
start the running of a new twenty-day limitations period. Without
the requisite "clear intent ' ' 66 to apply a decision or policy retrospec-
tively, courts seldom impose on agencies such an onerous burden.
However, agencies should clearly specify when limitations periods
are activated and prohibit retrospective application of policies or in-
dividual decisions.
As to the post-probationary period differential, the Loftand
opinion suggests that the agency must determine as a factual matter,
whether it was reasonable to charge Lofland with knowledge of his
grievance simply because his paycheck did not reflect the differential
or because the personnel regulations granted him the right to the
differential.67 This holding implies that employees must have actual
knowledge of policies and regulations before an agency can deny
the employee's privileges under them. The entire issue of knowl-
edge is discussed next.
b. The Discovery Rule.-In Lofland, the applicable procedural
limitation required an employee to file a grievance, "within 20 cal-
endar days from the date of occurrence of the grievance or knowl-
edge of the same."68 The personnel director and the Board
interpreted this to mean that the employee must file the grievance
within twenty days after it occurred, or within twenty days after the
grievant discovered the grievable actions. Their interpretation fo-
cused upon the grievant's knowledge of the act or omission, and did
not consider the grievant's knowledge of the facts or law that give
him a right to make a claim.69 Lofland argued that the phrase refers
to the grievant's knowledge of the circumstances that would give
65. See Loftand, 319 Md. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
66. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div. of Litton Sys., Inc., 278
Md. 120, 123-24, 360 A.2d 1, 4 (1976); see Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance
Comm'n, 40 Md. App. 329, 391 A.2d 1213 (1978).
67. See 319 Md. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
68. MONTGOMERY FIRE PERSONNEL REGULATIONS, supra note 15.
69. SeeJoint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E.35 (Lofland's Appeal to Board, Jan. 4,
1988).
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him a basis for making the claim. 70
The Court of Appeals accepted the administrative regulation's
explicit consideration of the employee's "knowledge," and inter-
preted this to mean the time when Lofland "should reasonably have
had knowledge of his grievance."71 This language is almost identi-
cal to the language used in tort cases applying the discovery rule.72
In these tort cases, however, the rule permits plaintiffs to file a com-
plaint even though the injury itself is not detected or reasonably dis-
coverable until after the limitations period expires. 73 The courts
have not applied the rule to a situation such as Lofland's, in which
the grievant simply was unaware of his right to file an action, or in
which the substantive law changes without articulating the conse-
quences for the statute of limitations.
Applying the discovery rule to Lofland's case as the circuit
court suggested,7 would have two consequences. First, administra-
tive agencies would be required in grievance proceedings to use the
rule, along with its principles and precedents. This could alleviate
much uncertainty in the process and allow for an objective standard
of review, but it could also force agencies to conduct detailed factual
investigations that would consume their limited resources.
The second consequence of applying the discovery rule in Lof-
land would be that the rule itself would expand. In Lofland's case, it
is unclear whether he knew of the personnel regulations and that he
had a right to file a grievance for his post-probationary period differ-
ential.75 These issues involve Lofland's knowledge of his rights and,
unlike tort cases, do not necessarily concern his knowledge of an
injury.76 The discovery rule's application would undermine the stat-
ute of limitations' purpose, and would reward grievants who remain
ignorant of the law and agency policies. Although the circuit court
judge suggested that using the discovery rule would be justified and
logical, 77 the Court of Appeals did not explicitly sanction its applica-
70. See id.
71. Lofland, 319 Md. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
72. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 444, 550 A.2d 1155, 1161 (1988);
Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981).
73. See Pennwalt, 419 Md. at 444-45, 550 A.2d at 1161 (describing Pierce v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 256, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983)); Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 636,
431 A.2d at 680.
74. See Joint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E.63 (Opinion of Cir. Ct., Sept. 20,
1988).
75. See Lofland, 319 Md. at 272, 572 A.2d at 166.
76. See generally Pennwalt, 314 Md. 433, 550 A.2d 1155; Poffenberger, 290 Md. 631, 431
A.2d 677.
77. The circuit court judge noted that, "[e]ngrafting into regulatory filing limitations
1038 [VOL. 50:1029
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tion in administrative cases. Agencies should wait for more specific
directives from the court before proceeding under the discovery
rule's analysis.
c. The Administrative Procedure Act.-The Court of Appeals held
that the agency erred when it neglected to make factual findings
concerning Lofland's "knowledge" of his grievance.7" A conserva-
tive interpretation would conclude that the court reviewed the
agency's determination under the substantial evidence standard of
the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act,79 and simply decided
that the record did not adequately support the agency's decision.
This was the circuit court's finding. 0 This holding is relatively nar-
row and fact specific, but gives the agency little guidance with re-
spect to legally necessary procedures.
The Court of Appeals found that the agency did not elicit
enough factual material to make a determination about Lofland's
"knowledge."'" The court may have intended that the agency sim-
ply make sufficient factual determinations to enable the court to per-
form its reviewing function. Another interpretation is that in
grievance proceedings the personnel director and the Board must
always conduct factual hearings. Alternatively, the opinion could
mean that cases involving timeliness disputes must be determined
by a hearing. A fourth plausible interpretation is that the agency
must hold a hearing whenever the regulation or procedure involves
an element of knowledge. Whatever the court's intent, any one of
these arguably valid interpretations might overburden the quasi-ju-
dicial and adjudicatory arm of state agencies. Until the court makes
an affirmative ruling on this issue, agencies would be wise to pre-
pare detailed factual findings.
d. Due Process .- Due process analysis involves identifying a
property interest, then defining the actual procedures the govern-
ment must follow before it can impinge upon that interest.8 2 The
court in Loftand did not apply or mention due process rights at all.
the discovery rule generally applicable to most suits filed in the law courts is consistent
with the policy of pursuing a rule of reason in limiting either the law suits or regulatory
actions." Joint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E.63 (Opinion of Cir. Ct., Sept. 20,
1988).
78. See Lofland, 319 Md. at 272-73, 572 A.2d at 166.
79. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-215(g)(3)(v) (1984).
80. SeeJoint Record Extract, supra note 8, at E.65 (Opinion of Cir. Ct. Sept 20, 1988).
81. See 319 Md. at 272-73, 572 A.2d at 166.
82. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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But because it held that Lofland was entitled to a hearing as a matter
of law,8 3 perhaps the court considered the constitutionality of the
agency's decision. Moreover, Lofland stated in his brief that due
process alone entitled him to a hearing,84 and the court, ruling in
his favor, did not reject his argument. But neither did it clearly state
whether the hearing requirement was alternatively justified by the
Administrative Procedure Act, agency regulations, 5 or any other
legal basis. The court might simply have remanded the case for fur-
ther fact-finding-by whatever means the Board chose-but it in-
stead remanded the case with specific instructions to the Board to
conduct an evidentiary hearing. 6
The court did not explain why Lofland's situation warranted the
extreme remedy of full evidentiary hearing, but the suggested due
process claim's practical consequences must be considered. If the
federal Constitution's due process clause requires state agencies to
conduct evidentiary hearings in all factual disputes, agency opera-
tions would be seriously hampered because these hearings would
consume the agency's scarce resources. The practical difficulty of
implementing such procedures suggests that Lofland should not be
viewed as extending due process rights in grievance proceedings;
however, legitimate complainants should not overlook due process
claims: the due process interpretation of the case is not completely
unfounded.
4. Conclusion.-After Lofland, administrative agencies should
be prepared to support their actions with more thorough factual
findings. It is not at all clear whether the court believes that griev-
ants have a due process right to an evidentiary hearing, or whether
only specific circumstances warrant substantial factual findings.
Similarly unclear is whether agency policies apply retrospectively,
even without clear legislative intent, and whether the discovery rule
or a similar analysis applies to agency grievance proceedings. Agen-
cies should tread lightly in these areas until the court explicitly de-
fines the law's limitations.
EMILY J. VAIAS
83. See Loftand, 319 Md. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
84. Brief of Petitioner at 21-22, 24, Lofland (No. 89-105).
85. See MONTGOMERY FIRE PERSONNEL REGULATIONS, supra note 15; MONTGOMERY
COUNTY FIRE AND RESCUE COMMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE No. 7-3, § 5.0 (Oct.
13, 1981, rev. Feb. 9, 1984).
86. See 319 Md. at 273, 572 A.2d at 166.
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II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Appealable Judgments and Notices of Appeal
In B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.,' the
Court of Appeals held that a party's appeal from the denial of its
motions for reconsideration and for new trial did not preclude ap-
pellate review of the underlying judgment on the merits.2 The
Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals, finding that
the plaintiff's appeal of the denial of its motions was taken from the
only final appealable judgment in the case,' an appeal that brought
up for review all earlier orders in the case.4 The court concluded
that "limiting language" in a notice of appeal is to be construed as
surplusage.5
The B & K Rentals decision clarifies for appeals purposes the
relationship between post-judgment motions and the finality of an
underlying judgment.' The court's opinion for all practical pur-
poses makes final judgments "interlocutory" rulings because judg-
ment motions deprive judgments of their finality.7 Finally, the
Court of Appeals' directive to liberally construe notices of appeal is
a victory for substance over form in Maryland's appellate
procedure.8
1. The Case.-In June 1984, B & K Rentals (B & K) leased
warehouse space owned and operated by Universal Leaf Tobacco
Co. (Universal) to store items B & K used in its business.' Fire de-
stroyed the warehouse and its contents in April 1985.'0 B & K al-
leged that Universal was negligent, and sued for damages."
The trial court denied Universal's motion for a directed ver-
1. 319 Md. 127, 571 A.2d 1213 (1990).
2. See id. at 130, 571 A.2d at 1215.
3. See id. at 131, 571 A.2d at 1215.
4. See id. at 132-33, 571 A.2d at 1216.
5. See id. at 138, 571 A.2d at 1218.
6. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
9. See B & K Rentals & Sales Co., Inc. v. Universal Leaf Co., 73 Md. App. 530, 531-
32, 535 A.2d 492, 493 (1988), aft'd, 319 Md. 127, 571 A.2d 1213 (1990). B & K Rentals
provides staging and seating for public gatherings. 73 Md. App. at 530-31, 535 A.2d at
492-93.
10. 73 Md. App. at 530-31, 535 A.2d at 492-93.
11. See id.
1041
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
dict.12 The jury returned a verdict for B & K, and awarded it
$123,252 in damages.'" Universal filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court granted on Janu-
ary 19, 1987.14 Within ten days of that judgment, on January 28,
1987, B & K filed a motion for reconsideration, and a motion for a
new trial. On February 17, 1987, the trial court denied both
motions. 5
B & K filed notice of appeal, which stated: "It is respectfully
requested that you enter an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals
on behalf of B & K Rentals & Sales Co., Inc., Plaintiff, from this
Court's Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for New Trial, entered in this action on February 17,
1987." 16
In the Court of Special Appeals, B & K argued that the trial
court's ruling on the motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict was erroneous, and it also claimed that the trial judge made
several errors during the trial. 17 The Court of Special Appeals de-
clined to review any of these issues, finding that B & K limited the
scope of its appeal by appealing from the February 17 order, and
not specifically appealing theJanuary 19judgment.' 8 The Court of
Special Appeals determined that B & K's appeal from the denial of
its motion to reconsider the judgment did not serve as an appeal
from the final judgment.' 9 Consequently, the court limited its re-
view to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the motions. The Court of Special Appeals concluded
12. B & K Rentals, 319 Md. at 128, 571 A.2d at 1214.
13. Id.
14. 73 Md. App. at 533, 535 A.2d at 494.
15. Id.
16. B & K Rentals, 319 Md. at 129, 571 A.2d at 1214.
17. See id.
18. See 73 Md. App. at 535, 535 A.2d at 495.
19. See id. The Court of Special Appeals stated that "when appellant filed its notice
of appeal on 18 March 1987, it could have appealed (1) the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, (2) the denial of the 'motion to reconsider,' or (3) the denial of the motion
for new trial, or all of the above." Id. The Court of Special Appeals turned to dictum
from Shipp v. Autoville Ltd., 23 Md. App. 555, 328 A.2d 349 (1974), cert. denied, 274 Md.
725 (1975), which stated that "if there are two or more appealable judgments in a cause,
an appellant designating one would be bound by the designation." Id at 560 n.4, 328
A.2d at 352 n.4. Applying the principle from Shipp to its view that two or more appeala-
ble judgments existed, the Court of Special Appeals found that B & K Rentals was
bound by its designation of the order denying the motions as the judgment appealed
from. See 73 Md. App. at 535, 535 A.2d at 495.
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that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and therefore
affirmed.2 °
The Court of Appeals granted B & K's petition for a writ of
certiorari to review a single issue:
Is the Court of Special Appeals precluded from consider-
ing the propriety of the underlying decision on the merits
solely because [the notice of appeal] designates, as the
judgment appealed from, the decision of the trial court
upon timely post-trial motions, where such judgment is the
final decision rendered by the trial court in the case... ?"
The Court of Appeals answered in the negative, and reversed.22
2. Legal Background.-
a. Effect of Post-Judgment Motions on the Finality of Judgments.-
Generally, a court that grants a party's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict enters a final appealable judgment.23
But subsequent motions for a new trial, to alter or amend a judg-
ment or court decision, or for the court to exercise its revisory
power, may deprive a previously "final" judgment of its finality.
Maryland rule 2-533 states that a party whose verdict has been set
aside on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may file
a motion for new trial within ten days after entry of that judgment. 24
Rule 2-534 provides that in an action decided by the court, a motion
to alter or amend a judgment may be filed within ten days of the
judgment, and may be joined with a motion for new trial.25
20. See id. at 538, 535 A.2d at 496.
21. 319 Md. at 130, 571 A.2d at 1215 (brackets and ellipses in original).
22. See id
23. To be final, a ruling must either determine and conclude the rights involved, or
deny the means of further prosecuting one's rights and interests in a proceeding.
Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989). To be considered
final and conclusive, the ruling must be unqualified and complete, except as to some-
thing that would be regarded as collateral to the proceeding. Id., 566 A.2d at 774. It
must leave nothing more to be done to effectuate the court's disposition of the matter.
Id., 566 A.2d at 773-74.
24. See MD. R. 2-533 (1991). It states, in pertinent part:
Any party may file a motion for new trial within ten days after entry of
judgment. A party whose verdict has been set aside on a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a party whose judgment has been amended on a
motion to amend the judgment may file a motion for new trial within ten days
after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict or the amended
judgment.
Id.
25. See MD. R. 2-534 (1991):
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Maryland rule 8-202(c) provides that when a motion is filed
pursuant to rules 2-533 or 2-534, notice of appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals must be filed within thirty days after denial or dis-
position of the motions.26 Based upon the principle in rule 8-
202(c), Maryland appellate courts have determined that "when a
motion to alter or amend an otherwise final judgment [or a motion
for a new trial] is filed within ten days after the judgment's entry, the
judgment loses its finality for the purposes of appeal." 7
In Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Commission,2 8 the circuit
court on January 22, 1985 issued an order that required the un-
named attorney to produce certain ledgers, agreements, and files.2 9
Ten days later, the Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC) filed a
motion that sought to impose further requirements on the attorney.
Before the circuit court ruled on the AGC's motion, the attorney
filed an order of appeal from the January 22 order. The AGC filed a
motion to dismiss the pending appeal on the ground that the Janu-
ary 22 order was interlocutory."0 The Court of Appeals ruled that
the January 22 order was final and appealable when the circuit court
entered it,3 but the order was rendered nonfinal and nonappeala-
ble by AGC's timely filing of its motion to amend.3 2
The Court of Appeals reiterated this principle less than one
In an action decided by the court, on motion of any party filed within ten
days after entry ofjudgment, the court may open the judgment to receive addi-
tional evidence, may amend its findings or its statement of reasons for the deci-
sion, may set forth additional findings or reasons, may enter new findings or
new reasons, may amend the judgment, or may enter a new judgment. A mo-
tion to alter or amend a judgment may be joined with a motion for a new trial.
Id.
26. See MD. R. 8-202(c) (1991). Rule 8-202 governs the time of filing notices of ap-
peal to the Court of Special Appeals only. It provides:
In a civil action, when a timely motion is filed pursuant to Rule 2-532, 2-
533, or 2-534, the notice of entry shall be filed within 30 days after entry of (1)
a notice of withdrawing the motion or (2) an order denying a motion pursuant
to Rule 2-533 or disposing of a motion pursuant to Rule 2-532 or 2-534. A
notice of appeal filed before the withdrawal or disposition of any of these mo-
tions does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to dispose of the motion.
Id.
27. Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n, 303 Md. 473, 486, 494 A.2d
940, 946 (1985); see Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md. 219, 241 n.19, 503 A.2d 239, 250
n.19 (1986); Sieck v. Sieck, 66 Md. App. 37, 42-44, 502 A.2d 528, 531-32 (1986).
28. 303 Md. 473, 494 A.2d 940 (1985).
29. See id. at 479, 494 A.2d at 943.
30. See id. The Court of Special Appeals denied the motion to dismiss, and certified
the case to the Court of Appeals.
31. See id. at 484, 494 A.2d at 945.
32. See id. at 484-86, 494 A.2d at 945-46.
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year later in Yarema v. Exxon Corp. "' In Yarema, the parties disputed
which of two judgments constituted the final judgment in the case:
the original judgment, entered on December 16, 1983, or the re-
vised judgment, entered twenty-eight days later, on January 13,
1984.14 The court stated that "even if the December 16, 1983 judg-
ment was final and appealable when entered, the revision of such
judgment on January 13, 1984 deprived the earlier action of its fi-
nality." 35 The court added in a footnote that if the motion to revise
the judgment had been filed within ten days of the judgment, the
motion itself would have deprived the judgment of its finality for
appeals purposes. 36 The rulings in Unnamed Attorney and Yarema
demonstrate a consistent interpretation of the relationship between
Maryland Rule 8-202(c) and certain post-judgment motions even
prior to B & K Rentals.
b. Appeal From Final Judgments: Appellate Review of Earlier Orders
in a Case.-Maryland Rule 8-131 (d) governs review of interlocutory
orders on an appeal from a final judgment.3 7 On such an appeal,
rule 8-131 (d) has been applied to allow appellate review of interloc-
utory orders such as denial of a jury trial,3" lack of jurisdiction to
determine an issue,39 and suppression of evidence.4"
c. Effect of Limiting Language in a Notice of Appeal.-Rules 8-2014t
and 8-20242 set forth the procedure for securing Court of Special
Appeals review by filing a timely notice of appeal. Neither rule re-
quires that a notice of appeal specify the judgment or order ap-
pealed from, or the party appealing, 43 and the most recent case law
33. 305 Md. 219, 503 A.2d 239 (1986).
34. See id. at 240, 503 A.2d at 250.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 241 n.19, 503 A.2d at 250 n.19.
37. See MD. R. 8-131(d). The rule provides that: "On an appeal from a final judg-
ment, an interlocutory order previously entered in the action is open to review by the
Court, unless an appeal has previously been taken from that order and decided on the
merits by the Court." Id.
38. See Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 481 A.2d 186 (1984).
39. See Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 428 A.2d 454 (1981).
40. See State v. Ensor, 27 Md. 670, 342 A.2d 1 (1975).
41. MD. R. 8-201 (1991). The rule states that: "Except as provided in Rule 8-204,
the only method of securing review by the Court of Special Appeals is by the filing of a
notice of appeal within the time prescribed in Rule 8-202." Id.
42. MD. R. 8-202(a). "Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by law, the notice
of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which
the appeal is taken." Id.
43. Compare FED. R. App. P. 3(c), which provides in pertinent part: "The notices of
appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment,
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supports liberal construction of this language.44
In Newman v. Reilly,45 the Court of Appeals noted that the Mary-
land Rules of Procedure do not require that a notice of appeal iden-
tify the party making the appeal, or the judgment appealed from.46
There, the court rejected the Court of Special Appeals' limitation on
the scope of the appeal when it was based solely on language gratui-
tously included in the notice of appeal.47
In Institutional Management Corp. v. Cutler Computer Concepts, Inc. ,48
the Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Special Appeals'
refusal to give liberal construction to language of appeal. Institu-
tional Management filed a timely appeal. 49 The language of the ap-
peal, however, referred to the judgment nisi, entered by the trial
court on December 3, 1980,50 rather than to the final judgment.
The Court of Appeals found, however, that "an order for appeal
timely filed subsequent to the entry of final judgment was an appeal
from a final judgment, irrespective of the text of the order for
appeal."'"
Similarly, in MPTH Associates v. State Department of Assessments and
Taxation,5" the Court of Appeals reiterated its reluctance to restrict
appellate review to the order of appeal's language. MPTH filed an
appeal from the trial court's "order" following a judgment on the
merits and denial of a timely-filed motion to reconsider. The De-
partment of Assessments asked the Court of Appeals to interpret
"order" as limiting the appeal to the order denying MPTH's motion
for reconsideration. The court disposed of this issue in a footnote,
order or part thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is
taken." Id.
44. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. But see also infra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
45. 314 Md. 364, 550 A.2d 959 (1988).
46. See id. at 383, 550 A.2d at 968.
47. See id., 550 A.2d at 968-69. The court added that if the plaintiff's attorney simply
had signed "a paper reading 'Please note an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals' and
the paper was filed within thirty days of the entry of the judgments] the legal effect
would have been to bring up for review all earlier appealable judgments in the case."
Id., 550 A.2d at 969.
48. 294 Md. 626, 451 A.2d 1224 (1982).
49. Id. at 628, 451 A.2d at 1225. Final judgment was entered on December 9, 1980;
the appeal was filed January 8, 1981. Id.
50. At that time, Maryland Rule 564(b)(1) provided that in a court trial, the court
should direct a judgment nisi, which the clerk would enter as a final judgment unless the
opposing party filed a motion for a new trial within three days. See id. at 629 n. 1, 451
A.2d at 1226 n.l.
51. Id. at 631, 451 A.2d at 1226.
52. 302 Md. 319, 487 A.2d 1184 (1985).
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saying "[w]e refuse to torture the language of the notice to produce
the effect which the County requests. 53
The clearest precedent opposing liberal construction was a less
recent case, Carter v. State.54 In Carter, the defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal, which stated that the appeal was "on the constitu-
tional question relating to Speedy Trials.""5 Carter did not raise the
speedy trial issue in his brief, however, and instead argued other
matters.56 The Court of Appeals found that his notice of appeal was
limited to the speedy trial issue.57 The court concluded that Carter
waived his right to appeal the sole reviewable issue because he failed
to brief it.5"
3. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals' opinion in B & K Rentals
made three main points. The court first determined that the case
did not present two or more appealable judgments.5 9 It held that
the order in B & K's notice of appeal "became the only final appeal-
able order in the case."'6 Second, the Court of Appeals stated that
B & K's appeal from the February 17 final judgment subjected the
January 19 "judgment" to review on appeal.6 The court noted that
it is "long established" that an appeal from a final judgment ordina-
rily brings up for review all earlier orders in the case.6 2 Finally, the
Court of Appeals stated that it will treat as surplusage language that
limits the scope of a timely notice of appeal, and that the issues on
appeal should be framed in the briefs, information report, and pre-
hearing conference. 6
a. Clarification of Appealable Judgments.-The B & K Rentals deci-
sion reiterated that "when a motion to alter or amend an otherwise
53. Id. at 328 n.6, 487 A.2d at 1189 n.6. Still, the court's decision clearly implied
that if the notice of appeal contained words limiting it to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, appellate review might have been limited to that order, and the ques-
tion of the circuit court's possible abuse of discretion. See id. In any event, the court's
analysis is far removed from Newman and the idea that one need only file a timely notice
of appeal stating, "Please note an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals" to bring up all
appealable judgments in a case. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54. 286 Md. 649, 408 A.2d 1335 (1979).
55. Id. at 651, 408 A.2d at 1336.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id., 408 A.2d at 1337. The court remanded the case to the Court of Special
Appeals with instructions to dismiss the appeal. See id. at 652, 408 A.2d at 1337.
59. See B & K Rentals, 319 Md. at 130, 571 A.2d at 1215.
60. Id. at 131, 571 A.2d at 1215.
61. See id. at 132, 571 A.2d at 1216.
62. See id. at 132-33, 571 A.2d at 1216.
63. See id. at 138, 571 A.2d at 1218.
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final judgment [or a motion for new trial] is filed within ten days
after the judgment's entry, the judgment loses its finality for the
purposes of appeal."' Thus in B & K Rentals the order denying the
post-judgment motions was the only final appealable judgment in
the case. 65
Strong precedent holds that post-judgment motions timely filed
under rules 2-533, 2-534, or 2-535 will render the underlying judg-
ment nonfinal and nonappealable.66 In such a situation, an appeal
filed before disposition of the motion is ineffective, and a new notice
of appeal will be necessary following disposition.67 The Court of
Appeals' ruling in B & K Rentals is significant because it reiterates
that immediately upon a motion filed pursuant to rules 2-533, 2-
534, or 2-535, the underlying judgment is no longer final nor
appealable.
b. Appellate Review of Earlier Orders in a Case.-The B & K Rentals
court premised part of its holding on the "long established principle
of appellate procedure now embodied in Rule 8-131(d), that an ap-
peal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for review all earlier
orders in the case."6" Through the language "all earlier orders," the
court avoided labeling as interlocutory the underlying judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. But because rule 8-131(d) is con-
cerned exclusively with interlocutory orders,69 that label is inescap-
ably implied.
The judgment notwithstanding the verdict, deprived of its final-
ity by B & K's motions, is not interlocutory in the traditional sense.
The court supported its application of rule 8-131 (d) by citing a vari-
ety of cases in which interlocutory orders were reviewed on an ap-
peal from a final judgment.7" None of the cases cited, however,
presents a situation in which an otherwise final judgment became
interlocutory upon the subsequent filing of motions for the court to
exercise its revisory power.
Thus, B & K Rentals stands in part for the proposition that an
underlying judgment deprived of its finality by the filing of motions
will become an interlocutory order for appeals purposes. As an in-
64. See id. at 132, 571 A.2d at 1216 (quoting Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Griev-
ance Comm'n, 303 Md. 473, 486, 494 A.2d 940, 946 (1985)).
65. See id.
66. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
67. See Unnamed Attorney, 303 Md. at 486, 494 A.2d at 946.
68. 319 Md. at 132-33, 571 A.2d at 1216 (emphasis added).
69. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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terlocutory order, the underlying judgment will be reviewable on an
appeal from a final judgment under rule 8-131 (d).
Arguably, the Court of Appeals could have concluded its deci-
sion in B & K Rentals at this point. After it held that the judgment
from which B & K appealed was the only final appealable judgment,
and that under 8-131 (d) the underlying judgment was open to ap-
pellate review, the court had fully addressed the question before
it.7 The court continued, however, making a significant statement
on the law concerning limiting language in a notice of appeal.
c. Liberal Construction of Notices of Appeal.-In the final part of its
decision, the Court of Appeals made it clear that Maryland courts
must liberally construe notices of appeal. Language that might limit
the issues on appeal must be treated as "surplusage" under the
overarching principle that the definition of issues is a "function of
the briefs, information report, and prehearing conference," and not
the notice of appeal.72
Maryland case law, as well as a decision of the United States
Supreme Court,73 supports the court's conclusion. Maryland deci-
sions such as Newman and Institutional Management strongly support
the court's liberal construction of notices of appeal. 4 Maryland
cases note the absence of any procedural requirement that a notice
of appeal set forth the judgment appealed from, or even identify the
71. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
72. See B & K Rentals, 319 Md. at 133-34, 571 A.2d at 1216.
73. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). In Foman, the First Circuit reasoned
that since Foman's notice of appeal failed to specify that her appeal was taken from the
underlying judgment as well as an order denying post-judgment motions, the court's
appellate review was limited to the question of the district court's abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the motions. See Foman v. Davis, 292 F.2d 85, 87 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd,
371 U.S. 178 (1962).
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the defect in the second notice did not
mislead or prejudice the respondent, and that "the Court of Appeals should have
treated the appeal froi the denial of the motions as an effective, although inept, at-
tempt" to appeal from the underlying judgment as well. 371 U.S. at 181.
The Foman Court then instructed:
It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere techni-
calities. "The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill
in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits."
Id. at 181-82 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).
74. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
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party appealing.7 5 Given the rules' inherent flexibility, Maryland
courts have been properly hesitant to limit a party's appeal based on
language "gratuitously included in the body of the order."76 After
B & K Rentals, this principle is even more firmly established.
In fact, the Court of Appeals specifically overruled Carter v. State
"and other decisions to the same effect,"7 7 which were "out of step"
with the court's formulation.7" Limiting language in a notice of ap-
peal is to be treated as surplusage and will not defeat an appeal in
Maryland.
4. Conclusion .- The B & K Rentals decision will prove valuable
to Maryland courts and practitioners. The decision nicely clarifies
the effect of post-judgment motions on both the finality of judg-
ments, and the issues reviewable by appellate courts. More signifi-
cantly, however, B & K Rentals states unequivocally that notices of
appeal shall be construed liberally so as not to limit the issues on
appeal. With this statement, Maryland continues the trend toward
substance over form, and away from the days when a single misstep
in pleading was fatal to a proper decision on the merits.
BRUCE T. CARTON
75. E.g., Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 383, 550 A.2d 959, 968 (1988); Williams v.
Dawidowicz, 209 Md. 77, 82, 120 A.2d 399, 401-02 (1956).
76. Newman, 314 Md. at 383, 550 A.2d at 969.
77. 319 Md. at 138, 571 A.2d at 1218.
78. See id. at 137, 571 A.2d at 1218.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
A. Maryland's Single-Subject Rule
In Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State,' the Court of Appeals addressed
the constitutionality of an act establishing ethical standards for
Prince George's County council members in zoning matters, and ex-
tending the county's authority to impose energy and transfer taxes.2
The court revived a rarely used provision of the Maryland Constitu-
tion to strike down the ethics portion of the act.3 The court held
that the act violated the state constitution's single-subject rule,4 but
it found that the ethics provisions were severable.5 Consequently,
the county's taxing authority as granted by the act was allowed to
stand.6
The court's reliance on this often invoked7 but seldom used
doctrine' has several practical implications. The Porten Sullivan deci-
sion will force the legislature to approach cautiously any attempt to
attach unpopular riders to strongly supported bills.9 The decision
will also remind the General Assembly when drafting new laws to be
more explicit with regard both to their substantive content and to
their titles.' 0
The court's striking down as unconstitutional the ethics portion
of the law by invoking the single-subject doctrine is not as serious as
invalidating the entire statute." The bill's ethics portion may be re-
1. 318 Md. 387, 568 A.2d 1111 (1990).
2. See Act of May 5, 1989, ch. 244, 1989 Md. Laws 2241; 318 Md. at 389, 568 A.2d
at 1112.
3. See 318 Md. at 389, 568 A.2d at 1112.
4. See id. at 409, 568 A.2d at 1121-22; MD. CoNsT. art. III, § 29. The constitution
states in relevant part: "every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but
one subject, and that shall be described in its title[.]" Id.
5. See 318 Md. at 410-11, 568 A.2d at 1122.
6. See id. at 411, 568 A.2d at 1122; see infra note 109.
7. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
8. See Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 402, 568 A.2d at 1118. Prior to this case, the Court
of Appeals used the provision to invalidate statutes only twice, in 1891 and 1911. See
Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 21 A. 56 (1891); Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386, 80 A.
1066 (1911); see also Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, " 42 MINN. L.
REV. 389, 447 (1958) ("[Iln only a handful of cases have the courts held an act to em-
brace more than one subject" (footnote omitted)).
9. See infra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
10. See State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 96, 16 A. 445, 446 (1889) ("Many Acts are passed,
and often of great importance, the titles of which are exceedingly deficient in definite
and clear description of the subject-matter of the Act.")
11. The Porten Sullivan Corporation's original complaint alleged that the bill vio-
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enacted under a separate act. Should this occur, the courts may
again encounter the act, this time facing a constitutional challenge
on the merits. ' 2
1. The Case.-Chapter 244 of the 1989 Maryland Laws' 3 began
as an emergency measure designed to sustain Prince George's
County's taxing authority by passing House Bill 889, to renew an
energy tax,' 4 and House Bill 890, to renew a transfer tax,' 5 that
were both scheduled to expire in the summer of 1989.16 The House
of Delegates passed the bills on March 6, 1989, with only one mem-
ber opposing.' Near the end of March, after the House of Dele-
gates passed a third bill involving Prince George's County, the
controversy first began that led to addition of the lengthy ethics
provisions. s
An attorney in the county sought the disqualification of five
Prince George's County Council members after his neighborhood
was rezoned.' 9 He argued that these five council members received
"political contributions from the zoning applicant's attorneys and
other agents."' 2°  Concerned about these allegations, Prince
George's County senators met with the attorney to discuss his pro-
posed solutions to conflicts arising when council members received
money from present or potential zoning applicants. Subsequent to
lated several constitutional provisions; however, the court did not reach these issues. See
Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1115; see also infra note 31 and accompanying
text.
12. Re-enactment does not appear likely. Although the Prince George's County del-
egation introduced in the 1990 legislation two bills similar in nature to the ethics provi-
sion, see Md. H.B. 975, 1990 Sess.; Md. S.B. 832, 1990 Sess., neither passed. No similar
bills were introduced in the 1991 session.
13. Act of May 5, 1989, ch. 244, 1989 Md. Laws 2241.
14. Md. H.B. 889, 1989 Sess. House Bill 889 concerned an energy tax, which if not
extended would have resulted in a $25 million loss to the county in the next fiscal year
(1990). See id.; Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 393, 568 A.2d at 1114.
15. Md. H.B. 890, 1989 Sess. House Bill 890 extended an act already once pro-
longed, which provided a 0.5% increase in transfer taxes imposed on all county real
property transactions. See id. For fiscal year 1990 alone, estimated revenues generated
by continuing the increased tax totalled $13.4 million. See 318 Md. at 393, 568 A.2d at
1114. The two taxes would generate funds to be directed to education and public safety,
"those two budgetary areas making up about 70 percent of the county budget." Id.
16. See 318 Md. at 393, 568 A.2d at 1113-14.
17. See id. at 393-94, 568 A.2d at 1114.
18. The third bill, House Bill 891, authorized the county to levy impact fees on new
developers to help finance construction of needed public facilities. See H.B. 891, 1989
Sess. This bill did not succeed, nor was it consolidated with the other bills into Chapter
244. See 318 Md. at 394-95, 568 A.2d at 1114.
19. See Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 394, 568 A.2d at 1114.
20. Brief of Appellants at 8, Porten Sullivan (No. 89-93) (footnote omitted).
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this meeting, the county delegation combined the attorney's pro-
posed ethics provisions with the energy and transfer tax bills, result-
ing in a completely revised single bill, House Bill 890.21 The Senate
passed the bill in its final form on April 6, 1989, and the House
passed it four days later, on the regular session's final day.2"
The ethics provision, applicable only to Prince George's
County, governed zoning applications to the county council.2 3 It
provided that any applicant for a zoning exception or variance
24
must file with the application an affidavit disclosing campaign con-
tributions 25 the applicant made to any Prince George's County
Council member within the three preceding years. An applicant
failing to disclose this information would be guilty of a misde-
meanor, and subject to a $1000 fine, a one year prison term, or
both.26 The provision also imposed a corresponding duty upon
county council members to disclose any contributions they received
from the applicant within the three years preceding the zoning ap-
plication. Any council member receiving such a contribution would
be disqualified from participating in voting on that application.27
Porten Sullivan Corporation (Porten Sullivan) opposed the bill
because of the corporation's extensive involvement in the county.
Porten Sullivan was a self-described "Maryland corporation en-
gaged in the building and development of award-winning residential
properties and communities," and carried on over a quarter of its
business in Prince George's County. 28 As a result, the corporation
frequently filed zoning applications in the county.2 9 Porten Sullivan
was also a "politically active" corporation, and made contributions
totalling $625 to four members of the County Council over the
course of approximately three years.3 0
Porten Sullivan initiated a suit against the State of Maryland,
Prince George's County, and other parties involved in county zon-
ing, raising numerous constitutional challenges against the bill.3 '
21. See 319 Md. at 394-95, 568 A.2d at 1114; Md. H.B. 890, 1989 Sess. (emergency
bill).
22. See 319 Md. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1114-15.
23. See Act of May 5, 1989, ch. 244, 1989 Md. Laws 2241.
24. The term "applicant" potentially includes the applicant's spouse or child, and
any business organization in which the applicant holds an interest. See id.
25. Contributions include money, goods, and services. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Brief of Appellants at 4, Porten Sullivan (No. 89-93) (footnote omitted).
29. See 318 Md. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1115.
30. See Brief of Appellants at 5, Porten Sullivan, (No. 89-93).
31. See 318 Md. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1115. With regard to the United States Constitu-
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The trial court dismissed the suit on the defendants' summary judg-
ment motion. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari before the
Court of Special Appeals considered the case, and reversed the trial
court's judgment, basing its holding solely on the Maryland Consti-
tution's single-subject rule.3 2
2. Legal Background.-Forty-one state constitutions bar legisla-
tive enactment of bills concerning more than one subject.33 A ma-
jority of the states have general single-subject provisions, though
some exempt particular types of bills.3 4
tion, Porten Sullivan alleged that the ethics legislation abridged the rights of free speech
and association, see Brief of Appellants at 15, Porten Sullivan (No. 89-93); that the act was
overly broad and vague, see id. at 20; and that it created "legislative classifications that
unconstitutionally den[ied] appellants' equal protection of the laws," id. at 35.
With regard to Maryland law, Porten Sullivan alleged that the legislation violated
Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, which creates home rule powers, and which
the appellants contended gives power to devise legislation such as the ethics provision
to the counties, and not the General Assembly. See id. at 37. They also argued that the
legislation violated the single-subject rule, and the separation of powers doctrine under
Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See id. at 42, 46. Porten Sullivan con-
tended that granting power to the circuit court "to determine whether to void the illegal
zoning action 'if the court deems voiding the action to be in the best interest of the
public,'" vested improper power in the courts and allowed them to encroach on the
legislative role of determining the public's best interests. Id. at 46.
It is interesting to note that Porten Sullivan devoted most of its brief to attacking
the ethics legislation on federal constitutional grounds; its attack on the single-subject
issue constituted a very small portion of its argument. See id. at 44-46.
32. See Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 396, 568 A.2d at 1115.
33. See ALA. CONsT. art. IV, § 45; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV,
pt. 2, § 13; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9; CoLo. CONsT. art. V, § 21; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 16;
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6; GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, par. 3; HAw. CONST. art. III, § 14;
IDAHO CONST. art III, § 16; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8; IND. CONsT. art. IV, § 19; IowA
CONST. art. III, § 29; KAN. CONST. art II, § 16; Ky. CONST. § 51; LA. CONST. art. III, § 15;
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 24; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 17; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 23; MONT.
CONST. art. V, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14; NEv. CONST. art. IV, § 17; N.J. CONST. art.
IV, § 7, par. 4; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 15; N.D. CONST. art. IV,
§ 33; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 15; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 57; OR. CONsT. art. IV, § 20; PA.
CONST. art. III, § 3; S.C. CONST. art III, § 17; S.D. CONsT. art. III, § 21; TENN. CONST.
art. II, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 22; VA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 12; WASH. CONST. art II, § 19; W.VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30; WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 18;
WYo. CONST. art. III, § 24. States without a single-subject provision are Arkansas, Con-
necticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Is-
land, and Vermont.
See also N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.01 (4th ed. 1985).
Although the United States Constitution contains no such provision, similar restrictions
exist in Congress' procedural rules. See, e.g., Rules of the House of Representatives of
the United States, 101st Cong., Rule XVI(7) ("[N]o motion or proposition on a subject
different from that under consideration shall be admitted under color of amendment.").
For a more thorough discussion, see Bach, Germaneness Rules and Bicameral Relations in the
U.S. Congress, 7 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 341 (1982).
34. A common example of such an exemption is general appropriations bills, which
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a. Purpose.-Prohibiting multi-subject bills prevents legislative
"log-rolling": the alliance of several minority interest groups to cre-
ate a bill that embraces their collective objectives, thus resulting in a
majority vote that would have been uncertain if the proposals each
had been represented in separate bills."5 The prohibition also pre-
vents the related practice of attaching riders to highly popular bills,
thereby forcing adoption of the undesirable portion so that the orig-
inal bill's vitality may be sustained.36 Furthermore, restricting bills
to a single subject protects the governor's veto powers, because the
veto generally extends only to whole bills.37 The single-subject rule
may serve other purposes, such as keeping the public aware of the
content of bills being enacted into law and "facilitat[ing] an orderly
and rational legislative process."' s
Also important, although only mentioned briefly in the Porten
Sullivan opinion, is the requirement in most constitutional provi-
sions that a bill's subject be expressed in its title.3 9 The title provi-
sion is usually treated as a doctrine separate from the single-subject
often are exempted from the one-subject provision and then specifically restricted with
particular provisions in the state constitution. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 45 (except-
ing general appropriation bills and general revenue bills); OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 57
(excepting general appropriation and revenue bills). The reasoning for creating a spe-
cific constitutional provision with respect to such bills is that "the general appropria-
tions bill presents a special temptation for the attachment of riders. It is a necessary and
often popular bill which is certain of passage." Ruud, supra note 8, at 413.
Exceptions such as this often are not true exemptions of a particular type of bill
from the one-subject rule, but rather are explicit declarations within the constitutional
provision that the exempted subject is itself one subject. See id. at 444-46. For example,
an Alabama court interpreted the exception of general revenue bills from the one-sub-
ject requirement as a declaration that a general revenue bill concerns a single subject,
despite the possible inference that it embraces a number of subjects. See Harris v. State
ex rel Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 104, 151 So. 858, 861 (1934).
35. Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 399, 568 A.2d at 1116; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184,
193 (1859); see also Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Alaska 1974) (describing "the
primary aim of 'one-subject' provisions in state constitutions [as] restraint of log-rolling
in the legislative process"); Ruud, supra note 8, at 391 (explaining the method of log-
rolling by minority groups).
36. See 318 Md. at 399, 568 A.2d at 1116; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 (1854). The
Court of Appeals faulted the bill for violating this principle. The court explained that
"the delegates from Prince George's County were put in precisely the position from
which the one-subject clause was intended to protect them: the necessity 'for a legislator
to acquiesce in [a possibly] undesirable bill in order to secure useful and necessary legis-
lation.' " Id. at 409, 568 A.2d at 1121 (citation omitted).
37. See R. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure. Legislative Compli-
ance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 797, 809 (1987).
38. Ruud, supra note 8, at 451.
39. 318 Md. at 402, 407, 568 A.2d at 1118, 1120-21. Of the state constitutions con-
taining single-subject provisions, see supra note 33, all but those of Illinois and Indiana
also impose the title requirement in the same section.
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rule.4" This requirement ensures that the legislature and the public
are aware of all subjects included in the legislation.4
b. Judicial Enforcement.-Although single-subject provisions
serve important purposes, judicial enforcement of these provisions
has been relatively rare.42 The principle that legislative acts enjoy a
presumption of validity has inhibited exercise of the single-subject
rule; a statute generally will be struck down only if it manifestly con-
travenes the rule's purpose. 43 Furthermore, courts are reluctant to
intrude upon the legislative domain; they do not wish to belittle or
embarrass the legislature by implying that it has passed a bill
through questionable means of log-rolling, or by using subversive
techniques to sneak a rider through passage.44
The cornerstone of judicial interpretation of the single-subject
rule in Maryland is the case of Davis v. State,45 which laid down the
principles upon which the rule was based. The Davis court was
asked to strike down an act titled "An act to regulate inspections in
the city of Baltimore,''46 on the ground that the act altered specific
provisions of an earlier statute concerning inspection of tree bark
intended for export. 47 The appellant argued that the new act could
not change the old law without a specific repealer.4' He also argued
that the new act's modifications were not expressly stated in its title,
nor were they aligned with the bill's general subject. 49 Ruling for
the State, the court echoed the single-subject law's objectives: to
prevent the attachment of riders to strongly supported bills in order
to secure passage of less popular provisions; to protect the people
from being hurt by such a practice; and to protect the legislators
40. See, e.g., Harbor v. Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 1096, 742 P.2d 1290, 1300, 240
Cal. Rptr. 569, 579 (1987) (in California, the one-subject requirement and the title re-
quirement are "independent provisions which serve separate purposes"). But see Ruud,
supra note 8, at 391-92 (even though the two doctrines have independent historical rea-
sons for their existence, and were intended to serve different functions, they often are
treated together when speaking of their purposes).
41. See Ruud, supra note 8, at 391-92. The title requirement's origins suggest that it
is more specifically aimed at "prevent[ing] legislation by stealth," whereas the one-sub-
ject provision serves the more general purposes enumerated above. See id.
42. See supra note 8.
43. See, e.g., County Comm'rs v. Meekins, 50 Md. 28, 40 (1878) ("an Act will not be
held to be unconstitutional, unless it is in such plain conflict with some provision of the
Constitution as to leave no discretion to the Court in the premises.").
44. See Ruud, supra note 8, at 393-94.
45. 7 Md. 151 (1854).
46. Act of May 10, 1854, ch. 200, 1854 Md. Laws 254; see 7 Md. at 152.
47. See 7 Md. at 152.
48. See id. at 154.
49. See id. at 159-60.
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from being tricked into supporting bills of whose content they may
have been unaware.5" The court often has repeated these purposes
in subsequent opinions, but it has infrequently applied the single-
subject rule to strike down a legislative act."'
c. Tests.-To overcome the standard presumption of legisla-
tive validity, the courts may apply several tests to define the neces-
sary limitations of a bill conforming with the one-subject rule. The
word "subject" may be construed several ways, and courts in vari-
ous jurisdictions have embraced different tests to determine subject
matter germaneness. For example, in Indiana, a bill may be struck
down only when the bill embraces "two or more subjects, having no
legal connection with each other."' 52 Most tests are similarly ambig-
uous, such as the Minnesota requirement that the subjects at issue
have "a logical or natural connection."5 " When such an act is at
issue, the strong presumption favoring the legislature results in tests
that are liberal and open ended.54
50. See id. at 160; see also Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667, 671, 73 A.
710, 712 (1909) (striking down an act on the basis of the title provision, and explaining
that one of the one-subject rule's purposes was fairly to advise "the Legislature and the
people . . . of the real nature of pending legislation." (quoting State v. Norris, 70 Md.
91, 95-96, 16 A. 445, 446 (1889))).
51. See Everstine, Titles of Legislative Acts, 9 MD. L. REV. 197, 216 (1948). A recent
court opinion illustrating this cursory treatment of the single-subject provision is Whit-
ing-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 499 A.2d 178 (1985), in which
the court's twenty page opinion gave a scant one page summary of Article 3, section 29's
history. See id. at 361, 499 A.2d at 189. Application of the one-subject provision to the
facts of the case consisted of one sentence: "The bill is germane to the single subject of
time bars against claims arising out of Injury [sic]." Id., 499 A.2d at 190; see infra note
57.
52. Grubbs v. State, 24 Ind. 295, 297 (1865).
53. Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577, 50 N.W. 923, 924 (1891).
54. TheJohnson court explained that:
To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar
and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having
any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. All that is necessary
[for the act to comply with the single-subject provision] is that the act should
embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all mat-
ters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with
or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be
parts of, or germane to, one general subject.
Id. (emphasis added).
Occasionally courts find that an act violates the one-subject rule when, to a layper-
son, it seems to address just one subject. In Moore v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 32
La. Ann. 1013 (1880), the Louisiana court struck down an act that "prescrib[ed] the
manner of changing parish lines and of removing parish seats." Id. at 1014 (emphasis
added). The court held that changing parish lines was a subject distinct from that of
moving parish seats because the Louisiana Constitution referred to "all laws changing
parish lines or removing parish seats .... " Id. at 1015. The court held the statute void
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Addressing the act in question, the Davis court characterized
the test as "relat[ing] to inspections, and to such other matters only
as are inseparably connected with it, and to none other . ...
Considering the possibility of a stricter standard, the court contin-
ued, "[i]t could hardly be successfully urged against a law, that it
does not embrace and dispose of the whole subject to which it relates.
If it could be, few laws, if any, could stand such a test."'5 6 In a later
case, the court adopted as an additional means of interpretation the
test of germaneness; this test is met if "several. sections of the law
refer to and are germane to the same subject-matter. 57
These tests, like those used in other jurisdictions, indicate the
courts' strong reluctance to strike down a legislative act.58 Courts
are predisposed "to uphold rather than defeat the enactment wher-
ever possible." 59 After giving the legislature this leeway, a court will
only strike down a statute if it is "plainly repugnant to the
Constitution. "60
d. Application in Maryland Case Law.-Before the Porten Sullivan
decision, Maryland courts used the one-subject rule to strike down
only two acts.6 ' In Sharf v. Tasker,62 the first of these cases, the
even though the two subjects had a "logical and natural connection," even without the
benefit of a liberal construction. See id. at 1017.
55. 7 Md. at 160; see also County Comm'rs v. Meekins, 50 Md. 28, 41 (1878) ("to
render a law obnoxious to [the single-subject rule], there must be engrafted upon a law
of a general nature, some subject of a private or local character, or that two or more
dissimilar and discordant subjects must be legislated upon the same law." (emphasis in
original)).
56. Davis, 7 Md. at 160 (emphasis in original).
57. Mayor of Baltimore v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574, 579 (1879) (emphasis in original); see
also Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 361, 499 A.2d 178, 190
(1985) (an act concerning both a statute of limitations and a bar on certain unrelated
causes of action after a certain number of years "is germane to the single subject of time
bars against claims arising out of Injury [sic]," even though the former was a conven-
tional statute of limitations and the latter bar was a grant of immunity).
58. See, e.g., Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 383, 21 A. 56, 57 (1891) ("A liberal con-
struction has always been placed upon [the single subject provision], so as to uphold,
rather than strike down, enactments passed by the General Assembly.").
59. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607,
614, 150 A.2d 421, 426 (1959).
60. Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 187 Md. 67, 79, 48
A.2d 593, 599 (1946).
61. See supra note 8. The Porten Sullivan court mentioned a third case, Ellicott
Machine Co. v. Speed, 72 Md. 22, 18 A. 863 (1889), in which the court ruled that corpo-
rations were not subject to the employee wage payment provisions of an act governing
insolvent employers. See id. at 24, 18 A. at 863-64. In dictum, the Ellicott court noted
that if corporations had been subjected to the statute, it would then have "add[ed] a new
feature to the insolvent laws, and ... then the Act would embrace more than one sub-
ject, and be in direct conflict with the Constitution[.]" Id. at 25, 18 A. at 864.
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Court of Appeals held that an act concerning assessment, taxation,
and sale of unclaimed military land lots63 contained a "repeal by
mere implication"'  of a previous act. The court struck down the
act, reasoning that a "proposed or attempted repeal is in no sense
germane to the subject-matter disclosed or described in the title." 65
The court also found that a provision remitting certain sums col-
lected under the act's authority had "nothing at all to do with the
object and purpose of the statute." ' Although the court based its
decision on both the one-subject requirement and the title require-
ment, the line between the two was indistinct.6 7 It appears, how-
ever, that the decision could have been made wholly on the basis of
the one-subject rule.68
In the second case employing the one-subject rule to strike
down a statute, Curtis v. Mactier,6 9 the Court of Appeals interpreted
an act "to incorporate the Village of Chevy Chase, in Montgomery
County, Maryland." 70 The act contained a section that gave to the
Montgomery County Commissioners certain taxing powers.7 The
court held that this section "contain[ed] provisions which . . . have
never been embraced in any municipal charter in this State, and
which are.., not germane to the object and purposes of an ordinary
municipal charter.""2 The infrequent use of Maryland's one-subject
provision prior to Porten Sullivan illustrates the courts' strong ten-
dency to construe statutes as liberally as possible, and to grant the
legislation a strong presumption of validity.7"
An examination of Maryland statutes that have withstood con-
stitutional attack helps explain the distinctions courts draw. In Par-
62. 73 Md. 378, 21 A. 56 (1891).
63. See Act of March 10, 1874, ch. 66, 1874 Md. Laws 66.
64. 73 Md. at 384, 21 A. at 57.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 385, 21 A. at 57.
67. See supra note 40.
68. See 73 Md. at 384, 21 A. at 57.
69. 115 Md. 386, 80 A. 1066 (1911).
70. Act of April 8, 1910, ch. 382, 1910 Md. Laws 983.
71. See id. § k.
72. 115 Md. at 393, 80 A. 1066, 1068. The court quoted at length the trial court's
opinion, which said,
The statement of [the act's] purpose as being merely to 'incorporate the village
of Chevy Chase', can not by any construction be held sufficient to include legis-
lation which contemplates action by entirely separate agencies, and which
might have been effectually enacted without the incorporation of the
municipality.
Id. at 393-94, 80 A. at 1069.
73. See Everstine, supra note 51, at 216-18.
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kinson v. State,74 the Court of Appeals examined whether an act that
by its title prohibited liquor sales but also in its text prohibited the
giving of liquor, embraced more than one subject.7 5 The court up-
held the act against both one-subject and title challenges, and ex-
plained the principle underlying the constitutional provision:
Whilst it is certainly proper that this provision should
be so construed as to prevent a repetition of the evils which
it was designed to prohibit, it is no less proper to avoid the
opposite extreme, the necessary effect of which would be,
in many instances, greatly to embarrass the Legislature in
the discharge of their duties, and would also be calculated
to produce much controversy in regard to the validity of
many laws.76
Although one could literally interpret the act as having two sub-
jects-sale and gift-the court explained that "we cannot suppose
the sale of [liquor] was the chief mischief designed to be prevented,
but the procurement of it in any way."' 77 Consequently, liquor pro-
curement was the act's single subject, rather than a specific method
of acquisition.
The court might have used a strict application of the single-sub-
ject provision to strike down a statute in numerous cases, but in-
stead upheld the statute's validity. In Catholic Cathedral v. Manning,78
the court examined an act giving Baltimore City authority to build
streets on land that had been a church cemetery. 79 Although this
process ultimately involved a number of separate geographical and
temporal phases,8 ° the court held all parts to be germane to the act's
general subject-creation of new roads on cemetery land.8' The
court explained that "the subject of the statute is confounded with
the mere details or interdependent acts prescribed by the statute,
and authorized to be done in carrying into effect the subject-matter
itself .... There is no foreign, irrelevant, or discordant matter in-
74. 14 Md. 184 (1859).
75. See Act of Feb. 17, 1858, ch. 55, 1858 Md. Laws 58.
76. 14 Md. at 194.
77. Id. at 195-96.
78. 72 Md. 116, 19 A. 599 (1890).
79. See Act of April 7, 1886, ch. 280, 1886 Md. Laws 449.
80. Because prior law had forbidden such city action, the new act repealed the old
laws, and provided for removal of the remains interred where the streets would be built.
72 Md. at 120, 19 A. at 600. Human remains buried in cemetery land rendered unsuita-
ble for its original purpose because of the proximity of new roads also were to be "relo-
cated." The act granted this adjacent land to the city because it no longer would be
needed. See id. at 120-21, 19 A. at 600.
81. See id. at 133, 19 A. at 604.
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corporated in the statute. " ' 2
In Price v. Liquor License Commissioners,83 an act entitled "An Act
to enable the registered qualified voters of Cecil County to deter-
mine by ballot whether spirituous or fermented liquors or cider
shall be sold in said county," ' 4 survived a single-subject attack.8s
Although the act contained two sets of provisions, only one would
come into effect, contingent on the results of the citizens' referen-
dum. 6 The court held that because the constitutional provision
"has always received a liberal construction," 7 the act could not "be
said to embrace distinct subjects of legislation."8
In the same term, the court upheld an act that limited expendi-
tures on public highways in Talbot County.8 9 The act contained a
provision involving not just highways, but also bridges.9 ° The court
allowed the act to stand, and found that "highway" was a general
term embracing bridges as well as roads. 9'
In a more recent case, Madison National Bank v. Newrath,92 the
court found that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) of Mary-
land93 conforms to the one-subject rule.94 The court cited several
factors supporting its decision. The code's uniform nature, as indi-
cated by its title, notifies a reader of its comprehensiveness; the act
"contains no incongruous or unrelated features"; 95 a special com-
mission appointed by the governor gave serious consideration to
the UCC's enactment; and the UCC received widespread publicity in
the two years before it was enacted, which implies that the bill's na-
ture was clear to anyone concerned.96 The court concluded that the
UCC was "not the evil against which [the single-subject provision]
... was designed to protect the public and the legislature." 97
82. Id.
83. 98 Md. 346, 57 A. 215 (1904).
84. Act of April 9, 1898, ch. 532, 1898 Md. Laws 1273.
85. 98 Md. at 351, 57 A. at 217.
86. See ch. 532, 1898 Md. Laws 1273.
87. 98 Md. at 351, 57 A. at 217.
88. Id. at 352-53, 57 A. at 217.
89. See County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County v. County Comm'rs of Talbot
County, 99 Md. 13, 57 A. 1 (1904); Act of April 8, 1902, ch. 300, 1902 Md. Laws 420.
90. See ch. 300, 1902 Md. Laws 420.
91. See 99 Md. at 20-21, 57 A. at 3.
92. 261 Md. 321, 275 A.2d 495 (1971).
93. See MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-10 1 et seq. (1975).
94. See 261 Md. at 336, 275 A.2d at 503.
95. Id. at 339, 275 A.2d at 504.
96. See id. at 337-39, 275 A.2d at 503-04.
97. Id. at 339, 275 A.2d at 504.
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3. Analysis.-
a. Comparison.-As compared with these cases addressing com-
pliance with the single-subject rule, the facts in Porten Sullivan align
more closely with those statutes that were struck down. The statutes
that were upheld contained no hint of legislative misbehavior-in
contrast to the controversy surrounding House Bill 890.98 Further-
more, the Porten Sullivan bill's scope goes beyond that of acts that
have withstood a constitutional attack; i.e., the bill's ethics provi-
sions and tax provisions appear to be totally unrelated.'
Many Maryland bills that survived constitutional attack con-
tained two subjects with a relatively clear common link. For exam-
ple, highways and bridges are closely related;1 °° and gift and sale
are two ways of conveying a particular item.' In Catholic Cathedral,
the temporal interdependence of certain events caused them to fall
within the same subject's purview.102 In each of these cases, intui-
tive reasoning allows the two subjects to be linked without violating
the single-subject rule.
But no such logical link existed between the Porten Sullivan bill's
elements. The subjects of political ethics and taxation are not ones
that most people would connect, knowing nothing else about them.
Although the appellees contended that the two subjects were suffi-
ciently related because "the Act deals generally with Prince
George's County government," 103 the court pointed out that the
case on which the appellees relied was not dispositive. In that case,
County Commissioners v. Meekins,'" the court upheld an act establish-
ing Dorchester County's governmental structure.'0 5 The act cre-
ated a system of tax levy and collection, and also described the
duties of the county commissioners, treasurer, and tax collectors.1
0 6
The court explained that these subjects were "closely connected
and [made] to depend each upon the other ....
98. See supra note 36.
99. Compare supra notes 74-97 and accompanying text (discussing acts that have with-
stood single subject attack).
100. See County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County v. County Comm'rs of Talbot
County, 99 Md. 13, 57 A. 1 (1904); supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
101. See Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184 (1859); supra notes 74-77 and accompanying
text.
102. See 72 Md. 116, 19 A. 599 (1890); supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
103. 318 Md. at 404, 568 A.2d at 1119.
104. 50 Md. 28 (1878).
105. See id. at 42-43; Act of March 27, 1878, ch. 160, 1878 Md. Laws 262.
106. See ch. 160, 1878 Md. Laws 262.
107. 50 Md. at 42.
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The same cannot be said of the Prince George's County bill in
Porten Sullivan. There was no interdependence between taxing au-
thority and the ethics provision. Moreover, the fact that the ethics
provision was added to House Bill 890 long after the bill's inception
indicated that the two were wholly unrelated.' Finally, the court
was able to sever the ethics provision and allow the tax provisions to
stand, and this supports the idea that the two were not closely
connected.° 9
Perhaps if the court reviewed single-subject challenges with
greater deference to the legislature, House Bill 890 would have sur-
vived. The court might have accepted the argument that the act ad-
dressed the single subject of governing Prince George's County.
Under the standard that now prevails, however, the court simply
could not have done this. The tests of germaneness and "logical
and natural connection" inject a common sense element: is it intui-
tively reasonable and sensible for the two subjects at issue to be
linked in a single bill? The answer in Porten Sullivan was necessarily
no.
b. Consequences.-The Porten Sullivan decision joins but two
others that have enforced the Maryland Constitution's one-subject
provision. The decision is unlikely to effect a radical change in the
Court of Appeals' view on the rule. Indeed, the court reinforced the
one-subject rule's previously recognized principles.' Given that
the rule has not been enforced for nearly eighty years, it needed
108. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
109. A court rarely rules that one part of an act is severable, and that the other por-
tion is still good law. See Ruud, supra note 8, at 399. Professor Ruud cited only one
circumstance in which this is proper-when a rider has been attached to a popular bill.
Where it is clear that a provision dealing with an unrelated subject had this
tactical relationship to the rest of the act, it seems to be consistent with the
rationale of the one-subject rule to hold only the rider invalid. The trouble-
some question, though, would seem to be one of determining when this situa-
tion exists.
Id. at 400. The Porten Sullivan court found the provisions severable, suggesting that the
ethics portion was added on because the taxing provisions were so certain to pass. After
first establishing that there is a" 'strong presumption' " that the legislature favors sever-
ability, 318 Md. at 410, 568 A.2d at 1122 (quoting State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315
Md. 254, 297, 554 A.2d 366, 387 (1989)), the court concluded that the taxing measures
"were the original, true, and dominant subject of what eventually became Chapter 244.
The 'ethics' provisions were incongruous and discordant additions, 'foreign or irrele-
vant matter,' unconnected in subject-matter to the 'tax' provisions, and [therefore] un-
constitutional." 318 Md. at 410-11, 568 A.2d at 1122. The court also cited the bill's
legislative history, which further supported a finding that the legislative intent was to
make the ethics and taxing provisions severable. See id. at 411 n.8, 568 A.2d at 1122 n.8.
110. See 318 Md. at 401-03, 568 A.2d at 1117-18.
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rejuvenation. Because the bill's two provisions were related only by
virtue of their application to the same county, Porten Sullivan was a
proper case for applying the rule. It is unlikely, however, that the
decision will result in a rush of litigation on the point. Although the
rule often is cited in Maryland and in other jurisdictions, it is not
usually a primary issue." 1
If the legislature wishes to keep the ethics provision, it must
now re-enact it separately. This appears unlikely at present." 2 If
the ethics provision were to pass a second time, it could again reach
the courts, particularly given the numerous other constitutional at-
tacks raised in this appeal. 3
4. Conclusion.-Although the one-subject rule may be, to the
litigator, "a weak and undependable arrow in his quiver"' 1 4 because
courts so rarely depend upon it, its presence may have something of
an in terrorem effect upon the legislature. That is, the rule is seldom
applied because the legislature is careful not to breach it. If that is
the case, the Porten Sullivan decision will reinforce this legislative
caution. Even if the effect is not so strong, Porten Sullivan serves the
important purpose of rejuvenating a valid part of the Maryland Con-
stitution, and reassuring the public and the legislature that the pro-
vision should be taken seriously.
B. Non-Emergency Medication of Involuntarily Committed Mental
Patients
In Williams v. Wilzack," 5 the Court of Appeals held unconstitu-
tional a statute allowing forcible, non-emergency medication of an
involuntarily committed mental patient' 16 because it failed to pro-
vide necessary procedural due process protections. 1 7 The court
applied federal law to dispose of the statute on narrow grounds, and
did not reach the complex issues that have eluded precise definition
in the federal courts. The court recognized, as have federal courts,
that an involuntarily committed mental patient has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in being free from arbitrary administration
of antipsychotic drugs."18
111. See Ruud, supra note 8, at 452.
112. See supra note 12.
113. See supra note 31.
114. Ruud, supra note 8, at 447.
115. 319 Md. 485, 573 A.2d 809 (1990).
116. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-708(a) (1990).
117. See 319 Md. at 509-10, 573 A.2d at 821.
118. See id. at 508, 573 A.2d at 820.
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The procedural protections accorded to secure this interest de-
pend on the scope of that right, an issue that the court did not spe-
cifically address. Instead, the court applied federal law to the case's
facts, and implied that a patient's substantive rights, and their pro-
cedural safeguards, are the same under Maryland and federal law.
1. The Case.-In October 1986, Laquinn Williams was commit-
ted to a state psychiatric institution for evaluation of his competence
to stand trial on criminal charges of second degree attempted rape
and battery." 9 After he was found competent to stand trial, Wil-
liams pleaded and was pronounced not criminally responsible under
Maryland's Health-General Article, section 12-108.120 In accord-
ance with this verdict, the trial court committed Williams to a state
psychiatric institution for care and treatment. 12'
In July 1987, Williams' treating psychiatrist prescribed Mellaril,
an antipsychotic drug. Williams refused to take the drug, claiming it
would alter his thought processes and interfere with the exercise of
his religion, as well as his ability to assist his attorney at a subse-
quent release hearing.' 22
Pursuant to the Health-General Article, section 10-708, a
clinical review panel met in August to review Williams' refusal to
119. See Williams, 319 Md. at 489, 573 A.2d at 810-11. Williams was committed to
Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center, operated by the Maryland State Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene. See id. at 488-89, 573 A.2d at 810.
120. See id. at 489, 573 A.2d at 810-11; MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-108(a)
(1990). Section 12-108 provides in relevant part:
A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of
that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retarda-
tion, lacks substantial capacity:
(1) To appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or
(2) To conform that conduct to the requirements of the law.
Id.
121. Williams, 319 Md. at 489, 573 A.2d at 811. The law provides that "after a verdict
of not criminally responsible, the court immediately shall commit the defendant to the
Department [of Health & Mental Hygiene] for institutional, inpatient care or treat-
ment." MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-111 (a) (1990). An individual so committed
is to be discharged "only if that individual would not be a danger, as a result of mental
disorder or mental retardation, to self or to the person or property of others if dis-
charged." Id. § 12-113(b). Thus, the state's interest in committing an individual to a
mental health facility is to provide care and treatment, and to protect the public.
122. Williams, 319 Md. at 490, 573 A.2d at 811. For a discussion of the intrusive na-
ture and side effects of antipsychotic drugs, see Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy:
Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461, 474-79 (1977); see also
Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to Rot" Collide: The Right to Refiue Anti-
psychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Hous. L. REV. 447, 508-13 (1990) (listing the neuro-
logical and behavioral side effects induced by antipsychotic drugs).
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take the drug.123 The panel gave Williams only five minutes notice
of the hearing, and allowed him to be present just long enough to
explain why he refused to take the drug. The panel did not give
Williams or his lawyer the opportunity to present evidence or to
cross-examine witnesses.' 24
The panel unanimously determined that Williams should be re-
quired to take the medication notwithstanding his objections, and
he was forcibly medicated for the next two-and-one-half weeks. Wil-
liams expressed his intention to obtain an ex parte injunction
against the forcible medication, and in response, the State agreed to
discontinue it and to review Williams' case a second time. 125
On September 15, 1987, a second panel reviewed the case and
unanimously recommended that Williams be medicated over his ob-
jections.' 26 Williams responded by filing in the Circuit Court for
123. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-708 (a)-(b) (1990), entitled "Refusal of
medication; clinical review panel," which reads as follows:
(a) Election to refuse medication; exceptions.-An individual in a facility may elect to
refuse medication used for the treatment of a mental disorder except:
(1) When the medication is provided on the order of a physician in an
emergency where the individual presents a danger to the life or safety of the
individual or others; or
(2) In nonemergency situations, where the individual is hospitalized in-
voluntarily or by order of a court and the medication is approved by a clinical
review panel.
(b) Composition of panel.-(1) The clinical review panel consists of the following
members appointed by the clinical director:
(i) The clinical director if the clinical director is a physician or a physician
designated by the clinical director;
(ii) A psychiatrist; and
(iii) A nonphysician mental health care provider.
(2) If a member of the clinical review panel also is directly responsible for
implementing the individualized treatment plan for the individual under re-
view, the clinical director shall designate another panel member for that spe-
cific review.
Id.
124. Williams, 319 Md. at 509, 573 A.2d at 821. The panel gave Williams' attorney 45
minutes notice of the hearing. Section 10-708 did not provide for advance notice or an
opportunity to defend. See id. For the statute's text, see infra note 127.
125. See 319 Md. at 490, 573 A.2d at 811.
126. See id. at 491, 573 A.2d at 812. The panel found that Williams' symptoms ham-
pered his capacity to make reasonable treatment decisions, and that his " 'high degree of
suspicion' " would prevent him from benefiting from any of the " 'talking therapies' "
recommended by Williams' privately engaged psychiatrist. See id. The panel concluded
that medication was "'the most appropriate type of intervention compatible with this
patient's well being,'" id., and that medication might improve Williams' mental state
and make him agreeable to future treatment with other types of therapy. Finally, the
panel stated that withholding treatment would "lengthen the time of hospitalization,
maintain the barrier to relating with others, and perhaps allow Mr. Williams to further
disintegrate." Id.
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Montgomery County an action against the State, alleging that forci-
ble medication under the procedures of section 10-708127 violated
his state and federal constitutional rights to privacy, due process,
freedom of speech, thought, and religion, as well as equal protec-
tion under the law.128 He also claimed that, under the Maryland
Declaration of Rights and the United States Constitution, due pro-
cess requires a judicial proceeding to determine one's competence
before the hospital may forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs.
12 9
The circuit court granted the State summary judgment, holding
that section 10-708 did not on its face violate Williams' constitu-
tional rights.'3 ° The court also found that the State's conduct in
complying with the statute did not violate any of Williams' specific
rights. Williams appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari before the Court of Special Appeals considered the case.' 3 '
The Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of the
statute allowing forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to an
involuntarily committed mental patient in a non-emergency situa-
tion.13 2 Because Williams was the first person of this class to attack
the statute's constitutionality in a Maryland court, 3 3 the court ex-
amined federal law to determine whether individuals involuntarily
127. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-708 (c) (1990). Subsection (c) states in rele-
vant part:
(1) In determining whether to approve the medication, the clinical review
panel shall:
(i) Review the individual's clinical record;
(ii) Consult with facility personnel who are responsible for implementing
the individual's treatment plan;
(iii) Consult with the individual regarding the reasons for refusing the
medication;
(iv) Review the individual's capacity to make decisions concerning treat-
ment; and
(v) Review the potential consequences of requiring the individual to ac-
cept the medication and of withholding the medication from the individual.
(2) The clinical review panel may not approve the medication where there are
alternative treatments that are acceptable to both the individual and facility
personnel who are directly responsible for implementing the individual's treat-
ment plan.
Id.
128. See 319 Md. at 491-92, 573 A.2d at 812.
129. See id. at 493, 573 A.2d at 813.
130. Id. at 492, 573 A.2d at 812.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 486, 573 A.2d at 809.
133. This is not to say, however, that Williams was the first patient to assert a right to
refuse medication. Approximately 50% of psychiatric outpatients stop taking medica-
tion as prescribed, and anywhere from 1% to 15% of committed patients refuse anti-
psychotic drug treatment. See Blackburn, supra note 122, at 458 n.53, 461 n.62.
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committed to mental institutions have a constitutional right to re-
fuse treatment and, if so, what limitations federal courts place on
this right. 3
4
The court held that section 10-708, on its face and as applied in
this case, did not afford the required procedural due process protec-
tions that the state and federal constitutions guarantee, and it there-
fore could not be enforced against him.' 35 Specifically, the court
found that the absence of provisions for advance notice to the pa-
tient of the proceedings, and for an opportunity to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses, rendered the statute procedurally un-
constitutional under federal law.13 6
2. Legal Context.-
a. Right to Refuse in Maryland.-Under the Maryland case Sard
v. Hardy,137 a "physician, treating a mentally competent adult under
non-emergency circumstances, cannot properly undertake to per-
form surgery or administer other therapy without the prior consent
of his patient."'3 8 Thus, if competent, 3 9 the patient has the right to
exercise control over his own body by deciding whether to submit to
certain medical treatment.' 40 In enacting section 10-708, the Gen-
134. See Williams, 319 Md. at 495-507, 573 A.2d at 814-20. According to the court,
reviewing case law in jurisdictions that have considered the constitutional implications
of forcibly medicating involuntarily committed mentally ill patients helps little in deter-
mining the constitutionality of the Maryland statutes, because it involves interpreting
varying statutes, state constitutions, and common-law rules. See id. at 510 n.9, 573 A.2d
at 821 n.9.
135. See id. at 509-10, 573 A.2d at 820-21.
136. See id. (citing Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990)).
137. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d at 1014 (1977).
138. Id. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019 (the doctrine of informed consent requires a physi-
cian to inform a patient of the illness's nature, the proposed treatment, the contem-
plated therapy's probability of success and its alternatives, and the risk associated with
such treatment).
139. Williams was never adjudicated incompetent. The court stated that "[n]othing
in § 10-708 requires that the inmate be adjudged incompetent before drugs may be
involuntarily administered to him. The fact that the inmate has been involuntarily insti-
tutionalized in a psychiatric facility is not tantamount to a finding that he is mentally
incompetent to make treatment decisions." 319 Md. at 508 n.8, 573 A.2d at 820 n.8; cf.
Blackburn, supra note 122, at 472 n.88 (Maryland law has no express provisions that
persons committed to state mental institutions are presumed competent unless adjudi-
cated incompetent).
140. See Sard, 281 Md. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019. The doctrine of informed consent
imposes on the physician a duty to explain the medical procedure to the patient, and
warn her of any material risks inherent in the therapy. This obligation enables the pa-
tient to make an informed and intelligent decision about whether to undergo the treat-
ment. A physician may not substitute her judgment for that of the patient in the matter
of consent to treatment. See id. at 439-40, 379 A.2d at 1020.
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eral Assembly altered the common law right to refuse medication,
by allowing nonconsensual medication of patients involuntarily
committed by court order to a psychiatric facility when a clinical re-
view panel of health care professionals approves the medication.'
4 1
b. Formulation of a Constitutional Right to Refuse Medication and
Limitations on this Right: Federal Law.-
(1) Youngberg v. Romeo.-In Youngberg v. Romeo,' 4 2  the
Supreme Court held that a profoundly retarded man who was invol-
untarily committed to a Pennsylvania State institution had constitu-
tionally protected interests in safe conditions of confinement,
freedom from bodily restraint, and minimal training as therapy for
his condition.143 Defining Romeo's substantive rights as "liberty in-
terests" protected under the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, 144 the Court stated that a court must determine whether
those rights have been violated by balancing the individual's liberty
interests against the state's interests.145 The proper standard for
determining whether a state has adequate procedural safeguards
protecting those liberty interests is whether professional medical
judgment in fact was exercised; courts must presume that decisions
141. State laws recognizing the committed person's right to refuse antipsychotic drug
treatment are grouped as follows: Twenty-two states recognize the right of all commit-
ted persons to refuse treatment; five states recognize the right of voluntary, but not
involuntary, patients' right to refuse (Maryland falls in this group); five states expressly
deny all committed patients a right to refuse; fourteen states and the District of Colum-
bia do not in any way address a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. See Blackburn, supra
note 122, at 466 & 466-67 n.78.
142. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
143. See id. at 324. Nicholas Romeo was a profoundly retarded thirty-three year old
man who was committed to a state institution and injured on numerous occasions, both
by his own violence and by other residents' reactions to him. Id. at 309-10. At times, he
was physically restrained by "soft" restraints on his arms. Id. at 310 n.4. Romeo's
mother brought suit as her son's next friend, claiming that the institution violated his
constitutional rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See id. at 310.
144. See id. at 314-15.
145. See id. at 320. Included among the state's interests were the protection of institu-
tionalized individuals and others from violence, and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens additional procedures would require. See id. at 320-21. Maryland law provides
individuals in mental health facilities with a statutory right to
[rieceive appropriate humane treatment and services in a manner that restricts
the individual's personal liberty . . . only to the extent necessary . . . ; [to
r]eceive treatment in accordance with the applicable . . . individualized treat-
ment plan . . . ; [and to be] free from restraints . . . [absent an] emergency
where the individual presents a danger to the life or safety of the individual or
of others.
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-701(c)(l)-(3) (1990).
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by qualified professionals are valid.' 4 6 Such decisions can only be
overruled if they are "such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that
the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment." 47
The Youngberg Court's professional-judgment standard is signif-
icant because it removes from the judicial process the decision to
override a patient's substantive rights. But in making a decision,
medical professionals may not disregard the state statutory proce-
dural protections accorded to the patient, and judicial review will
occur upon the patient's showing that the facts do not support the
medical professional's decision to forcibly medicate her.'
48
(2) The Rennie, Johnson, and Charters Trilogy.-Because the
institutional care of mentally disabled persons poses problems that
in many ways are unlike those associated with the institutional treat-
ment of the mentally ill, it was unclear whether the Youngberg deci-
sion should control a mentally ill patient's right to refuse
antipsychotic medication.' 49 The United States Courts of Appeals
for the Third and Fourth Circuits addressed this question in Rennie
v. Klein (Rennie II),' 0 Johnson v. Silvers,'' and United States v.
Charters. 152
In Rennie H, an individual who was involuntarily committed to a
New Jersey mental facility brought an action charging the defendant
officials and employees with violating his constitutional right to re-
fuse antipsychotic drugs.15 3 The court held that the drugs "may be
constitutionally administered to an involuntarily committed men-
tally ill patient whenever, in the exercise of professional judgment,
such an action is deemed necessary to prevent the patient from en-
dangering himself or others.' 54 Thus, although it recognized that
146. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-23. The Court said that "there certainly is no rea-
son to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in mak-
ing such decisions." Id. at 323.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 322-23.
149. See Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized Mentally
Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1720, 1734 (1982). The main legal distinction between the two
groups is that mentally retarded persons are presumed incompetent to make decisions,
while mentally ill persons are not presumed incompetent. See supra note 139.
150. 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) [Rennie II].
151. 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984).
152. 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
153. See 720 F.2d at 267-68.
154. Id. at 269.
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the mentally ill patient has a substantive constitutional interest to be
free from medication, the court accepted the professional-judgment
standard as sufficient procedural protection of that interest.' 55 Judi-
cial review would be available to protect the patient only from arbi-
trary administration of drugs.'
5 6
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Johnson held that forcible admin-
istration of antipsychotic drugs presented a sufficient intrusion upon
bodily security to give rise to a constitutionally protectible liberty
interest. 57 The court said that the remaining issue, whether the
deprivation of that interest was without procedural due process of
law, was to be decided under Youngberg's professional-judgment
test.'
58
Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Charters recognized that persons
legally confined "retain significant [liberty] interests ... [that] must
yield to the legitimate government interests that are incidental to
the basis for legal institutionalization."' 5 9 The court recognized
155. See id. at 269-70. But the Rennie II court distinguished its professional-judgment
standard from that proposed by Chief Judge Seitz in Youngberg v. Romeo, and cited with
approval by the Supreme Court. See id. at 270 n.8; Youngberg v. Romeo, 644 F.2d 147,
178 (4th Cir. 1980) (Seitz, CJ., concurring). The Rennie II court stated:
The essential difference between the constitutional standard proposed by
Chief Judge Seitz and that announced here is that Judge Seitz would leave it to
the professional judgment of the medical authorities as to whether anti-
psychotic drugs could be forcibly administered to involuntarily committed pa-
tients even in the absence of a threshold determination that the patient was a
danger to himself or others. The standard adopted here would preclude the
forcible administration of such drugs unless the predicate determination was
made that the patient was a danger either to himself or others.
720 F.2d at 270 n.8.
156. The professional-judgment standard replaced the more demanding "least intru-
sive means" standard espoused by the court two years earlier in Rennie v. Klein, [Rennie
I] 653 F.2d 836, 845 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). In Rennie I, the court said that the invol-
untarily committed patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs may be limited only by
the least intrusive infringement that does not exceed "that required by needed care or
legitimate administrative concerns." Id. Maryland law provides that "[tihe clinical re-
view panel may not approve the medication where there are alternative treatments ......
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-708(c)(2) (1990). For § 10-708(c)'s text in its en-
tirety, see supra note 127. Because alternative treatments necessarily include "least in-
trusive" alternatives, there is some uncertainty as to the standard to be applied in
Maryland. For a comprehensive discussion of the "least intrusive means" doctrine, see
generally Comment, The Scope of the Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse
Treatment with Psychotropic Drugs: An Analysis of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 28
VILL. L. REV. 101 (1982).
157. See 742 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1984). As was Williams, Johnson was an involun-
tarily committed patient at Perkins Hospital Center, and claimed that forcible medica-
tion with antipsychotic drugs interfered with his thought process. See id. at 824.
158. See id. at 825.
159. 863 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
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valid limitations on the mentally ill individual's substantive liberty
interests, and established procedural due process requirements the
state must follow to limit those rights, saying that individual inter-
ests are "only afforded protection against arbitrary and capricious
government action."' 6
These Third and Fourth Circuit decisions establish that forcible
administration of antipsychotic drugs to involuntarily committed
psychiatric patients implicates a constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest. Both circuits nevertheless applied Youngberg's professional-
judgment test' 6 ' to find that procedural due process does not re-
quire a judicial determination to override the patient's refusal to
take the drugs. The Supreme Court ruled on the issue for the first
time in Washington v. Harper.'62
(3) Washington v. Harper.-Harper involved a challenge to a
prison policy authorizing forcible treatment with antipsychotic
drugs under certain circumstances. 6s According to the policy, the
prison could forcibly medicate a prisoner if a psychiatrist deter-
mined that the prisoner (1) suffered from a mental disorder and (2)
was gravely disabled, or posed a likelihood of serious harm to him-
self, others, or their property.' 64 An inmate who refused medica-
tion was entitled to a hearing before a special committee consisting
of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and the associate superintendent of
the prison's medical center.' 65 None of the committee members
could be involved in the inmate's treatment or diagnosis at the time
of the hearing.' 66 The policy also provided the prisoner certain
procedural rights, but did not allow for ajudicial hearing before for-
160. Id. The court specifically found that procedural due process would be satisfied
by placing responsibility in appropriate medical personnel for making base-line medica-
tion decisions, with judicial review to guard against arbitrariness. Thus, the court would
not require any judicial proceeding to determine the patient's competence and then, if
found incompetent, to determine his best interests. See id. at 308-09. The court rea-
soned that ifjudges were required to make "substituted judgments" for the incompetent
patient, they would be "cast in the [improper] role of making the primary decisions on
purely medical and psychiatric questions, rather than reviewers of such decisions made
by qualified professionals." Id. at 309.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 146-147.
162. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). The Court initially considered, but did not decide the
issue, in Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). See infra note 180.
163. See Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1032.
164. Id. at 1033.
165. Id. The committee's composition is similar to that of the clinical review panel
provided by the Health-General Article. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-708(b)
(1990); supra note 123.
166. 110 S. Ct. at 1033.
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cible treatment was authorized.' 6 7 The prisoner bringing the suit
claimed that absence of a judicial hearing violated both the federal
and state constitutions.'
68
The Supreme Court recognized that under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, the inmate has a protectible lib-
erty interest in being free from the arbitrary administration of anti-
psychotic drugs.' 69 Nevertheless, the Court held that the inmate
could be medicated over his objections because the state policy
comports with both substantive and procedural due process require-
ments: the policy is reasonably related to the State's legitimate in-
terest in combatting the danger posed by a violent, mentally ill
inmate, 70 and the policy's administrative hearing procedures com-
port with procedural due process. 17t
More important, the Court held that due process did not re-
quire a judicial hearing to determine competence before an institu-
tion could forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to involuntarily
committed mental patients. t 7  This is significant because it carves
out a narrow exception to the principle that competent adults may
refuse medical treatment.'17  The Court justified this by noting the
nature of the prison environment, which "is made up of persons
with 'a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often vi-
olent, conduct' ,,i7' and which in some instances necessitates forci-
ble medication. Thus, Harper clarified that the Youngberg
professional-judgment standard would dictate procedural due pro-
cess protections of mentally ill patients' rights.
167. d. at 1033-34. The procedural rights provide that the inmate be given at least
24 hours notice of the hearing; that he receive notice of the tentative diagnosis, its fac-
tual basis, and the reason the staff believes medication is necessary; that he has a right to
attend the hearing, present evidence and witnesses, cross-examine staff witnesses, and
have the assistance of a lay advisor who understands the psychiatric issues involved; that
minutes of the hearing be kept and a copy provided to the inmate; that he has the right
to appeal the committee's decision to the Superintendent of the prison's medical center;
and that he has the right to seek judicial review of the decision in state court. Id.
168. See id. at 1034.
169. See id. at 1036.
170. See id. at 1038-39.
171. See id. at 1044 (mandating notice and the specified hearing rights "satisfies the
requirement that the opportunity to be heard 'must be granted at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.'" (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
172. See id. at 1040. If a judicial determination of incompetency is unnecessary, then
the question of Williams' competence is irrelevant. See supra note 139 and accompany-
ing text.
173. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
174. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1038 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).
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3. Analysis.-The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized, as
did the Supreme Court in Harper, that mentally ill patients have a
protectible liberty interest in being free from forcible arbitrary med-
ication.' 75 Thus, the court interpreted the legislature's intent as
creating a
justifiable expectation that the drugs will not be adminis-
tered to an inmate unless he is mentally ill and a danger to
himself or others .... The extent of Williams's constitu-
tional right to refuse drugs prescribed for this purpose
must be determined in the context of his confinement, as
stated in Harper. . . . Thus, unwanted drugs could in no
event be administered to a mentally ill inmate involuntarily
admitted to a state psychiatric facility, absent compliance
with the strict legislative formulation of § 10-708.176
The court concluded that in section 10-708 the legislature im-
plicitly recognizes a protectible interest because the statute carves
out only a very narrow exception to the common-law rule that a pa-
tient must consent to treatment. The deficiency in the court's opin-
ion is its neglect to give an express ruling on whether the Maryland
constitution and the federal constitution recognize the same sub-
stantive and procedural rights. Absent such a holding, the legisla-
ture can only assume that the court will not require procedural
protections beyond those required in Harper.177 This is reasonable
given the court's reliance on federal law in Williams.' 78
Using federal law to determine the procedural minimum the
legislature must provide to protect the patient's interest, the court
implied that Maryland's constitution recognizes the same substan-
175. See Williams, 319 Md. at 509-10, 573 A.2d at 821. The court stated that "[s]ection
10-708, like the administrative policy approved in Harper, implicitly recognizes that the
involuntarily committed inmate has a significant constitutional liberty interest to be free
from the arbitraiy administration of antipsychotic drugs." Id. at 508, 573 A.2d at 820
(emphasis in original). See also Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1036.
176. 319 Md. at 508-09, 573 A.2d at 820 (footnotes omitted). Regardless of whether
the legislature intends to re-enact section 10-708 to comport with the Williams decision,
the fact that it statutorily recognized a right to refuse medication, then denied that right
to a particular group of individuals, evidences its strong support of the state's interests
in this area. If the legislature does re-enact section 10-708, Williams clarifies that
Harper's procedural protections will have to be included. The question remains, how-
ever, whether these protections will be sufficient to make the statute constitutional, or
whether the Maryland legislature must include additional requirements.
177. The court not only cited federal law, but the legislature also constructed section
10-708 in accordance with the federal "medical model" of limiting a committed person's
right to refuse medication. See Blackburn, supra note 122, at 479, n. 101.
178. See 319 Md. at 495-507, 573 A.2d at 814-20.
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tive and procedural interests as does the federal constitution., 79
This is significant because if Maryland law recognizes broader lib-
erty interests than those recognized by the federal constitution, then
"the broader state protections would define the actual procedural
rights and duties of persons within the State. '"180 Thus, amending
section 10-708 to include Harper's procedural due process protec-
tions may not suffice to make the statute valid under the Maryland
constitution.
Although the court cited federal cases as authority and it did
not expressly declare that Maryland recognizes broader liberty in-
terests than those recognized by the federal constitution, it clouded
the issue by citing the Maryland Code provisions concerning the
rights of mentally ill individuals."8 ' Perhaps the court wanted to
emphasize the importance it places on the liberty interests of men-
tally ill individuals, and the fact that certain fundamental rights may
not be abridged unless absolutely necessary. By "reminding" the
legislature of the statutes that give mentally ill persons the opportu-
nity to participate in developing their own treatment plans, the
court might simply be signalling the legislature that section 10-708
would be constitutional if the legislature adopts Harper's procedural
protections.
The court compared Harper's Supreme Court-approved proce-
dural due process protections 8 2 with section 10-708's require-
179. The State asserted that the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the United States
Constitution are to be construed as a single document and, therefore, that they have the
same meaning. See Brief for Appellee at 15-16, Williams (No. 88-140). Case law estab-
lishes that the "rights guaranteed by these Articles of the Declaration of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment are the same .... In construing these Articles the Maryland
court has held that the decisions of the Supreme Court are practically direct authori-
ties." Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 138, 141-42
(D. Md.) (citing City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957)), aff'd, 398
F.2d 226 (1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968); Home Utilities Co. v.
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610, 122 A.2d 109 (1955); Goldsmith v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939).
180. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982). In Mills, voluntary and involuntary
mental patients at a Massachusetts state institution brought a class action alleging that
their federal constitutional rights were violated by forcible administration of anti-
psychotic drugs. See id. at 293-94. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals to consider whether correct disposition of the case was affected
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's intervening decision involving such
rights, under both Massachusetts common law and the federal constitution. See id. at
303.
181. See 319 Md. at 486-88, 573 A.2d at 809-10 (citing MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§§ 10-701(c), (), -702, -703, -706 (1990)); see also supra note 145.
182. See supra note 167.
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ments,' and found that on its face, section 10-708 did not provide
procedural due process protections to which Williams was enti-
tled.'" 4 Thus, without considering Williams' other claims, the court
invalidated the statute solely on the procedural due process
grounds, and declared that Sard v. Hardy's common-law princi-
ples'8 5 were controlling.' By invalidating the statute on narrow
grounds, stating simply that section 10-708, "in its present form, can-
not be enforced against Williams,"' 8 7 the court implied that the stat-
ute could be enforced if it contained Harper's procedures.
Assuming that federal law is the proper authority for determin-
ing the rights of involuntarily committed mental patients in Mary-
land, the federal law's scope remains to be determined. There are
many issues that federal courts have not addressed in assessing the
constitutionality of forcible medication statutes. In particular, they
have avoided the more difficult first amendment and equal protec-
tion claims by labeling them general "liberty interests,"' 88 and ana-
lyzing them under the due process clause.
The nature of the procedural protection, however, varies with
the right to be protected. The procedural protection due must be
determined in light of a particular case's facts and the "degree of
potential deprivation that may be created by a particular deci-
sion," 189 which necessarily hinges on the scope of the constitutional
right infringed upon. Absent federal delineation of the nature and
scope of this vague "protectible liberty interest," the Williams court
did not attempt to define the constitutional right.' 90 In particular,
183. See supra note 127.
184. See 319 Md. at 509, 573 A.2d at 820-21.
185. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); see supra notes 137-140 and accompanying
text.
186. See 319 Md. at 510, 573 A.2d at 821.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1034-36 (1990) (prisoner
claimed violation of due process, equal protection, and free speech clauses and the
Court, not considering each claim separately, referred to them as "significant liberty
interests" protected under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause); cf. Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 294 n.3 (1982) (noting that the district court's characterization of
such "liberty interests" as "the power to produce ideas" embodied first amendment
concerns).
189. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (the essence of due process is the
requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against
him and the opportunity to defend; due process is a flexible concept and calls for such
procedural protections as the situation demands).
190. The court's analysis in Williams consisted of summaries of several federal cases
with the conclusion that due process was not satisfied in light of one of the decisions. See
391 Md. 485, 495-510, 573 A.2d 809, 813-21 (1990).
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the court did not address Williams' specific challenges that the stat-
ute violated his first amendment right to freedom of religion and his
right to equal protection under the law.
Williams argued that antipsychotic drug treatment disrupted
his thought processes to such an extent that he could not recite the
daily prayers required by his religion,'' and this denied his first
amendment right to freedom of religion. Because the court invali-
dated on due process grounds the forcible medication statute, it did
not address this claim, and left unclear whether the State's interests
in forcible medication would override such a claim.' 92
Nor did the court address Williams' claim that the statute vio-
lated state and federal constitutional equal protection guarantees by
discriminating between involuntary psychiatric patients and all
other patients needing psychiatric or other medical treatment.'
9 3
Williams argued that section 10-708 discriminates against involunta-
rily committed mental patients because it does not allow them an
adjudication of incompetence, and appointment of a guardian, prior
to the medication's forcible administration. 94 Absent a finding of
incompetence, Williams argued that the common-law principle con-
trols-no competent person may be forcibly medicated in non-
emergency situations."' The equal protection argument's force is
lessened by the Supreme Court's finding in Harper, that a judicial
determination of incompetence is unnecessary, given a state's legiti-
mate interest in reducing the danger that a mentally ill person
poses. 196 But Harper does not fully justify the discriminatory effect
of Maryland's statute, especially considering that every other Mary-
land citizen has the common-law right to medical self-
determination.
4. Conclusion.-The court's holding in Williams restored the
common law as controlling a mentally ill patient's right to refuse
medical treatment, and removed any discrimination among different
classes of mental patients. Although it invalidated the forcible med-
ication statute, the court assessed only its procedural deficiencies
without indicating which of Williams' substantive rights it was pro-
191. See id. at 490, 573 A.2d at 811.
192. The court stated that section 10-708 was unconstitutional "on [the procedural
due process] ground alone, without consideration of Williams's other claims .... " 319
Md. at 510, 573 A.2d at 821.
193. See Brief for Appellant at 26-32.
194. See id. at 27.
195. See id.; see Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 439, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (1977).
196. See Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1039 (1990).
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tecting. Thus, the legislature can reasonably assume that proce-
dural amendment of the statute will make it constitutionally valid.
Nevertheless, because the court disposed of the statute on this issue
alone, procedural changes may be insufficient to correct any sub-
stantive defects in the statute. Until the federal courts clearly define
the nature and scope of the right to refuse forced medication, invol-
untarily committed mental patients in Maryland will benefit from
the court's reluctance to restrict their right to refuse treatment.
C. Right to a Speedy Trial
In State v. Bailey,'97 the Court of Appeals held that a two year
and nine day delay between arrest and trial did not violate the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial,' 98 or his four-
teenth amendment right to due process of law.' 99 To evaluate the
speedy trial claim, the court applied the balancing test established in
the 1972 Supreme Court case, Barker v. Wingo.200 The balancing test
requires weighing four factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) the rea-
son for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a
speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 20 ' The Court
of Appeals assumed that the length of delay was the entire two year
and nine day period between the defendant's arrest and his trial,
and thus found it unnecessary to address whether the State's entry
of a nolle prosequi stopped the speedy-trial clock.20 2 The court
concluded that Bailey's right to a speedy trial was not violated be-
197. 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 (1990). Judge Orth wrote the court's opinion, joined
by Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Eldridge. Judge McAuliffe wrote a concurring opin-
ion, joined by Judge Rodowsky. See id. at 421, 572 A.2d at 558. Judge Cole dissented,
joined by Judge Adkins. See id. at 424, 572 A.2d at 559.
198. Id. at 420-21, 572 A.2d at 557. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy... trial .... "). See also Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) (the sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial is "fundamental" and applies to the states because it is incorporated under the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause).
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of... liberty .. . without due process of law
.... Id.
200. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
201. See id. at 530-32.
202. See 319 Md. at 410, 572 A.2d at 552. A nolle prosequi is a decision not to prose-
cute. The short-hand term for an entry of nolle prosequi is "nol pros." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 945 (5th ed. 1979). The Maryland Rules provide for disposition of charges
by a nolle prosequi as follows:
The State's Attorney may terminate a prosecution on a charge and dismiss the
charge by entering a nolle prosequi on the record in open court. A statement
of the reasons for entering a nolle prosequi shall be made a part of the
record....
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cause, on balance, the case's circumstances outweighed any actual
prejudice to Bailey.2 °3 The court rejected Bailey's due process
claim because he failed to demonstrate that the delay caused him
unfair prejudice. 2° In Bailey, the court discussed in detail only the
actual prejudice prong of the Barker test.20 5 The analysis thus fo-
cused to a greater extent than have previous cases on the single fac-
tor of actual prejudice. 20 6
1. The Case.-On February 14, 1986, Alex Ray Bailey was ar-
rested and charged with several violations of the Controlled Dan-
gerous Substances Act.20 7 Five weeks later, a grand jury indicted
him on charges of cocaine distribution, possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. OnJune 6,
1986, the State dismissed the charges by entering a nolle prose-
qui.2°s The State initiated the nol pros after it became aware that
one and one-half years earlier, Bailey was tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced in absentia in South Carolina for drug-related offenses. 209
The defense counsel objected to the entry of a nolle prosequi, and
reiterated Bailey's demand for a speedy trial. 210
On May 28, 1987, nearly one year after the State entered a
nolle prosequi, Bailey was reindicted for cocaine possession, and in-
When a nolle prosequi has been entered on a charge, any conditions of
pretrial release on that charge are terminated, any bail bond posted for the
defendant on that charge shall be released. The clerk shall take the action nec-
essary to recall or revoke any outstanding warrant or detainer that could lead to
the arrest or detention of the defendant because of that charge.
MD. R. 4-247.
The Court of Special Appeals viewed the determinative issue in this case as whether
the nol pros was legitimate, so as to stop the clock until new charges were filed, or
illegitimate, so that the speedy-trial clock was not tolled. See Bailey v. State, No. 88-737,
slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 17, 1989) (per curiam), rev'd, 319 Md. 392, 572
A.2d 544 (1990). The Court of Appeals held that even if the speedy trial clock ran from
the original charges, Bailey's right to a speedy trial was not violated. See 319 Md. at 420,
572 A.2d at 557.
203. See 319 Md. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557.
204. See id. at 420-21, 572 A.2d at 557.
205. See id. at 412-19, 572 A.2d at 553-57.
206. See infra notes 266-273 and accompanying text.
207. Bailey, 319 Md. at 397, 572 A.2d at 546; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286A (1957).
208. 319 Md. at 397, 572 A.2d at 546. The State's reasons for the nol pros were to
allow it to develop a charge of cocaine importation against Bailey, to allow South Caro-
lina "to enroll" the conviction in absentia so that Maryland could sentence Bailey as a
recidivist, and to allow Bailey to begin serving his South Carolina sentence. See id. at
402-03, 572 A.2d at 549.
209. See id. at 399, 572 A.2d. at 547.
210. See id. at 401, 572 A.2d at 548.
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dicted for the first time for importing cocaine into Maryland. 2"
During the interval between dismissal of the original charges and
the filing of new charges, Bailey was held in South Carolina pursu-
ant to his ten year sentence in that state. l2
Bailey was brought to trial approximately nine months after the
new charges were issued. 21 3 For seven months of this period, he
remained incarcerated in South Carolina and fought extradition to
Maryland. 214 After he was returned to Maryland, the court post-
poned the original trial date because of conflicts with the defense
counsel's schedule.21 5 Six days before trial, Bailey moved to dismiss
for "lack of a speedy trial."21 6 The Circuit Court for Montgomery
County denied the motion and the trial proceeded. A jury found
Bailey guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and
not guilty of bringing cocaine into the State.2 1 7
To summarize, the time between Bailey's original arrest and his
trial can be divided into three intervals: (1) from his arrest on Feb-
ruary 14, 1986 until the indictment was nol prossed onJune 6, 1986
(approximately four months); (2) from June 6, 1986 until May 28,
1987 when Bailey was reindicted for possession of cocaine and in-
dicted for the first time for importing cocaine into Maryland (ap-
proximately one year); and (3) from May 28, 1987 until February 19,
1988 when Bailey's motion to dismiss was heard and denied six days
before trial (approximately nine months). 21 1
Bailey appealed his conviction on the grounds that the State's
delay in bringing him to trial violated his sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial and alternatively, that it denied him due process of
law. 21 9 The Court of Special Appeals reversed Bailey's conviction,
211. Id. at 397-98, 572 A.2d at 546.
212. Id. at 401-02, 572 A.2d at 548. After the State's Attorney's Office nol prossed
the original Maryland indictment, Bailey was returned to South Carolina pursuant to a
request it filed in accordance with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 616A-616R (1987 & 1989 Supp.).
213. See 319 Md. at 397-98, 572 A.2d 546.
214. On July 1, 1987, about four weeks after the reindictment, Maryland requested
Bailey's return pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. See id. at 402, 572
A.2d at 548. Because Bailey resisted the extradition, South Carolina did not approve
the transfer until November 3, 1987, and Bailey did not arrive in Maryland until Novem-
ber 25, 1987. See id.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 398, 572 A.2d at 546.
217. Id.
218. See Bailey v. State, No. 88-737, slip op. at 1-2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 17, 1989)
(per curiam), rev'd, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 (1990). The court set out a "chronol-
ogy" of events in the opinion. See 319 Md. at 398-402, 572 A.2d at 546-48.
219. See No. 88-737, slip op. at 1.
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holding that his right to a speedy trial was violated. It did not reach
the due process claim.2 20 The court viewed the dispositive issue to
be whether the nolle prosequi was a legitimate termination of the
case so as to toll the speedy trial clock. 2 ' It reasoned that a legiti-
mate nolle prosequi 222 would have stopped the speedy-trial clock so
that the delay would be limited to the nine month period from re-
indictment to trial, which was largely attributable to the defend-
ant.22 3 If, however, the nol pros was not legitimate and did not stop
the clock, the resulting two year and nine day delay was "presump-
tively prejudicial" and was largely attributable to the State. Because
the State nol prossed the charges for purposes of tactical delay and
not to build a prima facie case, the Court of Special Appeals con-
cluded that the nolle prosequi did not stop the speedy trial clock,
and the resulting delay violated Bailey's right to a speedy trial. 224
The State petitioned the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of cer-
tiorari, and Bailey filed a conditional cross-petition. The court
granted both petitions.2 25 The questions presented for review were:
(1) whether the Court of Special Appeals, for purposes of Bailey's
speedy trial claim, erred in concluding that the delay should be mea-
sured from the original indictment, and not from the time new
charges were filed; and (2) if the nol pros did not toll the speedy
trial clock, was Bailey denied his right to a speedy trial?226
2. Legal Background.-In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court
identified four factors to consider in light of the case's circum-
220. See id.
221. See id. at 2. The Court of Special Appeals noted that the State entered the nol
pros to gain two tactical advantages-the benefit of enhanced sentencing, and additional
charges. The court said that the State could delay a trial for those reasons but that if it
did,
it must pay a calculated price. The price is that such delay will count against
the State in a speedy trial analysis. If a short delay will gain a significant advan-
tage, it may well be worth the State's gamble. A lengthy delay for tactical ad-
vantage, however, will frequently be fatal to the State's case. When the State is
getting little or nothing in return, it is quite obviously a bad gamble.
Id. at 4.
222. Legitimate reasons to enter a nol pros include situations in which the State lacks
evidence or probable cause to continue the prosecution. See Ward v. State, 30 Md. App.
113, 130, 351 A.2d 452, 461 (1976) (a delay was not within the purview of a speedy trial
analysis if the State dismissed the charges because of a lack of probable cause); Brady v.
State, 36 Md. App. 283, 290, 374 A.2d 613, 618 (1977) (the State could nol pros charges
if it had insufficient evidence to support a conviction).
223. See No. 88-737, slip op. at 2.
224. See id. at 7-8.
225. Bailey, 319 Md. at 397, 572 A.2d at 546.
226. Id. at 408, 572 A.2d at 551.
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stances, to determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial was violated. 227 The factors are: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of
his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 22 ' The Court ex-
plained that the relative importance of each factor depended on
each case's particular circumstances:
We regard none of the four factors identified above as
either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are
related factors and must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these fac-
tors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in
a difficult and sensitive balancing process.229
As in any balancing test, there is a considerable subjective ele-
ment in interpreting each case's circumstances. Additionally, deci-
sions on speedy trial claims are complicated by this constitutional
protection's "amorphous" nature.230 The right to a speedy trial dif-
fers from other constitutionally guaranteed individual rights be-
cause it was created to protect both society and an accused 23 1 _
parties who may have contrary interests. For example, the state's
failure to bring a defendant promptly to trial may benefit the de-
fendant, who often will prefer to delay trial.23 2
227. See 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972). In Barker, the Court used a four-pronged bal-
ancing test, and held that the "extraordinary" delay of more than five years between the
defendant's arrest and trial did not deny his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id. at
530-33. After ten months of incarceration, Barker was released on bail. The prosecu-
tion continued the trial 16 times; the bulk of these delays were for the purpose of trying
Barker's accomplice in the hope of obtaining a conviction and testimony necessary to
convict Barker. Id. at 516-17. It took six trials before Barker's accomplice was con-
victed. Id. at 535 n.39. Subsequent delays were attributed to a key prosecution witness's
illness. Barker raised his first objection to the continuances approximately three and
one half years after his arrest. Id. at 517-18. The Court reasoned that the delay's length
was "extraordinary" and weighed heavily against the state. See id. at 533-34. The Court
held that this was a "close" case, but the fact that "Barker did not want a speedy trial"
outweighed the deficiencies in bringing him to trial. See id. In adopting the balancing
test, the Barker court rejected "two inflexible approaches" advocated as means to reduce
uncertainty and subjectivity from the evaluation of speedy trial claims. See id. at 529-30.
It refused to establish specific, permissible time periods, and it rejected the rule that a
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right. See id. at 522-30.
228. See id. at 530-32.
229. Id. at 533.
230. See Note, Criminal Procedure-United States v. MacDonald: Continued Uncertainty in the
Right to a Speedy Trial, 61 N.C.L. REV. 563 (1983).
231. See Survey, Speedy Trial, District of Columbia Court of Appeals Project on Criminal Proce-
dure, 27 How. L.J. 805, 805 (1984) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 519).
232. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 519, 521 (delays allowed defendants a greater opportunity
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Speedy trial claims are also difficult to assert because, if the
court upholds the defendant's claim, the only available sanction is
dismissal, and this may require freeing a guilty defendant.23 3 Courts
understandably are reluctant to reach this result in the absence of
clearly intentional State misconduct.23 4
a. Length of the Delay.-In speedy trial claims, the length of de-
lay acts as a triggering mechanism: "until there is some delay which
is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into
the other factors that go into the balance. '"235 In Barker, the
Supreme Court refused to define a specific period after which the
constitutional right is violated.236 Rather, the Court indicated that
the specific crime's nature should be used to evaluate whether a de-
lay of a particular duration is tolerable.
237
Applying Barker, the Court of Appeals in Epps v. State 238 held
that a one year and fourteen day delay between arrest and trial was
"presumptively prejudicial" so as to trigger the balancing test.239 In
subsequent cases, this duration has been used as a benchmark such
that a delay greater than one year and fourteen days automatically
invokes the balancing process.
240
to plea bargain and "otherwise manipulate the system," and to increase the likelihood
that witnesses would be unavailable or have forgotten their testimony).
233. See id. at 522; see also Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) ("the only
possible remedy" for a violation of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial was to set
aside the conviction and to dismiss the charges).
234. Examples of misconduct include delaying a trial until an alibi witness died, or to
avoid a specific judge. See Bailey, 319 Md. at 403-04, 572 A.2d at 549.
235. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
236. See id. at 523. The Supreme Court found no constitutional basis for authorizing
courts to prescribe time periods to define the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Rather, the Court left it to the legislatures defining procedural rules to establish time
limits within which trials must be held. See id.; see, e.g., Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974,
18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988) (the prosecution must file within thirty days of arrest a criminal
information or indictment; arraignment must be filed within ten days after the informa-
tion or indictment was filed; and the final trial must be held within one hundred days of
the initial arrest); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1987) (prescribing specific periods for
various stages in an accused's prosecution); R. GILBERT & C. MOYLAN, MARYLAND CRIMI-
NAL LAw: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 42.10 (1983 & Supp. 1988); MD. R. 4-271.
237. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. For example, the more complicated the case, the
greater the time permitted to the state; therefore, a delay is more easily tolerated. See id.
at 531.
238. 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975).
239. See id. at 111, 345 A.2d at 72.
240. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 6, 367 A.2d 1, 5 (1976); Smith v. State, 276
Md. 521, 528, 350 A.2d 628, 633 (1976); Reed v. State, 78 Md. App. 522, 532, 554 A.2d
420, 428 (1989).
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b. Reason for the Delay.-The Supreme Court indicated that the
reason assigned to each period of a delay is an important factor that
courts should assess in the speedy trial inquiry:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to ham-
per the defense should be weighed heavily against the gov-
ernment. A more neutral reason such as negligence or
overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate re-
sponsibility for such circumstances must rest with the gov-
ernment rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid
reason such as a missing witness, should serve to justify ap-
propriate delay.24'
The Court of Appeals has established a similar analysis whereby
a delay is first attributed to the State or the defendant, and then
weighed against that party according to the delay's underlying moti-
vation or cause,242 and if the State caused it, whether the delay was
deliberate, negligent, or justifiable.24 ' A delay accrued continuously
rather than in a piecemeal fashion will be weighed more heavily.244
c. Defendant's Assertion of the Right.-The severity of a depriva-
tion of the right to a speedy trial is directly linked to a defendant's
assertion of the right, because "failure to assert the right will make
it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy
trial." 245 Although the defendant's failure to assert the right does
not waive it entirely, its assertion is important evidence of
deprivation.246
In Maryland, a defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy
trial is usually given substantial evidentiary weight. For example, in
Jones v. State,247 the defendant repeatedly demanded a speedy
trial.248 The State, however, argued thatJones' "numerous changes
of counsel" were intentional delays that showed he did not really
241. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
242. SeeJones, 279 Md. at 6-7, 367 A.2d at 5-6; Smith, 276 Md. at 528, 350 A.2d at 633.
243. See Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 549-50, 350 A.2d 640, 645 (1976). A deliberate
delay would be weighted more heavily against the responsible party; inadvertent or neg-
ligent delay would be weighted less heavily; and a justifiable delay would not prejudice
the responsible party at all. See id.
244. See Jones, 279 Md. at 7, 367 A.2d at 6.
245. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
246. See id. at 531-32.
247. 279 Md. 1, 367 A.2d 1 (1976).
248. See id. at 14-15, 367 A.2d at 10.
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want a speedy trial.2 49 The court rejected this argument, and gave
Jones' assertions of his right full evidentiary weight.
250
d. Prejudice to the Defendant.-A court must assess actual preju-
dice to the defendant in light of the interests that the speedy trial
right was intended to protect. 251  The Court in Barker identified
three main interests: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarcer-
ation; (2) minimization of the defendant's anxiety and concern; and
(3) minimization of defense impairment.25 2 Of these interests, the
Court noted that impairment of the defense should be weighted
most heavily because it would "skew[] the fairness of the entire sys-
tem."' 253 The defendant generally has the burden of showing actual
prejudice. 54 Commentators have noted, however, that the party
with that burden rarely prevails because it is so difficult to establish
actual prejudice.255
3. Analysis.-
a. Applying the Balancing Test in Bailey.-The Court of Appeals
held that a two year and nine day delay between Bailey's arrest and
trial did not violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial.2 56 The
majority assessed actual prejudice to Bailey in light of the three in-
terests protected by the right.2 57 Bailey was imprisoned in Maryland
for only four months from the time of his arrest until his return to
South Carolina.258 He remained incarcerated in South Carolina, on
unrelated charges, until he was returned to Maryland approximately
three months before trial.259 Because Bailey's South Carolina incar-
ceration was not attributable to Maryland, and because the delay af-
ter his return to Maryland was largely attributed to Bailey, the court
249. See id. at 15, 367 A.2d at 10.
250. See id. at 16, 367 A.2d at 11.
251. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
252. See id.
253. Id.
254. See Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Right to Speedy Trial, 26 VAND. L. REV. 171,
173 (1973).
255. See Survey, Right to a Speedy Trial, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV.
164 (1972). The Barker court recognized that it is extraordinarily difficult to prove or
disprove that a witness's memory has faded, and that the fading has significantly affected
the case's outcome. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
256. See Bailey, 319 Md. at 420-21, 572 A.2d at 557.
257. See id. at 416-19, 572 A.2d at 555-57. The concurring opinion agreed with the
result on the grounds that the nol pros was proper, and hence the delay attributable to
the state did not implicate the sixth amendment. See id. at 421, 572 A.2d at 558.
258. Id. at 416, 572 A.2d at 555.
259. Id. at 417, 572 A.2d at 555.
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found minimal the total pre-trial incarceration attributable to the
State of Maryland.260
The court rejected Bailey's claims that he suffered actual preju-
dice as a result of impairment of his defense and living with anxiety
and concern.2 6' It stated that Bailey's claims to the contrary were
"bald" statements, unsupported by evidence, and without merit,262
and concluded that any presumed or actual prejudice from the delay
was outweighed by the case's particular circumstances.2 63
The court's statement in its holding, that the circumstances
"outweigh... any prejudice,"'12 1 suggests that the majority put con-
siderable weight on the absence of substantial actual prejudice. The
court did not discuss the other three balancing factors in any de-
tail,265 and their relative contribution to the court's analysis is
unclear.
The court's reliance solely on a finding of no substantial preju-
dice was a departure from cases in which it specifically stated that all
factors must be considered. In Brady v. State,266 (Brady I) the court
stated: "after there has been a constitutionally significant delay, no
one circumstance is controlling in deciding whether the defendant
has been denied a speedy trial but ... all pertinent factors must be
considered. ' 2 67 In Brady I, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court
of Special Appeals, which upheld the defendant's conviction be-
cause there was no showing of actual prejudice resulting from a
fourteen month delay.268 On remand, the Court of Special Appeals
purported to balance the factors, and again upheld the conviction
on the finding that no actual or presumed prejudice existed. 6 9 In
Brady v. State,270 (Brady II) the Court of Appeals attempted to "settle
the role of prejudice in speedy trial cases and to emphasize the role
to be played by the other factors courts have stressed as important
in the balancing process." 2' 1 The court held that lack of actual prej-
udice was not dispositive, and after considering each factor, held
260. See id. at 416-17, 572 A.2d at 555-56.
261. See id. at 417-19, 572 A.2d at 556-57.
262. See id. at 417, 572 A.2d at 556.
263. See id. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 409-12, 572 A.2d at 552-53.
266. 288 Md. 61, 415 A.2d 1126 (1980).
267. Id. at 66, 415 A.2d at 1128-29.
268. See id. at 62, 415 A.2d at 1126-27.
269. See Brady v. State, 46 Md. App. 518, 521, 419 A.2d 390, 391 (1980).
270. 291 Md. 261, 434 A.2d 574 (1981).
271. Id. at 263, 434 A.2d at 575.
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that the State violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial.272
Thus, Maryland precedents "leave no room for the single factor
approach. , 27
3
Although Bailey purported to follow the balancing test,274 it is
difficult to read the majority opinion as strictly adhering to a multi-
factor approach. The bulk of the court's analysis was devoted to
examining the three interests that are the basis of evaluating actual
prejudice. 275 The court declared that "the peculiar circumstances
of this case, considered in the light of the factors to be assessed,
were sufficient to outweigh, in the balance, any prejudice, actual and
presumed, arising from the length of the delay. ' 276 Although the
majority purportedly balanced all four factors, the absence of ex-
press consideration of the other factors, in contrast with the opin-
ion's full discussion of actual prejudice, indicates an emphasis on
actual prejudice that departs from the court's previous applications
of the balancing test.
Because the right to a speedy trial is by nature so amorphous,
and determining speedy trial questions is so imprecise, the results of
these cases are necessarily fact specific. For that reason, Bailey's ap-
parent emphasis on actual prejudice probably will not substantially
influence future cases. The approach in Bailey should be narrowly
interpreted to apply to its particular facts.
b. The Nolle Prosequi.-The Bailey majority avoided deciding
what effect a nol pros has on the speedy-trial clock.277 The Supreme
Court has indicated that the prosecution's dismissal of an indict-
ment permanently tolls the speedy-trial clock's running as to that
indictment, provided the prosecution acted in good faith.278 The
272. See id. at 269, 434 A.2d at 578.
273. Brady 1, 288 Md. at 67, 415 A.2d at 1129.
274. As the court observed in its opinion:
Common to all speedy trial cases decided by the Supreme Court and this Court
is the recognition ... that the balancing test adopted by the Supreme Court is
difficult to apply, no one factor being dispositive. All the cases emphasize that
in the determination of the speedy trial question, each case rests on its own
facts. The determination must be made upon an overall view of the circum-
stances peculiar to each particular case.... [N]o one circumstance, such as the
lack of actual prejudice, is controlling in deciding whether the defendant has
been denied a speedy trial. All pertinent factors, including the presumption of
prejudice, must be considered.
319 Md. at 414-15, 572 A.2d at 554-55.
275. See id. at 416-19, 572 A.2d at 555-57.
276. Id. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557.
277. See 319 Md. at 411-12. 572 A.2d at 553.
278. United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982).
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Court of Appeals has followed this rule where Maryland statutory
law providing a right to a speedy trial was allegedly violated. 279 In
Curley v. State,280 the Court of Appeals held that as long as the nol
prosequi's purpose or effect was not to circumvent the statutory
speedy trial requirement, its entry tolled the clock, and the clock
runs anew when new charges are filed. 28 ' Thus, if the prosecution
enters a nol pros for legitimate reasons, any new indictment is
wholly independent of the original for purposes of the statutory
right to a speedy trial.282
Because the statutory speedy trial requirements are distinct
from the constitutional right to a speedy trial,283 the Curley holding
does not necessarily control in the Bailey situation. Nevertheless,
the use of similar principles in constitutionally-based claims is
appropriate.
The Court of Special Appeals viewed the nol pros issue as the
case's central issue. The court reasoned that its outcome "hinged"
on whether the nol pros was legitimate so as to stop the speedy trial
clock until the new charges were filed, in which event the State
would prevail. On the other hand, if the nol pros was not legitimate,
the clock was not tolled and the delay's length was the entire two
year period. Under those circumstances, the defendant would pre-
vail. The Court of Appeals found that even under "the view most
favorable to Bailey"-namely, that the entire period between his
arrest and trial was relevant to the analysis-his sixth amendment
right had not been violated.2 4 Although the delay was sufficiently
long to be "presumptively prejudicial" so as to trigger the balancing
test,28 5 that test yielded a finding of no constitutional violation.
279. See, e.g., Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 474 A.2d 502 (1984); State v. Glenn, 299
Md. 464, 474 A.2d 509 (1984). The relevant statutory provision is Article 27, § 591
(1987), which is implemented by MD. R. 4-271.
280. 299 Md. 449, 474 A.2d 502 (1984).
281. See id. at 462, 474 A.2d at 508; see also Lee v. State, 61 Md. App. 169, 485 A.2d
1014 (1985) (although the negligent misplacement of the defendant's request for dispo-
sition was not done in bad faith, it nonetheless caused the indictment's dismissal, and
cannot be considered equivalent to a good faith dismissal).
282. See Curley, 299 Md. at 462, 474 A.2d at 508; Glenn, 299 Md. at 466-67, 474 A.2d at
511.
283. See State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 657, 516 A.2d. 965, 968 (1986). Unlike statutes
or rules in many other jurisdictions, Maryland's section 591 and rule 4-271 "were not
intended to be codifications of the constitutional speedy trial right but 'stand on differ-
ent legal footing.' " State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 428, 456, 470 A.2d 1269, 1272, 1295
(1984). The statutory provision's chief purpose was to serve as a prophylactic measure
to further society's interest in the prompt disposition of criminal trials. See id.
284. See 319 Md. at 415, 572 A.2d at 555.
285. See id. at 411, 572 A.2d at 553.
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Thus, it is an open question in Maryland whether a legitimate nol
pros stops the clock for constitutionally based claims.
Viewing the delay resulting from nol pros filings in the light
most favorable to defendants broadens the range of cases that trig-
ger the speedy trial analysis. Under the majority's approach, delays
that would not rise to "constitutional dimensions" if a nol pros
stopped the clock may now invoke the balancing test. Courts thus
may be forced unnecessarily to apply the difficult and sensitive bal-
ancing test. The question of how to treat nol proses remains for
future resolution.
4. Conclusion.-In State v. Bailey, the Court of Appeals held that
Bailey was not denied his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial
even though there was a two year and nine day delay between his
arrest and his trial.28 6 In arriving at this conclusion, the majority
emphasized the absence of actual prejudice, rather than conforming
to the traditional analysis of balancing the length of delay, the rea-
son for delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and actual prej-
udice in light of the case's particular circumstances. Despite case
law to the contrary, this could signal that in future cases the Court of
Appeals will give greater weight to the actual prejudice factor.
The court did not decide the effect of a nol pros on the speedy-
trial clock. By assuming that the delay resulting from a nol pros was
chargeable to the State, the court may have expanded the scope of
cases in which the constitutional speedy trial claim is implicated.
The decision leaves this question for future consideration.
Nonetheless, in light of the right's subjectiveness and the bal-
ancing test's nature, Bailey may not significantly alter the manner in
which cases are decided. The outcome of each claim will remain fact
dependent. Perhaps Bailey merely illustrates that in cases mirroring
these facts, courts may apply the balancing test with even greater
flexibility.
D. Loud Noise Statute and the First Amendment
In Eanes v. State,287 a divided Court of Appeals upheld the con-
viction of an anti-abortion protestor prosecuted under a statute288
proscribing "loud and unseemly" noise.289 Though the protestor
286. See id. at 420-21, 572 A.2d at 557.
287. 318 Md. 436, 569 A.2d 604 (1990).
288. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121 (1987).
289. See 318 Md. at 468, 569 A.2d at 619-20. Judge Adkins wrote the court's opinion,
joined by ChiefJudge Murphy and Judges Rodowsky and McAuliffe. See id. at 440, 569
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spoke without amplification, during the daytime, and on a public
sidewalk in downtown Hagerstown, the court held that the statute's
application was constitutional.290
In upholding the statute and the protestor's conviction, the
court treated the statute as a content-neutral restriction on the time,
place, and manner of speech."' The court interpreted the words
"loud and unseemly" to mean "unreasonably loud," and added sev-
eral requirements to the statute as predicates to its enforcement.292
The result is perhaps the first reported decision by a state's highest
court sanctioning a conviction arising from unamplified, constitu-
tionally-protected speech delivered in a traditional public forum,
merely because the speaker spoke too loudly.293
1. The Case.-Jerry Eanes was convicted of violating a Mary-
land statute by disturbing the peace.294 The statute makes it unlaw-
ful for a person to "wilfully disturb any neighborhood .. .by loud
and unseemly noises .... "295 The offense occurred during an anti-
abortion demonstration on a public street in front of a Hagerstown
abortion clinic. 296 The defendant and another man were part of a
small demonstration in front of the clinic, which was located in a
neighborhood containing other businesses and some residential
apartments. Eanes' role was "'to preach the gospel of Jesus
Christ.' "297 Mr. Eanes testified that his intended audience was
"' 'not just ... the people in [the clinic] building .... I was speaking
to the general people that were in that area ...... 298
Although Eanes spoke without amplification equipment, his
voice was quite loud, and several people in the neighborhood com-
plained to police that they were disturbed by the volume of his
preaching. 299 The police warned Eanes to lower his voice, but he
A.2d at 605-06. Judge Eldridge dissented, joined by Judges Cole and Blackwell. See id.
at 469, 500, 569 A.2d at 620, 636.
290. See id. at 468, 569 A.2d at 620.
291. See id. at 449, 569 A.2d at 610. Specifically, the court read the statute as a restric-
tion on the manner (loudness) of expression. See id.
292. See id. The court held that police may act under the statute only upon receiving a
citizen's complaint, and only after warning the speaker. See id. at 463-64, 569 A.2d at
617-18.
293. See id. at 469, 569 A.2d at 620 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
294. See Eanes, 318 Md. at 442, 569 A.2d at 607.
295. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121 (1987).
296. See 318 Md. at 441, 569 A.2d at 606.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 443, 569 A.2d at 607.
299. Id. at 441, 569 A.2d at 606. Witnesses described Eanes' conduct as " 'screaming
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refused, and they arrested him. °0
In the Washington County district court, and later in the circuit
court, Eanes was found guilty of violating the disturbing-the-peace
statute.3 0 1 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari3 o to consider
whether the statute could be "used by the State to limit the volume
level of speech protected by the first amendment to the United
States Constitution.-3 0 3
2. Legal Background and the Court's Reasoning.-
a. Free Speech Generally.-The first amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech
.... ,"4 This command applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 30 5 Despite the amendment's sweeping language, the
Supreme Court has long held "that the state may sometimes curtail
speech when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate
interest. 30 6
The first step in evaluating a speech restriction's constitutional-
ity is determining whether the restriction affects "protected
speech. ' "' The Constitution does not protect all speech.30 8 Cer-
tain categories of speech "are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
without screeching,' 'shouting and screaming,' 'yelling and screaming at the top of his
voice.'" Id. at 442, 569 A.2d at 607.
300. See id., 569 A.2d at 606.
301. See id., 569 A.2d at 607; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121 (1987).
302. See Eanes v. State, 315 Md. 223, 554 A.2d 351 (1989).
303. 318 Md. at 440, 569 A.2d at 606. The decision considered only the first amend-
ment, and not the "similar guarantee under Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights." Id. at 440 n.1, 569 A.2d at 606 n.1.
304. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
305. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (New York "anarchy" statute did
not violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech).
306. City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (upholding the
Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibiting posting signs on public property) (citing
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
307. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988) (describing
the "two-track" approach to first amendment analysis, which divides speech into pro-
tected and unprotected classes). But see Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Stan-
dards for the Free Speech Clause, 19 ARIz. ST. LJ. 195 (1987) (criticizing the two-tier
approach).
308. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.").
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social interest in order and morality. ' 30 9 For example, speech likely
to precipitate violence ("fighting words") is not constitutionally
protected. 1t
The State's ability to restrict speech also depends upon the fo-
rum in which the speech takes place. The Supreme Court applies
the highest scrutiny to regulation of speech in forums that are tradi-
tional places for public speech."1 ' Thus, speech delivered in public
streets and parks "which by long tradition or by government fiat
have been devoted to assembly and debate" is protected by a higher
standard than speech delivered elsewhere. 1 2
Speech restrictions are also differentiated by whether they are
"content-based" ' 13 or "content-neutral." ' 4 Regulation that is con-
tent-based is subject to strict scrutiny,31 5 while regulations that re-
strict speech without regard to its content receive a lesser degree of
scrutiny.31 6
b. Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech.-The State may restrict
the time, place, and manner of speech to serve legitimate govern-
ment interests.31 7 In order to meet constitutional standards, these
restrictions must be neutral in content, narrowly tailored to serve a
309. Id.
310. See id.; Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982) (describing "fighting
words" and obscenity doctrine as applied in Maryland); Reese v. State, 17 Md. App. 73,
81-83, 299 A.2d 848, 854-55 (1973) (differentiating fighting words from words that are
merely "annoying"); Lynch v. State, 2 Md. App. 546, 561, 236 A.2d 45, 54 (1967) (in-
flammatory racial speeches were fighting words because they presented a "clear and
present danger" of inciting violence and thus were not protected by the first amend-
ment). But see Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 617-18, 366 A.2d 41, 46 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 974 (1977) (verbal slurs against blacks and police officers directed to no one in
particular held not to be fighting words). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 307, §§ 12-8 to
-10.
311. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 307,
§ 12-24.
312. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (preferential access to interschool mail and teachers'
mailboxes did not violate the first amendment).
313. See id.
314. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
315. See id.
316. The doctrine of content-neutral regulation of protected speech was recently re-
stated in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2754 (1989); see infra notes 319-
322 and accompanying text. For a description of the doctrine's development and help-
ful analysis see generally Day, supra note 307.
317. See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753-54; see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
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significant government interest, and allow ample alternatives for
expression. 1 8
The Supreme Court recently discussed the doctrine of content-
neutral restrictions in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 19 The City of
New York passed an ordinance requiring groups using the Central
Park bandshell to follow certain procedures.3 "' The Court upheld
the ordinance as a valid content-neutral regulation.3 2' The Ward
decision stated that the test for content neutrality was "whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagree-
ment with the message it conveys .... The government's purpose is
the controlling consideration .... Government regulation of ex-
pressive activity is content-neutral so long as it is 'justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.' "22
A wide variety of government interests support content-neutral
regulation of speech. These have included prevention of visual clut-
ter on public property, 23 control of "secondary effects" sur-
rounding adult movie houses, 2 4 protection of children from
indecent radio broadcasts,3 25 and protection of the privacy of other
citizens.3 26
In addition to serving a significant government interest, a con-
tent-neutral regulation of speech must be "narrowly tailored," de-
fined as "not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
318. See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753-54; see also Landover Books v. Prince George's
County, 81 Md. App. 54, 72, 566 A.2d 792, 801 (1989).
319. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
320. Id. at 2751-53. The ordinance required those using the bandshell also to use the
City's amplification equipment and City personnel to operate it. See id. at 2752.
321. See id. at 2753.
322. Id. at 2754 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 466 U.S.
288, 293 (1984) (other citations omitted)).
323. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 794 (1984) (cardboard
campaign signs on public utility poles).
324. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (statute upheld
prohibiting adult movie theatres within 1000 feet of any residential dwelling, church,
park, or school); Landover Books v. Prince George's County, 81 Md. App. 54, 566 A.2d
792 (1989) (zoning ordinance prohibiting adult bookstore within 1000 feet of any resi-
dential zone, school, library, park or recreation facility, or church was upheld as content-
neutral); 5297 Pulaski Hwy., Inc. v. Town of Perryville, 69 Md. App. 590, 519 A.2d 206
(1987) (ordinance upheld requiring application for conditional use permit for adult
bookstores).
325. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(afternoon broadcast of words describing sexual and excretory activities).
326. See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (picketing a
personal residence); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (demonstrations
disrupting a school); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound trucks).
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government's interest. "327 This test allows the government consid-
erable leeway. As stated in Ward, "a regulation of time, place, or
manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate content-neutral interests but it . . .need
not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means of [achieving the
desired ends]."' 28
The Supreme Court has held that in order to be valid, a restric-
tion governing time, place, and manner of speech must provide am-
ple alternatives for communication of the ideas that are incidentally
restricted. 29 The Court has never rejected a statute for failing this
test, nor has it provided much guidance in how the test applies. For
example, in Ward, the Court stated that the guideline in question
met this requirement because it had "no effect on the quantity or
content of that expression beyond regulating the extent of amplifi-
cation."330 Moreover, the Court stated that "there has been no
showing that the remaining avenues of communication are
inadequate. '
'13 l
c. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals found that the
disturbing-the-peace statute was a constitutionally valid restriction
on the time, place, and manner of speech, both generally and as
applied to Eanes. 3 2 In the court's view, the statute was justified by
the substantial government interest in protecting the privacy of citi-
327. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753.
328. Id. at 2757-58. But see Sable Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989) (statute denying all access to "dial-a-porn" serv-
ices not sufficiently narrow to meet legitimate end of protecting children).
329. See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753.
330. Id. at 2760.
331. Id. (citing City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 & n.23, 812
& n.30 (1984); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949)). The range of alternatives
that the Court has approved suggests that almost any "reasonable alternative" will sat-
isfy the test. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) (alternatives to picket-
ing a single residence were adequate; the picketers were generally free to picket in the
neighborhood or to picket at places of business); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (zoning regulations upheld restricting adult movie theaters
to certain areas; the areas set aside did not deny the theater owners "a reasonable op-
portunity to open and operate an adult theater."); Clark v. Community For Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-95 (1984) (restrictions on camping in certain areas
upheld; the availability of other areas set aside for camping were adequate for whatever
expressive purpose the act of sleeping might serve). But see Young v. American Mini
Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976) (cautioning against using restrictive zoning to
suppress speech).
332. See Eanes, 318 Md. at 468, 569 A.2d at 620; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121
(1987). The court was untroubled by a prior decision, Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451
A.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983), in which it construed § 121 as a
content-based regulation. The court did not overrule Diehl, but held that case applicable
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zens who find themselves a "captive audience." ' The court re-
quired, however, that the police warn the speaker prior to an arrest,
and that such action be taken "only upon receipt of a complaint
from an affected citizen," which forms the basis for a reasonable be-
lief that the statute has been violated. 3 4 The court upheld Eanes'
conviction because these steps were taken, and the state successfully
proved that Eanes' voice was so loud under the circumstances as to
be unreasonably intrusive. 3 5
The court also rejected Eanes' claim that the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague.3 3 ' Though the court conceded that the statute's
"loud and unseemly" language was imprecise, it held that this
phrase meant "unreasonably loud in the circumstances," and found
constitutionally permissible this sort of objective, normative
standard. 3 7
3. Analysis.-The Eanes court upheld a statute regulating pro-
tected speech, even though the speech took place in the traditional
public forum of a public street corner. In applying the content-neu-
tral doctrine, the court faced several strong arguments against the
statute's constitutionality. First, the court previously treated the
statute as content-based rather than content-neutral.3 3 8 Second, the
Supreme Court never had applied content-neutral noise volume
regulation to the unamplified human voice.33 9 Third, the statute ar-
guably was vague and violated the "narrowly tailored" requirement
for content-neutral regulation. In upholding Eanes' conviction over
these arguments, the court took considerable liberty in construing
the statutory language and in applying the narrowness, vagueness,
and captive-audiences doctrines.
a. Content Neutrality.-The statute enforced against Eanes pro-
hibited "loud and unseemly noise. "340 The court's logic in deter-
only when the state uses § 121 to "regulate the content of speech." 318 Md. at 444, 569
A.2d at 608.
333. See id. at 449-51, 569 A.2d at 610-11.
334. See id. at 464, 569 A.2d at 617-18.
335. See id. at 468, 569 A.2d at 620.
336. See id. at 458-64, 569 A.2d at 615-18.
337. See id. at 461-63, 569 A.2d at 616-17.
338. See Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098
(1983).
339. "The Supreme Court has never held that the government has a legitimate inter-
est in controlling the volume of unamplified political or social speech delivered in an
appropriate place and at an appropriate time." 318 Md. at 478-79, 569 A.2d at 625
(Eldridge, J., dissenting).
340. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121 (1987).
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mining that the statute was content-neutral centered on its
construction of this phrase as meaning "unreasonably loud." ''
This construction served two purposes. First, by reading "un-
seemly" as "unreasonable," and linking it directly to the word
"loud," the court was able to construe the statute as regulating only
the volume, and not the content, of speech. 42 The construction
also distinguished Eanes from prior decisions, particularly Diehl v.
State,14s in which the prohibition against "loud and unseemly noise"
was treated as a content-based restriction. In Diehl, the defendant
screamed profanity at a policeman. 44 The court explicitly consid-
ered the content of his speech, and held that "Diehl's conduct must
have advocated imminent lawless action and been likely to incite a
breach of the peace in order to be proscribable by the State. 345
The Eanes court recognized that Diehl treated the statute as con-
tent-based. 46 It insisted, however, that in Eanes the statutory lan-
guage could be treated as content-neutral without overruling its
prior decisions.3 47 This is troubling because it leaves the statute
facially valid both as a content-based regulation and a content-neu-
tral regulation. If the arrest was based on volume alone, then "loud
and unseemly" means "unreasonably loud," and the conviction's
constitutionality is tested by the relatively lenient content-neutral
standard. If, however, the conviction was based on the speech's ob-
jectionable content, then "loud and unseemly" continues to mean
"loud and unseemly," and the conviction is tested by the much
more speech-protective standards that apply to content-based re-
strictions. As the dissent noted, "[t]his is a great deal of flexibility
for three little words.
'5 48
b. Significant Government Interest.-To support its decision, the
court relied on the government's interest in protecting "captive
audiences." According to the court, " [t]he notion of 'captive audi-
ence' involves the problem of the unwilling listener or viewer who
341. See 318 Md. at 449, 569 A.2d at 610.
342. See id.
343. 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983).
344. See id. at 468, 451 A.2d at 116.
345. Id. at 472, 451 A.2d at 119.
346. See 318 Md. at 444-55, 569 A.2d at 608.
347. See id. at 445, 569 A.2d at 608 ("We did not in (Diehl], however, consider the
argument the State at present raises before us: that the statute serves as a constitution-
ally valid content-neutral regulation of the volume level of protected speech.").
348. Id. at 488-89, 569 A.2d at 630 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). "How such flexibility
can be deemed to constitute a 'narrowly tailored' regulation of speech is beyond my
comprehension." Id.
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cannot readily escape from the undesired communication, or whose
own rights are such that he or she should not be required to do
so."
'3 4 9
The Supreme Court first used this doctrine to permit regulating
amplified sound trucks operating in urban areas.35 0 Without such
regulations, "in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and tran-
quility so desirable for city dwellers would . . .be at the mercy of
advocates of particular religious, social or political persuasions."' 5 '
Since then, the captive audience doctrine has been applied to pro-
tect schools from disturbing noises, 52 to bar certain advertisements
in city buses, 5 3 and to prohibit radio broadcast of indecent mate-
rial. 54 But the Supreme Court has been quite clear in pointing out
that a person is not captive if there are reasonable means of avoid-
ing unwanted communications.3 55
The novelty of Eanes' application of the "captive audience" doc-
trine lies in the fact that Eanes spoke without mechanical amplifica-
tion.3 56 Because amplified speech carries greater potential for
disruption than unamplified speech, prior anti-noise cases stressed
the potential intrusiveness on unwilling listeners of amplified
sound. 5 7 Nevertheless, the court explicitly rejected the notion
"that amplification is a constitutional sine qua non."358
349. Id. at 451, 569 A.2d at 611 (citing Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not
To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 153, 195-97 (1972) ("suppression of the communica-
tion itself should thus be viewed as a last resort when less restrictive alternatives have
failed.")).
350. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78 (1948) (ordinance prohibited "loud and
raucous noises" generated by amplifiers attached to motor vehicles); see also Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 (1948) (concerning loudspeaker permits); Note, Too Close for
Comfort: Protesting Outside Medical Facilities, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1856 (1988); Comment,
"I'll Defend to the Death Your Right to Say It... But Not to Me"-The Captive Audience Corollary
to the First Amendment, 1983 S. ILL. U.L.J. 211 (1983).
351. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87.
352. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
353. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (political advertising).
354. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
355. See, e.g., Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (ban on drive-in
movies containing nudity not valid because people could look away from the screen);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (people in a courtroom are not captive audi-
ences to inscriptions written on another's clothing).
356. See 318 Md. at 441, 569 A.2d at 606.
357. See, e.g., Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Only a disregard of
vital differences between natural speech, even of the loudest spellbinders, and the noise of
sound trucks would give sound trucks the constitutional rights accorded to the unaided
human voice." (emphasis added)); see also Reeves v. McConn, 638 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.
1981) (speaker of obscene or indecent words protected only when using unamplified
voice).
358. 318 Md. at 456, 569 A.2d at 614.
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The Eanes decision also expands the scope of the captive audi-
ence doctrine in Maryland, by applying it to speech delivered in a
traditional public forum. If people living and working in a commer-
cial district during working hours are a captive audience deserving
protection, then there seems to be no time or place where the "un-
reasonably loud" speech would be lawful. As the dissent argued,
the statute could be applied to noisy political demonstrations
outside the Maryland State House in Annapolis. 59
c. Narrowly Tailored.-The concepts of "narrowness" and
"vagueness" are closely related. Narrowness, which is a first
amendment requirement, means that the government must choose a
means of regulation that "targets and eliminates no more than the
exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy. '3 60 A statute is uncon-
stitutionally vague under the fourteenth amendment if it fails to give
"fair notice" to those who might fall under its jurisdiction, or if it
fails to give sufficient direction to enforcement authorities, possibly
leading to arbitrary enforcement.3 6'
The Eanes court held that the "reasonable volume" standard
was not unconstitutionally vague: "[a] law is not vague simply be-
cause it requires conformity to an imprecise normative standard.-3 62
The court added a warning requirement to the statute because "a
speaker exercising the legitimate rights of free speech may be una-
ware that his or her volume has reached a prohibitive level and has
become unlawfully disruptive. "363
The court also added a requirement that "police may act under
this statute only upon receipt of a complaint from an affected citizen
upon the basis of which the officer reasonably believes that the stat-
ute has been violated. ' '" 3 ' This requirement was intended to pre-
vent the statute from conferring "impermissible discretion" on
"Eanes would have it that a speaker could stand in front of a residence at two
o'clock in the morning and shout at top volume as long as he or she pleased[,]
provided a message was being conveyed. We disagree. If the State is able to
prove that, under the circumstances, the human voice is so unreasonably loud
as to be unreasonably intrusive on a captive audience, that is enough. .... Cap-
tive auditors in their homes and places of business need not become an unwill-
ing congregation for Eanes's street-preaching."
Id. at 456-57, 569 A.2d at 614 (citation omitted).
359. See id. at 474, 569 A.2d at 622-23 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
360. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984).
361. See 318 Md. at 458-59, 569 A.2d at 615. For a discussion of Maryland's vague-
ness doctrine, see Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 389 A.2d 341 (1978).
362. 318 Md. at 459, 569 A.2d at 615.
363. Id. at 463, 569 A.2d at 617.
364. Id. at 464, 569 A.2d at 617-18.
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enforcement officers. 65 The dissent suggested that the require-
ment provides little protection, and noted that "[w]hen a particular
speech is unpopular or unusual, I doubt that it will be difficult to
find an affected citizen to complain, ostensibly because of the sound
level." 66
With regard to the requirement that restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of speech be narrowly tailored, the majority
maintained that the statute "is tailored to respond to the individual
circumstances and, as it is here construed, to regulate only that con-
duct which on balance can appropriately be limited consistent with
the first amendment .. ".. ,36' The Court confused the vagueness
doctrine with the requirement for narrow tailoring, and failed to
conduct the type of analysis suggested by leading Supreme Court
cases.
3 68
The Supreme Court held a statute to be narrowly tailored if it
addressed particular places, or times, or manners in which particular
means of communication would be regulated. In Ward, for example,
the ordinance at issue regulated use of amplified sound equipment
in a Central Park bandshell, a specific and narrowly defined means
to protect the Park's neighbors from concert noise.3 69 By contrast,
the statute at issue in Eanes does not regulate any specific time,
place, or manner of speech.37 ' This flexibility is inconsistent with
the requirement for narrow tailoring.
d. Alternative Means of Communication.-The Eanes majority
found that the statute allowed ample alternative means of communi-
cation.37 "Nothing in [the statute] prevents a speaker from orally
addressing passersby, or from distributing literature or carrying a
sign which expresses his or her viewpoint. '"72 Although Eanes had
365. See id., 569 A.2d at 618.
366. See id. at 475, 569 A.2d at 623 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). For a general discussion
of the government's pretextual use of facially neutral regulations, see L. TRIBE, supra
note 307, at § 12-5 to -6.
367. 318 Md. at 457-58, 569 A.2d at 614.
368. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757-58 (1989); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-88 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
369. See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2756; see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483 (regulation prohibited
only picketing directed at a single residence "proceed[ing] on a definite course or route
in front of a home").
370. The court described the statute as regulating the "manner" of communication as
it is "informed" by the elements of time and place. 318 Md. at 449, 569 A.2d at 610.
371. See id. at 458, 569 A.2d at 614.
372. Id., 569 A.2d at 614-15. Thus, the court concluded "[tihat a speaker's potential
aural audience may be limited by the inability to stand outside a residence or business
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alternatives, he was engaged in "the most basic form of free
speech, '3 7 3 and the alternatives are arguably less effective ways of
communicating his ideas.
4. Conclusion.-In Eanes, the Court of Appeals applied ques-
tionable first amendment analysis to a general disturbing-the-peace
statute. Public speakers in Maryland, whose speech is constitution-
ally protected and delivered in a traditional public forum, should
not be held criminally liable merely for speaking in an unreasonably
loud manner.
E. Employee Drug Testing
In City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local
400 17 the Court of Appeals ruled that a mandatory suspicionless
drug testing program targeting government employees withstood
constitutional scrutiny.375 The court held that the city's proposed
program for testing its police and fire fighters did not violate the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.376 The court found that employees had a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy because they already had consented to
urinalyses during routine physical examinations.377 The court
adopted reasoning similar to that applied by the Supreme Court in
the companion cases of National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab 3 7' and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association 179 decided
earlier in the year.
1. The Case.-In Annapolis, uniformed police and fire fighters
must undergo periodic physical examinations to ensure in light of
their occupational demands that they continue to be fit and in good
health. 3 0 The examination includes urinalysis to detect medical ail-
and scream a message to the unwilling listener therein is of little consequence when
there are ample alternative channels of conveying that communication which have not
been shown to be inadequate." Id., 569 A.2d at 615.
373. Id. at 492, 569 A.2d at 631 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
374. 317 Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989).
375. See id. at 566, 565 A.2d at 683.
376. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause ...." Id.
377. See 317 Md. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676.
378. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
379. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
380. United Food and Commercial Workers, 317 Md. at 545-46, 565 A.2d at 672-73.
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ments. In September 1986, the City initiated a program to further
test the urine samples for the presence of illegal drugs;38 ' all col-
lected samples would be tested without individualized suspicion that
an employee uses drugs.38 2 The new examination would occur an-
nually, and employees would be given adequate notice of its exact
time. 3
Notwithstanding their support of improved safety and efficiency
in the work environment, unions representing police and fire fight-
ers disagreed with the City over the proposal's details.38 4 Frustrated
by the stalemate, the City filed a complaint with the Maryland Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service38 1 in October 1987, alleging that the
unions were breaching their collective bargaining agreements by
failing to negotiate in good faith.3 8 6 After a hearing, the Mediation
Service found constitutional the mandatory, suspicionless drug test-
ing because the employees already submitted to testing pursuant to
their periodic physical examinations.3 8 After concluding that the
two sides would never reach an agreement, the Mediation Service
informed the City that it could execute its plan.
The unions sought judicial review of the ruling in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County, asking the court to enjoin the pro-
gram's implementation and to remand the case to the Mediation
Service with instructions to order further negotiations.38 8 After de-
381. Id.
382. Id. at 545, 565 A.2d at 672.
383. Id. at 546, 565 A.2d at 673. According to the plan, the examination would be
scheduled during the employee's "birthday" month, with 30 days prior notice of the
examination week, and 48 hours notice of the exact time. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id. at 546-47, 565 A.2d at 673. The Maryland Mediation and Conciliation
Service (the Mediation Service) is authorized to act on behalf of the Commissioner of
Labor and Industry to investigate labor disputes and to mediate them if the dispute
"may result in a strike or lockout." MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 3 (1985).
386. 317 Md. at 547, 565 A.2d at 673. The City filed the complaint pursuant to the
Annapolis City Code, which prohibits a union from refusing to negotiate with the City in
good faith-an unfair labor practice. See ANNAPOLIS, MD., Crrv CODE § 3.32.070(A)
(1986). The Code also authorizes the Mediation Service to hear all claims of unfair
labor practices. See id. § 3.32.070(B).
387. 317 Md. at 548, 565 A.2d at 674.
388. See id., 565 A.2d at 673-74. The unions maintained that the program was uncon-
stitutional under both the state and federal constitutions because it lacked a reasonable
suspicion requirement for testing. See id. For the text of the Maryland constitutional
provision, see infra note 398. The unions claimed that the Maryland Administrative Pro-
cedure Act gave the court authority to review the decision. See 317 Md. at 548, 565 A.2d
at 674 (citing MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -217 (1984 & Supp. 1990)).
The circuit court disagreed with the unions, concluding that the Mediation Service's
ruling was not appealable because the Service was not an agency "authorized by law to
adjudicate contested cases." 317 Md. at 548, 565 A.2d at 674; see MD. STATE Gov'T
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termining that the drug testing constituted a "search ' 3 8 9 under the
fourth amendment, the circuit court applied a balancing test, weigh-
ing the employee's privacy interests against the legitimate govern-
mental interests.3 9 0 The court concluded that the testing violated
the fourth amendment because there was neither individualized sus-
picion nor generalized suspicion of a drug problem in the work
force.5 9' Consequently, it granted the unions' request for a writ of
mandamus enjoining the program's implementation. 9 2
The City appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari
prior to review by the Court of Special Appeals because of the con-
stitutional issues involved. 93 The Court of Appeals relied heavily
on the Von Raab and Skinner opinions and reversed the lower court's
decision. 94
2. Legal Background.-
a. Defining a "Search."-The fourth amendment protects citi-
zens from certain kinds of searches.3 95 In Katz v. United States,396 the
CODE ANN. § 10-201 (b)(1), (2) (1984). Despite this determination, the circuit court is-
sued a writ of mandamus enjoining the program's implementation. See 317 Md. at 548-
49, 565 A.2d at 674.
389. See id. at 549, 565 A.2d at 674. The Court of Appeals, with little discussion,
agreed with this aspect of the circuit court decision, deferring to the Supreme Court's
judgment in Skinner that urine testing invades an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy. See id. at 551, 565 A.2d at 675. The Skinner opinion, in turn, drew support from
the conclusion reached unanimously by the federal Courts of Appeals that urine testing
is a "search" under the fourth amendment. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 617-18 n.4.
In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom.
Penny v. Kennedy, 915 F.2d 1065 (1990) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit reasoned:
The act of urinating is one of the most private of all activities. The subjective
expectation of privacy felt by many individuals when urinating is undoubtedly
one that society is prepared to consider reasonable. There are few other times
where individuals insist as strongly and universally that they be let alone to act
in private. Furthermore, the information that may be gleaned from the analysis
of an individual's urine compels the conclusion that a mandatory urinalysis,
whether directly observed or not, constitutes a "search" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.
Id. at 1542-43.
390. See 317 Md. at 549, 565 A.2d at 674.
391. See id. at 550, 565 A.2d at 675.
392. See id. at 548-49, 565 A.2d at 674.
393. See id. at 550, 565 A.2d at 675.
394. See id. at 567, 565 A.2d at 683.
395. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For the text of the fourth amendment, see supra note
376.
396. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (forbidding introduction of evidence secured without a
search warrant by attaching a listening device to a public phone booth).
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Supreme Court defined a "search" as any invasion wherein the per-
son had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the thing
searched.397 In a similar provision, article 26 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights prohibits issuance of general warrants, and war-
rants without oath or affirmation;398 it is construed in the same way
as the fourth amendment.399 Decisions involving federal constitu-
tional rights are very persuasive, though not controlling, authority
for interpreting the state constitution and state statutes.4 °0
In Jones v. McKenzie,4° t the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia decided that urinalysis testing government
employees for drugs constitutes two searches: (1) invading the pri-
vacy surrounding the act of urination itself, and (2) intruding upon
the personal matters revealed by the analysis of the sample.40 2 Rely-
ing on this approach, the Court of Appeals in United Food and Com-
mercial Workers analyzed both intrusions.403
b. Breaking Away from the Probable Cause Requirement.-
(1) Extenuating Circumstances.-Generally, the Supreme Court
has adopted a strict reading of the fourth amendment's text, invali-
dating any search conducted without a warrant based on probable
cause.40 4 In a select group of cases, 40 5 the Court relaxed this stan-
397. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
398. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 26. Article 26 provides:
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to
seize any person or property, are grevious [grievous] and oppressive; and all
general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected per-
sons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are ille-
gal, and ought not to be granted.
Id. (brackets in original).
399. See Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 382, 51 A. 26, 29 (1902) (noting the fourth and
fifth amendments to the United States Constitution, and articles 26 and 22 of Maryland's
Declaration of Rights are intimately related, and shed great light on each other).
400. See Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 322, 430 A.2d 49, 55 (1981); see also Lambert v.
State, 196 Md. 57, 62, 75 A.2d 327, 329 (1950) ("decisions of the Supreme Court on the
kindred 4th Amendment are entitled to great respect").
401. 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom. Jenkins v.Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633
(1989).
402. See id. at 340 n. 11. Because of this double intrusion, the court reasoned that the
employee's privacy interest was not diminished by the mere fact that tests were con-
ducted in the privacy of a restroom. See id.
403. See 317 Md. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676.
404. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding unconstitutional the
warrantless search of a suspect's home in the absence of exigent circumstances); Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) ("murder scene" exception to the fourth and fourteenth
amendments is not consistent with those amendments, and does not justify a four day
warrantless search of the suspect's apartment).
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dard when extenuating circumstances surrounded the search. Thus,
in the leading case of Terry v. Ohio,40 6 the Court found it permissible
for a police officer to "frisk" a subject without probable cause to
arrest, so long as the officer's suspicion was reasonable and based
on objective, relevant facts.40 7 The Terry decision's important legacy
is its articulation of a two-tier test for determining the "reasonable-
ness" of a search: (1) whether the search is "justified at its incep-
tion;"'4 °8 and (2) whether the search is "reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."' 40 9 The Terry test has been used to determine the reasona-
bleness of other searches conducted without probable cause, includ-
ing the reasonableness of drug testing.4 10
(2) "Special Needs. "-Within the last five years, the Supreme
Court has carved out of the probable cause requirement another
category of exceptions. In New Jersey v. T.L.O. ,41 the Court upheld a
school administrator's right to inspect a student's personal belong-
ings based on the administrator's reasonable suspicion that she had
violated a school rule.412 Even though the Court recognized that
the fourth amendment applies to civil searches, 41 1 it was willing to
405. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (validating an inventory search
conducted after a vehicle was legally impounded; the search was conducted to protect
the owner's interest in the property, and to protect the police from false claims of theft);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (allowing an automobile search
carried out at a fixed checkpoint along the national border); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (upholding the constitutionality of a search incident to a lawful
arrest conducted without probable cause or reasonable suspicion).
406. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
407. See id. at 21-22 ("in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be
judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the mo-
ment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that
the action taken was appropriate?"). The Court of Appeals has approved the use in
Maryland of the Terry reasonableness standard. See State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 367
A.2d 1223 (1977) (using the Terry standard, but holding that it was not met if the officer
was searching for evidence of a crime, and physical safety concerns were not apparent).
408. 392 U.S. at 20.
409. Id.
410. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1544 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated
sub nom. Penny v. Kennedy, 915 F.2d 1065 (1990) (en banc).
411. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
412. See id. at 327-28. The student was taken to the principal's office because she was
allegedly caught smoking in the lavatory. Id. at 328. The student denied that she had
been smoking and claimed that she did not smoke at all. The assistant vice-principal
opened the student's purse and found not only the package of cigarettes but cigarette
rolling paper. Based on this discovery, he further examined her purse and uncovered
marijuana, other drug paraphernalia, a large amount of money, and some incriminating
papers indicating that the student was involved in the sale of illegal drugs. See id.
413. See id. at 335.
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accept a lesser standard of reasonableness when "public interest"
demanded it.4" 4 Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, cau-
tioned that the balancing test is the exceptional standard for fourth
amendment review, 4' 5 but in certain cases, "special needs" greater
than mere law enforcement render the probable cause standard
unworkable.41 6
Two years later in O'Connor v. Ortega,4 1 7 the Court found a "spe-
cial need" in government workplaces.41 8 An employee suspected of
various wrongdoings stored some personal items in his office. 4 19
While the employee was on compulsory administrative leave, his su-
pervisor searched the office without the employee's knowledge or
consent, on the pretext that an inventory of government property
was in progress.42 ° Upon review, the Court, citing the T.L.O. opin-
ion, agreed with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit42' that
an employee has an expectation of privacy even when civil authori-
ties conduct the search.422 Nevertheless, it remanded the case be-
cause it found that the employee's expectation of privacy may be
reduced by actual office procedure, or by valid government
regulations.423
It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth Amendment was pri-
marily directed was the resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary practice of using
general warrants or 'writs of assistance' to authorize searches for contraband by
officers of the Crown. But this Court has never limited the Amendment's pro-
hibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by the
police.
Id. (citations omitted).
414. See id. at 341. In balancing the student's privacy interest against the school's
need to retain order and control, the Court determined that requiring a warrant "would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the schools." Id. at 340.
415. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
416. Id. Specifically, school supervisors lacked the requisite knowledge to make a
judgment regarding the existence of probable cause. See id. at 353 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
417. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
418. See id. at 725.
419. Id. at 712-13.
420. Id. The employee, a doctor at a state hospital, was suspected of improprieties in
his supervision of the psychiatric residency program, including sexual harassment and
unsuitable disciplinary actions. See id. at 712. Although the hospital initially claimed
that the search was conducted as part of a routine state property inventory, there was no
policy of inventorying the offices of employees who were on administrative leave. Id. at
713. Moreover, the papers were simply stored in boxes, and a formal inventory was
never conducted. Id. at 714.
421. The Court of Appeals concluded without explanation that the search was uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 714.
422. See id. at 715; supra note 413.
423. See id. at 717. The Court decided that a case by case analysis was proper because
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The O'Connor Court balanced public employees' privacy inter-
ests in respect to their possessions with the "realities of the work-
place." '424 The Court decided that in this context a probable cause
requirement was neither warranted nor feasible.425 Applying the
Terry standard of reasonableness, the Court determined that the
search was "justified at its inception ' 426 because the employer had
individualized suspicion of the employee's wrongdoings. Neverthe-
less, it remanded the case to determine whether the scope of the
intrusion was reasonable.427
The "special needs" doctrine also arose in Griffin v. Wisconsin,42 s
wherein the Court allowed probation officers acting pursuant to a
state regulation to search without a warrant a probationer's
home. 4 29 The search ensued after a tip from a police officer led the
probation department to conclude that "reasonable grounds" ex-
isted to surmise that the probationer illegally possessed contra-
band.4"' In this case, the government's interests in the
probationer's rehabilitation and the protection of the community
encompassed a "special need."' 431 Unlike a police officer, a proba-
tion officer is presumed to have his charge's best interests in
mind.432 Moreover, a probationer has a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy than a citizen free from the penal system's constraints.433 The
Court decided that requiring a warrant would hamper a quick re-
sponse to suspected misconduct;434 likewise, a probable cause re-
some government offices may be so open that employees would have no reasonable
expectation of privacy. See id. at 718.
424. Id. at 72 1. The Court suggested that "realities of the workplace" might include a
co-worker's need to retrieve work-related files or correspondence, and routine inven-
tories performed to secure state property. See id. at 721-22.
425. See id. at 725.
426. Id. at 726. But the Court declined to decide whether a search could be reason-
able absent individualized suspicion. See id. But see National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (validating a suspicionless drug testing program).
427. See 480 U.S. at 727-29 (the lower court's grant of summary judgment was inap-
propriate because the record was inadequate to assess the reasonableness of the search
and the parties disputed its justification).
428. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
429. See id. at 870-71. The regulation permits a probation officer to search a proba-
tioner's home without a warrant, subject to supervisory approval, and based on reason-
able grounds that the probationer possesses contraband in violation of her probation.
See id.
430. Id. at 871.
431. See id. at 875.
432. Id. at 876.
433. Id. at 874.
434. See id. at 876.
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quirement would hamper the regulation's deterrent effect. 43 5
Finding the regulation constitutional, the Court declined to decide
whether any search was lawful if based on "reasonable grounds. 43 6
In Von Raab and Skinner, the Court expanded the "special
needs" doctrine into the drug testing arena. The Court used three
factors to support incorporating drug testing into the doctrine: (1)
the search's civil nature; (2) the search's non-discretionary nature;
and (3) the existence of a particular scenario that diminished the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.43 7 In Von Raab, the
Court validated a program that required drug testing of any United
States Customs personnel who sought promotion into areas that in-
volved drug interdiction or carrying firearms. 438 Garnering support
from the "special needs" precedent, the Court decreed that the
Customs Service's duties would be jeopardized if the Service were
required to obtain search warrants for "routine, yet sensitive, em-
ployment decisions. ' '4 39 Because only employees seeking promo-
tion were tested, the Court conjectured that affected employees had
prior knowledge of the regulations and that a warrant requirement
would not more effectively protect the employee's privacy inter-
est. 44 ' The Court defended the suspicionless search not as a re-
sponse to evidence of a departmental drug problem, but as a
response to a national dilemma.44 ' An angry dissent chastised the
majority for allowing the Government to flout fourth amendment
protections in order to make a point about the seriousness of our
nation's drug problem.442
435. See id. at 878.
436. See id. at 880.
437. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-68,
671-72 (1989).
438. See id. at 679. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated
the district court injunction and found that a customs agent using drugs would be sus-
ceptible to bribery and blackmail, and would be tempted to divert for his own use seized
contraband. Moreover, a drug-impaired agent carrying a firearm could endanger him-
self, fellow agents, and the public. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
816 F.2d 170, 178 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 489 U.S.
656 (1989).
439. 489 U.S. at 667. Once again, the Court drew attention to the non-criminal na-
ture of the search, and emphasized that test results could not be turned over to prosecu-
tors. See id. at 663.
440. See id. at 667.
441. See id. at 674 ("there is little reason to believe that American workplaces are im-
mune from this pervasive social problem").
442. See id. at 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Scalia did not find
plausible the majority's explanation of the government's "special need":
It is not apparent to me that a Customs Service employee who uses drugs is
significantly more likely to be bribed by a drug smuggler, any more than a Cus-
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Skinner concerned Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regu-
lations that compelled railroads to test employees for drug and alco-
hol use following major accidents or incidents.44 Although the
regulations required the railroad immediately to transport the in-
volved crew members to a testing facility,44 4 the Court established
that the privacy interests aroused were "minimal" compared to the
governmental interest at stake.4 4 5 The Court concluded that rail-
road employees experienced a diminished expectation of privacy by
virtue of their participation in a highly regulated industry;446 more-
over, the regulations required no direct observation of the sample
collection, and personnel unrelated to the employer conducted the
testing.447 According to the majority, obtaining a warrant would be
impracticable because the delay could lead to the destruction of evi-
dence. 448 Furthermore, individualized suspicion would be difficult
to ascertain in a serious accident's confusing aftermath.4 4 9
The Von Raab and Skinner decisions significantly broaden the
"special needs" doctrine. It is applied for the first time to the search
of a person; moreover, it is applied for the first time absent a finding
of individualized suspicion. Justice Scalia dissented in Von Raab, and
lamented that the fourth amendment has become "frail protection"
if a national drug problem is the only justification necessary to
uphold "demeaning bodily searches, without particularized
suspicion. "450
toms Service employee who wears diamonds is significantly more likely to be
bribed by a diamond smuggler-unless, perhaps, the addiction to drugs is so
severe, and requires so much money to maintain, that it would be detectable
even without the benefit of a urine test.
Id. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
443. See 489 U.S. 602, 609 (1989). The FRA promulgated drug-testing regulations
after investigation indicated that prevalent drug and alcohol abuse in the railroad indus-
try posed a threat to public safety. See id. at 607.
444. Id. at 609-10.
445. See id. at 624-25 (detaining an employee to procure urine and other samples was
not a significant invasion of privacy because employees are ordinarily restricted in their
movements during normal working hours and conditions).
446. See id. at 627.
447. Id. at 626-27.
448. See id. at 623-24.
449. See id. at 631. The Skinner dissent, however, was quick to point out that, unlike
prior cases, test results were turned over to prosecutors. See id. at 650-51 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall also noted that the diminished privacy interest argument
based on pervasive industry regulations had in the past been used only for searches of
belongings. See id. at 648-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
450. 489 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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3. Analysis.-In United Food and Commercial Workers, the Court of
Appeals embraced without discussion the "special needs" doctrine
and adopted the same analysis applied by the Supreme Court. The
opinion emphasized the civil nature of the search and stressed the
fact that positive tests cannot be turned over to prosecutors without
the employee's consent.45 ' The court reasoned that the absence of
particularized suspicion alone does not transgress fourth amend-
ment standards of reasonableness.452 Where the Supreme Court
drew the dissent's fire for abandoning individualized suspicion,
453
the Court of Appeals used lack of individualized suspicion to sup-
port its holding; it argued that in situations in which everyone must
undergo testing as part of a physical examination, no stigma at-
taches to testing.454
The court's most powerful weapon to defeat the unions' claims
is that the employees already undergo urinalysis testing.455 Because
the employees did not object to this testing in the past, the court
completely bypassed considering the intrusion involved in the tak-
ing of the sample. 456 The court indicated that it would consider the
reasonableness of the intrusion, but quickly dismissed this inquiry,
stating that the routine physical examination and urinalysis already
exposed the "private facts" that drug testing would uncover because
the examinations were instituted for that very purpose.4 5 7 Thus, the
court found the City's interest in promoting the safety of the public,
co-workers, and the employees themselves, sufficiently compelling
to outweigh the minimal privacy interests involved.458
The Court of Appeals did a credible job applying the Supreme
Court criteria, but it failed to undertake more than a superficial
analysis of the facts-facts that could distinguish the case from both
Skinner and Von Raab. In Skinner, there was strong evidence of an
industry-wide drug problem,450 but Annapolis admitted it had no
evidence of any drug problem in either the police or fire depart-
ments.4 60 Moreover, the railroad employees in Skinner were only
451. See 317 Md. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676.
452. See id. at 564, 565 A.2d at 682.
453. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 638
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
454. See 317 Md. at 557, 565 A.2d at 678.
455. See id. at 546, 565 A.2d at 672.
456. See id. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676.
457. See id. at 554, 565 A.2d at 677.
458. See id. at 563, 565 A.2d at 681.
459. See 489 U.S. at 606-07.
460. See Brief for Appellee at 26, United Food and Commercial Workers, (No. 89-38) ("At
oral argument in the Circuit Court below, the City clearly enunciated the asserted basis
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tested following an accident or suspicious behavior,4 6t and not on a
routine basis. A closer review of the facts of United Food and Commer-
cial Workers and Skinner reveals more differences than similarities.
Although the facts of United Food and Commercial Workers and Von
Raab are more consistent, an important distinction may be drawn.
In Von Raab, Customs' employees were compelled to undergo test-
ing only when seeking a new position.46 2 Annapolis already re-
quired prospective police and fire fighters to undergo pre-
employment drug screening 463 and because the Von Raab decision
had held pre-employment drug testing constitutional, the union did
not contest this issue.464 But Annapolis was also attempting to test
employees who were trying to retain current positions. The Court
of Appeals could have found this testing beyond the scope of Von
Raab--an interpretation that has already been articulated by at least
one appellate court.4 5
Even if the Court of Appeals correctly found that the city's test-
ing program was within the confines of Skinner and Von Raab, the
court ignored its responsibility to address separately the state con-
stitution,466 which the opinion does not mention. The Court of Ap-
peals could have determined that the state constitution affords
greater protection to individual privacy interests than the recent
Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth amendment.4 7 Here
again, other jurisdictions have seen fit to afford this protection in
drug-testing cases.468
for the proposed testing program: 'We have no evidence .. .that there is a drug use
problem at all .... [Wle're ... trying to make sure that a problem never starts in the
first place.' ").
461. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
462. See 489 U.S. at 660-61.
463. See Brief for Appellee at 22-23 ("Neither union has at any time objected to the
suspicionless testing of applicants for police officer (and firefighter) positions .... Such
testing has not been the subject of the preliminary injunction or writ of mandamus is-
sued by the Circuit Court.").
464. See id.
465. See Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (the Department of
Justice's drug testing program was too broad because it included persons who did not
prosecute drug offenders).
466. A state constitution that affords the same protections as does the federal consti-
tution would be superfluous. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland at
8, United Food and Commercial Workers, (No. 89-38). Although a state may not revoke
rights granted by the federal constitution, it may provide its citizens with more expan-
sive rights. See id. The determination of the state's highest court will be dispositive in
interpreting the meaning of a provision in the state constitution. See id.
467. See supra note 398.
468. See, e.g., Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing
Comm'n, 403 Mass. 692, 532 N.E.2d 644 (1989) (using state constitution to invalidate
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4. Conclusion.-In City of Annapolis v. United Food and Commercial
Workers, Local 400, the Court of Appeals followed the Supreme
Court's lead both in adopting a "special needs" doctrine in search
and seizure cases, and in placing employee drug testing under that
doctrine. The Court of Appeals may continue to follow that lead
and feel free to take the "special needs" doctrine to unknown and
unlimited constitutional domains. But in its eagerness to support
the Supreme Court and current public opinion, the Court of Ap-
peals may have done a disservice to the citizens of Maryland by fore-
going serious analysis of the state and federal constitutional rights
to privacy.
F. Protective Sweeps During In-Home Arrests
In Buie v. State (Buie 1 ),469 on remand from the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals applied an objective standard to judge the rea-
sonableness of a warrantless search conducted to protect the safety
of police officers during an in-home arrest.4 7° This discussion re-
views the Supreme Court's ruling that protective sweeps 47' are con-
stitutional when based on reasonable suspicion, and explores
whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted that ruling in
applying a purely objective standard. It concludes that the Buie
opinion should be read narrowly to conform to the Supreme Court's
rationale for permitting protective sweeps as an exception to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement.
1. The Case.-
a. Buie .-- On February 3, 1986, two individuals, one of whom
was wearing a red running suit, robbed at gunpoint a pizza parlor in
Prince George's County, Maryland. 472 That same day, the Prince
George's County police obtained arrest warrants for Jerome Buie
and his alleged accomplice, Lloyd Allen. The police then placed
Buie's house under surveillance. Two days later, having established
through a pretextual telephone call that Buie was at home, the po-
random urine testing of owners, jockeys, and others in the horse racing industry); Fra-
ternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216 NJ. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (1987)
(using state constitution to invalidate suspicionless urine testing of police officers).
469. [Buie I], 320 Md. 696, 580 A.2d 167 (1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1011 (1991).
470. See 320 Md. at 703, 580 A.2d at 170.
471. The Supreme Court defined the term "protective sweep" as "a quick and limited
search of a premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police
officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places
in which a person might be hiding." Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1094 (1990).
472. Id. at 1095.
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lice entered his house to execute the arrest warrant.4 7- The officers
did not have a search warrant for the house.474
Once inside, the officers moved throughout the house, with one
of them guarding the basement stairs so that no one could come up
and surprise them.475 This officer twice called into the basement,
ordering anyone in it to come out; Buie ultimately responded and
emerged from the basement. After Buie was placed in custody, an-
other officer entered the basement, ostensibly to search for other
individuals.476 In the basement, the officer seized a red running suit
found in plain view that resembled the one used in the pizza parlor
robbery. 4
7 7
The trial court denied Buie's motion to suppress the running
suit, and Buie was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and
using a handgun in the commission of a felony. 478 The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed, holding that when there is reason to be-
lieve that accomplices remain at large, a mere reasonable suspicion
will justify a "limited additional intrusion to investigate the possibility of
their presence" when performing an in-home arrest pursuant to an
arrest warrant.
479
The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals in
a four to three decision, holding that the search and seizure were
unconstitutional because the officers did not have probable cause to
search the basement without a warrant.48 0  At the heart of the
473. Id.
474. Buie 1I, 320 Md. at 707, 580 A.2d at 172 (Adkins, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court has ruled that an arrest warrant gives the police authority to enter the subject's
home when there is reason to believe she is within. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 603 (1980). Police may not, however, enter a third party's home absent a search
warrant or exigent circumstances. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14
(1981).
475. 110 S. Ct. at 1095.
476. Id. The officer testified that he entered the basement "in case there was some-
one else" down there. Id. When asked at trial, the officer who guarded the stairs said
that he was not worried about there being any danger. Buie 1I, 320 Md. at 708, 580 A.2d
at 173.
477. 110 S. Ct. at 1095. If the officer's entry into the basement fell under a lawful
exception to the warrant requirement, the seizure of the red running suit was legal be-
cause it was found in plain view, and the officer had probable cause to believe it was
evidence of a crime. See id. at 1096. See also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987)
(probable cause is required to invoke the "plain view" doctrine).
478. 110 S. Ct. at 1095.
479. Buie v. State, 72 Md. App. 562, 575-76, 531 A.2d 1290, 1297 (1987) (emphasis
in original) (citing 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.4(b) (2d ed. 1987), rev'd, 314
Md. 151, 550 A.2d 79 (1988), vacated 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990)).
480. See Buie v. State (Buie 1), 314 Md. 151, 153, 550 A.2d 79, 80 (1988), vacated 110
S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
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court's reasoning was its belief that because an individual enjoys a
greater expectation of privacy at home than in public, courts should
afford homes greater protection.48 ' Weighing this privacy interest
against the governmental interest served by the intrusion, the Court
of Appeals determined that "to justify a protective sweep of a home,
the government must show that ... probable cause to believe that 'a
serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger' exists. "482 The
court ruled that the police did not have probable cause to believe
that exigent circumstances existed, and therefore the lower court
should have suppressed the running suit. 483 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari,48 4 and vacated and remanded.485
b. The Supreme Court Opinion.-In Maryland v. Buie,486 the
Supreme Court refused to adopt a bright-line rule that a protective
search is per se valid whenever an in-home arrest is made pursuant
to an arrest warrant for a violent crime.487 Instead, relying on its
reasoning in Terry v. Ohio48 a and Michigan v. Long,489 the Court ap-
481. See Buie, 314 Md. at 156, 159-60, 550 A.2d at 81, 83; Doering v. State, 313 Md.
384, 397, 545 A.2d 1281, 1287-88 (1988) (a person's expectation of privacy is much
greater in the home than in an automobile). The fourth amendment provides that
"[tihe right of the people to be secure in their ... houses . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. If a warrantless
search is valid under the fourth amendment, it must fall within one of the "well-recog-
nized exceptions" to the warrant requirement. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763
(1969); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967) (probable cause does not
justify a warrantless search, except in "well-delineated exceptions").482. Buie 1, 314 Md. at 159-60, 550 A.2d at 83 (quoting United States v. Kolodziej,
706 F.2d 590, 596 (5th Cir. 1983) (in turn quoting United States v. Smith, 515 F.2d
1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976))). The court distinguished
Buie I from other cases that allowed searches based on less than probable cause, such as
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See 314 Md. at 159-60, 550 A.2d at 83.
483. See Buie 1, 314 Md. at 166, 550 A.2d at 86.
484. See Maryland v. Buie, 490 U.S. 1097 (1989).
485. See Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1095 (1990).
486. 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
487. See id. at 1099. Furthermore, the Court decided that Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969), was not controlling. See 110 S. Ct. at 1099. Chimel held that during an
in-home arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant, a warrantless search of an individual lim-
ited to the arrestee's grabbing area did not violate the fourth amendment. See Chimel,
395 U.S. at 763. The Court rejected Chimel's applicability to Maryland v. Buie because 1)
"Chimel was concerned with a full-blown search of the entire house for evidence of the
crime for which the arrest was made... not the more limited intrusion contemplated by
a protective sweep" and 2) "the justification for the search incident to arrest considered
in Chimel was the threat posed by the arrestee, not the safety threat posed by [third
parties in] the house." 110 S. Ct. at 1099; see Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 208-09,
468 A.2d 333, 336-37 (1983) (discussing Chimel); 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 6.4(b) (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991).
488. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
489. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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plied a balancing test to find protective sweeps constitutional if they
are based on reasonable suspicion.490 The Buie Court concluded
that a warrantless protective sweep conducted during an in-home
arrest does not violate the fourth amendment "when the searching
officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articul-
able facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a
danger .... 491 ' A suspicion is reasonable if there are "articulable
facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those
facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those
on the arrest scene. 4 92
The Supreme Court did not decide the Buie case on the merits.
Instead, it vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment, and remanded
the case for application of the new reasonable suspicion standard.
493
490. See 110 S. Ct. at 1097-98. The Supreme Court justified relaxing the probable
cause standard for protective sweeps by analogizing the protective sweep at issue in
Maryland v. Buie to the "stop and frisk" rule articulated in Terry and expanded in Long.
See id. In Terry the Court found constitutional a brief, warrantless stop and limited frisk
for weapons, based on the officer's reasonable suspicion that the person was engaged in
wrongdoing and the "need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves . . . in
situations where they may lack probable cause." Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. In Long, the
Court extended the Terry principles to warrantless searches of automobiles. See Long,
463 U.S. at 1051-52. The Court said that automobile searches are constitutional when
confined to the passenger compartment and places where weapons may be hidden, "if
the police officer possesses a reasonable belief ... that the suspect is dangerous and the
suspect may gain immediate control of weapons." Id. In effect, to protect the safety of
police officers, "Long authorized a 'frisk' of an automobile for weapons." 110 S. Ct. at
1097.
491. 110 S. Ct. at 1099-1100; see Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The
Court emphasized that even when justified, a protective sweep does not allow a full
search of the premises, "but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces
where a person may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the
reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the
arrest and depart the premises." 110 S. Ct. at 1099 (footnote omitted).
492. 110 S. Ct. at 1098.
493. See id. at 1100. In concurring opinions, Justices Stevens and Kennedy disputed
each other's view of whether the protective sweep of Buie's house should be upheld on
remand. Justice Stevens argued that the reasonableness standard requires police of-
ficers who conduct a protective sweep to have a subjective belief that they are in danger.
See id. at 1100 (Stevens, J., concurring). Noting testimony of the officer guarding the
door that "he was not worried about any possible danger," Stevens determined that this
standard was not met. See id. Justice Kennedy countered that only objective reasonable-
ness is necessary, and implied that compliance with police department policy on safety
procedures is sufficient to constitutionally justify a protective sweep. See id. at 1101
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' concurring opinion is also interesting be-
cause it suggested that a legitimate protective sweep requires the police to show that no
safer alternative to the sweep existed. See id. at 1100 (Stevens, J., concurring). The
Court as a whole is unlikely to accept this interpretation, however, because in other
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c. Buie II: The Court of Appeals' Decision on Remand.-In a four to
three decision on remand,49 4 the Court of Appeals determined that
reasonable suspicion must be tested from the view of a reasonable
police officer acting under the same circumstances, and not from the
view of the particular police officers involved in the search.495 The
majority was convinced by the Supreme Court's comparison of Buie
with Terry and Long that the Court, without ever articulating the
proper standard, intended courts to use an objective standard to
evaluate reasonable suspicion. 496 Furthermore, the court felt that
an objective standard was consistent with fourth amendment juris-
prudence, and was supported by existing Maryland law.497 Apply-
ing the objective standard of reasonable suspicion in evaluating the
police officer's actions, the court ruled that the limited search of
Buie's basement was lawful because a reasonably prudent police of-
ficer, acting under similar circumstances, could reasonably suspect
that someone dangerous was hiding there.498
fourth amendment situations, it has rejected the less-intrusive alternative approach. See
2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 487, § 6.4(b), at 88-89 (Supp. 1991).
494. Judge McAuliffe, joined by Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Rodowsky, wrote a
plurality opinion, and Judge Chasanow concurred in the result. Judge Adkins, who
wrote the majority opinion in Buie I, wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Judges El-
dridge and Cole, both of whom also joined him in the earlier decision. Judge Blackwell,
the Buie I majority's fourth member, had since been replaced by Judge Chasanow, who
became the swing vote on remand. See Buie II, 320 Md. at 697, 580 A.2d at 167; Buie I,
314 Md. 151, 550 A.2d 79 (1988).
495. See Buie II, 320 Md. at 700-03, 580 A.2d at 169-70.
496. See id. at 700-01, 580 A.2d at 169. The Supreme Court used language in Terry
and Long suggesting an objective test: "whether a reasonably prudent man in the cir-
cumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). The Supreme Court in Maryland v. Buie, however, never stated
whether the police officers making the arrest must hold that belief, or if it may be in-
ferred from the facts as judged against what a reasonable police officer would believe
when faced with the same circumstances. See Buie I, 320 Md. at 700-01, 580 A.2d at
169. But the Court stated that the reasonableness standard for protective sweeps "is no
more and no less than was required in Terry and Long." 110 S. Ct. at 1098.
497. See Buie II, 320 Md. at 701-03, 580 A.2d at 169-70.
498. See id. at 703, 706, 580 A.2d at 170, 172. The Supreme Court did not articulate a
clear standard as to what facts establish reasonable suspicion and thus justify a protec-
tive sweep. See id. at 700-01, 580 A.2d at 169. The Maryland decision in Buie II is there-
fore important because it articulated several factors that can be considered to determine
whether suspicion was reasonable. See Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine:
Recurrent Questions Regarding the Propriety of Searches Conducted Contemporaneously with an
Arrest On or Near Private Premises, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 973, 1010-16 (1979). Some of the
facts that the court in Buie H relied on as evidence sufficient to justify the protective
sweep were: (1) the crime's dangerous nature-armed robbery, (2) the officers' knowl-
edge that the crime weapon had not been recovered, and (3) commission of the crime
with an accomplice who was unaccounted for at the time of Buie's arrest. See Buie 11, 320
Md. at 703-06, 580 A.2d at 170-71.
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Adkins criticized the majority for
improperly broadening the Supreme Court's ruling. He believed
that the majority, by relying on a purely objective standard of rea-
sonableness, allowed protective sweeps in situations the Supreme
Court specifically rejected as improper. 499  He interpreted the
Supreme Court's opinion to define reasonableness as a subjectively-
held articulable suspicion that is also objectively reasonable. 500 In
his view, this standard was not met in Buie, rendering impermissible
the protective sweep at issue.5
0
'
2. Legal Background.-The Supreme Court in Maryland v. Buie
did not articulate whether reasonable suspicion must be judged
under an objective standard or a subjective standard. 502 Therefore,
to determine which was the proper standard to apply when evaluat-
ing a protective sweep's reasonableness, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals in Buie II reviewed the concept of reasonableness as applied in
other fourth amendment cases.50 3
In Stackhouse v. State, °4 a case involving a protective sweep con-
ducted to prevent destruction of evidence,50 5 the Court of Appeals
applied a subjective test, concerning itself "only with what the po-
lice officers believed at the time" 506 to determine whether the
search's scope was proper.50 7 Because the "state did not show that
at the time of the search ... the officers believed that [there was a]
threat of the destruction of evidence," the court suppressed the evi-
dence obtained in the sweep.5 °8
On the other hand, in Maryland v. Macon,5 "9 the Supreme Court
499. See 320 Md. at 706-07, 580 A.2d at 172 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
500. See id.
501. See id. at 709-14, 580 A.2d at 173-76 (Adkins, J., dissenting). Judge Adkins was
impressed with the testimony of the officer guarding the basement that he was not wor-
ried about being in danger. See id. at 708-11,580 A.2d at 173-74 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
He explained that in his opinion the facts also failed to meet the majority's purely objec-
tive standard. See id. at 707-14, 580 A.2d at 172-76 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
502. See Buie I1, 320 Md. at 700, 580 A.2d at 169.
503. See id. at 701-03, 580 A.2d at 169-70.
504. 298 Md. 203, 468 A.2d 333 (1983).
505. See id. at 206, 468 A.2d at 335. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
threat of the destruction of evidence sometimes constitutes exigent circumstances justi-
fying a warrantless search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963).
506. 298 Md. at 220, 468 A.2d at 342.
507. See id. (any search beyond the arrestee's "wingspan" must be pursuant to a war-
rant or to an exception to the warrant requirement).
508. Id. at 220, 468 A.2d at 342.
509. 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
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determined that the purchase by undercover police officers of alleg-
edly obscene magazines shortly before the warrantless arrest of a
sales clerk was not an illegal seizure, even though the police in-
tended to use the magazines as evidence. 5  The Court noted that it
would apply an "objective assessment of the officer's actions in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time ... and
not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged
action was taken.'
The Supreme Court addressed the issue more recently in Hor-
ton v. California,5 t2 a case in which police without a warrant seized
evidence that was in plain view but whose discovery was not inadver-
tent.5 I3 The Court remarked that applying an objective standard of
conduct would better serve evenhanded law enforcement than
would examining the police officer's subjective state of mind.51 4 In-
deed, many other fourth amendment cases have also applied an ob-
jective standard.515 Terry, on which the Court of Appeals placed
much emphasis,516 strongly suggests that an objective standard for
judging reasonableness allows greater judicial control of the
police.
5 17
Professor LaFave's treatise on search and seizure supports us-
ing an objective standard of reasonableness. 1 Professor LaFave
510. See id. at 471.
511. Id. at 470-71 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 138 (1978)). The
Court in Scott also noted that even if an officer does not have a subjective basis for mak-
ing a warrantless custodial arrest, the search still is valid if his actions were objectively
justified. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138.
512. 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
513. See id. at 2304. It is interesting that Justice Stevens, who in Horton wrote the
majority opinion urging an objective standard, wrote a concurring opinion in Maryland
v. Buie promoting a subjective standard. Compare id. with Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct.
1093, 1100 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
514. See 110 U.S. at 2308-09 ("The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evi-
dence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its
seizure ....").
515. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2801. (1990) (police officer's determi-
nation of consent to enter must be judged against objective standard); see also Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("As in other Fourth Amendment contexts ... the
.reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one..."); Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 (1988) (objective standards used to determine
whether a reasonable person, in view of circumstances, would have believed he or she
was free to leave); Herod v. State, 311 Md. 288, 299, 534 A.2d 362, 367 (1987) (officer's
subjective legal interpretation of basis for warrantless search is not controlling).
516. See Buie 1I, 320 Md. at 701-03, 580 A.2d at 169-70.
517. See 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) ("in making that assessment [reasonableness] it is
imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard"); Kelder & Statman,
supra note 498, at 1007.
518. See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 487, § 9.3(a), at 424-25.
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stated that the "reasonable belief" required for an arrest is not
based on what the arresting officer "did or did not believe." 5 9 He
concluded that there is no requirement to show that the officer had
actual suspicion when evaluating the reasonableness required for a
Terry stop.
5 20
3. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals ruled that the reasonable-
ness of a protective search must be judged from the view of an ob-
jective police officer in similar circumstances.52' Courts usually
apply this objective standard when reviewing police conduct in
fourth amendment cases. This policy protects citizens against possi-
ble police excesses in performing their law enforcement duties, and
subjects their conduct to the scrutiny of a detached and neutral
judge. Police officers must point to specific and articulable facts that
support intruding into a citizen's privacy so that a judge may later
"evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances. ' 522 This avoids infringing citi-
zens' constitutional rights based exclusively on police officers' "inar-
ticulate hunches. '5 23  The fact-finder ignores a particular police
officer's personal biases by judging his or her actions against what a
reasonable police officer would have believed under similar
circumstances.524
But focusing exclusively on the objective standard poses
problems for ensuring constitutional protections similar to those
posed by a standard that focuses solely on the police officers' sub-
jective intent. 5 2  The danger of allowing the police to perform a
protective sweep when it is objectively reasonable, but not sup-
ported by subjectively held reasonable suspicion, is that the police
will use these situations as a pretext to perform a search that would
otherwise require a search warrant.526 If the police do not fear for
519. Id. at 424.
520. See id. at 424-26.
521. See Buie II, 320 Md. at 703, 580 A.2d at 170.
522. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
523. Id. at 21-22; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-357 (1967). The Court
has often recognized that the interest of "officer[s] engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime," differs from the Court's interest in upholding consti-
tutional protections. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (footnote omit-
ted); see Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1981).
524. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
525. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 70, 87-88 (1982). Burkoff also
suggested that Terry applied both an objective inquiry-into the reasonableness of the
officer's decision to engage in the search-and a subjective inquiry-into the police of-
ficer's actual factual basis for deciding to act. See id.
526. Burkoff described as "superobjectivist" an inquiry that ignores the searching of-
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their safety, but conduct a search in the hope of finding incriminat-
ing evidence, the evidence should be suppressed.527
Furthermore, an objective standard that ignores the police of-
ficers' subjective intent exceeds the limited exception to the warrant
requirement that the Supreme Court established in Maryland v.
Buie.528 Before the Supreme Court's decision, the appellate courts
reached different results in evaluating the constitutionality of pro-
tective sweeps based on less than probable cause.529 In Maryland v.
Buie, the Supreme Court made clear that there is a limited exception
to the fourth amendment warrant requirement for protective sweeps
if the sweeps are based on a reasonable suspicion that the area cov-
ered harbors a person who poses a threat to police safety.53 ° The
Court determined that the Constitution permits this exception be-
cause concern for a police officer's safety outweighs any limited in-
fringement on the privacy interests in the home occasioned by the
search, particularly because the officers are operating in a hostile
environment.5 3 '
The Supreme Court specifically rejected a bright-line rule al-
lowing a protective sweep whenever police perform an in-home
arrest for a violent crime.53 2 It recognized that a protective sweep's
intrusion into individual privacy was not de minimis, and thus
should be allowed only when the interest in providing for police
safety outweighs the privacy interest injured by the protective
sweep.533 To permit a warrantless search when an arresting police
officer has no subjective fear of danger, but a reasonable police of-
ficer would have manifested fear based on the facts of the situation,
alters the balance struck by the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Buie.
If the officers do not subjectively fear for their safety, then there is
no need to provide for the police protection that is the underlying
reason for allowing the protective search. If the rule were other-
ficer's actual intent in favor of the intent of an objectively reasonable officer. Id. at 88.
He also raised the concern that this "superobjectivist" approach could result in the pres-
entation of evidence discovered subsequent to the search that the officers were unaware
of at the time of the search. See id.
527. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-65 (1968).
528. See Buie 11, 320 Md. at 706-07, 580 A.2d at 172 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
529. See United States v. Jackson, 778 F.2d 933, 936-37 (2d Cir. 1985) (comparing
circuits), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986); see also Joseph, The Protective Sweep Doctrine:
Protecting Arresting Officers from Attack by Persons Other than the Arrestee, 33 CATH. U.L. REV.
95, 121-29 (1983); Kelder & Statman, supra note 498, at 1006-07 & nn. 99, 101, 105.
530. See 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1099-1100 (1990).
531. See id. at 1097-98.
532. See id. at 1098-99.
533. See id. at 1098.
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wise, police departments would be free to adopt a policy of perform-
ing protective sweeps whenever making in-home arrests for a
violent crime because, as the Court pointed out, all in-home arrests
by their nature pose a potential threat to police safety.5"' The
Supreme Court clearly rejected this result.535
It seems improbable that a police officer would testify in court
that he or she had no subjective fear of attack.536 It would be wise,
however, to read the Court of Appeals' decision narrowly to avoid
improperly broadening the Supreme Court's ruling on protective
sweeps. One of the police officers involved in Buie's arrest testified
that he was not "worried about there being any danger. ' 53 7 Based
on this testimony, Buie argued that because the police did not sub-
jectively fear danger from attack, it was unreasonable to conduct the
protective search that led to discovery of the incriminating evidence,
and ultimately to Buie's conviction.53 8 This testimony alone, how-
ever, should not result in suppression of the evidence. The court
may look at the evidence taken as a whole to determine whether the
police officer held a subjective fear of attack.53 9 That one officer was
unafraid that the area swept harbored someone who posed a danger
is not conclusive as to whether the other officers feared an attack. It
is conceivable that one or more of the police present feared an as-
sault, and that one of them performed the protective sweep because,
534. See id.; Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981).
535. See I 10 S. Ct. at 1099; Buie, 320 Md. at 706, 580 A.2d at 172 (Adkins, J., dissent-
ing). It also seems inconsistent that searches based on "inarticulable hunches" would be
legal when the police possess no fear whatsoever. See 110 S. Ct. at 1097 (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1967)).
536. This is particularly true if counsel adequately prepares the officer to testify. But
see supra note 476. In fact, at trial the State attempted to reopen the suppression hearing
in order to introduce evidence that the officer who searched the basement possessed a
subjective suspicion of fear for his safety, even though the trial judge found for the State
on the suppression motion. See Buie v. State, 72 Md. App. 562, 567-68, 531 A.2d 1290,
1292-93 (1987). The Court of Special Appeals rejected the State's attempt to introduce
evidence in this post hoc manner. See id. at 568, 531 A.2d at 1293; Buie 1, 314 Md. 151,
155 n.2, 550 A.2d 79, 81 n.2 (1987).
537. Buie H, 320 Md. at 708, 580 A.2d at 173.
538. See id. at 700, 580 A.2d at 169.
539. See id. at 703, 580 A.2d at 170. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the ques-
tion of bad faith was not an issue in this case. See id. at 703 n. 1, 580 A.2d at 170 n. 1. But
a subjective/objective test eliminates the possibility of bad faith on the part of police
officers. See id. at 706, 580 A.2d at 172 (Adkins, J., dissenting). A police officer who
testifies that he had no fear of danger, and took no action demonstrating the contrary,
clearly has exercised the search in bad faith, notwithstanding the fact that the circum-
stances might have caused a reasonable officer to fear danger of an attack. See id.; see also
3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 487, § 9.3(a) at 428 n.34 (a police officer's actions in the heat of
the moment are an indication of the officer's subjective belief).
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in part, he was worried about an attack.5 40 If this is true-the officer
testified that he entered the basement "in case there was someone
else""Ml down there- then the search was proper and use of the
running suit at trial was not unconstitutional.
Read in this manner, Buie conforms to the Supreme Court's rul-
ing regarding protective sweeps, because the search was performed
to protect police officer safety. Once it is established that at least
one of the officers had a subjective fear of attack, the court must
then determine whether that suspicion was objectively reasonable.
This test requires the fact finder to determine "whether a reason-
ably prudent police officer, under those circumstances, is justified in
forming a reasonable suspicion that the house is harboring a person
posing danger to those on the arrest scene. "542
4. Conclusion.-In interpreting the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard, the Maryland Court of Appeals unnecessarily broadened the
protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement by using a
purely objective test to judge the sweep's reasonableness. A rule
that does not take into account the subjective intent of the police
officers making the arrest goes beyond what the Supreme Court in-
tended when it articulated the exception and the underlying reasons
for granting it. Therefore, to best protect the privacy interests
granted by the Constitution, and the need to judge police conduct
in a neutral and detached manner, a subjective intent that is objec-
tively reasonable should be found before a protective sweep is ruled
constitutional. This standard offers a realistic balance between the
goal of protecting police safety and preserving individual privacy in-
terests. The Buie decision should be read narrowly so that it con-
forms to this test and is consistent with the Supreme Court's
540. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 487, § 9.3(a), at 426-27. Police officers are permitted
to bring to the analysis their specialized training and experience in law enforcement
when making judgments about a particular situation. See United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (police must establish "a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped").
541. Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1093, 1095 (1990).
542. Buie II, 320 Md. at 703, 580 A.2d at 170 (citing 110 S. Ct. at 1099).
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underlying rationale in finding constitutional reasonable protective
sweeps.
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IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Defendants' Rights to Review State Child Abuse Records
In State v. Runge,' the Court of Appeals held that a defendant
charged with child abuse had no statutory right2 to review confiden-
tial state records relating to the abuse victim.3 In construing the
confidentiality statute, the court examined the statute's language
and its legislative history, and determined that its purpose was to
permit release of confidential information only in certain circum-
stances.4 According to the court, the legislature did not intend to
provide an accused child abuser with statutory entitlement to such
information.5
The Court of Appeals appropriately confined its analysis to in-
terpreting the confidentiality statute, because it was the only author-
ity relied upon by the defendant. It did not decide whether a
Maryland defendant is entitled to obtain disclosure of certain
records under the sixth amendment's confrontation clause 6 or the
Maryland constitution's declaration of rights.7 Although the
Supreme Court has limited the reach of the federal Constitution's
confrontation clause,8 future Maryland defendants should argue for
expansion of the right of confrontation under the Maryland
constitution.
1. The Case.-The Cecil County grand jury indicted William
Frederick Runge on three counts of sexually abusing his three chil-
dren.9 Prior to trial, he sought production by the Cecil County De-
partment of Social Services (DSS) of "all records in any way relating
1. 317 Md. 613, 566 A.2d 88 (1989).
2. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 6 (Supp. 1989).
3. See 317 Md. at 620, 566 A.2d at 91. On a separate issue, the court also held that
the trial court's admonitory remarks to defense counsel did not warrant a mistrial. Id. at
625, 566 A.2d at 94.
4. See id. at 620, 566 A.2d at 91. The statute makes unauthorized release of child
abuse records a criminal offense. See infra note 11.
5. See Runge, 317 Md. at 620-21, 566 A.2d at 91.
6. The sixth amendment confrontation clause provides: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. The Maryland constitution provides "[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every
man hath a right ... to be confronted with the witnesses for and against him on oath
.... MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 21.
8. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion), discussed infra
notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
9. Runge, 317 Md. at 614, 566 A.2d at 88.
1123
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to" himself and his family.' ° DSS moved to quash the subpoena,
relying, like Runge, on article 88A, section 6(b) of the Maryland
code." At a pretrial hearing, the circuit court judge followed the
Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,' 2 which called
for in camera review by the trial judge to determine which documents
of a confidential file should be disclosed to a defendant.' 3 The cir-
cuit court reviewed the entire DSS file and read into the record all
documents it deemed material to Runge's defense.' 4 Additionally,
the court ordered the State and DSS to give to the defense, either
before trial or at the time the Runge children testified, all of the
children's prior statements.' 5 The court also ordered immediate re-
lease of certain documents to the defense, including copies of all
letters written by Runge. 6 The judge stated that by these disclo-
10. Id.
11. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 6(b) (Supp. 1989). Subsection (b) provides, in
part:
(b) Child abuse or neglect.-Except as otherwise provided in Title 5, Subtitle 7
of the Family Law Article, all records and reports concerning child abuse or
neglect are confidential, and their unauthorized disclosure is a criminal offense
subject to the penalty set out in subsection (e) of this section. Information
contained in reports or records concerning child abuse or neglect may be dis-
closed only:
(1) Under a court order;
(2) To personnel of local or State departments of social services, law en-
forcement personnel ... ;
(3) To local or State officials responsible for the administration of the
child protective service as necessary to carry out their official functions;
(4) To a person who is the alleged child abuser ... if that person is re-
sponsible for the child's welfare and provisions are made for the protection of
the identity of the reporter or any other person whose life or safety is likely to
be endangered by disclosing the information;
(5) To a licensed practitioner who ... is providing treatment or care to a
child who is the subject of a report of child abuse or neglect; or
(6) To a parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care and
custody of a child, if provisions are made for the protection of the identity of
the reporter or any other person whose life or safety is likely to be endangered
by disclosing the information.
Id.
The state also relied on a Maryland law that prohibits the disclosure of certain pub-
lic records. See Brief and Appendix of Petitioner at 3, State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 566
A.2d 88 (1989) (No. 89-28); MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-616(c) (1984) ("A custo-
dian shall deny inspection of public records that relate to welfare for an individual.").
12. 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion). See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying
text.
13. See id. at 58.
14. See Runge, 317 Md. at 615, 566 A.2d at 88.
15. See id.
16. See id., 566 A.2d at 88-89. The information disclosed pursuant to the order per-
tained to DSS's recent and past contacts with the Runge family. These related to the
incidents of abuse that ultimately resulted in the charges against the defendant in this
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sures, the defense "got just about the whole record, if not all the
record." '7
A jury convicted Runge on all three counts of child abuse, and
the court sentenced him to three concurrent fifteen-year prison
terms.' 8 He appealed the decision and argued before the Court of
Special Appeals that Ritchie did not control. 9 Runge distinguished
Ritchie by pointing out that the Pennsylvania disclosure statute at
issue in that case did not provide for disclosure to the alleged child
abuser, as the Maryland statute does.21 The Court of Special Ap-
peals accepted Runge's argument and reversed his convictions,
holding that the Maryland statute mandates disclosure of the
records.2'
The Court of Appeals granted the State's petition for certiorari
to interpret the Maryland statute.22 Before the court, Runge relied
solely on the statute as the basis for his claim that he was entitled to
full disclosure of the DSS file. 23 The court therefore confined its
case, and to prior allegations of child neglect. Brief and Appendix of Petitioner at 4,
State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 566 A.2d 88 (1989) (No. 89-28).
17. Runge, 317 Md. at 615, 566 A.2d at 89.
18. Id. at 614, 566 A.2d at 88.
19. See Runge v. State, 78 Md. App. 23, 29, 552 A.2d 560, 564, rev'd 317 Md. 613,
566 A.2d 88 (1989).
20. See id. At the time of the Ritchie trial, the Pennsylvania statute authorized disclo-
sure of confidential child abuse records only to an authorized official of a child protec-
tive agency, a physician treating the child, the child's guardian ad litem, or a court of
competent jurisdiction pursuant to court order. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2215 (Pur-
don Supp. 1975).
The defendant in Runge argued that because § 6(b)(4) permits disclosure to an al-
leged child abuser, the court's in camera review of the file should have been limited to
protecting from disclosure the identities of the reporters of abuse. See Runge, 78 Md.
App. at 29, 552 A.2d at 564; MD. CODE. ANN. art. 88A, § 6(b) (Supp. 1989).
21. See Runge, 78 Md. App. at 34-35, 552 A.2d at 566-67. The court made two obser-
vations. First, the statute's terms do not explicitly require or permit a court to screen
the requested files beyond what is necessary to protect the reporters of the information.
Id. at 33-34, 552 A.2d at 566. Second, the use of "may" in subsection (b)'s opening
paragraph does not automatically mean that disclosure is discretionary. The context of
the statute in which the word "may" is used may require that it be interpreted as
mandatory. Id. at 34, 552 A.2d at 566. The cases cited by the court, however, do not
support that assertion, because they use the word "shall." See, e.g., Resetar v. State Bd.
of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 547-50, 399 A.2d 225, 230-32, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979)
(failure to observe a rule that the "Board shall ... render a decision... within thirty (30)
days..." did not strip the Board of authority to discipline a teacher where the rule did
not provide a penalty in the event of a rule violation); Blumenthal v. Clerk of Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County, 278 Md. 398, 408, 365 A.2d 279, 285-86 (1976) (new
statute subsection softened the mandatory tone of prior subsections that contained the
word "shall").
22. See State v. Runge, 316 Md. 258, 558 A.2d 390 (1989) (cert. granted).
23. See Runge, 317 Md. at 615-16, 566 A.2d at 89.
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analysis to interpreting the statute and did not discuss the Maryland
rules of discovery or the disclosure principles established by United
States Supreme Court cases. 24 Using the statute's legislative his-
tory, the court determined that the legislature designed the law to
prevent wrongful disclosure of child abuse records.25 Under the
court's interpretation, the statute provides custodians of child abuse
records with discretion to release records only in defined circum-
stances, but with immunity from prosecution for authorized re-
leases.2 6  The Court of Appeals thus held that the trial court
correctly rejected Runge's claim of entitlement to the records under
section 6(b).
2. Legal Background.-
a. Child Abuse Legislation.-Until recently, child abuse and ne-
glect were hidden problems-known to exist, but rarely acknowl-
edged.2 s As society's awareness of child abuse increased, so did the
states' efforts to reform their child protection systems.2 9 Congress
expressed its concern by passing the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act 30 (Child Abuse Act) in 1974. The Child Abuse Act
set forth the criteria for states' eligibility for federal grants to im-
prove their child abuse services."' As part of the effort to conform
with the federal scheme, most states have enacted provisions to pre-
serve the confidentiality of child abuse records and protect the iden-
tities of those who report child abuse.3 2
24. See id. at 616, 566 A.2d at 89.
25. See id. at 620, 566 A.2d at 91.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Ne-
glect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 458 (1978) (examining the "second generation" of state child
protection laws enacted after the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act).
29. Id. at 459.
30. Act of Jan. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5106 (Supp. V 1975)).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (Supp. V 1975).
32. Section 5103(b)(4) requires states to enact confidentiality measures as a requisite
of grant eligibility. "[A State shall] ... provide for methods to preserve the confidential-
ity of all records in order to protect the rights of the child and of the child's parents or
guardians ... " Id. § 5103(b)(4).
Under the regulations implementing the Child Abuse Act, a state "must provide by
statute that all records concerning reports and reports of child abuse and neglect are
confidential and that their unauthorized disclosure is a criminal offense." 45 C.F.R.
§ 1340.14(i)(1) (1989). For examples of typical state confidentiality statutes, see CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11167.5 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-314 (Supp. 1989);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,. para. 2061.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 722.627 (West Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-409 (Supp. 1990).
1126 [VOL. 50:1123
CRIMINAL LAW
A 1983 Maryland act"3 reflects the State's desire to conform
with federal mandates, and to protect neglected and abused chil-
dren. 4 By introducing the Child Protection Bill in the 1983 legisla-
tive session, Delegate Sheila Hixson sought to provide additional
statutory protection for abused children." One of the proposed
changes to existing law was in the area of confidentiality." The stat-
utes existing in 1983 conferred confidentiality only on information
relating to applicants for or recipients of social services." Thus, a
child abuse victim's records were not confidential unless the victim
had already applied for social services or was receiving services at
the time. Delegate Hixson urged the extension of confidentiality to
cover all abuse victims.3 8 In response to subsequent concerns about
an alleged abuser's right to receive notice that a report had been
made,3 9 she proposed an exception to the provision that made dis-
closure criminal-the release of records "[t]o a person who is the
alleged child abuser or the person who is suspected of child ne-
glect."40 A modified version of this proposal later became section
6(b)(4).4 1
Thus, section 6(b)(4)'s original aim was to allow for notice to
the alleged abuser. The most significant aspect of a confidentiality
statute such as Maryland's, however, appears to be its effect on pre-
trial discovery of child abuse records and reports when the alleged
abuser becomes a defendant in criminal proceedings. Any defend-
33. Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 492, §§ 2, 3, 1983 Md. Laws 1500, 1502-03.
34. Runge, 317 Md. at 619, 566 A.2d at 90-91.
35. See Hearing on H.B. 1395-Child Protection before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, 1983 Sess., Mar. 19, 1983 (testimony of Delegate Sheila Hixson).
36. See id. Another proposed change was to expand the existing neglect and abuse
statutes to include children who are in potential danger of neglect and abuse. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. One commentator has stated that "[a]s a matter of fundamental fairness, if not
constitutional right," accused abusers have a right to know what information a govern-
ment agency is keeping about them. See Besharov, supra note 28, at 510. Only when
alleged abusers know what is in the records can they pursue their rights to amend the
record or remove it from the agency's files. Id. at 510-11.
40. See Memorandum and attachment from Delegate Sheila Hixson to the Hon. Jo-
seph E. Owens, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Mar. 23, 1983) (proposed
amendment to H.B. 1395) (legislative file of MD. H.B. 1395, 1983 Sess.).
41. The Department of Human Resources (DHR) proposed the current language of
article 88A, § 6(b)(4) after expressing reservations about the scope of Delegate Hixson's
proposed amendment. Letter from Joy Duva, Dep't of Human Resources, to the Hon.
Joseph E. Owens, Chairman, HouseJudiciary Committee (Mar. 29, 1983) (legislative file
of MD. H.B. 1395, 1983 Sess.). DHR was concerned that providing access to records to
an alleged abuser who was not related to the child victim would endanger the victim and
his or her family. See id.
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ant has a legitimate interest in obtaining information that may help
impeach the testimony of the victim and other witnesses.4 2 Denying
access to this information could impair the defendant's ability to
conduct cross-examination, which is a right secured by the sixth
amendment's confrontation clause.43  Thus, a conflict about
whether a statute permits or mandates disclosure of child abuse
records necessarily implicates confrontation issues.
b. The Right of Confrontation.-
(1) In general.-Two significant purposes lie at the core of the
right of confrontation.4 4 One is to give the judge and jury opportu-
nities to observe a testifying witness's comportment.4 5 The ability
to observe is seen as an aid to evaluating the witness's credibility.46
The other purpose is "to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination."' 47 The Supreme Court has emphasized this purpose,
stating that the most significant guaranty of the right of confronta-
tion is an "adequate opportunity for cross-examination.14
Maryland's state constitution, adopted in 1776, recognized a
defendant's right to confrontation even before the sixth amendment
was drafted.49 Maryland courts have stated that this right includes
the accused's right to be seen by his accuser when the accuser is
testifying,5 ° as well as the right to cross-examine opposing
42. See, e.g.,Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957) (impeachment of testi-
mony was "singularly important" to the defendant).
43. See generally infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
44. The right of confrontation guarantees the defendant the right to be present at
his or her trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); Lewis v. United States, 146
U.S. 370, 372-73 (1892). But the right to be present at trial may be lost by consent.
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (the defendant waived his right to be
present by voluntarily absenting himself from trial). The defendant's misconduct may
also result in loss of the right. Allen, 397 U.S. at 346 (the defendant's persistently dis-
ruptive behavior at trial caused him to lose his right to be present for the remainder of
the proceedings).
45. 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 153 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 150 (emphasis in original).
48. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965). The history of the right of con-
frontation is not clear. For a treatment of how the right became part of English common
law, see Gregory v. State, 40 Md. App. 297, 306 n.6, 391 A.2d 437, 443 n.6 (1978).
49. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 21. See supra note 7 for the text of article 21.
The sixth amendment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965).
50. See Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 512-13, 530 A.2d 275, 283 (1987); see also
Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 389, 91 A. 417, 424 (1914) ("living witnesses ... are
required to be produced in court, confronted with the accused, and deliver their testi-
mony under the sanction of an oath .... ");Johns v. State, 55 Md. 350, 360 (1881) (one
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witnesses.5 1
Cases arising under the confrontation clause generally fall into
two broad categories: "cases involving the admission of out-of-
court statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law or
by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination., 5 2 The intro-
duction of hearsay evidence often characterizes cases of the first cat-
egory. The confrontation clause limits the prosecution's ability to
use as evidence statements of persons who do not testify at trial and
therefore cannot be cross-examined. 5' The Supreme Court has for-
mulated a two-part inquiry to test hearsay's admissibility under the
confrontation clause. First, the prosecution must establish that the
hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify at trial; if the witness is
available, the prosecution must produce her at trial so the defense
can cross-examine her.' After a showing of unavailability, the
purpose served by cross-examination is that the witness may observe the defendant and
discover that she had a made a mistake in the identity of the party committing the
crime). In Wildermuth, the court discussed how physical confrontation satisfies the con-
frontation clause's main purpose-to find the truth:
This requirement supports the truth-seeking function of confrontation because
it tends to impress upon the witness the seriousness and solemnity of the occa-
sion, and as a consequence, the necessity for truthful testimony. The need for
truthfulness is further enhanced by the witness's awareness that the accused has
personal knowledge of the facts bearing on his or her involvement in the of-
fense charged.
Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 513, 530 A.2d at 283.
51. See State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 76, 288 A.2d 163, 166 (1972) (the right to con-
front accusers is grounded in the belief that an individual should have the opportunity to
cross-examine the accusers); see also Franklin v. State, 239 Md. 645, 647-48, 212 A.2d
279, 281 (1965) (although the right to cross-examine is inherent in the right of confron-
tation, it cannot override a witness's right to refuse to testify on the basis of self-
incrimination).
52. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985) (per curiam). Fensterer itself did
not fall into either category. See id. at 19. The defendant alleged that his right to con-
frontation was violated when during his cross-examination of an expert witness, the wit-
ness could not recall the scientific tests on which he had based his conclusion. See id. at
17. The Court rejected the defendant's claim after determining that the witness's mem-
ory loss was demonstrated in front of the jury and that the defense had impeached the
witness's testimony with its own expert witness's testimony. See id. at 20-22.
53. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Such statements ordinarily constitute
hearsay, but they may be admissible if they fall within a recognized hearsay exception.
Id. The Supreme Court has stressed, however, that the key issue under the confronta-
tion clause is not compliance with hearsay rules, but rather assurance that "the trier of
fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
54. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). In Barber, a key
witness was in federal prison at the time of the defendant's trial. At a pretrial hearing in
the presence of the defendant and his lawyer, the witness gave testimony that was sub-
ject to cross-examination. The State introduced a transcript of the testimony as evi-
dence at the trial, arguing that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial. Id. at 720.
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statement is admissible only if it bears sufficient indicia of reliabil-
ity. 5 Applying this standard, the Court has held admissible testi-
mony from a prior trial that was subject to cross-examination,56 as
well as preliminary hearing testimony when the defense counsel's
cross-examination at that hearing was not "significantly limited in
any way."
57
In the second category of cases, statutory or judicial restrictions
on the scope of cross-examination are challenged as violations of
the defendant's right of confrontation. The confrontation clause
ensures that a defendant has sufficient leeway in cross-examining
the government's witnesses.58 The Supreme Court has found, for
example, a constitutional violation when a trial court prohibited a
The Court recognized that the confrontation clause has not been violated when prior
testimony has been subject to cross-examination and the witness is unavailable for testi-
fying at trial. Id. at 722. In reversing the defendant's conviction, however, the Court
held that "a witness is not 'unavailable'. . . unless the prosecutorial authorities have
made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." Id. at 724-25. The State should
have sought the cooperation of the federal prison officials in getting the witness to the
trial. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1972) (the declarant's permanent
transfer to a foreign country constituted sufficient unavailability where there was no es-
tablished means of compelling his appearance). But see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970) (plurality opinion). In Dutton, the Court did not require a showing of unavailabil-
ity after determining that it was "remote" that the defendant would benefit from being
able to cross-examine the declarant about the truth of his statement. Id. at 89.
55. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
56. See Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 216.
57. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970). See also Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965). In Pointer, the defendant was arrested for robbery and brought before a
judge for a hearing. At the hearing, an assistant district attorney presented the victim as
the prosecution's chief witness, but the defendant, who did not have counsel, did not
conduct cross-examination. After indictment and before trial, the victim moved out of
state. At trial, the State offered a transcript of the witness's prior testimony as evidence
against the defendant, who had since obtained a lawyer. Id. at 401. Over the lawyer's
objections, the evidence was admitted and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant did not have the opportunity, through counsel, to ade-
quately cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing, and reversed the convic-
tion. Id. at 407-08.
Maryland courts have decided similar cases. The defendant in State v. Collins, 265
Md. 70, 288 A.2d 163 (1972), was mailed notice of the scheduled deposition of a wit-
ness, but he was out of town and did not receive the notice until after the deposition.
His attorney, who was present, objected to the proceedings because of his client's ab-
sence, but proceeded to cross-examine the witness. See id. at 74, 288 A.2d at 166. Seek-
ing to have the witness's testimony admitted into evidence, the State argued that the
confrontation requirements were satisfied by the service of notice and the attorney's
presence. See id. at 79, 288 A.2d at 168. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the
defendant's right to be present at the deposition could not be waived by his attorney's
presence. See id. at 80-81, 288 A.2d at 169.
58. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("[T~he cross-examiner is not
only permitted to ... test the witness' perceptions and memory, [but also] . .. to im-
peach ... the witness.").
1130 [VOL. 50:1123
CRIMINAL LAW
defendant from asking the principal prosecution witness for his cor-
rect name and address.59 Also, the Court has held that a trial judge
erred in denying defense counsel the opportunity to raise the issue
of a key witness's juvenile probationary status.60
The Supreme Court has recently attempted to draw a distinc-
tion between pretrial and trial restrictions on the scope of cross-
examination 6 ' and has stated that the right of confrontation is a trial
right.62 But in prior cases, the Court has held that events occurring
outside of trial may impair cross-examination," and therefore, it
was constitutional error to deny access to material that would aid in
questioning a prosecution's witness' and to exclude defense coun-
sel from a pretrial identification lineup.65
The Court has also attempted to settle whether the confronta-
59. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968); see also Alford v. United States,
282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931) (the trial court erred in disallowing an inquiry into a witness's
place of residence when such a question was appropriate in placing the witness in his
proper setting).
60. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 320. The trial court in Davis prohibited the defendant from
questioning a witness about the latter's juvenile criminal record because a statute made
that information confidential. Defendant's counsel wanted to argue that the witness,
who was on probation, was assisting the police out of fear that his probation would be
revoked. See id. at 311. The Supreme Court held that the restriction on cross-examina-
tion violated the confrontation clause by interfering with the defendant's ability to im-
peach the witness's testimony. See id. at 320.
Brown v. State, 74 Md. App. 414, 538 A.2d 317 (1988), is an example of a court-
imposed restriction in Maryland. The State's sole witness in Brown had been arrested on
charges unrelated to those involving the defendants. Id. at 516, 538 A.2d at 318. After
cooperating with the police by giving information about the defendants' alleged criminal
activities, the charges against the witness were not prosecuted. Id. at 417, 538 A.2d at
318. The trial judge prohibited the defense counsel from questioning the witness about
her arrest or the circumstances surrounding her statements to the police. Id., 538 A.2d
at 319. The defendants were convicted. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals stated
that a trial court may exercise its discretion to control the limits of cross-examination
only after "the constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry has been afforded the
defendant." Id. at 419, 538 A.2d at 319 (citing United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203,
213 (6th Cir. 1986)). The court emphasized that cross-examination to test the witness's
credibility is especially important when the State's case rests exclusively on that witness's
testimony. See id. at 421, 538 A.2d at 320. In this instance, the trial court's ruling im-
peded the defendants' cross-examination and was a violation of their rights of confron-
tation. See also Lewis v. State, 71 Md. App. 402, 415, 526 A.2d 66, 72 (1987) (right of
confrontation was violated when the trial court imposed a time limit on the defendant's
cross-examination).
61. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 n.9 (1987) (plurality opinion) (con-
frontation clause protects trial rights and does not compel pretrial production of infor-
mation that might be useful in preparing for. trial).
62. See id. at 52. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957).
64. Id.
65. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
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tion clause guarantees effective cross-examination or merely the op-
portunity for effective cross-examination. Recent decisions have
supported the latter conclusion: the clause guarantees "an opportu-
nity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is ef-
fective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might
wish."66 The need for an inquiry into the effectiveness of cross-ex-
amination however, has been strongly implied on other occasions.67
(2) Child abuse cases.-The Supreme Court first considered the
accused child abuser's right of confrontation in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, a case involving facts similar to those in Runge. The defend-
ant was accused of sexually abusing his thirteen-year-old daugh-
ter.6" While preparing his defense, Ritchie subpoenaed Children
and Youth Services (CYS), seeking access to the agency's file on his
daughter's case. 69 CYS denied Ritchie access to the file, claiming
that it was privileged under a statute that makes all CYS reports con-
fidential, with certain exceptions. 70  The trial court later convicted
Ritchie of incest, rape, and other charges, but the Pennsylvania ap-
pellate courts vacated the conviction and remanded the case after
determining that Ritchie's right of confrontation had been
violated.7 '
The majority of the Supreme Court in Ritchie agreed with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the defendant was entitled to
know whether relevant information existed in the CYS file.72 Four
66. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis in original). See also
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 53 (quoting Fensterer); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 n.12 (1980)
("in all but ... extraordinary cases, no inquiry into 'effectiveness' is required").
67. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) ("Petitioner was thus denied the
right of effective cross-examination"); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968). De-
fense counsel in Smith asked the witness to state his correct name and address, but the
trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the question. See id. at 130-31. The
Supreme Court determined that "[t]o forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the
threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself." Id. at 131.
See also Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
68. 480 U.S. 39, 43 (1987) (plurality opinion).
69. Id. CYS is a protective service agency established by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to investigate cases of suspected child abuse and neglect. Id.
70. Id. See supra note 20.
71. 480 U.S. at 45-46. The Commonwealth argued that nondisclosure of the file to
the defendant was harmless because the trial judge had examined the file and concluded
that it contained no information relevant to Ritchie's defense. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, however, determined that the defendant was entitled to have the file re-
viewed by his advocate, who may see relevance where a trial judge would not. Id. at 46.
72. See id. at 58. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court was joined in full by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor. See id. at 42. Justice Blackmun
joined in all of the opinion except for the confrontation clause discussion. See id. at 61
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of the five justices making up the majority, however, disagreed with
the Pennsylvania court's decision that Ritchie's access to the file was
guaranteed by his right of confrontation.7" The Court instead used
a due process analysis, holding that relevant information in the file
must be disclosed to the defendant when it is material to his
defense.74
3. Analysis.-
a. The Defendant's Statutory Right to the Child Abuse File-The Inter-
pretation of Article 88A, Section 6(b).-In Runge, the Court of Appeals
did not address the confrontation clause or the disclosure issues dis-
cussed in Ritchie and other Supreme Court cases, because the de-
fendant relied solely on article 88A, section 6 in claiming he was
entitled to full access to DSS's files. 75 Thus, the problem before the
court was one of statutory construction, and in reversing the Court
of Special Appeals, the court stated that the lower appellate court
had not sufficiently explored the statute's legislative history and
purpose.76
Article 88A, section 6 makes disclosure of certain public assist-
ance records a criminal offense, but defines several exceptions for
disclosure of child abuse records. 77  The main issue before the
Court of Appeals was whether disclosure under these exceptions
was discretionary or mandatory. The pertinent sentence of subsec-
tion (b) provided: "Information contained in reports or records
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun nevertheless joined in the Court's judgment, be-
cause he felt that the due process analysis outlined by Justice Powell was sufficient to
protect the confrontation right. See id. at 65 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
73. See id. at 54.
74. See id. at 56-58. The plurality relied on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90-91
(1963), in which the Court imposed on the government a due process obligation to
provide evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused and material to the
accused's guilt or punishment.
Maryland courts have gone even further. Under Carr v. State, 284 Md. 455, 397
A.2d 606 (1979), a criminal defendant is entitled, upon request at the conclusion of the
witness's direct testimony, to any prior statements of the witness for use in cross-exami-
nation. In Carr, the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's armed robbery convic-
tion when the state denied defense counsel access to a key witness's prior signed
statement that was inconsistent with the witness's testimony at trial. See id. at 472-73,
397 A.2d at 614. The court held that the state denied Carr due process of law. See id.
See also Leonard v. State, 46 Md. App. 631, 421 A.2d 85 (1979), aft'd, 290 Md. 295, 429
A.2d 538 (1981). "[lIt is incumbent upon the court . .. to permit [defense] counsel to
inspect the statement and determine for himself whether it is or is not usable for cross-
examination." id. at 639, 421 A.2d at 89.
75. See Runge, 317 Md. at 615-16, 566 A.2d at 89.
76. See id. at 616, 566 A.2d at 89.
77. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 88A, § 6 (Supp. 1989).
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concerning child abuse or neglect may be disclosed only: .... "78 To
interpret the meaning of this language, the court first looked to the
statute's legislative history.7 9 The court found that the legislation's
initial purpose was to conform Maryland's existing statute to the
federal law, making the state eligible for federal grants."0 The court
observed that in light of this purpose and the general societal goal
of protecting the confidentiality of those who report abuse, subsec-
tion (b) could not be read as mandating disclosure of child abuse
files to accused child abusers."' The statute is merely permissive,
protecting records custodians from criminal prosecution for disclo-
sures made under defined circumstances.12 In discussing the law's
affirmative purpose, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the stat-
ute was not intended to grant additional discovery rights to criminal
defendants.8 3 Runge's claim that he was entitled to disclosure of
the DSS files under section 6(b) could not succeed.
In a technical sense, the Court of Appeal's decision is unassaila-
ble. The court proposed only to construe correctly the statute at
issue, and it appears to have succeeded. The Court of Special Ap-
peals stretched the rules of statutory construction too far in ruling
that the word "may" in section 6(b) actually meant "shall" and man-
dated disclosure of records to the defendant.8 4 This is not to say
that "may" can never have a mandatory meaning. The verb's form
78. Id. § 6(b) (emphasis added).
79. The Court of Appeals approved the intermediate appellate court's consideration
of the statute's plain language in light of its purpose. See id. at 616, 566 A.2d at 89
(citing Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 560, 566 (1987)).
The court determined, however, that the Court of Special Appeals did not give adequate
attention to the statute's legislative history and purpose. See id.
80. See Runge, 317 Md. at 619, 566 A.2d at 90-91. See supra notes 30-32 and accompa-
nying text. The Court of Special Appeals acknowledged this purpose in Freed v.
Worcester County Dep't of Social Servs., 69 Md. App. 447, 518 A.2d 159, cert. denied,
309 Md. 47, 522 A.2d 392 (1986), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 804 (1987). Freed held that
article 88A, section 6(b) does not provide for disclosure of the identity of a reporter of
child neglect to the suspects, who alleged that the complaint was made in bad faith. See
id. at 453-54, 518 A.2d at 162.
81. See Runge, 317 Md. at 620, 566 A.2d at 91.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Indeed, the intermediate appeals court's decision in Runge v. State is particularly
unusual in light of that court's statement in another case that "the statute was never
intended to be a vehicle to permit the willy-nilly disclosure of the very records the Legis-
lature sought to keep confidential." Freed, 69 Md. App. at 454, 518 A.2d at 162. The
Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that the statute's purpose was to encourage the
reporting of child neglect and stated that "[w]ere we to allow a court to order disclosure
merely upon demand or upon the parent's or guardian's belief that the disclosure was
made in bad faith, the nondisclosure statutes would be severely eroded, if not effectively
eliminated." Id. at 454-55, 518 A.2d at 162-63.
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is not the sole determinant of whether a statute is mandatory or di-
rectory.85 Courts, however, "will apply that construction which best
carries into effect the purpose of the statute under consideration in
order to determine whether the statute is mandatory or direc-
tory."86 By strongly emphasizing the statute's legislative history in
addition to looking at its plain language, the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly applied the rules of statutory construction and arrived at the
only logical result.
b. The Defendant's Constitutional Right to the Child Abuse File-The
Right of Confrontation.-Runge claimed only a statutory right to DSS's
records; he did not claim he was entitled to the file based on his
right of confrontation.8 7 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not
address any constitutional questions implicated by the case.88 Fu-
ture defendants may, however, be able to gain access to child abuse
records under a right-of-confrontation argument. These defend-
ants could argue that the court should expand the right of confron-
tation under article 21 of the Maryland constitution by adopting
Justice Brennan's position in his Ritchie dissent.89
Confrontation clause issues do not arise only at the trial stage.90
85. N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 57.03 (Sands 4th ed. 1984)
(other considerations can overcome the natural connotation of the verb's form).
86. Id. § 57.04. Sutherland also suggests considering the effects of alternative con-
structions. See id. § 57.07. Section 6(b)'s legislative history makes clear that one of the
laws' purposes is to encourage reporting of abuse and neglect. If disclosure of DSS's
files to suspected abusers was mandatory, as opposed to directory, potential reporters
would likely fear retaliation and thus be discouraged from reporting the abuse they ob-
served. See also Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 632
(1987) (when construing a statute, courts must consider persuasive evidence that in-
cludes a bill's title and function paragraphs, and amendments and their relationship to
earlier and subsequent legislation).
87. See Runge v. State, 78 Md. App. 23, 552 A.2d 560 (1989). The defendant argued
to the Court of Special Appeals that the trial court's application of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
was erroneous. See id. at 29, 552 A.2d at 563-64. Because of significant differences be-
tween the confidentiality statutes in Pennsylvania and Maryland, the court's in camera
inspection should not have included determining which parts of the file were relevant to
Runge's defense. Rather, it should have been limited to "safeguarding from disclosure
the identity of the reporter(s) of the abuse." Id., 552 A.2d at 564.
88. See Runge, 317 Md. at 615-16, 566 A.2d at 89.
89. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 66-72 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 52. Justice Powell cited two Supreme Court cases as support for the state-
ment that the right of confrontation is only a trial right. See id. at 52-53; California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) ("it is this literal right to 'confront' the witnesses at the
time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause");
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ("The right to confrontation is basically a trial
right."). As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, however, neither statement was a
response to the question of whether the right of confrontation is implicated by events
outside of trial. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Maryland courts should recognize that a defendant's ability to cross-
examine an adverse witness can be affected by events occurring both
before and during trial. Pretrial events, such as denial of access to
certain relevant documents, can affect the scope of cross-examina-
tion at trial.9 ' Moreover, an argument can be made that the right of
confrontation demands an analysis of the effectiveness of a defend-
ant's cross-examination, not just an inquiry into whether the de-
fendant had an opportunity for cross-examination. To ignore the
effects of pretrial events or to limit the right strictly to an opportu-
nity for cross-examination could render the confrontation clause an
"empty formality." 92
In Davis v. Alaska,9" the trial court, pursuant to a state statute,
issued a pretrial protective order prohibiting any reference to a key
prosecuting witness's juvenile record.9 4 Because of this prohibition,
the defense counsel could not adequately demonstrate to the jury
the witness's source of bias.9 5 The Supreme Court concluded that
the jurors were entitled to have the defense theory presented to
them so that they could better judge the weight to give the witness's
testimony.96 The decision in Davis demonstrates that the distinction
between pretrial and trial events is suspect because pretrial events
can restrict the ability to cross-examine as much as an event during
trial. Yet, the Court in Ritchie stated that the defendant's need for
pretrial access to information that may help impeach a witness could
not entitle the defendant to see the records;9 7 Ritchie's sixth amend-
ment rights would have been violated by a court-imposed restriction
at trial, not by a pretrial denial of access to CYS's files.9 8 But as
Justice Blackmun observed in his concurring opinion: "[a] State
[cannot] avoid Confrontation Clause problems simply by deciding
91. Denying access to material that would serve as the basis for effective questioning
of an adverse witness is such an event because it would hinder defense counsel's ability
to pursue certain lines of inquiry at trial. Thus, pretrial denial of access to material
information effectively restricts a defense lawyer as much as a trial court's ruling. See
infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
227 (1967) (presence of counsel at pretrial identification lineup allows a defendant
meaningful cross-examination of witnesses against him and ensures a fair trial).
92. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 62 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
93. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
94. Id. at 311.
95. Id. at 318.
96. See id. at 317. The Court emphasized that defense counsel, because of the pre-
trial order, was unable to gather evidence "from which to argue why [the witness] might
have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at
trial." Id. at 318 (emphasis in original).
97. See 480 U.S. at 52 (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 53-54.
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to hinder the defendant's right to effective cross-examination, on
the basis of a desire to protect the confidentiality interests of a par-
ticular class of individuals, at the pretrial, rather than at the trial,
stage." 99
In Runge, the trial court's refusal to grant the defendant access
to the DSS files was highly prejudicial to the defendant. Even
though the defendant received most of the file after the court's in
camera inspection, he did not receive the children's statements con-
tained in the file until halfway through the second day of the three-
day trial.' This limited the cross examination's potential scope,
preventing defense counsel from using the children's prior inconsis-
tent statements, or any other information that may have been in the
file, to impeach the children's testimony. With no specific facts on
which the defendant's attorney could base his questions, the jury
may have thought that he was attacking the witnesses' credibility
without justification.' 0 '
The right of confrontation should encompass effective cross-ex-
amination, not just an opportunity for cross-examination. The
Supreme Court has stated that the confrontation clause protects the
right to cross examination, and is designed to promote reliability in
the truth-finding process.' 0 2 Professor Wigmore called cross-exam-
ination the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth.""0 3 Presumably, cross-examination can be an even more im-
portant factor in the truth-seeking process if it is truly effective. Yet
the Ritchie opinion stated that the defendant's confrontational right
was satisfied by the mere opportunity of cross-examination at trial,
without regard to the effectiveness of that questioning. '04 But even
if the sixth amendment does not ensure effective cross-examination,
Maryland courts could expand the right of confrontation under the
Maryland constitution to require an inquiry into the effectiveness of
cross-examination.
Challenging the witness's credibility is one of the most impor-
99. Id. at 65 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. See Respondent's Brief at 13-14, State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 566 A.2d 88
(1989) (No. 89-28).
101. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) ("on basis of limited cross-examina-
tion ... jury might well have thought defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and
baseless.., attack on [the witness's credibility]"); Hopper v. State, 64 Md. App. 97, 106,
494 A.2d 708, 713 (1985) (the judge's curtailing of defendant's questioning, designed to
attack witness's credibility, was reversible error).
102. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987).
103. 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 1367.
104. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (plurality opinion).
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tant means of finding the truth through cross-examination. 0 5 But a
defense lawyer denied access to important documents may be pre-
cluded from effectively pursuing that path. The mere opportunity
to cross-examine the witness does not necessarily provide the jury
with sufficient information with which to assess the witness's credi-
bility. Entering into an open line of inquiry with no real 'foundation
may harm the defendant's case more than it would be harmed by
not cross-examining that witness at all. For example, in State v. De-
Lawder,' °6 the trial court prohibited the defendant, charged with car-
nal knowledge of a female under the age of fourteen years, from
pursuing a line of questioning that would show that the victim had
previously engaged in sexual intercourse with other persons. 0 7 De-
fense counsel intended to show that the victim accused the defend-
ant because she was pregnant by another person and was afraid to
tell her mother that she had voluntarily had intercourse.'0 8 Af-
firming the circuit court's order of a new trial, the Court of Special
Appeals observed that the accuracy and truthfulness of the victim's
testimony was the key element in the State's case.' 0 9 Prohibiting the
defense from exposing facts from which the jury could gauge the
witness's reliability was reversible error because it denied the de-
fendant the right of effective cross-examination." 0 Maryland courts
can ensure that defendants have an effective means to test a wit-
ness's account of events by giving the defendant access to the wit-
ness's prior statements or to certain records, such as child abuse
files.
To be sure, the State has a strong interest in preserving the
confidentiality of its child abuse records."' No defendant should
have unfettered access to such important records, but neither
should an agency have so much discretion to deny a defendant ac-
cess to any part of the file as to infringe upon her constitutional
rights. An alleged child abuser's right to confront witnesses already
has been weakened by a statute that permits an alleged child abuse
victim to testify from outside the courtroom via closed-circuit televi-
sion."2 In approving the use of closed-circuit television in child
105. See id. at 51-52; Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.
106. 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975).
107. Id. at 220, 344 A.2d at 451.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 226-27, 344 A.2d at 454.
110. Id. at 227, 344 A.2d at 455.
111. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987); Besharov, supra note 28,
at 508-09.
112. See MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988).
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abuse cases, the Court of Appeals recognized that the government
has a compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and psycho-
logical well-being of child victims.'" Clearly, such an interest might
outweigh a defendant's right to a face to face confrontation with the
child. The same cannot be said of the right to "confront" the child
abuse records. When an alleged abuser has access to records, the
concern is not the trauma a child may suffer in testifying, but rather
the protection of the identities of persons whose safety may be en-
dangered by the information's disclosure." 4 Provided that the
identities of such persons are protected, defendants should have ac-
cess to the records." 5
4. Conclusion.-State v. Runge was not a difficult decision for the
Court of Appeals. The court corrected the Court of Special Ap-
peals' rather broad interpretation of a state confidentiality statute.
Since Runge relied solely on article 88A, section 6(b) in claiming a
right of access to the child abuse records, the court correctly con-
fined its analysis to that issue.
Future defendants, however, should challenge denial of access
to confidential child abuse files as a violation of their right of con-
frontation. In arguing that Maryland courts should expand the right
of confrontation under article 21 of the Maryland constitution, de-
fendants can emphasize: (1) that their ability to cross-examine a wit-
ness can be restricted by both pretrial and trial events and (2) that
ignoring the issue of the effectiveness of cross-examination divorces
the right of confrontation from its truthseeking goals. To guarantee
a fair trial, courts should not be quick to approve restrictions on a
defendant's ability to cross-examine witnesses. The door remains
open for Maryland courts to give real meaning to the right of
confrontation.
113. See Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 518, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (1987).
114. Those persons usually include the reporter of the suspected child abuse. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 6(b)(4) (Supp. 1989) (requiring protection of the reporter and
other persons before child abuse records are disclosed).
115. In his dissent in Ritchie, Justice Brennan argued that the plurality's due process
analysis will not prevent infringements on the rights of confrontation and cross-exami-
nation. 480 U.S. at 71-72 (Brennan,J., dissenting). According to Justice Brennan,Jencks
v. United States, which was based on confrontation concerns, not due process concerns,
required that only the defense counsel, not a trial judge, could decide what information
is material for the purpose of impeaching the prosecution's witness. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at
72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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B. Defining the Limits to the Anti-Shuffling Provision of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers
In State v. Jefferson".6 the Court of Appeals ruled that the anti-
shuffling" 7 provision of article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (IAD)" 8 requires only that a "trial" be "had" on any out-
standing charges forming the detainer's basis before the receiving
state is permitted to return the prisoner to the place of his original
imprisonment." 9 The court reached its conclusion by performing a
two-part analysis. First, by strictly construing the statute's language,
the court found that the defendant's district court trial satisfied the
IAD's anti-shuffling requirements. Read literally, the receiving state
is not required to keep a prisoner until final disposition of all
charges, but only until a "trial" is "had."' 2 Second, the court
found that the problems associated with the detainer system, which
the statute attempts to address, primarily arise because of "unsub-
stantiated charges or charges that remain lodged after the prisoner is
returned."'' Once a prisoner faces trial and is convicted, the
charges no longer are unsubstantiated. 2 2 Although a district court
conviction may be overturned through a de novo appeal to the cir-
cuit court,12 appeals are beyond the scope of article IV(e)'s anti-
shuffling provision. 114
1. The Case.-Anthony Jerome Jefferson was charged in the
District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County with theft of
116. 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918 (1990).
117. Shuffling, or shuttling as it is alternatively called, refers to transferring prisoners
between institutions pursuant to detainers issued to prosecute other charges.
118. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616E(e) (1987) (codifying article IV(e)). The provision
states:
(e) Dismissal of indictment, etc., on which no trial had.-If trial is not had on any
indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the pris-
oner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article
V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any fur-
ther force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.
Id. For the history of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), see generally infra
notes 140-144.
119. See 319 Md. at 684, 574 A.2d at 922.
120. Id. at 683, 574 A.2d at 922.
121. Id. (emphasis in original).
122. See id.
123. See id.; MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-301(d) (1989); infra notes 129 &
130.
124. See 319 Md. at 684, 574 A.2d at 922.
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goods valued at more than $300.'25 Before he was tried on this
charge, District of Columbia officials incarcerated him in the Lorton
Penitentiary for another offense.' 2 6 On April 19, 1990, while still at
Lorton, Jefferson was served with a detainer' 2 1 issued on the theft
charge. ' 28 The next day, he was transferred to Montgomery County
to stand trial before the district court.' 2
9
On May 19, 1988, Jefferson was convicted in the district court
of theft of goods having a value in excess of $300, and sentenced to
a term of imprisonment. On the same day, he appealed to the Cir-
cuit Court for Montgomery County for a trial de novo.'3 ° On May
23, 1988, Maryland officials returned Jefferson to Lorton, prior to
the de novo circuit court trial.' 3 1
On July 13, 1988, Jefferson moved to dismiss the theft charges,
claiming that his return to Lorton before the trial de novo violated
article IV(e) of the TAD.'- 2 He argued that a "trial" was not "had"
under the IAD's terms, and therefore, the theft charge should be
dismissed with prejudice.' 33 He also claimed that a de novo appeal
is a continuation of the district court trial, and is not a second
125. Id. at 676, 574 A.2d at 918; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (1987) (consoli-
dated theft statute). Theft of goods worth more than $300 is a felony offense. See id.
126. Brief for Respondent at 1, State v. Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918 (1990)
(No. 130).
127. Under the IAD, "a detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a
prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted for some pending criminal
charges in another jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); S.
REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 4864, 4865. Cf. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 725 (1985) (a detainer
based on a probation-violation charge is not a detainer within the meaning of the IAD's
article III); United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S 340, 360-61 (1978) (a writ of habeas corpus
to prosecute (ad prosequendum) issued by a federal court to state authorities, directing a
state prisoner's production for trial on federal criminal charges, is not a detainer within
IAD's meaning and thus does not trigger its operation).
128. Jefferson, 319 Md. at 676, 574 A.2d at 918. The District Court of Maryland for
Montgomery County originally issued the detainer as an arrest warrant on November
23, 1987. Id.
129. Id. In Maryland, the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over many
criminal offenses. See MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-301 (1989); see also id. § 4-
302 (listing exceptions to the district court's original jurisdiction).
130. Jefferson, 319 Md. at 676, 574 A.2d at 918. In Maryland, "[a] party in a civil case
or the defendant in a criminal case may appeal from a final judgment entered in the
District Court." MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-401(a) (1989). In all criminal
cases, the appeal shall be tried de novo, unless both parties agree to an appeal heard on
the record. Id. § 12-401(d).
131. Brief of Respondent at 2, Jefferson v. State, 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918 (1990)
(No. 130).
132. Id.
133. Jefferson, 319 Md. at 677, 574 A.2d at 919.
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proceeding. 13 4
The circuit court agreed with Jefferson's interpretation of arti-
cle IV(e) of the IAD. Focusing on the IAD's general purpose, it said
that a jurisdiction that has obtained temporary custody of another
jurisdiction's prisoner must "complete its business with the prisoner
before returning him to the custodial jurisdiction."' 35 Having con-
cluded that the TAD contemplated Jefferson's continued detention
in Maryland until his appeal de novo was completed, the court held
thatJefferson was entitled to dismissal of all outstanding charges.' 6
The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari
3 1
to consider whether Jefferson's rights under the IAD were violated
when he was returned to Lorton before his circuit court de novo
appeal.'13  The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judg-
ment and held that "[t]he final judgment rendered against Jefferson
in the District Court satisfied § 616E(e)'s [article IV(e)'s] require-
ment that a 'trial' be 'had' on the 'complaint contemplated hereby,'
regardless of whether the de novo trial was 'had' as well."' 3 9
134. Id.
135. Memorandum and Order at 3, State v. Jefferson, Criminal No. 51516 (Cir. Ct.
Montgomery Co., Aug. 21, 1989), reprinted in Joint Record Abstract at 28, State v. Jeffer-
son, 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918 (1990) (No. 130). See Boyd v. State, 51 Md. App. 197,
203, 441 A.2d 1133, 1137 (1982) (1AD requires that the "receiving State, once it has
obtained custody of the prisoner under the Act, wrap up its business with him, so to
speak, before returning him to the custodial (sending) State"), aff'd, 294 Md. 103, 447
A.2d 871 (1982).
136. See Joint Record Abstract at 30.
137. The Court of Appeals, not the Court of Special Appeals, has authority to review
this type of decision:
The Court of Appeals shall require by writ of certiorari that a decision be
certified to it for review and determination in any case in which a circuit court
has rendered a final judgment on appeal from the District Court ... if it ap-
pears to the Court of Appeals, upon petition of a party that:
(1) Review is necessary to secure uniformity of decision, as where the same
statute has been construed differently by two or more judges; or
(2) There are other special circumstances rendering it desirable and in the
public interest that the decision be reviewed.
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-305 (1989). But cf. Legal Aid Bureau v. Farmer,
74 Md. App. 707, 709-14, 539 A.2d 1173, 1175-79 (1988) (holding that the Court of
Special Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over a circuit court order imposing sanction
on attorney).
138. See Jefferson, 319 Md. at 678, 574 A.2d at 919.
139. Id. at 684, 574 A.2d at 922.
[VOL. 50:11231142
1991] CRIMINAL LAW 1143
2. Legal Background.-
a. Interstate Agreement on Detainers.-
(1) The Agreement's Legislative History and Purpose.-The IAD is a
compact among forty-eight states,141 the District of Columbia, Pu-
erto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States government.' 4 1
The Agreement's text generally follows the Council of State Gov-
ernments' Suggested Legislative Program for 1957.142 Maryland
enacted the Agreement in 1965,43 responding to the well-docu-
mented shortcomings of the detainer system as it existed prior to
the IAD's enactment. 144
140. Only Mississippi and Louisiana have not enacted the LAD. See 18 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 1 historical note (West 1985) (listing state versions of the IAD).
141. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 715, 719 (1985). Congress enacted the Inter-
state Agreement on Detainers Act in 1970, joining the United States and the District of
Columbia as parties. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, 84
Stat. 1397 (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. § 2); H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEwS 4864, 4865 (for legislative history).
142. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM
FOR 1957 (1956).
The IAD's origins can be traced to 1948, when the Joint Committee on Detainers
issued a report detailing problems arising from the detainer system. See United States v.
Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1978). Justice White, writing for the majority in Mauro,
explained that five guiding principles emerged from the Joint Committee on Detainers'
report, and served as the "underpinnings of the Agreement":
1. Every effort should be made to accomplish the disposition of detainers
as promptly as possible.
2. There should be assurance that any prisoner released to stand trial in
another jurisdiction will be returned to the institution from which he was re-
leased.
3. Prison and parole authorities should take prompt action to settle de-
tainers which have been filed by them.
4. No prisoner should be penalized because of a detainer pending against
him unless a thorough investigation of the detainer has been made and it has
been found valid.
5. All jurisdictions should observe the principles of interstate comity in
the settlement of detainers, and each should bear its own proper burden of the
expenses and effort involved in disposing of the charges and settling detainers.
436 U.S. at 350 (citing Bennett, The Last Full Ounce, 23 FED. PROBATION 20, 22 (1959)).
143. See Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 627, 1965 Md. Laws 862 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 616A-616R (1987)). Maryland has also enacted an Intrastate Agreement on
Detainers. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616S (1987); see also Barnes v. State, 20 Md.
App. 262, 268, 315 A.2d 117, 121 (interstate and intrastate agreements on detainers
should be construed together, harmonizing their general purpose and scope), aft'd, 273
Md. 195, 328 A.2d 737 (1974).
144. See infra note 149 (listing the detainer system's deleterious effects); see generally
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719-21 (1985) (the IAD was an attempt to correct the
detainer system's deficiencies); Mauro, 436 U.S. at 349-53 (history of the LAD's enact-
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Before the lAD was adopted, prosecutors often filed detainers
based on criminal charges having little basis, only later to withdraw
these near the end of a prisoner's sentence.' 45 This practice has
been termed "corrosive" to the rehabilitative process.' 46  The
Agreement's general purpose, spelled out in article I, demonstrates
legislative recognition of this problem:
The party states find that the charges outstanding
against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments,
informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing
speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other juris-
dictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of
prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is
the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agree-
ment to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition
of such charges and determination of the proper status of
any and all detainers based on untried indictments, infor-
mations, or complaints. The party states also find that pro-
ceedings with reference to such charges and detainers,
when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot prop-
erly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is
the further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-
operative procedures. 147
The case law acknowledges that unsubstantiated detainers
based on untried charges adversely affect prisoners.' 48 The IAD's
enactment provided a uniform method of resolving detainers by
limiting their deleterious effects.' 49
ment); Bennett, supra note 142, at 22 (detailing initial steps taken to reduce the detainer
system's unfairness).
145. See Carchman, 473 U.S. at 729 & n.6; H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4864, 4865.
146. See Bennett, supra note 142, at 21.
147. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616B (1987).
148. See Jefferson, 319 Md. at 679, 574 A.2d at 920.
149. See id. at 680, 574 A.2d at 920; United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359-60
(1978).
Many courts have described these effects. The Jefferson court summarized the most
inclusive list as follows:
[Tihe inmate is (1) deprived of an opportunity to obtain a sentence to run con-
currently with the sentence being served at the time the detainer is filed; (2)
classified as a maximum or close custody risk; (3) ineligible for initial assign-
ments to less than maximum security prisons (i.e., honor farms or forestry
camp work); (4) ineligible for trustee [sic] status; (5) not allowed to live in pre-
ferred living quarters such as dormitories; (6) ineligible for study-release pro-
grams or work-release programs; (7) ineligible to be transferred to preferred
medium or minimum custody institutions within the correctional system, which
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The IAD contains two procedures for disposing of detainers:
the prisoner may request final disposition under article III, or a
party state may request temporary custody or availability under arti-
cle IV.'50 When disposition is requested under either method, the
prosecutor is required to bring the prisoner to trial on any "indict-
ment, information or complaint" before returning the prisoner to
the "original place of imprisonment."'' If "trial is not had," the
detainer must be dismissed with prejudice.15 2
(2) Interpretation by the Courts.-The IAD's legislative history
does not specifically define the term "trial," nor does it directly ad-
dress what is required for a trial to be "had."'" 3 Courts have
agreed, however, that a trial is not had when a prisoner is returned
to the sending jurisdiction before trial, unless the prisoner is re-
turned at his own request. 54
includes the removal of any possibility of transfer to an institution more appro-
priate to youthful offenders; (8) not entitled to preferred prison jobs which
carry higher wages and entitle [him] to additional good credits against [his]
sentence; (9) inhibited by the denial of possibility of parole or any commutation
of his sentence; (10) caused anxiety and thus hindered in the overall rehabilita-
tion process since he cannot take maximum advantage of his institutional
opportunities.
319 Md. at 679-80, 574 A.2d at 920 (quoting Carchman, 473 U.S. at 730 n.8, which in
turn quotes Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308, 314 n.10 (8th Cir. 1973) (brackets in
original)).
150. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616D, 616E (1987); United States v. Coffman, 905
F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351-52 (explaining IAD provi-
sions); Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 304, 455 A.2d 973, 974-75 (1983) (explaining
procedural details).
151. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616D(a), (d), 616E(a), (d) (1987).
152. See id. §§ 616D(d), 616E(e) (1987).
153. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 142; see also Carchman, 473
U.S. at 744 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the term "trial" as used in article III, represents
the "broader concept of 'final disposition' "); Tinghitella v. California, 718 F.2d 308,
311 (9th Cir. 1983) (the LAD's use of "trial" encompasses sentencing). But cf. Carchman,
473 U.S. at 728 (congressional legislative history suggested that Congress believed that
the agreement required a trial only for "detainers based on untried criminal charges");
United States v. Coffman, 905 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1990) (the term "trial" as used in
the Agreement's anti-shuffling provision does not include sentencing).
154. See Gillard v. State, 486 So. 2d 1323, 1327-28 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (article
111(e) was violated when a prisoner was returned prior to trial); Marshall v. Superior
Court, 183 Cal. App. 3d 662, 667, 228 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 (1986) (a prisoner transferred
in order to enter a guilty plea, and returned after the prosecutor dismissed charges,
could not be subject to a new detainer on the same charges); State v. Moser, 445 So. 2d
696, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (the prisoner's return before trial violated the "anti-
shuffling" provision).
Many courts have refused to apply the anti-shuffling provision when the prisoner
requested return to the original jurisdiction. See United States v. Boggs, 612 F.2d 991
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 857 (1980); Gray v. Benson, 608 F.2d 825 (10th Cir.
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The question presented inJefferson-whether a de novo trial on
appeal is a new proceeding or is a continuation of the original
trial-is a case of first impression in Maryland.155 The court's analy-
sis in Jefferson can be better understood in light of various courts'
treatment of whether the IAD term "trial" encompasses sentencing.
In Tinghitella v. California, ' 6 a Texas prisoner filed a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that California violated his "speedy trial"
rights under the IAD'5 7 by refusing to return him to California for
sentencing.1l ' By analogizing the IAD's use of "trial" to the sixth
amendment's use of "trial,' 59 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the terms "trial" and "final dis-
position" as used in the IAD encompass sentencing."'6 The court
found that "[b]oth the rehabilitative and fair treatment purposes of
the IAD would be better effectuated by construing trial to include
sentencing. "161 Establishing the sentence's length is important
both from the perspective of the prisoner's morale and proclivity for
rehabilitation, and his eligibility to participate in certain rehabilita-
tive programs, which may depend on the length of the sentence to
1979); People v. Engelson, 55 A.D.2d 960, 391 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1977) (anti-shuffling pro-
vision was not violated where prisoner requested return); United States v. Ford, 550
F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'don other grounds, sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S.
340 (1978); Commonwealth v. Mallon, 279 Pa. Super. 350, 421 A.2d 234 (1980) (pris-
oner requested return in order to keep his job at the sending state's prison).
155. SeeJefferson, 319 Md. at 678, 574 A.2d at 919.
156. 718 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1983).
157. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616D(a) (1987) (requires the receiving state to
bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days of the request for "final disposition" under
the IAD). The court denied Tinghitella relief, finding that he had not complied with the
IAD's procedural requirements. See 718 F.2d at 313.
158. 718 F.2d at 310. Tinghitella jumped bail in California after his conviction but
prior to sentencing on an assault charge. Id. Authorities learned several years later that
he was incarcerated in Texas, and California placed a detainer on him. California re-
fused to comply with his request under article 111(a) to return to California for final
disposition of the charge. Id.
159. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial .... "). The Tinghitella court noted that the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether sentencing is part of the trial for sixth amend-
ment purposes. See 718 F.2d at 313 (1983); see also Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S.
354, 361 (1957) (the Court assumed "arguendo that sentence is part of the trial for pur-
poses of the Sixth Amendment").
The Tinghitella court stated that the Ninth Circuit and others have followed the
Supreme Court's assumption in Pollard, and have treated sentencing as part of the trial
for sixth amendment purposes. See 718 F.2d at 312-13; see, e.g., United States v. Mer-
rival, 600 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Campisi, 583 F.2d 692, 694 (3d
Cir. 1978); United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246, 1252-53 (6th Cir. 1977) (employing a
balancing test to determine reasonableness of delay in sentencing).
160. See Tinghitella, 718 F.2d at 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1983).
161. Id. at 311 n.5.
1146 [VOL, 50:1123
CRIMINAL LAW
be served in the receiving state. 162
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Coffmnan, however, expressly
rejected the Tinghitella court's reasoning. 163 In Coffman, the court
held that "trial" in the IAD anti-shuttling provision does not include
sentencing."4 The Coffman opinion focused on the IAD's use of the
terms "disposition," "final disposition," "prosecution," and
"trial."' 65 The court found that "disposition," as used in the IAD,
refers to the final resolution of charges; 66 "final disposition" en-
compasses both imposition and service of sentence; t67 and "prose-
cution" includes the ambit of proceedings based on an "untried
indictment, information, or complaint."'168 The court noted that in
articles III(d) and IV(e), the drafters chose to use the term "trial"
rather than "disposition," "final disposition," or "prosecution."' 69
The court concluded that this statutory construction illustrated the
drafters' intent:
In our view this change in terminology reflects a decision
to limit the scope of the anti-shuttling provisions to pre-
conviction transfers. If the drafters had wished to extend
the IAD's anti-shuttling provisions to incidences occurring
after the trial but before sentencing, they could have used
the term "disposition," "final disposition," or "prosecu-
tion." They did not. Isolating the sentences containing
the word "trial," as the Ninth Circuit and Carchman dissent
apparently did, renders meaningless the use of the words
"disposition," "final disposition," and "prosecution" in
the other articles of the IAD.' 7°
The Tenth Circuit adopted the position that this interpretation
does not detract from the IAD's clearly defined purpose to facilitate
162. See id.
163. 905 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1990) (decided one day beforeJefferson).
164. See id. at 332.
165. See id.
166. See id.; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616B (1987) ("the purpose of this agreement
[is] to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges").
167. See 905 F.2d at 332; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616D(e) (1987).
168. See 905 F.2d at 332; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616F(d) (1987) ("[T]emporary
custody .. .shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or
charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints
which form the basis of the detainer.").
169. See 905 F.2d at 332.
170. Id. But see Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 744 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(claiming that article III uses the terms "trial" and "final disposition" interchangeably);
Tinghitella v. California, 718 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1983) ("central policy foundations
of the IAD support a broad construction of the term 'trial' ").
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prisoner rehabilitation. 7 Though Coffman's sentencing was com-
pleted in less than one day, the possibility of long delays, lasting
weeks or months, clearly undermines the effectiveness of the send-
ing state's rehabilitative programs. 72 The court thus concluded
that an interpretation of "trial" to include sentencing would effec-
tively defeat one of the IAD's stated purposes.' 7 3
b. De Novo Appeal in Mayland-Is a De Novo Trial a New Proceed-
ing?-In Maryland, the district court has exclusive original jurisdic-
tion over a wide range of relatively serious crimes.' 74  Maryland
law' 75 grants defendants in criminal cases the right to appeal from a
district court final judgment. 176 The law also provides the defend-
ant in a criminal case the right to an appeal tried de novo.' 77
The Court of Appeals has "consistently treated de novo appeals
as wholly original proceedings, that is, as if no judgment had been
entered in the lower court."'17 8 Nevertheless, the circuit court con-
ducts the de novo trial as part of its appellate jurisdiction.' 79 For
example, because of the proceeding's appellate nature, the de novo
trial must be tried under the same charging document.' 80
171. See 905 F.2d at 333.
172. See id. Jefferson noted in his brief that prisoners commonly are transferred be-
tween the District of Columbia and Maryland facilities. See Brief of Respondent at 5,
Jefferson v. State, 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918 (1990) (No. 130). With this in mind, the
Jefferson court's decision likely was influenced by the effect its ruling may have on large
numbers of prisoners. The court did not fully articulate the practical considerations, but
these cannot be ignored.
173. See 905 F.2d at 333. Jefferson took a similar position by viewing the statute as a
whole. See 319 Md. at 684-85, 574 A.2d at 922-23.
174. See supra note 129; see also State v. Anderson, 320 Md. 17, 29 n.4, 575 A.2d 1227,
1232 n.4 (1990) (distinguishing the Maryland appellate system from the Massachusetts
"two-tier" system).
175. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-401(a) (1987).
176. See supra note 130; see, e.g., Harper v. State, 312 Md. 396, 397, 540 A.2d 124, 125
(1988) (the defendant was entitled to a jury trial de novo in the circuit court on appeal
from a district court order finding him in criminal contempt).
177. See supra note 130.
178. Hardy v. State, 279 Md. 489, 493, 369 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1977). The Court of
Appeals has interpreted de novo to mean "afresh" or "anew." See id. at 493, 369 A.2d at
1046. See also Pinkett v. State, 30 Md. App. 458, 468, 352 A.2d 358, 365 (1976) (de novo
appeal must be tried on the same charging document as the district court trial).
179. See Hardy, 279 Md. at 493, 369 A.2d at 1046.
180. See Pinkett, 30 Md. App. at 468, 352 A.2d at 365. See also Lewis v. State, 289 Md.
1, 4, 421 A.2d 974, 977 (1976) (ruling that the appellate trial is based on the original
district court charging document); MD. R. 4-201 (c) (3) (on appeal, a defendant is entitled
to a trial in circuit court on the charging document filed in the district court); MD. R.
1314b (rule 4-204, governing amendments to charging documents applies in appellate
court). Maryland's use of the term charging document is consistent with the IAD's refer-
ence to "untried indictment, information, or complaint." See supra note 168.
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Discussing the second trial's de novo nature, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals has stated that "[t]he de novo trial washes out the trial
in the District Court but not the basis for it."'' The Supreme
Court, describing the analogous Massachusetts "two-tier" system
for trying minor crimes, found that "the second stage proceeding
can be regarded as but an enlarged, fact-sensitive part of a single,
continuous course of judicial proceedings."' 18 2
These descriptions could lead to the conclusion that the de
novo trial in Maryland is a successive element of a fact finding pro-
cess, continuing the original trial.' The Court of Appeals, how-
ever, dismissed this interpretation in a decision issued after Jefferson,
declaring that the Supreme Court's description of the Massachusetts
system "would not be an appropriate description of Maryland's
system."'
' 8 4
3. Analysis.-The nature of the Maryland de novo trial system
supports Jefferson's contention that article IV(e) of the IAD prohib-
its a prisoner's return to his original place of imprisonment before
de novo trial in the circuit court.'8' The Jefferson court, however,
citing the language of article IV(e), maintained that:
[t]he "anti-shuffling" provision of § 616E(e) does not, by
its terms, require the receiving state to keep a prisoner un-
til the final disposition of the charges against him. It only
requires that a "trial" be "had" on the charges. Had the
IAD intended to require that the receiving state hold a pris-
oner until all appeals were exhausted, rather than just until
completion of the trial, it would have said so in no uncer-
tain language.' 86
The Court of Appeals' reasoning closely parallels that of the
181. Pinkett, 30 Md. App. at 469, 352 A.2d at 366.
182. Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 309. The Massachu-
setts "two-tier de novo system," applies only to minor crimes, and is significantly differ-
ent from Maryland's de novo appellate procedure. In Massachusetts, the only appeal
available to a criminal defendant convicted of a minor crime is a trial de novo before a
jury session of the same court, and the initial judgment is vacated upon application for a
trial de novo. State v. Anderson, 320 Md. 17, 29 n.4, 575 A.2d 1227, 1232 n.4 (1990).
Compare supra notes 129-130 (describing Maryland's district court and appellate system).
183. See Brief of Respondent at 13, Jefferson v. State, 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918
(1990) (No. 130).
184. See State v. Anderson, 320 Md. 17, 29, n.4, 575 A.2d 1227, 1232, n.4 (1990)
(discussed supra note 182).
185. See Brief of Respondent at 13, Jefferson v. State, 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918
(1990) (No. 130).
186. 319 Md. at 683, 574 A.2d at 922.
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Tenth Circuit in Coffman.' sv The Coffman court held that "trial" in
the IAD anti-shuffling provision does not include sentencing.18 8
Though the Court of Appeals did not cite Coffman, it noted that at
least three other jurisdictions have held inapplicable the IAD's anti-
shuffling provision when a prisoner is returned to his original place
of imprisonment after a mistrial, but before a retrial.1 8 9 These par-
allels support a literal interpretation of the anti-shuffling provision's
language.' 90 By its terms, the IAD requires only that a "trial" be
"had."'t9 t
But the court relied more heavily on the IAD's legislative pur-
pose, which was to address broader concerns associated with detain-
ers "based on unsubstantiated charges, or charges that remain lodged
after the prisoner is returned."' 92 After the district court convicted
him, Jefferson no longer faced unsubstantiated charges.' 9 The
court acknowledged that his conviction could be overturned on his
de novo appeal.' 94 It found, however, that his appeal constituted a
new trial, and required that a new detainer be issued requesting his
presence for the appeal.1 95
Although the court concluded that the anti-shuffling provision
did not apply, it also stated that Jefferson was still protected under
IAD, article III,96 which provides that he be brought to trial within
180 days after serving on the prosecutor written notice of request
for final disposition. 97 In addition, the court noted that the Consti-
tution guarantees Jefferson the right to a speedy trial.'98
The court grounded its decision primarily on a finding that the
IAD's article IV was based solely on the problems associated with
187. See United States v. Coffman, 905 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1990). Both courts look
for support to the text of the IAD. The Tenth Circuit, however, went farther than the
Jefferson court in its analysis of the terms "trial," "disposition," "final disposition," and
"prosecution." See supra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
188. See 905 F.2d at 333.
189. See 319 Md. at 684, 574 A.2d at 922. The court cited United States v. Evans, 423
F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 556 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1977); Shanks
v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Wilkett v. State, 753 P.2d
383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
190. See Jefferson, 319 Md. at 684, 574 A.2d at 922.
191. See supra note 118.
192. 319 Md. at 683, 574 A.2d at 922 (emphasis in original).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 683-84, 574 A.2d at 922.
196. See id. at 685, 574 A.2d at 923.
197. See MD. ANN. COnE art. 27, § 616D(a) (1987).
198. See 319 Md. at 685, 574 A.2d at 923; see also supra note 159.
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unsubstantiated charges.1 99 Through this approach, the court
reached a sound conclusion, but the reasoning it employed raised
unnecessary questions. The court could more easily have reached
the same decision by employing the reasoning found in Coffan.
The Coffman court focused on article IV's language, and found that
the word "trial" did not mean "disposition" or "final disposi-
tion. ' '2°  Clearly, the Jefferson court could have found that the plain
meaning of "trial" does not include a de novo appeal, but rather is
encompassed within the term "final disposition."
Still, the IAD's terms will protect Jefferson when he is returned
to Maryland for his trial de novo.2 0 1 But this conclusion poses a
problem. Although the court found that Jefferson no longer faces
unsubstantiated charges, having been convicted by the district
court, he still faces a de novo trial on appeal. 20 2
In order to obtain Jefferson's presence for the de novo trial, the
prosecution must issue a detainer requesting it.203 In theory, the
IAD will guarantee certain protections with regard to this de-
tainer.20 4 This second detainer, however, will be based on the same
charging document as the first detainer.25 Since the court already
has concluded that these charges no longer are unsubstantiated, it is
not clear how Jefferson can effectively use the IAD to guarantee his
procedural rights.
Maryland law guarantees Jefferson the right to appeal his dis-
trict court conviction, 2 6 but the Court of Appeals' logic denies him
the IAD's anti-shuffling provision protection during the course of
his second trial. The court concluded that the anti-shuffling provi-
sion only protects prisoners from detainers based on unsubstanti-
ated charges.207 The charges in Jefferson's case were resolved when
a final judgment was entered by the district court. It follows that
Jefferson may not rely on the anti-shuffling provision's protection
during the second trial, even though unnecessary transfers between
facilities could hinder his ability to mount a successful defense.
The court's logic implies that Jefferson will be denied all IAD
protection during his second trial. The court found the anti-shuf-
199. See id.
200. See 905 F.2d at 332.
201. See 319 Md. at 683-85, 574 A.2d at 922-23.
202. See id. at 683, 574 A.2d at 922.
203. See id. at 683-84, 574 A.2d at 922.
204. See id. at 685, 574 A.2d at 923.
205. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
206. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-401 (1989).
207. See 319 Md. at 683, 574 A.2d at 922.
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fling provision inapplicable after the district court conviction be-
cause "the problems and uncertainties associated with detainers are
based on unsubstantiated charges or charges that remain lodged af-
ter the prisoner is returned. 2 °  The new detainer is not based on
unsubstantiated charges. It follows that the entire IAD is inapplica-
ble after the second trial, and not just the anti-shuffling provision.
The court likely did not intend this result. Nevertheless, the court's
restrictive reading of the IAD's purpose may unnecessarily limit its
usefulness in future cases.
4. Conclusion .- The Court of Appeals in Jefferson eliminated any
remaining uncertainty over the limits of the IAD's anti-shuffling pro-
vision. The court held that article IV of the IAD requires only that a
"trial" be "had" on the charges against a prisoner,20 9 and that a
final judgment in a district court trial constitutes a "trial" for the
AD's purposes. 2 10
Though the court did not decide the issue of whether post-con-
viction sentencing is part of a "trial," the Jefferson opinion's logic
makes it clear that the anti-shuffling provision will be read liter-
ally.2 1 It is unlikely that the court would accept any interpretation
of "trial" that includes post-conviction sentencing. 21 2 Moreover,
once a district court convicts a prisoner, he no longer faces unsub-
stantiated charges .2 " Extending Jefferson's reasoning, the anti-shuf-
fling provision may not apply to prisoner transfers after conviction,
but before sentencing.
The Jefferson court nevertheless read the anti-shuffling provision
as narrowly as possible. The result is an added degree of certainty
in interpretation of statutory language.
DAVID B. MONKS
JEROME A. MURPHY
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 684, 574 A.2d at 922.
211. See id. at 683-84, 574 A.2d at 922.
212. See United States v. Coffman, 905 F.2d 330, 332 (10th Cir. 1990). But see
Tinghitella v. California, 718 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1983).
213. See 319 Md. at 683, 574 A.2d at 922.
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A. Portability of State Pension Benefits
In Morris v. Prince George's County,' the Court of Appeals inter-
preted Maryland Code article 73B, section 32(a)2 and found that the
legislative policy favoring pension benefit portability necessitates al-
lowing transferees to carry actual years of service from their former
retirement system to their new retirement system for the purpose of
determining retirement eligibility.3 The decision was important be-
cause the Maryland State Retirement System (MSRS) and the Prince
George's County Police Pension Plan (the Plan) have different em-
ployee contribution rates and retirement eligibility.4
Just two days before the court issued the Morris decision, the
legislature amended section 32 by adding a new subsection5 which
provides an exception to the Morris holding for police or fire depart-
ment pension plans, allowing them to set their own guidelines as to
whether the years of prior service will be credited in the new system
on a one-for-one basis.6 For those transferring within State or local
government pension plans other than police or fire departments,
the Morris holding remains effective.
1. The Case.-In 1971, Daniel Morris joined the Prince
George's County Sheriff's Department, and approximately two
years later he began contributing to MSRS.7 In 1982, after serving
eleven years as a deputy sheriff, Morris transferred to the Prince
1. 319 Md. 597, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 32(a) (Supp. 1989).
3. 319 Md. at 600, 573 A.2d at 1347.
4. See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
5. See Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 609, 1990 Md. Laws 2655 (chapter 609 originally
labeled the amended section as § 32(e), but when compiled as part of the 1990 Cumula-
tive Supplement to the Code, the section was changed to § 32(f)).
6. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 32(f) (Supp. 1990).
[W]hen a member of a retirement or pension system operated by the State or a
political subdivision of the State transfers to a police or fire department retire-
ment or pension system operated by the State or a political subdivision of the
State, the plans, rules, regulations, guidelines, and policies of the retirement or
pension system into which the member transfers shall govern in determining:
(i) The years of service necessary to qualify the member for retirement
... and the amount of retirement benefits to be credited.
Id.
7. Brief for Appellant at 2, Morris (No. 89-121).
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George's County Police Department.8 Similarly, Eric Olsen in 1976
joined the Prince George's County Sheriff's Department and began
contributing to the MSRS. Eight years later, Olsen also transferred
to the Prince George's County Police Department.9
Morris and Olsen each asked Prince George's County whether
their MSRS benefits would transfer, and claimed that they were as-
sured that their credited service with the Sheriff's Department
would be fully applied, and that they would be eligible for retire-
ment after a total of twenty years continued service.'"
Nevertheless, the Prince George's County Pension Plan Admin-
istrative Review Board ruled in 1987 that neither Morris nor Olsen
could count their years of service as sheriffs' deputies for computing
their date-of-retirement eligibility from the police department."1
The Review Board based its decision on the Plan's requirement that
an individual serve twenty years "as a police officer" before becom-
ing eligible for retirement. 12
In July 1987, Morris and Olsen filed a complaint for a declara-
tory judgment, and the Circuit Court for Prince George's County
rendered a decision in April 1989.'" The circuit court considered
how to interpret article 73B, section 32(a), 4 which states in relevant
part that "the member shall receive service credit in the system into
which the member transfers for and in the amount of benefits accu-
mulated in the system from which the member transfers."' 5 Morris
8. 319 Md. at 600, 573 A.2d at 1347.
9. Brief for Appellant at 2-3.
10. See id. Morris testified at deposition that a county administrator specifically as-
sured him that "his time in the Sheriff's Department would count toward the twenty
years required by the Prince George's County Police Department prior to retirement."
Id. at 2.
11. Morris, 319 Md. at 600-01, 573 A.2d at 1347.
12. See id. at 601, 573 A.2d at 1347. Thus, Morris and Olsen would have to serve in
the County police department for twenty years, regardless of how much time they served
in another branch of state or local government. See id. at 601 n.l, 573 A.2d at 1347 n.l.
"The police pension plan makes it clear that a police officer is a sworn member of the
Prince George's County Police Department. As deputy sheriffs, Morris and Olsen did
not qualify." Id. Under the Plan, an employee must serve either 20 years as a police
officer, or until age 55. See PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., POLICE PENSION PLAN § 1
(1983). The MSRS requires that an employee work either 25 years or reach the age of
60. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § ll(1)(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
13. See Morris v. Prince George's County, No. CAL 87-11653 (Cir. Ct. for Prince
George's County, Apr. 27, 1989), vacated, 319 Md. 597, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990); see also
319 Md. at 601-02, 573 A.2d at 1347-48.
14. 319 Md. at 600, 573 A.2d at 1347.
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 32(a) (Supp. 1989). This section reads, in its entirety:
If a member transfers from a retirement or pension system operated on an
actuarial basis where accumulated contributions are deducted on all earnable
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and Olsen argued that section 32(a) requires that their time served
as deputy sheriffs must count as actual service as Prince George's
County police officers for the purpose of determining their retire-
ment dates under the Plan. t" The Pension Plan Review Board ar-
gued that it requires that their years of service transfer from MSRS
to the Plan only for the purpose of computing retirement benefits,
but not for the purpose of determining the retirement date. The
circuit court agreed with the Review Board, and found that the legis-
lature intended section 32 to permit only monetary benefits, and not
years of service, to transfer from the first to the second pension
plan. 17
Morris and Olsen appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,' 8
but the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari before proceed-
ings began in that court.' 9
2. Legal Background and the Court's Reasoning.-The Court of
Appeals held that Morris and Olsen were entitled to carry the
number of years served from the old pension plan to the new one
for the purpose of determining the year they would be eligible for
retirement." The Court of Appeals analyzed the meaning of "ser-
compensation to a retirement or pension system where accumulated contribu-
tions are deducted on all earnable compensation, the member shall receive ser-
vice credit in the system into which the member transfers for and in the amount
of benefits accumulated in the system from which the member transfers. The
transfer of credit shall occur upon the deposit, within 1 year of the member's
transfer, of the total accumulated contributions to the member's credit in the
annuity or other corresponding fund of the system from which the member
transferred to the fund of the system into which the member transferred.
Id.
16. See Brief for Appellant at 405, Mors (No. 89-121).
17. See id. at 601-02, 573 A.2d at 1348.
18. Id. at 601, 573 A.2d at 1348.
19. See Morris v. Prince George's County, 317 Md. 609, 565 A.2d 1033 (1989).
20. See Morris, 319 Md. at 600, 573 A.2d at 1347. The court stated that the trial court
judge improperly construed the section's meaning. See id. at 602-03, 573 A.2d at 1348-
49. The trial judge acknowledged that elsewhere in article 73B, the phrase "creditable
service" referred both to years of employment and the amount of monetary benefits
earned. See id. at 602, 573 A.2d at 1348; MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 11 (1989). But,
when it interpreted the phrase "service credit" in section 32(a), the trial court concluded
that the legislature intended only monetary benefits to be portable. See 319 Md. at 602,
573 A.2d at 1348. "There is nothing in Article 73B to indicate that [the bifurcated use
of 'creditable service'] was what the legislature had in mind. It is more reasonable to
conclude that service credit can refer either to a credit of years toward retirement or to
credit for purposes of determining amount of retirement allowance." Id. (brackets and
emphasis in original).
The Court of Appeals stated that the trial judge "violated the normal process of
statutory construction by deleting from the statute the words 'and in the amount of' in
order to support his interpretation." Id. at 603, 573 A.2d at 1348. The judge also mis-
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vice credit" and "benefits"-terms that the trial court considered
crucial in interpreting section 32(a).2 1 Although the statute's plain
language is a starting point in determining its meaning, the court
said it must look for the statute's general aim or policy.
22
a. The Meaning of "Service Credit" and "Benefits. "--The court first
turned to article 73B for definitions. Although it found no express
definition of "service credit," the court found that article 73B, sec-
tion 1(10), used the similar phrase, "creditable service," which des-
ignated the way in which years of service are computed to determine
retirement eligibility.23 Also, the court found that in various code
sections, "service credit" referred to years of service. 4 The court
concluded that "creditable service" and "service credit" each refer
to the number of years of employment counted to determine retire-
ment eligibility. 5
The court turned to ascertaining the meaning of "benefits." 26
Noting that in the dictionary, 7 and in article 73B,2 s the word
broadly connotes "advantage," the court stated that the definition is
not restricted to monetary payment.2 9 But because elsewhere in ar-
ticle 73B "benefits" refers to mere monetary advantages, ° the court
applied the "plain language" rule, and did not accurately interpret the legislative history
and purpose. See id., 573 A.2d at 1349.
21. See id. at 604, 573 A.2d at 1349; see also Morris v. Prince George's County, No.
CAL 87-11653, slip. op. at 5-7 (Cir. Ct. for Prince George's County, Apr. 27, 1989),
vacated, 319 Md. 597, 573 A.2d 1356 (1990).
22. See Morris, 319 Md. at 603-04, 573 A.2d at 1349.
23. See id. at 605, 573 A.2d at 1349; MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 1(10) (1988).
"'Creditable service' shall mean prior service plus membership service for which credit
is allowable." Id.
24. See 319 Md. at 605, 573 A.2d at 1349; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 9(4)
(1988). "Prior service credit.- Upon verification of the statements of service the board of
trustees shall credit to each member the service rendered prior to the date of the estab-
lishment of the retirement system." Id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, §§ 85, 115, 144
(1988) (considering the extent to which different types and periods of employment may
apply toward eligibility for retirement).
25. See 319 Md. at 604, 573 A.2d at 1350.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 605-06, 573 A.2d at 1350; see also RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 194 (2d ed. 1987) ("benefit" means "an advantage"); WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 204 (1976) (definition 2a states that "benefit"
means "advantage, good"). Compare id. (definition 3a states that "benefit" means "a
cash payment or service provided for under an annuity pension plan, or insurance
policy").
28. See 319 Md. at 605-06, 573 A.2d at 1350.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 606-07, 573 A.2d at 1350-51; MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 11(1)(a)
(1988).
Any member may retire upon written application to the board of trustees set-
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looked to the statute's legislative history to determine the section 32
meaning of "benefits," as well as "service credit."'"
b. Article 73B's Legislative History.-The court began its search
for legislative purpose and contextual meaning with the Maryland
State Retirement System's formation in 1941 .32 Early provisions au-
thorized transfers between retirement systems operated on an actu-
arial basis,3 3 and stated that any person transferring into the new
retirement system "shall receive prior service credit in the system to
which he has transferred for all service rendered prior to January 1,
1926 ... and membership service credit for all continuous service
since January 1, 1926.""4
The court found that the word "benefits" referred to both mon-
etary benefits and service for eligibility,35 and that prior service
could be counted for retirement eligibility.3 6
ting forth at what time he desires to be retired, provided that such member at
the time so specified for his retirement shall have attained the age of sixty (60)
or shall have rendered twenty-five (25) years of creditable service as an
employee.
Id.; see also id. §§ 86, 117, 145 (using the term "benefits" in captions to refer to the time
when an employee is eligible to retire).
31. See 319 Md. at 607, 573 A.2d at 1351.
32. See Mors, 319 Md. at 607, 573 A.2d at 1351; MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 2
(1988). The MSRS first was amended in 1947. See Act of Apr. 25, 1947, ch. 664, 1947
Md. Laws 1638, 1638-39.
33. See Act of Apr. 25, 1947, ch. 664, 1947 Md. Laws 1638, 1638-39. Section 25, as
enacted by chapter 664, states:
Any person who is a member of any retirement system, which is being operated
on an actuarial basis .... either under the laws of this State or under the laws of
any political sub-division of this State, may transfer his membership to any
other such retirement system upon accepting office or employment which
makes it possible or mandatory for him to participate in such other system and
if such acceptance of office or employment would make it impossible for him to
continue as a contributing member of the retirement system of which he has
been a member.
Id. Section 25 is the predecessor of section 31.
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 26 (1947). Section 26 was section 32(a)'s
predecessor.
35. See Morris, 319 Md. at 609, 573 A.2d at 1352; see also Act of Apr. 25, 1947, ch.
663, 1947 Md. Laws 1638:
AN ACT . ..providing for the transfer without loss of pension benefits by
members of any retirement system operated on an actuarial basis under the
laws of this State or any political sub-division thereof to any other retirement
system operated on an actuarial basis under the laws of this state or any polit-
ical subdivision thereof.
Id.
36. See Act of Apr. 25, 1947, ch. 664, 1947 Md. Laws 1638, 1640, which provides that
"upon becoming a member of the retirement system to which he has transferred, such
person shall .. .be eligible for such pension and annuity . . .including the credits for
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Article 73B was again substantially revised in 1979.17 The Pen-
sion System for Employees of the State of Maryland, eventually re-
placed the old Maryland State Retirement System, 8 and in the
process, section 32 again was amended. 9 Prince George's County
argued that the 1979 amendments confined benefits portability to
monetary benefits. 40 The court rejected the County's argument on
the ground that the 1979 Act's title makes plain that the legislature
had no intent to change any benefits, including eligibility for
retirement.4
The legislature again amended section 32 in 1981, expanding
types of retirement systems between which transfers could be
made.42 In 1988, the legislature amended section 32, adopting the
language now in dispute in Morris.43
The Court of Appeals quoted the State of Maryland's amicus
curiae brief.44 "For the last 42 years, the [Maryland State Retire-
ment System] has credited members of its retirement systems with
prior service in other retirement systems for the purpose of comput-
ing retirement eligibility."'45 The court concluded that this long-
standing practice illustrated the administrative agency's construc-
tion of section 32(a), and this was entitled to deference.46
But the Morris court virtually ignored the fact that the Plan ex-
plicitly states that the employee must have been employed as a po-
lice officer in order to qualify for retirement. The Plan states that an
employee can retire at age 55 or when he has "completed 20 years
of Credited Service during all of which he was an Employee."' 47 The
Plan defines "Employee" as "any person employed by the County as
a policeman. "48
The court nevertheless held that "in light of the legislative pur-
previous service in the retirement system from which he has transferred." Id. Section
27 was the predecessor of section 33.
37. See 319 Md. at 610, 573 A.2d at 1352.
38. See id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 112 (1988).
39. See Act of 1979, ch. 23, 1979 Md. Laws 70, 76.
40. See 319 Md. at 610, 573 A.2d at 1352-53.
41. See id. The court added that the amendments merely restated the prior language
in a different form. See id.
42. See Act of May 12, 1981, ch. 394, 1981 Md. Laws 1782.
43. See Act of May 27, 1988, ch. 780, 1988 Md. Laws 5057.
44. See Morris, 319 Md. at 613, 573 A.2d at 1354.
45. Brief of the State of Maryland as Amicus Curiae at 2, 3, Momis, (No. 89-121).
46. 319 Md. at 613, 573 A.2d at 1354 (citing Sinai Hosp. v. Department of Employ-
ment, 309 Md. 28, 46, 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987)).
47. Appendix for Appellees at 108, Morris (No. 89-121).
48. Id. (Note that "Participant" means "an Employee who participates in the Plan,"
whereas "Employee" means a "policeman." See id.).
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pose of enhancing pension portability, section 32(a) permits an indi-
vidual to carry over accumulated years of service for retirement
eligibility when the individual transfers from one of the systems de-
scribed in section 32(a) to another of those systems." 49
3. Analysis of the Morris Decision and the Subsequent Legislative Re-
sponse.-If the legislature had not acted quickly to establish separate
provisions governing transfers into police and fire department pen-
sion systems, ° the Morris decision would have meant that any State
or County employee who transferred under article 73B's umbrella
from one state retirement system to another could have transferred
retirement eligibility credits earned in the former system. In the in-
stant case, Morris and Olsen were able to count their respective
eleven and eight years toward the Plan's twenty-year retirement
requirement.5
Within days of the Morris decision, however, the State of Mary-
land amended section 32 by adding subsection (f). 52 Subsection
32(f)(2) states that the policies of the police or fire department pen-
sion system into which an individual transfers shall govern in
determining:
(i) The years of service necessary to qualify the mem-
ber for retirement from the retirement or pension system
into which the member transfers; and
(ii) The years of service and amount of retirement
benefits to be credited by the retirement or pension system
into which the member transfers for the years of service
and retirement benefits earned while a member of the re-
tirement or pension system from which the member
transfers.5 s
Thus, subsection 32(f) allows the transferee pension system's
policies to determine whether years of service under the former sys-
49. Morris, 319 Md. at 615, 573 A.2d at 1354.
50. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
51. Although this holding supports Morris's and Olsen's claim that they are entitled
to count their years of service in the MSRS towards their retirement eligibility with the
Plan, Morris and Olsen ultimately may lose their case. Under § 32(a), members must
deposit within one year credit from their previous system into the new retirement sys-
tem. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 32(a) (Supp. 1990). Whether Morris and Olsen
complied with this requirement is in dispute and will be subject to further investigation
by the trial court on remand. See 319 Md. at 615-16, 573 A.2d at 1355.
52. See Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 609, 1990 Md. Laws 2655; 319 Md. at 614, 573 A.2d
at 1354.
53. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 32(f) (Supp. 1990); supra note 5.
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tem are equivalent to years of service in the present system.'M The
amendment effectively overrules the Court of Appeals' decision with
respect to transfers into police and fire departments. 55 By restrict-
ing the right to transfer service credits at will between the MSRS
and police and fire department pension systems, the legislature
eliminated the financial inequities inherent in such transfers, 56 and
reinforced its support for agreements derived from the collective
bargaining process.5
a. Restores Financial Equity to Pension Systems..-The Morris deci-
sion has substantial financial consequences. The police and fire de-
partment plans and the MSRS differ significantly in retirement
eligibility, amount of employee contribution, and retirement bene-
fits, and this makes inequitable a straightforward service credit
transfer.58
One important difference is that some police and fire depart-
ment retirement plans allow employees to retire earlier than em-
ployees who participate in the MSRS. For example, the Plan sets
the normal retirement date at "the earlier of the date on which a
Participant has attained age 55 or the date on which he has com-
pleted 20 years of Credited Service during all of which he was an
Employee."59 By contrast, the MSRS says that an employee must
reach the age of sixty or render twenty-five years of service." The
Plan thus allows employees to retire five years earlier than they
would be able to under the MSRS.
Another difference is that police and fire employees contribute
significantly more money to the Plan. The Plan requires an em-
ployee to contribute eight percent of the employee's compensation
each pay period.6 Under the MSRS, the employee contribution
54. See id.
55. The Court of Appeals was aware of this amendment when it decided Morris, but
noted that, "[t]he fact that the General Assembly has prospectively adopted the policy
advocated by the County is an added indication that current law, the law that applies to
Morris and Olsen, is as we have stated it to be." 319 Md. at 614, 573 A.2d at 1354.
56. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
58. See Brief for Appellees at 22, Morris (No. 89-121) (estimating that each appellant
would receive a windfall in excess of $30,000); see also infra note 66.
59. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., POLICE PENSION PLAN § 1 (1983); see Appendix
for Appellees at 108, Morris (No. 89-121).
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 1 l(1)(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
61. See PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., POUCE PENSION PLAN § 7 (1983); see also Ap-
pendix for Appellees at 135. "Compensation" means "the basic compensation received
by a Participant for services rendered by the Participant, excluding any overtime pay,
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rate is only five percent of earned compensation.6 2
Finally, police and fire department employees receive greater
annual compensation upon retirement. The Plan calculates annual
retirement benefits as 2.5% of an employee's average annual com-
pensation multiplied by her credited service up to a maximum of 20
years, plus 2% of her average annual compensation multiplied by
the number of years of credited service in excess of 20 years. 63 The
MSRS calculates its retirement allowance as one fifty-fifth (1.82%)
of an employee's average final compensation, multiplied by the
number of years of her creditable service.'
Although employees covered by the Plan receive more retire-
ment benefits than do employees under the MSRS, Plan employees
have contributed more money to the system during the course of
their employment."5 In this case, allowing Morris and Olsen to re-
tire with full Plan benefits after contributing to it for only half their
time as employees, would be allowing them to "buy" greater retire-
ment benefits for a lesser contribution than that made by all other
Plan employees.66 The legislature's enactment of section 32(f) pre-
bonuses, or other additional compensation." PoucE PENSION PLAN, supra, § 1; see Ap-
pendix for Appellees at 108.
62. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 14(l)(a) (Supp. 1990). "Earnable compensation"
means "the normal monthly compensation payable to an employee for working the nor-
mal time for the employee's position and that is equal to one-twelfth of the employee's
annual salary rate." Id. § 1(14).
63. See PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., POLICE PENSION PLAN § 4(c) (1983); see also
Appendix for Appellees at 120. Different formulae are listed for different retirement
dates. See id. This formula applies to participants who retire on or afterjuly 1, 1981. See
id. "Average annual compensation" means "an amount computed by dividing by two
the Compensation of a Participant during whatever period of twenty-four consecutive
months of his Continuous Service will provide the largest total Compensation for any
such period." POUCE PENSION PLAN, supra, § 1; see Appendix for Appellees at 107.
"Credited service" means "all service of a Participant for which credit is given under this
Plan for the purpose of computing any benefit provided by this Plan." POLICE PENSION
PLAN, supra, § 1; see Appendix for Appellees at 108. Credited Service can total a maxi-
mum of 27 years, which includes 20 years of Continuous Service plus time served in
MSRS. See POLICE PENSION PLAN, supra, § 1; see also Appendix for Appellees at 111.
64. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 1 l(3)(a) (1988). If at the time of retirement, the
employee has worked fewer than 30 years or is under 60 years old, his retirement allow-
ance is reduced by 0.5% for every month short of these standards. See id. § 11 (3)(a).
This reduction compounds the difference in retirement eligibility between MSRS and
the Plan. "Creditable Service" means "prior service plus membership service for which
credit is allowable." Id. § 1(10). "Average Final Compensation" means "the average
annual earnable compensation of an employee for the three years of service as an em-
ployee during which the employee's earnable compensation was highest, or if the em-
ployee had less than three years of service, then the employee's average earnable
compensation for his or her total service." Id. § 1(15).
65. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
66. An explanatory hypothetical illustrates the consequences. Scenario 1: A police
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vents this inequity. 7
b. Restores Integrity to the Collective Bargaining Process.-The Plan
originally required twenty-five years of service, but these were re-
duced to twenty on the condition that to be eligible for retirement
an employee must complete all those years of actual service in the
Prince George's County Police Department.' The reduction in the
required years of service was the result of the 1979 Fraternal Order
of Police (FOP) collective bargaining agreement.69 Because the
FOP is the exclusive bargaining unit, the Morris decision under-
mined the FOP's bargaining power.7' By amending article 73B, sec-
tion 32, the legislature returned the FOP's contract power.
c. Restricts Pension Portability.-As a result of the new legisla-
tion, the Plan will govern retirement eligibility of all future transfer-
ees to the police department. To qualify for full retirement benefits,
an employee must complete twenty years of service as a Prince
George's County police officer, or reach the age of fifty-five. 7'
These twenty years are required in addition to any years the em-
ployee contributed to the MSRS or other State or local government
pension plan prior to transferring to the Plan. 72 Although this has
beneficial financial consequences for police and fire department
or fire employee who works 25 years beginning at age 25, with a $10,000 annual salary
will contribute $20,000 (.08 X $10,000 X 25 years) to the Plan (no interest accumulated
or compounded). The employee's yearly retirement allowance will be $6,000 ((.025 X
$10,000 X 20 years) + (.02 X $10,000 X 5 years)). Scenario 2: An employee who has
the same conditions as scenario 1, except that the employee contributes to the MSRS.
The employee's contribution will be $12,500 (.05 X $10,000 X 25 years), with a yearly
retirement allowance of $3182 ((1/55 X $10,000 X 30 years)-a 30% reduction be-
cause after only working 25 years, and only being age 45, the employee is 60 months
away from the 30 years of service or 60 years of age goal, and loses 0.5% per month).
Scenario 3: An employee with a $10,000 annual salary works 10 years under the MSRS,
transfers to the Plan and is allowed to retire after only 10 more years pursuant to the
Morris ruling. The employee's contribution will have been $13,000 ($5000 from MSRS
= .05 X $10,000 X 10 years; $8000 from the Plan = .08 X $10,000 X 10 years). The
employee's yearly retirement allowance will be $5000 (if allowed to receive credit for all
years served under the MSRS, the employee would receive full Plan retirement allow-
ance: .025 X $10,000 X 20 years = $5000). Note, however, that the employee has
contributed $3000 less than someone who worked all 20 years in the Plan (.08 X
$10,000 X 20 years = $16,000)). Under § 32(f), this discrepancy is less likely to occur.
67. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
68. See Brief for Appellees at 25, Morris (No. 89-11).
69. See id.
70. See 319 Md. at 615 n.8, 573 A.2d at 1354-55 n.8.
71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72. See PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., POLICE PENSION PLAN § 3 (1983); Appendix
for Appellees at 111-19, Morris (No. 89-121).
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pension plans, it will have detrimental effects on transferees. Under
the new amendment, an individual who works and contributes to the
MSRS for 19 years and 364 days, and then transfers to the Plan,
could be required to work another 20 years, or to age 55, before
achieving retirement eligibility.13
One important question left unanswered is how an employee's
prior contributions to the MSRS are taken into account when the
employee transfers into the Plan. A Plan representative stated that
the contributions are actuarially accounted for, but nowhere is there
an explicit formula.7 4
4. Conclusion.-As a result of the Morris decision and subse-
quent legislative action, Maryland employees who transfer from one
job to another fall into two distinct pension categories: those trans-
ferring into police or fire departments, and those transferring else-
where. For those who transfer elsewhere, the Morris decision
applies. As long as both pension systems satisfy section 32(a) actua-
rial requirements, all years credited in the former pension system
must be credited in the new system, both for monetary benefits and
for determining retirement eligibility.
But those transferring into police and fire department pensions
face another situation. Section 32(f) mandates that the police or fire
department pension plan rules govern the date of retirement eligi-
bility. Consequently, an employee could face doubling his working
years before reaching retirement. Also, although monetary benefits
must be given credit, as yet there are no explicit rules stating how
this is to be done.
B. Abusive Discharge and Whistle-Blowing Managers
In Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hospital, Inc. ," the Court of Ap-
peals held that a tort action for wrongful or abusive discharge76 will
not lie if the discharge violates a public policy expressed in statutes
carrying their own remedies." The court reiterated its recent deci-
73. See Brief for Appellants at 5-6, Morris (No. 89-121). Such an employee would
have been required only to work an additional five years under MSRS to qualify for
retirement. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
74. See Appendix for Appellees at 95.
75. 320 Md. 483, 578 A.2d 766 (1990).
76. See infra notes 105-125 and accompanying text for further discussion of this tort
action's history and application. Courts have interchangeably labelled the tort "wrong-
ful," "abusive," or "retaliatory" discharge.
77. See 320 Md. at 493, 578 A.2d at 772.
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sion in Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,78 in which it held that
"[a]busive discharge is inherently limited to remedying only those
discharges in violation of a clear mandate of public policy which
otherwise would not be vindicated by a civil remedy. '" 79 The court
concluded that the antidiscrimination statutes implicated by Chap-
pell's suit, including title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196480 and
Maryland article 49B,8 ' as well as the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) ,82 provide exclusive administrative remedies for viola-
tions.8 An at-will employee may not seek compensatory or punitive
78. 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989).
79. Id. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180.
80. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-1 7 (1988). Title VII provides relief for victims
of employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See
id.
81. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-18 (1986). The "Maryland Fair Employment
Practices Law," enacted in 1965, was a direct response to title VII's enactment. See
Makovi, 316 Md. at 607, 561 A.2d at 181. Section 14 of the Act provides that the State's
public policy is "to assure all persons equal opportunity in receiving employment and in
all labor management-union relations regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or na-
tional origin, sex, age, marital status, or physical or mental handicap unrelated in nature
and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance of the employment." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1986).
82. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988) (establishing minimum wage and hour stan-
dards). The FLSA was enacted in response to "labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and gen-
eral well-being of workers." Id. § 202(a). The FLSA's policy is "to correct and as rap-
idly as practicable to eliminate the[se] conditions." Id. § 202(b).
83. Title VII established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
"to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth
in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1988). Title VII remedies in-
clude injunctions and any other affirmative action "which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay ... or any other equi-
table relief as the court deems appropriate." Id. § 2000e-5(g). Back pay may be col-
lected for as long as two years from the charge's filing. See id.
Article 49B remedies parallel the title VII remedies. Article 49B established the
Maryland Human Relations Commission (HRC) to investigate unlawful employment
practices. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § l(a) (1986). If an employer engages in an
unlawful employment practice, "the remedy may include, but is not limited to, reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief
that is deemed appropriate." Id. § 11 (e). A 1989 amendment extended back pay from
two years to thirty months. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 1 (e) (Supp. 1990).
The Fair Labor Standards Act created a Wage and Hour Division within the Depart-
ment of Labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1988). The Act also designated minimum wage
rates, maximum hours, and overtime pay rates. See id. §§ 206-07. When an employer
violates minimum wage and maximum hour laws, it may be liable to employees "in the
amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation... and
in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." Id. § 216(b). Remedies available
for an employer's retaliatory action against the employee for reporting Act violations
include "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate ... including without limi-
tation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an
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damages by bringing a tort action for abusive discharge if statutory
remedies exist.8 4
This Note discusses Chappell's significance and argues that it
was incorrectly decided. First, the majority failed to address Chap-
pell's claim that he should be allowed to seek recovery through a
common law action because he was excluded from the protection of
the Maryland Minimum Wage Act, the state's version of the FLSA.85
Second, despite the absence of clear legislative intent to make an-
tidiscrimination statutory remedies exclusive, the court nonetheless
presumed that it intended exclusivity. 6 In fact, the legislative his-
tory, particularly of title VII, reflects an intent to preserve alterna-
tive remedies for victims of employment discrimination.87 Finally,
in presuming that the statutory remedies are exclusive, the court
failed to analyze critically the underlying substantive policies of the
antidiscrimination and minimum wage and hour laws at stake in
Chappell. The court failed to give full effect to the important legisla-
tive purpose behind the statutes, and impeded the growth of a com-
mon law tort theory that would complement legislative expressions
of public policy.
1. The Case.-On November 23, 1988, Robert L. Chappell filed
suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against South-
ern Maryland Hospital (SMH) seeking compensatory and punitive
damages for his alleged "unjust discharge."8 8 Chappell stated that
SMH employed him on an at-will basis as Director of Personnel
additional equal amount as liquidated damages." Id. See infra note 103 for the text of
the FLSA's "whistle-blowing" provision.
84. Chappell, 320 Md. at 493, 578 A.2d at 772.
85. See infra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
86. The Chappell court did not specifically address legislative intent, but borrowed
heavily from its analysis of this subject in Makovi. There, the court relied on several
United States Courts of Appeals decisions and concluded that title VII does not permit
compensatory or punitive tort damages for prohibited employment discrimination. See
316 Md. 603, 623, 561 A.2d 179, 189; see also Richerson v.Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.
1977); Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1976); Russell v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); EEOC
v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
431 U.S. 951 (1977).
The Makovi court also pointed to the Maryland General Assembly's rejection of pro-
posed amendments to article 49B that would have provided compensatory damages for
employment discrimination. See 316 Md. at 624-26, 561 A.2d at 189-90. But see infra
note 137 and accompanying text for the Makovi dissent's interpretation of the General
Assembly's actions.
87. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
88. Chappell, 320 Md. at 485, 578 A.2d at 768.
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from July 1984 to December 1985.89 He alleged that during his em-
ployment, he discovered personnel practices that he believed were
unlawful under state and federal employment laws. These practices
included sexual harassment of female employees, violations of state
and federal wage and hour laws, and racially discriminatory hiring
practices.90
Chappell's complaint alleged that on numerous occasions he at-
tempted to advise SMH management of these illegal practices, but
that "no action was taken."'" After Chappell documented the viola-
tions and sent memoranda to top management, several SMH em-
ployees told Chappell that he was being set up for dismissal. 92 On
December 17, 1985, SMH fired Chappell.93 Chappell alleged that
his discharge was wrongful because it was caused by "his insistence
that the Hospital abide by the clear letter and spirit of the law[]." 94
SMH moved to dismiss Chappell's complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. SMH argued that Chap-
pell's complaint asserted no more than that the hospital was dis-
pleased that he raised allegations of unlawful conduct, and
consequently discharged him.95 It argued that firing Chappell for
this reason did not contravene a specific provision of Maryland pub-
lic policy, and therefore could not support a tort action for wrongful
discharge.96 SMH also claimed that the wrongful discharge action
could not lie in any event because exclusive statutory remedies ex-
isted to vindicate the public policy violations alleged in Chappell's
89. Id. Chappell's job entailed implementing all of SMH's employment-related poli-
cies. Id.
90. Id at 486, 578 A.2d at 768.
91. See id.
92. Id. According to Chappell, his immediate supervisor told him "that it appeared
that he [Chappell] would be set up as a result of the action on his part." Id. Chappell
also discussed the problems with SMH's legal counsel and was advised "that his assess-
ment of the situation was correct, but that it was doubtful that any action would be
taken." Id.
93. Id According to Chappell, he never officially was told that his job was in jeop-
ardy, he received an excellent job evaluation just four months before he was fired, and
when he was fired, he was not given any reason. See id. at 486-87, 578 A.2d at 768.
94. Id. at 487, 578 A.2d at 768.
95. See id. at 487-88, 578 A.2d at 769.
96. See id. at 488, 578 A.2d at 769. SMH relied on the court's decision in Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), answer conformed to, 538 F.
Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987). See
Chappell, 320 Md. at 488, 578 A.2d at 769. In Adler, the court dismissed Adler's com-
plaint for wrongful discharge because he failed to allege sufficiently that his discharge
violated any legislative enactment, judicial decisions, or state regulations, and hence did
not violate the state's public policy. See 291 Md. at 43-47, 432 A.2d at 470-73.
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The Circuit Court granted SMH's motion to dismiss.9" The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari,' and affirmed the lower
court's decision.'0° The court rejected Chappell's argument that
the antidiscrimination statutes and minimum wage statutes were in-
applicable because he was discharged for his conduct, rather than
his "status."'' l Instead, the court noted that the Maryland and fed-
eral antidiscrimination statutes, as well as the federal minimum
wage and hour law, make it unlawful to discriminate against an em-
ployee for "whistleblowing"' °2 on his employer.' 0 3 The court con-
97. See 320 Md. at 488, 578 A.2d at 769. SMH pointed to the Maryland Fair Employ-
ment Practices Law prohibiting employment discrimination based upon, among other
things, sex and race. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1986), and the Maryland Mini-
mum Wage Act, which proscribes the alleged wage and hour violations. See id. art. 100,
§§ 55A-93A (1985). SMH also argued, however, that because Chappell was a manage-
ment employee, he was excluded from the state Minimum Wage Act's protection. See
320 Md. at 488, 578 A.2d at 769. Therefore, SMH argued, his discharge did not violate
any provision of Maryland public policy. See id.
98. Chappell, 320 Md. at 488, 578 A.2d at 769.
99. See id. Certiorari was granted upon Chappell's appeal to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals. See id.
100. See id. at 497, 578 A.2d at 774.
101. See id at 491-92, 578 A.2d at 771. Chappell sought to distinguish his case from
Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989). Makovi involved an
at-will employee of a paint factory who was fired because she was pregnant. See id at
605, 561 A.2d at 180. The Makovi court struck the plaintiff's claim for a tort of abusive
discharge, noting that title VII and article 49B of the Maryland Code already provide
remedies for sex discrimination. See id. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190. Chappell argued that
he did not assert, as Makovi did, that he was a victim of race or sex discrimination, nor
were his rights violated under wage and hour laws. See 320 Md. at 491, 578 A.2d at 771.
Rather, his conduct in identifying problems at SMH caused his employment termina-
tion. See id.
102. "Whistle-blowing" is one of the unlawful motives for discharging an employee
for which courts have developed and applied the public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
103. See 320 Md. at 494-95, 578 A.2d at 772-73. The Maryland Fair Employment
Practices Law provides:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlaw-
ful employment practice by this subtitle or because he has made a charge, testi-
fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subtitle.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(f) (1986).
In this respect, article 49B is closely modeled on section 2000e-3(a) of the Civil
Rights Act, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee
either "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice"
under title VII (the opposition clause), or "because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing" (the
participation clause). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
Similarly, FLSA makes it unlawful "to discharge or in any other manner discrimi-
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cluded that the availability of a statutory civil remedy precluded
Chappell from seeking a tort remedy for abusive discharge." 4
2. Legal Background.-Under Maryland common law, an em-
ployee hired for an indefinite period was considered an at-will em-
ployee.1 0 5  In such cases, either party could terminate the
employment contract at any time for "good cause, bad cause, or no
cause at all."' °6
Recent federal and state legislation curtails the common law at-
will doctrine by providing greater protections to at-will employees.
Some of the most protective federal statutory schemes include FLSA
and title VII. 10 7 Article 49B of the Maryland Code, the state antidis-
crimination statute, closely parallels title VII's language, 0 8 and arti-
cle 100, the state minimum wage and hour law, mirrors the FLSA. t09
Additionally, several federal enactments prohibit employer retalia-
tion against employees who report violations of the statutes.l"0 Var-
ious Maryland statutes also contain whistle-blowing provisions."l'
In the wake of these protective legislative enactments, the judi-
ciary recognized that employers' at-will defense was eroding.
Courts used both tort and contract theories to afford relief to at-will
nate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testi-
fied or is about to testify in any such proceeding." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988).
104. See 320 Md. at 493, 578 A.2d at 772.
105. See Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 19 A.2d 183 (1941); Washington B. & A.R.
Co. v. Moss, 127 Md. 12, 21, 96 A. 273, 276 (1915).
106. NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956).
107. See supra notes 80, 82-83. Other federal legislative enactments protecting em-
ployee rights include: National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988) (guaranteeing employee freedom to organize unions, bargain collectively, and
engage in other concerted activity); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (prohibiting employment discrimination because
of age); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)
(prohibiting employment discrimination against those with physical or mental handicaps
by recipients of federal financial assistance).
108. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1986) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (1982); see Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 607, 561 A.2d 179, 181
(1989).
109. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §§ 55A-93A (1985) with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1988).
110. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. For a list of other federal regulatory
statutes that include provisions preventing retaliatory firings of employees who report
violations of the statutes, see Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 67 n.10 (1985).
111. See supra note 103 for the text of article 49B's whistle-blowing provision, and
infra note 130 for the Maryland Minimum Wage Act's whistle-blowing provision; see also
MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 43 (1985) (employee may not be discharged for trying to en-
force Maryland's Occupational Safety and Health Act).
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employees whose terminations violated either public policy, 1 2 im-
plied covenants of good faith and fair dealing," 13 or implied contract
covenants of job security."t 4 Most jurisdictions have adopted the
"public policy exception," which allows an employee to recover
damages from his employer if he is fired for reasons that undermine
public policy." 5 When a state or federal statute defines the public
policy and provides a remedy for its violation, the question arises
whether a tort action for wrongful discharge is a permissible alterna-
tive remedy." 
6
A majority of courts hold that a common law tort is barred if an
employer's action is prohibited by a statute already conferring a
remedy." 7 The minority view acknowledges the importance of the
legislature's administrative procedures and statutory remedies, but
recognizes alternative tort remedies in the absence of specific legis-
lative intent to make statutory remedies exclusive." 8
112. See, e.g., Peterman v. International Bd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 188-90, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (Ct. App. 1959) (discharging an employee for refusing
to give false testimony is against public policy); Palmeteer v. International Harvester
Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 133, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981) (cause of action in tort upheld
where employee was discharged for providing information to police for use against an-
other employee); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 252-53, 297 N.E.2d
425, 428 (1973) (discharging employee for filing workmen's compensation claim war-
rants a tort action); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 219, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (1975) (dis-
charge of employee for serving on jury against employer's wishes is actionable in tort);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978) (cause of action upheld
for employee discharged for attempts to require bank to comply with consumer credit
law).
113. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104-06, 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (1977) (firing salesman to avoid paying him a commission vio-
lated an implied covenant of good faith with an at-will employee); Monge v. Beebe Rub-
ber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (firing an at-will employee in bad
faith constituted a breach of the employment contract).
114. See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465-66, 443 N.E.2d 441,
445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982) (certain provisions of the employment application
and the personnel manual are part of the employment contract).
115. See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931-32 (1983). In determining a state's public policy,
a court may look to legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions, or administrative
regulations, although it usually is the legislature's function to declare public policy. See
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981), answer
conformed to, 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 830 F.2d 1303
(4th Cir. 1987).
116. See, e.g., Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989)
(employee brought a wrongful discharge action against an employer, alleging that she
was discharged because of her pregnancy).
117. See Survey, Limiting the Tort of Abusive Discharge, Developments in Maryland Law,
1988-89, 49 MD. L. REV. 702, 707 n.131 (1990), for a list of cases representing the ma-
jority view on the tort for wrongful discharge.
118. See, e.g., Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (D. Nev. 1985)
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In Adler v. American Standard Corp. , t the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, on a question of law certified from the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, recognized a cause of action for
abusive discharge of an at-will employee "when the motivation for
the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy.' ' 20
Later, in Ewing v. Koppers Co.,121 the court extended the tort action
to contractual employees 22 to "foster the state's interest in deter-
ring particularly reprehensible conduct."'' 2  But in Makovi, the
court severely limited the tort's application: no abusive discharge
remedy would lie if the public policy violation was proclaimed by a
statute providing its own remedy.' 24 The Chappell court used this
reasoning to support dismissing Chappell's abusive discharge
claim. 125
3. Analysis.-Chappell does little more than affirm the court's
recent holding in Makovi. But Chappell was incorrectly decided on its
facts and on larger policy grounds. As the dissent noted, the court
should have allowed Chappell to bring a common law action be-
cause he was excluded from the Maryland Minimum Wage Act's
protection. 126
Chappell's claim for wrongful discharge rested in part on his
belief that he was fired for reporting SMH's violations of federal and
state wage and hour laws.' 27 The majority argued that he was pre-
cluded from bringing a common law action in tort 28 because the
FLSA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
(age and sex discrimination); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108,
1121-22 (D. Mass. 1980) (age discrimination); Broomfield v. Lundell, 159 Ariz. 349,
355, 767 P.2d 697, 703 (Ct. App. 1988) (sex discrimination); Holmes v. Haughton Ele-
vator Co., 404 Mich. 36, 41-42, 272 N.W.2d 550, 551 (1978) (age discrimination);
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 90-91, 689 P.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (1984)
(sex discrimination).
119. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
120. Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
121. 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988).
122. See id. at 49, 537 A.2d at 1. In Ewing, a former employee brought an abusive
discharge action alleging he was fired in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation
claim. See id. at 47, 537 A.2d at 1174. The court found that the wrongful discharge
tort's public policy component applies equally to employees under contract. See id. at
49, 537 A.2d at 1175.
123. Id.
124. See 316 Md. 603, 626, 561 A.2d 179, 190 (1989); supra note 86 and accompany-
ing text.
125. See 320 Md. at 493, 578 A.2d at 772.
126. See id. at 503, 578 A.2d at 776 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 487, 578 A.2d at 768.
128. See id. at 493, 578 A.2d at 772.
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employee for reporting violations of the Act, and provides its own
remedies.129 But Maryland's Minimum Wage Act excludes Chappell
from the protection of its whistle-blowing provision because he held
an administrative position.' 3 0 The existence and language of the
provision, however, express a clear public policy to protect those
who act for the public good in reporting violations of state mini-
mum wage and hour laws.' 3 ' Therefore, under Makovi, "the gener-
ally accepted reason for recognizing the tort, that of vindicating an
otherwise civilly unremedied public policy violation," 13 2 applies to
Chappell's claim. He should have been allowed to sue in tort for
abusive discharge. '3 3
The legislative intent to preserve or preclude alternative reme-
dies is a larger issue governing the majority's decision in Chappell. 134
The majority adopted the view expressed in Makovi that the antidis-
crimination statutes' remedies are preemptive, and thus preclude ju-
dicially created tort remedies."" But the legislative history of the
antidiscrimination statutes, especially title VII, evidences congres-
129. See supra notes 83 and 103 and accompanying text.
130. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 89(b) (1985), which penalizes
[any employer who discharges any employee because such employee has made
any complaint to his employer, to the Commissioner [of the Division of Labor
and Industry] or his authorized representative, that he has not been paid wages
in accordance with the provisions of the subtitle, or because such employee has
instituted any proceeding under or related to this subtitle, or because such em-
ployee has testified in any such proceeding.
Id. But the Act excepts from the definition of "employee" any "individual employed in a
bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity." This definition would ex-
clude Chappell. See id § 82(e)(2).
131. See id.
132. 316 Md. 603, 626, 561 A.2d 179, 190 (1989).
133. SMH argued that because Chappell was excluded from the protection of the
Maryland Minimum Wage Act, public policy considerations were not implicated. See 320
Md. at 488, 578 A.2d at 769. Arguably the majority simply accepted this argument on its
face, because it did not discuss the Act's application to Chappell's claim.
134. The court in Chappel did not discuss the role of legislative intent in determining
whether the statutory remedies at stake were exclusive. The court, however, had already
analyzed legislative intent in Makovi. See 316 Md. at 621-26, 561 A.2d at 188-90. There-
fore, the majority relied heavily on its Makovi decision in upholding its conclusion that
the statutory remedies provided were exclusive. See Chappell, 320 Md. at 497, 578 A.2d
at 774.
135. See Makovi, 316 Md. at 621, 561 A.2d at 188. Addressing the exclusivity of reme-
dies under title VII, the Makovi court acknowledged congressional policy that nothing in
title VII "shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, pen-
alty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State." Id The court
concluded that the decision whether to recognize a new tort is made by each state judici-
ary "in light of relevant policy determinations made by the [legislative branch]." Id. at
622, 561 A.2d at 188 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983)).
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sional desire to preserve alternative remedies.' 3 6 Similarly, nothing
in article 49B's legislative history suggests legislative intent to pre-
clude a common-law tort remedy.13 7
The court's deference to legislative remedies is questionable in
light of the positive role the court could play in enforcing the poli-
cies expressed in the whistle-blowing provisions. Generally, the
courts have applied these provisions liberally to shield employees
who report violations.' l 3 The underlying rationale is that "without
some guaranteed protection to assert equal employment rights, the
ultimate purpose of the act would be severely limited."'3 9 In
136. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-49 (1974) (summa-
rizing title VII's legislative history and demonstrating the compatibility of its remedies
with non-statutory remedies); see also Herbert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Ap-
proaches to Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1971) (discussing
the relationships of various remedies for employment discrimination claims); cf. Patter-
son v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2376 (1989) (refusing to extend 42
U.S.C. § 1981 to cover a racial harassment claim because it would " 'federalize' matters
traditionally covered by state common law").
137. See 320 Md. at 499-500, 578 A.2d at 775 (Adkins, J., dissenting). In Makovi,
Judge Adkins outlined his argument concerning the nonexclusivity of article 49B reme-
dies. First, article 49B's employment provisions are closely modeled on those of title
VII. See 316 Md. at 630, 561 A.2d at 192; Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 51 (1984).
Second, title VII's legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend its remedies
to be exclusive. See 316 Md. at 632, 561 A.2d at 193; infra note 141 and accompanying
text. Third, the dissent noted Court of Appeals' decisions suggesting that article 49B's
remedial scheme is not comprehensive. See 316 Md. at 639, 561 A.2d at 197; see, e.g.,
Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 26, 511
A.2d 1079, 1092 (1986) (the plaintiff was not required to exhaust her remedies under
article 49B before the HRC); see also Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 53 (1984) (recog-
nizing the limited remedial authority of the HRC pursuant to article 49B)'. Finally, in the
dissent's view, the General Assembly's failure to pass provisions allowing full tort dam-
ages under article 49B may be attributed to objections to other portions of the proposed
bills, and a reluctance to allow an administrative agency to award tort damages. See 316
Md. at 642, 561 A.2d at 198; see also Recent Cases, Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1732, 1735-36 (1990) (including additional legislative history arguments
against Makovi).
138. See, e.g., EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (9th Cir.
1983) (letter protesting unspecified "racism" and "discrimination" in employer's prac-
tices is permissible form of protected opposition); Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647
F.2d 441, 448-49 (4th Cir. 1981) (female employee who was discharged because she
complained to employer about sex discrimination was entitled to reinstatement with
back pay and salary equal to her male counterparts', court costs, and attorney's fees);
Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980) ("By protecting
employees from retaliation, [§ 2000e-3(a)] is designed to encourage employees to call to
their employers' attention discriminatory practices of which the employer may be una-
ware or which might result in protracted litigation to determine their legality if they are
not voluntarily changed.");Jenkins v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1274,
1278 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (§ 2000e-3(a) protects an employee fired for complaining to the
manager that a fellow employee was experiencing sexual harassment).
139. Chappell, 320 Md. at 494, 578 A.2d at 772.
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presuming exclusivity in the absence of legislative intent, courts fail
to effectuate fully the legislative policy in protecting whistle-blow-
ers. 140 "The availability of a common law tort remedy supplements
rather than hinders the goals of the statutes." 141
Determining the court's proper role in formulating common
law remedies that parallel statutory remedies necessitates using a
predictable test that balances the relationship between the two ap-
proaches.4 2 One test, modeled on the Supreme Court's proposed
test in Cort v. Ash,' 43 would involve examining the following four
factors: (1) whether the plaintiff is in the class the statute seeks to
benefit; (2) whether there is conclusive evidence of legislative intent
to foreclose recognizing parallel common law remedies; (3) whether
recognizing parallel common law remedies furthers the legislative
scheme's public policy; and (4) whether the claim's subject matter is
traditionally relegated to common law.' 44 Although the Supreme
Court of late has been unreceptive to claims of private causes of
action-it demands affirmative evidence of legislative intent to cre-
ate private remedies-Maryland courts could use this analysis to fa-
cilitate examination of alternative remedies absent legislative intent
to the contrary.' 45  By encouraging the judiciary to carefully ex-
140. See id. at 500, 578 A.2d at 775 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
141. Id. Common law remedies should be available because statutory remedies often
fail to capture the personal nature of the injury done to a wrongfully discharged
employe[e].... Reinstatement, back pay, and injunctions [may] vindicate the
rights of the victimized group without compensating the plaintiff for such per-
sonal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of stress, a sense of degradation,
and the cost of psychiatric care. [In such cases,] [lIegal as well as equitable
remedies are needed to make the plaintiff whole.
Holiens v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or. 76, 97, 689 P.2d 1292, 1303-04 (1984).
142. See Greenbaum, supra note 110, at 105.
143. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Supreme Court developed a four-part test to
determine whether a private right of action based on a federal statute should be implied
if the statute fails on its face to provide such a remedy. See id. at 78. Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), and subsequent cases have called into question Cort's
liberal approach to implied causes of action. See Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct.
513, 521 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
144. See Greenbaum, supra note 110, at 106.
145. The test would also serve to (1) produce a result more responsive to the legisla-
ture's policy considerations, (2) provide more flexible and effective remedies through
application of contract and tort theories, (3) make state courts more attractive forums in
which to bring claims, and (4) enhance thejudiciary's role in creating a dialogue with the
legislature concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant statutory remedies.
See Greenbaum, supra note 110, at 109-11. See also Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21
HARV. L. REV. 383, 385-86 (1908) (criticizing judicial reluctance to use statutory policy
in developing common law rules); Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in
Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 558 (1982) (calling for more assimilation
into the common law of statutory policies).
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amine underlying statutory policy goals, this analysis would more
fully effectuate state and federal legislative public policy.
4. Conclusion.-On two occasions the Court of Appeals nar-
rowly interpreted its holding in Adler that a tort action for abusive
discharge will lie when the motivation for the discharge violates
public policy. In Makovi and Chappell, the court ironically "makes
the statutes that establish the public policy, allegedly contravened
here . . .the means of depriving [the plaintiff] of the benefits of an
abusive discharge action." 146 As a result of these holdings, the
court has moved further away from giving greater substance to the
public policies expressed in the antidiscrimination and minimum
wage and hour laws.
SHARON L. TASMAN
MARGARET A. JACOBSEN
146. 320 Md. at 501, 578 A.2d at 775 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (citing Makovi, 316 Md.
at 630, 561 A.2d at 192 (Adkins, J., dissenting)).
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VI. EVIDENCE
A. The Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine and Medical Malpractice Cases
In Meda v. Brown,' the Court of Appeals held that expert testi-
mony in a medical malpractice case that rested in part on inferences,
sufficiently established against the defendant a prima facie case of
negligence.2 The Court of Appeals rejected the Court of Special
Appeals'" application of res ipsa loquitur,4 instead drawing a distinc-
tion between "the question of whether an inference may be drawn
by an expert [and] . . . whether an inference may be drawn by a
layman." 5 The Court of Appeals based its decision on the suffi-
ciency of the expert's testimony rather than on a finding of res ipsa
loquitur, and in so doing, clarified two areas of Maryland tort law.
First, the court made it clear that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not apply where expert testimony is necessary in a medical
malpractice case,6 foreclosing the doctrine's use in all but the most
obvious malpractice situations. Second, the court said that even
when a jury would not be permitted to infer negligence from cir-
cumstantial evidence, an expert witness could draw such an infer-
ence without the inference being characterized as mere "speculation
or conjecture."7 Although the Court of Appeals refused to apply
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to ordinary medical malpractice cases
in Maryland, it achieved the same result by permitting an expert wit-
ness to draw a similar inference of negligence based on circumstan-
tial evidence.
1. The Case.--On February 11, 1980, plaintiff Dorothy Virginia
Brown entered Sinai Hospital in Baltimore for bilateral breast bi-
opsy surgery.8 The surgery, performed under general anesthesia,
began shortly before noon and lasted approximately two hours. Ms.
1. 318 Md. 418, 569 A.2d 202 (1990).
2. Id. at 420, 569 A.2d at 203.
3. See Brown v. Meda, 74 Md. App. 331, 537 A.2d 635 (1988), aff'd, 318 Md. 418,
569 A.2d 202 (1990).
4. See Meda, 318 Md. at 420, 569 A.2d at 203. For an explanation of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine, see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
5. Id. at 428, 569 A.2d at 206-07.
6. See id. at 425, 428, 569 A.2d at 205, 207.
7. Id. at 427, 569 A.2d at 206.
8. Brown v. Meda, 74 Md. App. 331, 333, 537 A.2d 635, 636 (1988), aft'd, 318 Md.
418, 569 A.2d 202 (1990).
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Brown remained in the recovery room for another three hours.9 At
approximately 4:45 p.m., while still "groggy" and unaware of her
surroundings, she was transferred from the recovery room to the
ward.' The next morning, Ms. Brown noticed pain, tingling, and
numbness in her right hand, particularly her fourth and fifth
fingers. "
Ms. Brown's condition was diagnosed as an injury to the ulnar
nerve, which extends from the shoulder into the hand, and provides
motor and sensory functions to the fourth and fifth fingers.' 2 The
condition persisted and was to a certain extent permanent.'"
OnJanuary 25, 1983, Ms. Brown filed with the Maryland Health
Claims Arbitration Office' 4 a malpractice claim against the hospital,
and several of the doctors and nurses in attendance during her sur-
gery, including the anesthesiologist, Dr. Harnath S. Meda.' 5 Prior
to the arbitration hearing, Ms. Brown dismissed with prejudice her
claims against all the defendants except Sinai Hospital, a nurse an-
esthetist, and Dr. Meda."6 The Health Claims Arbitration Panel
found only Dr. Meda liable, and awarded Ms. Brown $300,000.'
Dr. Meda subsequently rejected the panel's award.' 8
Ms. Brown filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City against Dr. Meda as the sole defendant.' 9 The complaint al-
leged that the anesthesiologist, or his agents, servants, or employ-
ees, negligently failed to properly position Ms. Brown's arm for the
surgical procedure, and failed to monitor adequately its position
while she was under anesthesia.20 At a jury trial, evidence estab-
9. Meda, 318 Md. at 421, 569 A.2d at 203.
10. Id.
11. Id. She complained to her nurses about this at the time. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Brown v. Meda, 74 Md. App. 331, 333, 537 A.2d 635, 636 (1988). See MD. CTS.
& JUD. PRoC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989 & Supp. 1990), which provide the
exclusive remedy for a person against a health care provider, unless the parties waive
arbitration by mutual agreement under § 3-2A-06A.
Ms. Brown's husband also joined in the action on a loss of consortium claim. Meda,
318 Md. at 420 n.l, 569 A.2d at 202 n.l
15. Meda, 318 Md. at 421, 569 A.2d at 203.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. A party may reject the panel's award for any reason. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(a) (1989).
19. Meda, 318 Md. at 421-22, 569 A.2d at 203.
The circuit court automatically reviews any arbitration award if one of the parties
rejects it. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-05(i) & -06 (1989).
20. Brown v. Meda, 74 Md. App. 331, 334, 537 A.2d 635, 637 (1988).
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lished that it was the anesthesiologist's duty to administer anesthe-
sia, monitor the patient's vital signs, and properly position the
patient to protect vulnerable nerves and blood vessels from com-
pression. 2 ' Ms. Brown produced two expert witnesses who testified
that, in their opinions, Dr. Meda departed from the appropriate
standard of care in failing to protect the patient's arm during sur-
gery to prevent nerve damage. 22 They also testified that to a rea-
sonable medical certainty, the patient suffered a compression injury
to the ulnar nerve during the operation, and that Dr. Meda's depar-
ture from the standard of care caused her injury.23 Ms. Brown's ex-
perts were, however, unable to testify conclusively as to the exact
position of her arm during surgery.
2 4
The jury found for Ms. Brown, awarding her $600,000 in dam-
ages. 25 The trial judge, however, determined that the testimony of
the patient's experts "rested upon inferences and thus constituted
the kind of res ipsa loquitur evidence" barred in Maryland medical
malpractice cases.26 The court granted the doctor's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.2 7 Ms. Brown appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the trial court, and di-
rected an entry of judgment for her in accordance with the jury ver-
21. Meda, 318 Md. at 421, 569 A.2d at 203. The plaintiff's expert witnesses agreed
that the anesthesiologist's duty extends through the surgical procedure. One expert
stated that the duty extended until the patient had fully recovered from anesthesia. Id.
22. Brown, 74 Md. App. at 337-38, 537 A.2d at 638-39.
23. Id.
24. Id. A neurologist testified that he reviewed Ms. Brown's hospital and other medi-
cal records and ruled out other possible causes of ulnar nerve injury, such as leprosy,
lead poisoning, and prolonged jackhammer use. Id. at 337, 537 A.2d at 638. In search-
ing for the injury's cause, he testified:
We have a perfect scenario with the operative procedure which occurred in
February of 1980.
Her arm was strapped on a ... cushion board, but nonetheless pressure
was abnormally applied to the ulnar area around the elbow and it was left there
in a period of time and the patient was overcome with anesthesia, could not
move it, take the pressure off or even report to her doctors that this happened.
We know that it happened at that time in addition because [of its] proxim-
ity to the onset of her symptoms.
Id.
A neurological surgeon gave similar testimony, and although Ms. Brown's medical
records did not reveal exactly how her arm had been positioned, both experts concluded
that "the only standard of care is that the ulnar nerve be protected and be kept from
injury and the fact that it was injured therefore tells me that there was a deviation from
the standard of care." Id. at 338, 537 A.2d at 639.
25. Id. at 334, 537 A.2d at 637.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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dict.2 s The Court of Special Appeals held that res ipsa loquitur was
properly invoked and that the expert testimony strengthened the
doctrine's applicability in this case.29 On petition by Dr. Meda, the
Court of Appeals granted certiorari."0
2. Legal Background .- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,3 liter-
ally "the thing speaks for itself,"'3 2 is an evidentiary device that per-
mits a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence based on
the strength of inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. 3 In
other words, the doctrine "is merely a short way of saying that the
circumstances attendant upon an accident are themselves of such a
character as to justify a jury in inferring negligence as the cause of
that accident .. . . "3' Res ipsa loquitur is especially useful in cases
in which the plaintiff cannot pinpoint how an injury occurred, or
determine the exact instrument that caused it.
The doctrine, viable in Maryland today but accepted with some
reservation, 5 has been called "notable for [its] persistence if not
28. Id. at 345-46, 537 A.2d at 642-43.
29. See id. at 345, 537 A.2d at 642.
30. Meda, 318 Md. at 422, 569 A.2d at 203.
31. The doctrine's use can be traced to Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
The plaintiff was injured by a barrel that fell from the defendant's window. Baron Pol-
lock wrote:
I think it would be wrong to lay down as a rule that in no case can [a]
presumption of negligence arise from the fact of an accident.... It is the duty
of persons who keep barrels in a warehouse to take care that they do not roll
out, and I think that such a case would, beyond all doubt, afford prima facie
evidence of negligence.... Or if an article calculated to cause damage is put in
a wrong place and does mischief, I think that those whose duty it was to put it in
the right place are prima facie responsible, and if there is any state of facts to
rebut the presumption of negligence, they must prove them.
Id. at 301.
32. BLACK's LAw DICrIoNARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979).
33. See Potts v. Armour & Co., 183 Md. 483, 487, 39 A.2d 552, 555 (1944) ("[A
plaintiff] may invoke the doctrine.., if [the act] is . . .so unusual in occurrence when
due care is exercised as to carry inherent probability of negligence on the part of the
defendant."); Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 55, 40 A. 1067, 1068 (1898) ("There are
instances in which the circumstances surrounding an occurrence... are held, if unex-
plained to indicate the .. .existence of negligence as the efficient cause of any injury
complained of."); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Hicks, 25 Md. App. 503, 526, 337
A.2d 744, 758 (1975) ("The doctrine... [allows the jury to] infer both negligence and
causation from the mere occurrence of the event and the defendant's relation to it.").
34. Benedick, 88 Md. at 55, 40 A. at 1068.
35. In a "memorable dissent" on the subject, quoted by the Meda court, 318 Md. at
422-23, 569 A.2d at 204, Chief Judge Bond of the Court of Appeals wrote:
It adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more clearly ex-
pressed for us in English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions. It does
not represent a doctrine, is not a legal maxim, and is not a rule.
It is merely a common argumentative expression of ancient Latin brought
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memorable for clarity." ' 6 Generally and in Maryland, elements re-
quired for creating an inference of negligence are: (1) an injury of a
type that usually does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2)
caused by an instrumentality within the defendant's exclusive con-
trol; and (3) under circumstances that indicate the casualty did not
result from the plaintiff's act or omission. In Maryland, there was
some early confusion as to the doctrine's procedural effects,38 but it
is now settled that res ipsa loquitur permits, but does not compel,
the jury to infer negligence.39
Despite its general acceptance in negligence cases, Maryland
courts traditionally have rejected the doctrine in medical malprac-
tice cases.4 ° In 1956, the Court of Appeals stated in a medical mal-
practice case that "[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
Negligence cannot be inferred from the occurrence alone."'" In
1958 the court announced that "[t]he mere fact that an unsuccessful
into the language of the law by men who were accustomed to its use in Latin
writings.... It may just as appropriately be used in argument on any subject,
legal or otherwise. Nowhere does it mean more than the colloquial English
expression that the facts speak for themselves, that facts proved naturally afford
ground for an inference of some fact inquired about, and so amount to some
proof of it.
Potomac Edison Co. v.Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 40-41, 152 A. 633, 636 (1930) (Bond, C.J.,
dissenting).
36. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel., 25 Md. App. at 510, 337 A.2d at 749.
37. Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Inc., 261 Md. 541, 547-48, 276 A.2d 81, 84
(1971); accord Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 273 Md.
592, 597, 332 A.2d 1, 4 (1975); Ramsey v. D.P.A. Assocs., 265 Md. 319, 325, 289 A.2d
321, 324 (1972).
38. See Thomsen, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases in Maryland,
3 MD. L. REV. 285, 298 (1939). After discussing the leading Maryland cases at the time,
the article concluded that the doctrine's successful application results in a rebuttable
presumption of law that the defendant was negligent, and shifts to the defendant the
burden of production. See also Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 37, 45, 273 A.2d 412,
416 (1971) (the plaintiff's successful invocation of res ipsa loquitur shifted to the de-
fendants the burden of coming forward with evidence of non-negligence).
39. The court in Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. stated:
We believe that the true interpretation of res ipsa loquitur in Maryland, de-
spite apparent inconsistencies in discussing it, is that espoused by the great
majority of American courts .... As for the plaintiff, the doctrine furnishes
sufficient evidence to go to the trier of fact. As for the defendant, the burden of
proof is not shifted to him, nor is any burden of introducing evidence cast upon
him, except in the very limited sense that if he fails to do so, he runs the risk
that the trier of fact may, and very likely will, find against him.
25 Md. App. at 529-30, 337 A.2d at 760.
40. See Hans v. Franklin Square Hosp., 29 Md. App. 329, 335, 347 A.2d 905, 909-10
(1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 744 (1976); Raitt v.Johns Hopkins Hosp., 22 Md. App. 196,
198, 322 A.2d 548, 550 (1974), rev'd, 274 Md. 489, 336 A.2d 90 (1975); Johns Hopkins
Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 625-26, 258 A.2d 595, 600 (1969).
41. Bettigole v. Diener, 210 Md. 537, 541, 124 A.2d 265, 267 (1956) (the patient,
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result follows medical treatment is not of itself evidence of negli-
gence. Nor does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply."'4 2 In
Maryland, these two statements are cited as authority for the doc-
trine's rejection, but the reasoning behind the statements has never
been fully explained.4"
Instead of using res ipsa loquitur in malpractice cases, the
plaintiff must produce expert testimony from which the trier-of-fact
can identify two elements: the standard of skill and care a profes-
sional ordinarily exercises, and the defendant's failure to satisfy this
standard.44 Expert testimony may be dispensed with only in negli-
gence cases so obvious that the jury's common knowledge and expe-
rience is sufficient to draw the inference of negligence.45 Thus, for
example, no expert evidence was required to establish the negli-
gence of an emergency room doctor who failed to examine, diag-
nose, and treat a patient who had been struck by a car and who later
died from the injuries. 46 Similarly, a surgeon who used non-sterile
needles in performing a surgical procedure was found negligent
without expert testimony.47 Maryland courts, however, did not ex-
pressly apply res ipsa loquitur in these cases.
The Court of Special Appeals hinted in several recent cases that
it would, under the proper set of facts, apply res ipsa loquitur to a
medical malpractice case. In 1976, the court in Hans v. Franklin
Square Hospital,48 bemoaned the fact that stare decisis prevented it
from applying the doctrine to a case in which the plaintiff underwent
who suffered facial paralysis following mastoidectomy, failed to produce legally suffi-
cient evidence of the defendant's negligence).
42. Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 462-63, 138 A.2d 902, 905 (1958) (the evidence
sustained a finding that a physician was not negligent in treating a patient with lipoidal
dye technique to locate pus following an operation).
43. The statements arose from several early cases in which the plaintiff sought to
prove the defendant's negligence from the occurrence of the injury itself. See Dashiell v.
Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896); State ex rel Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162,
26 A. 382 (1889). The basis for the statements appears to be the presumption under
Maryland law that physicians and other professionals have exercised their legal duty of
ordinary care and skill. Dashiell, 84 Md. at 380, 35 A. at 1096;Janney, 70 Md. at 171, 26
A. at 384. To that extent, the plaintiff bore the burden of showing negligence, which
"cannot be presumed, but must be affirmatively proved." Janney, 70 Md. at 171, 26 A. at
384. The synonymous use of "presumption" and "inference" in early cases may have
resulted from the notion that negligence cannot be inferred nor presumed from the
occurrence alone. See Thomsen, supra note 38, at 288-89.
44. Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 620, 258 A.2d 595, 598 (1969).
45. Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 97-99, 288 A.2d 379, 387-88 (1972).
46. See id. at 99, 288 A.2d at 388.
47. See Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hadary, 22 Md. App. 186, 195, 322 A.2d 258,
263 (1974).
48. 29 Md. App. 329, 347 A.2d 905 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 744 (1976).
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a hemorrhoidectomy and emerged from surgery with a "claw
hand."49 The court in Hans upheld the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict entered for the defendant physician on the ground that
because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was barred in Maryland
with respect to medical malpractice suits, the jury could not infer
negligence from an expert witness' testimony. 50
In 1981, the Court of Special Appeals for the first time used res
ipsa loquitur to analyze a medical malpractice case. In that case,
Stevens v. Union Memorial Hospital,5' the court denied the plaintiff re-
covery for failing to establish that the defendants had exclusive con-
trol of the instrumentality causing injury.52 Although it did not find
res ipsa loquitur applicable, the court questioned Maryland's rejec-
tion of the doctrine in medical malpractice cases. 53 Thus, when
Brown v. Meda' appeared on the appeals docket, the stage was set
for res ipsa loquitur's application to a medical malpractice case.
3. Analysis.-In reversing the trial court's judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, the Court of Special Appeals found that res
ipsa loquitur applied, and that its appropriate use was strengthened
by the testimony of Ms. Brown's expert witnesses. 55 The Court of
49. See id. at 335-36, 347 A.2d at 909-10. After the operation, the plaintiff awoke to
find his arm and hand paralyzed. During a postoperative examination, the doctor who
performed the operation noted in his record that the plaintiff suffered from ulnar nerve
palsy, "probably due to table position with arm up over head." The patient attempted
to show what probably caused his paralysis by calling as expert witnesses two doctors.
Id. at 336, 347 A.2d at 910. Although each doctor's opinion was that there was less than
adequate care in conforming with community standards, neither witness was able to sin-
gle out a negligent act that contributed to the injury. Id. at 336-37, 347 A.2d at 910.
50. See id. at 338, 347 A.2d at 911.
51. 47 Md. App. 627, 424 A.2d 1118 (1981).
52. See id. at 631-32, 424 A.2d at 1120-21.
53. The court stated, "[w]e are not to be understood as refusing to sanction the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice cases. The question
of whether the prior holdings of the Court of Appeals and this Court are still viable will
have to await another day." Id. at 632 n.5, 424 A.2d at 1121 n.5.
54. 74 Md. App. 331, 537 A.2d 635 (1988), aft'd, 318 Md. 418, 569 A.2d 202 (1990).
55. See id. at 344-45, 537 A.2d at 642. The court based its holding on persuasive
authority from other jurisdictions: Holloway v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 367 So. 2d 871,
873-74 (La. App. 1978) (expert testimony that during an operation, stretching was far
more probable than compression as the cause of a disabling arm injury, helped support
the use of res ipsa loquitur), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 458 (La. 1979); Parks v. Perry, 68
N.C. App. 202, 206, 314 S.E.2d 287, 290 (1984) (expert testimony that an arm injury
would not have occurred if the arm was properly positioned during an operation was
sufficient to support application of res ipsa loquitur), review denied, 311 N.C. 761, 321
S.E.2d 142 (1984); Matlick v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 25 A.D.2d 538, 538-39, 267
N.Y.S.2d 631, 632-33 (1966) (medical expert's personal knowledge of events that led to
a nerve injury during an operation entitled the plaintiff to rely on res ipsa loquitur);
Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 496 Pa. 465, 474-75, 437 A.2d 1134, 1138-39
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Special Appeals interpreted the line of Maryland cases that do not
require expert testimony in certain "obvious injury" malpractice
cases as tacit application of res ipsa loquitur.56 The court found that
the patient's expert witnesses drew "rational conclusions [based on]
much more than mere conjecture. '57 Their testimony supported
both the jury's inference that the defendant was negligent, and the
verdict for the plaintiff based on that inference. 58 To the extent that
it was inconsistent with Brown, the Court of Special Appeals ex-
pressly overruled Hans v. Franklin Square Hospital.59
The Court of Appeals affirmed, not on the basis of res ipsa lo-
quitur, but on the ground that the testimony was sufficient to sup-
port an inference of negligence drawn by the plaintiff's experts.w°
The Court of Appeals thus distinguished between the inference of
negligence drawn by an expert, and the inference of negligence that
ajury is permitted to draw.6 Only in the latter case, the court said,
is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur invoked:
The closest that this case comes to a reliance upon res
ipsa loquitur is in the inferential reasoning process used by
the plaintiff's experts in arriving at their conclusions that
Dr. Meda was negligent .... [N]either [expert] could tes-
tify as to the precise act of negligence that caused [the] in-
jury .... Each doctor, based upon his knowledge of the
facts and upon his expertise, concluded that Mrs. Brown's
injury was one that ordinarily would not have occurred in
the absence of negligence on the part of the anesthesiolo-
gist. This inferential reasoning has a familiar ring to it. It
(1981) (expert testimony that, absent negligence, suprascapular nerve palsy does not
ordinarily occur during gynecological procedures, supported an application of res ipsa
loquitur); Van Zee v. Sioux Valley Hosp., 315 N.W.2d 489, 493-94 (S.D. 1982) (expert
testimony that a shoulder injury was caused, to a reasonable certainty, by an injection
given during an operation was sufficient to show a deviation from the community stan-
dard of care).
56. The court stated:
An examination of several other cases, however, reveals that the Court did
not mean precisely what it seemed to say, i.e., that res ipsa loquitur can never apply
to medical malpractice cases. The Court frequently has said that when the
common knowledge of laymen is extensive enough to recognize or infer negli-
gence from the facts, the jury may do so without the aid of expert testimony,
thus applying res ipsa loquitur.
Brown, 74 Md. App. at 342, 537 A.2d at 641. Thus, in the Court of Special Appeals'
opinion, stare decisis did not constrain its decision.
57. Id. at 344, 537 A.2d at 641.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 346, 537 A.2d at 636-37.
60. See Meda, 318 Md. at 420, 569 A.2d at 203.
61. See id.
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is a major part of the concept of res ipsa loquitur. It is not,
however, res ipsa loquitur.62
Instead of applying res ipsa loquitur, the Court of Appeals in
Meda found that although the expert witnesses relied on circumstan-
tial as well as direct evidence,63 their reasoning was based on logic
rather than on speculation or conjecture.' The circumstantial evi-
dence therefore sufficiently supported the experts' inferences of
negligence. The Court of Appeals said that because the expert testi-
mony established a prima facie case of the defendant's negligence,
the jury verdict should have been permitted to stand.65
The court's distinction in Meda between an inference of negli-
gence properly drawn by an expert, and one based on the common
knowledge of a jury clarifies two areas of confusion in Maryland
medical malpractice law. First, because expert testimony is still re-
quired to establish negligence and causation in the ordinary medical
malpractice case, 6 the court's definition of res ipsa loquitur as a
jury's inference of negligence unaided by expert testimony pre-
cludes the doctrine's application in ordinary medical malpractice
cases. Second, the court expressly disapproved the holding in
Hans,67 clarifying that it will permit experts with sufficient knowl-
edge and training to make inferences of negligence similar to that
found in a res ipsa loquitur case. That is, a properly qualified medi-
cal expert may draw an inference of negligence from the facts sur-
rounding an injury, even though those facts do not show the
mechanism of the injury or the precise manner in which the defend-
ant was negligent. 8
Meda's practical effect is that, although expert testimony is still
required for a medical malpractice case, an expert witness may now
draw the same inferences that a jury, aided by expert testimony,
would draw in jurisdictions where the doctrine is permitted.69
62. Id. at 424-25, 569 A.2d at 204.
63. See id. at 427, 569 A.2d at 205.
64. See id. at 428, 569 A.2d at 206.
65. See id. at 429, 569 A.2d at 207.
66. The court confirmed that if the plaintiff had not produced expert witnesses, the
jury would not have been permitted to infer negligence from the injury's mere occur-
rence, as this case was not one of "obvious injury." Id. at 428, 569 A.2d at 206-07.
67. See id. at 427, 569 A.2d at 206.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., McWain v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 137 Ariz. 356, 360, 670 P.2d 1180, 1184
(1983) (medical evidence is required to show that injury does not ordinarily occur in the
absence of a doctor's negligence); Spidle v. Steward, 79 111. 2d 1, 6, 37 Ill. Dec. 326, 331,
402 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1980) (reaffirming the court's recognition that expert testimony
can establish a probability of negligence ifjurors were unfamiliar with the issue); Buck-
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Thus, if the plaintiff's expert witness can establish the elements of
res ipsa loquitur (without identifying them as such) and draw an in-
ference that the defendant was negligent, this will be held sufficient
evidence of negligence to go to the jury.7 ° The expert witness need
not identify the exact cause of the patient's injury, but need only
present credible evidence that the doctor's failure to meet the stan-
dard of care resulted in the patient's injuries. 7'
Legal scholars often have argued that there is nothing distinc-
tive about the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that its invocation repre-
sents no more than application of well-recognized principles of
inference and circumstantial evidence.72 In a formal sense, the logic
involved is certainly the same. Practically, res ipsa loquitur's persis-
tence can be attributed to a general trend toward strict liability and
social insurance. 73 This general trend is reflected, for example, in
courts' increasing tendency to impose liability without regard to
fault, on manufacturers of defective products, and the increasing
adoption of no-fault automobile insurance statutes.74 It has often
been said, however, that a physician is not an insurer or warrantor
of cures. 75 This may explain Maryland's reluctance to extend the
doctrine to medical malpractice cases.
On the other hand, legal scholars also believe that "nowhere is
the doctrine needed more than in the malpractice action."' 76 Often,
the patient is anesthetized at the time of the injury, or is otherwise
unable to determine what is being done to her body. The patient's
lack of medical expertise leads her to rely on the physician's profes-
elew v. Grossbard, 87 NJ. 512, 527, 435 A.2d 1150, 1158 (1981) (expert testimony that
the medical community recognizes that an event does not ordinarily occur absent negli-
gence can sufficiently support application of res ipsa loquitur);Jones v. Harrisburg Poly-
clinic Hosp., 496 Pa. 465, 472-73, 437 A.2d 1134, 1138 (1981) (an inference of
negligence is permitted when expert testimony can establish that an event would not
ordinarily occur absent negligence).
70. Meda, 318 Md. at 428, 569 A.2d at 207.
71. Id. at 427, 569 A.2d at 206.
72. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 39, at 243 (5th ed. 1984); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20
MINN. L. REV. 241, 258 (1936); Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 C~uF. L. REV.
183, 184-85, 232, 234 (1949).
73. 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.5, at 29-30 (2d ed.
1986).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 182, 13 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1941).
76. Hans v. Franklin Square Hosp., 29 Md. App. 329, 330, 347 A.2d 905, 907 (1975).
"Because the practice of medicine is itself the application of an inexact science, the prov-
ing of medical malpractice, causing untoward results, is by necessity also inexact. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur facilitates such proof." Id.
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sional judgment and skill. 7 In addition, physicians are reluctant to
testify against other physicians. This is so well recognized that it has
been termed the "conspiracy of silence." 7 These recognized obsta-
cles to plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases have led many jurisdic-
tions to permit the doctrine's application.79
American jurisdictions do not agree about when res ipsa loqui-
tur may be applied in a medical malpractice action. 0 But a growing
number of jurisdictions apply the doctrine not only when jurors can
determine from their own common knowledge that the defendant
was negligent, but also when they can infer this from the testimony
of expert witnesses.8 ' The Second Restatement of Torts is in accord with
these jurisdictions, commenting that "expert testimony ... may be
essential to the plaintiff's case where, as for example in some actions
for medical malpractice, there is no fund of common knowledge
which may permit laymen reasonably to draw the conclusion."8 "
Other jurisdictions limit res ipsa loquitur's application to situations
in which the jury can infer negligence solely from its own knowl-
edge.8" In Meda, Maryland now seems to have aligned itself with the
latter jurisdictions. But the Court of Appeals did not reiterate the
maxim that "res ipsa loquitur does not apply" in medical malpractice
cases. This could indicate that the doctrine may now be invoked in
the so-called "obvious injury" case. From a practical standpoint,
however, applying the doctrine to an "obvious injury" is superflu-
77. At least two legal scholars have agreed that the patient's trust and dependence
also places on the doctor the duty to give a full explanation of any untoward treatment
result. Res ipsa loquitur therefore may be regarded as a natural legal corollary of the
physician's moral and professional duty. Louisell & Williams, Res Ipsa Loquitur-Its Fu-
ture in Medical Malpractice Cases, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 252, 252-53 (1960).
78. 1 D. LouiSELL & H. WILLaMs, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 14.01, at 14-4 to -5
(1990).
79. Id. at 14-2 to -4.
80. Id. § 14.04, at 14-64 to -65.
81. E.g. Silverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1962) (if
risks in surgical operation are inherent and an injury that is rare occurs, res ipsa loquitur
may not be invoked unless it can be shown that such an injury does not occur without
negligence); Walker v. Distler, 78 Idaho 38, 47, 296 P.2d 452, 457-58 (1956) (expert
testimony is necessary "because the causative factors [of the injury] are not ordinarily
within the knowledge... of the jury"); Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ripon Cooperative, 50
Wis. 2d 431, 436-37, 184 N.W.2d 65, 67 (1971) ("plaintiff may [use] res ipsa loquitur if he
can produce . ..expert testimony which serves in the place of the jurors' common
knowledge").
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D comment d (1965).
83. E.g. Hornbeck v. Homeopath Hosp. Ass'n, 57 Del. 120, 126, 197 A.2d 461,463-
64 (1964); Lathon v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 250 A.2d 548, 549 (D.C. 1969); Collins v.
Meeker, 198 Kansas 390, 400, 424 P.2d 488, 497 (1967); Semerjian v. Stetson, 284
Mass. 510, 515, 187 N.E. 829, 831 (1933).
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ous, because Maryland law has always permitted a jury to infer neg-
ligence when the breach of duty is obviously below the accepted
standard of care."
The Court of Appeals' refusal to extend res ipsa loquitur to the
ordinary medical malpractice case is not surprising, given current
trends in Maryland medical malpractice law. As in other jurisdic-
tions, the balance between the plaintiff and the defendant in the
traditional tort system has in recent years been undermined by a
number of factors, perhaps most significantly by jury emotions in
determining liability and damages.8 5 Maryland courts have added
to this imbalance by promulgating liberal discovery rules and sub-
stantive law decisions favoring plaintiffs.8 6 For example, Maryland's
informed consent doctrine has increased physicians' burden to re-
veal to their patients vital treatment information. 7 And the "strict
locality" rule has been abandoned in favor of permitting expert wit-
nesses to give evidence on a nationwide standard of care.88 By per-
mitting plaintiffs to import expert witnesses from other parts of the
country, the judicial system has reduced the need for res ipsa loqui-
tur in medical malpractice cases, and weakened the "conspiracy of
silence" justification for adopting the doctrine.
Skyrocketing health care and medical malpractice insurance
costs in recent years have led the Maryland legislature and courts to
take steps to even the balance between the parties in a medical mal-
practice action. The Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Act 8 9 and
the $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in malpractice actions 9°
are two such attempts. The court's refusal to extend res ipsa loqui-
tur, with or without expert testimony, to the ordinary malpractice
case is consistent with these remedial aims of tort reform. Had the
court relaxed its proscription against res ipsa loquitur in Meda, med-
ical malpractice actions would likely have increased, with patients
invoking the doctrine when there is a grave injury but no clear negli-
gence, or when the injury is merely the unfortunate result of a new
medical treatment.
84. See, e.g., Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972); Suburban Hosp.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hadary, 22 Md. App. 186, 322 A.2d 258 (1974).
85. Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland's Response to the Medical
Malpractice Cris, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74, 79 (1980).
86. Id.
87. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 450, 379 A.2d 1014, 1025 (1977).
88. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 195, 349 A.2d
245, 249 (1975).
89. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989).
90. Id. § 11-108.
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The court in Meda established a middle ground between an ex-
pert opinion of negligence based on clearly ascertainable facts, and
expert opinion based on "mere speculation or conjecture. "91 When
medical records and the testimony of hospital personnel treating the
patient reveal specific negligent acts, a qualified physician may make
inferences predicated on those facts."2 When the expert's conclu-
sions are unsupported by factual evidence or analysis, these bare
conclusions cannot support an expert's inference of negligence.93
The middle ground carved out in Meda permits an expert witness to
infer from facts known to the patient, and from her own knowledge,
how the injury probably occurred, and to draw from those probabili-
ties an inference of negligence. To this extent, the court's decision
should make it easier for a plaintiff to present evidence on causation
in a medical malpractice case.
4. Conclusion.-In Meda, the Court of Appeals distinguished
between permitting a jury aided by expert testimony to infer negli-
gence, and permitting an expert witness to infer negligence from
circumstantial evidence. Instead of extending the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to medical malpractice cases, the court continues to require
expert testimony for all but the most obvious and egregious cases of
substandard medical procedure, but permits the expert to draw in-
ferences of negligence similar to those found in a res ipsa loquitur
case. The distinction drawn in Meda is at best "a matter of seman-
tics."" But the distinction nevertheless clarifies res ipsa loquitur's
applicability to a medical malpractice action, and the sufficiency of
expert testimony required for a finding of negligence. As a result of
this decision, Maryland has gained the benefits of res ipsa loquitur
enjoyed by jurisdictions that permit a jury to infer negligence aided
by expert testimony, while avoiding the possibility of increased
91. Meda, 318 Md. at 427, 569 A.2d at 206.
92. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Munday, 212 Md. 214, 218, 129 A.2d 162, 164 (1957)
(upholding a trial court's ruling to exclude a doctor's testimony when it was not clear on
what facts he based his opinion).
93. This may have been the case in Hans v. Franklin Square Hospital, where the expert
witness appeared to base his conclusion of negligence on the fact that the patient "went
in to have a hemorrhoidectomy and... came out with a claw hand." 29 Md. App. 329,
338, 347 A.2d 905, 911 (1976). Conclusions without a factual basis are sometimes re-
ferred to in other jurisdictions as "net opinions." See, e.g., Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic
Hosp., 496 Pa. 465, 437 A.2d 1134 (1981).
94. Orkin v. Holy Cross Hosp., 318 Md. 429, 569 A.2d 207 (1990) (companion
decision).
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medical malpractice claims that might have resulted from the doc-
trine's expanded availability in medical malpractice actions.
MARYANN S. COHEA
VII. FAMILY LAW
A. The Use of Accounts Created Pursuant to the Maryland
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act
In Brodsky v. Brodsky,' the Court of Appeals held that under the
Maryland Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (MUGMA), 2 a donor's intent
to create a custodianship lasting until the minor reaches age twenty-
one must be specified in writing.3 The court also ruled that a parent
cannot use MUGMA account funds to satisfy his independent obli-
gation to support the child,4 and that a court cannot modify a di-
vorce decree's child support provisions after the child reaches the
age of majority.5
The Brodsky court analyzed three separate but related issues. In
this case of first impression, the court interpreted MUGMA to im-
pose a written requirement to extend the duration of a MUGMA
custodianship.6 The court then held that funds accumulated in a
MUGMA account are indefeasibly and irrevocably vested in the
child, and a father cannot use the funds to satisfy an obligation to
provide a college education for his daughter.7 Finally, the court fol-
lowed the case law in a majority of other jurisdictions in holding that
a court does not have jurisdiction to modify a child support agree-
ment after the child has attained the age of majority.'
1. The Case.-Irvin and Marcia Brodsky married in 1967 and
their daughter, Adrienne, was born three years later.9 In 1977, Irvin
and Marcia signed a voluntary separation agreement, and on Janu-
ary 17, 1979 were divorced by the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County. The divorce decree incorporated the separation agree-
ment's terms, which provided in part that Irvin would pay for all of
1. 319 Md. 92, 570 A.2d 1235 (1990).
2. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-301 to -310 (1974) (repealed 1989). Forty-
eight states have passed a version of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA). Some
states, such as Maryland, have added the first letter of their state name to the acronym
and have made slight changes in the provisions, but in general the statutes are uniform.
See also infra note 19.
3. See 319 Md. at 99, 570 A.2d at 1238.
4. See id. at 100, 570 A.2d at 1238.
5. See id., 570 A.2d at 1239.
6. See id. at 98-99, 570 A.2d at 1237-38.
7. See id. at 99-100, 570 A.2d at 1238-39.
8. See id. at 100, 570 A.2d at 1238-39.
9. Id. at 94, 570 A.2d at 1235.
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Adrienne's college expenses.' 0
In December of 1974, Irvin opened a savings account for Ad-
rienne pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, and
opened other accounts in 1978, 1983, 1987, and 1988. Irvin was
both donor and custodian of each account."' Adrienne enrolled as
an undergraduate student at Boston University in the spring of
1988.2 After she turned eighteen, Adrienne wrote to her father re-
questing that he deliver all accounts maintained on her behalf, but
Irvin did not comply.' 3 Marcia wrote to Irvin two months later re-
questing that he pay Adrienne's first semester college expenses.
After receiving no reply, Marcia in August 1988 filed for a con-
tempt order to force Irvin to pay Adrienne's college expenses. Ad-
rienne filed a complaint against Irvin for an accounting and return
of monies maintained in the MUGMA accounts. In May 1989, Irvin
filed a complaint to modify the divorce decree to require Marcia and
Adrienne to contribute to Adrienne's college expenses. Irvin also
sought to limit his obligation to paying for Adrienne to attend a
more reasonably priced college.' 4
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County tried all issues in May
1989, and ordered Irvin to pay Adrienne's college expenses-an ob-
ligation that he assumed in the divorce decree.'" Although the
court dismissed Irvin's complaint to modify the divorce decree, it
allowed him to use the MUGMA accounts to pay Adrienne's college
expenses. The court granted Adrienne's request for an accounting,
but denied her petition for delivery of the MUGMA accounts, and
ordered that Irvin remain their custodian until Adrienne reached
age twenty-one.1 6
Adrienne and Irvin each appealed to the Court of Special Ap-
10. Id., 570 A.2d at 1235-36. Paragraph 5 of the voluntary separation agreement
provided in part:
If the child of the parties makes application to and is accepted by any college
before reaching her 21 st birthday, the husband agrees to provide the child with
an undergraduate college education to include tuition, fees, room and board,
and other costs associated therewith. However, if at any time after enrolling,
the child ceases to be'a regular full-time student in good standing, the hus-
band's obligations under this section shall terminate.
Id.
11. Id. at 94-95, 570 A.2d at 1236.
12. Id at 95, 570 A.2d at 1236.
13. Id. In May 1989, the MUGMA accounts had a fair market value of $27,891. id.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
16. Id. at 95-96, 570 A.2d at 1236.
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peals.17 Adrienne claimed that the trial court erred in not granting
her petition for delivery of the MUGMA accounts, and Irvin claimed
that the trial court erred in denying his complaint to modify the di-
vorce decree. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari on both is-
sues prior to a lower court decision.'"
2. Legal Background and Summary of Reasoning.-
a. Statutory Construction of MUGMA.-The Maryland Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act' 9 was enacted in 1974 and created a relatively
simple and inexpensive way to make gifts to minors while allowing a
custodian to retain control of the property until the child reached
the age of majority.20
In Maryland, the age of majority was lowered on July 1, 1973
from twenty-one to eighteen.2 ' But MUGMA's section 13-302(b-1)
specifies that "[a] donor who makes a gift to a minor in a manner
prescribed in subsection (a) of this section may provide that the custo-
dian shall deliver, convey, or pay it over to the minor on his attain-
ing the age of 21 years." 22 This amendment allowed a custodian to
extend a MUGMA custodianship's duration until the child reached
twenty-one, but if the custodian did not specify the extension, the
custodianship would automatically terminate on the child's eight-
17. Id. at 96, 570 A.2d at 1236.
18. See id.
19. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-301 to -310 (1974) (repealed 1989).
MUGMA was repealed as ofJuly 1, 1989, Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 638, 1989 Md. Laws
1989, but was replaced with a substantially similar act, the Maryland Uniform Transfers
to Minors Act (MUTMA). MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-301 to -324 (Supp.
1989). The Court of Appeals held that MUTMA does not apply to the case at bar be-
cause § 13-322 provides that it is not applicable to custodial property held in a custodi-
anship that terminated because the minor attained the age of 18 beforeJuly 1, 1989. See
Brodsky, 319 Md. at 97, 570 A.2d at 1237. Adrienne turned 18 before MUTMA's effec-
tive date. Id.
20. See Brodsky, 319 Md. at 96, 570 A.2d at 1236. Section 13-302(a) provides in part:
An adult may, during his lifetime or by will, make a gift of... money.., to
a person who is a minor on the date of the gift or distribution:
(3) If the subject of the gift is money, by paying or delivering it to a broker
or a financial institution, for credit to an account in the name of the donor,
another adult, a guardian of the minor, or a trust company, followed, in sub-
stance, by the words: "as a custodian for [name of minor] under the Maryland
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act."
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-302(a) (1974) (repealed 1989).
21. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 24 (1973).
22. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-302(b-1) (1975) (repealed 1989) (emphasis
added).
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eenth birthday.23 The main issue before the court was whether the
donor's intent to extend the custodianship could be expressed
orally or must be written.24
The court noted that in construing a statute the words are as-
sumed to have their natural and ordinary meaning.25 By definition,
the words "may provide" are an elective clause or condition that
may be specified in a contract, statute, deed, or will.26 If the words
are interpreted by their plain meaning, "may provide" requires the
donor to manifest her intentions in writing.27
Furthermore, the court interpreted legislative intent as requir-
ing a formalized designation when the parties departed from the
MUGMA's provisions so that anyone inspecting the account could
decipher the donor's intentions.2 8 This formalized designation of
intent is based on the necessity of documenting donative intent-an
element of every inter vivos gift.2 9 If the donor's intent was not
clearly documented, there might be confusion and doubt among
family members, the financial institution, and the court.3 0 Hence,
formalized writing gives clear and unmistakable evidence of the gift-
giver's donative intent.
Irvin Brodsky did not document his intent to extend the custo-
dianship."' The Court of Appeals therefore held that he had not
made the election under section 13-302(b-1), and thus had a duty to
deliver all MUGMA accounts to Adrienne on her eighteenth
birthday.3
b. Use of MUGMA Accounts for Independent Obligations.-The
court next considered whether Irvin could use the MUGMA ac-
counts to satisfy his obligation to pay for Adrienne's college educa-
23. See Brodsky, 319 Md. at 97-98, 570 A.2d at 1237.
24. See id. at 97, 570 A.2d at 1237.
25. See id. at 98, 570 A.2d at 1237.
26. See id. The word "may" is generally understood as permissive rather than
mandatory, and suggests that a custodian may elect when to terminate the custodian-
ship. See id. "Provide" is defined as "to make a proviso or stipulation." See id. (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DIc'rIONARY 1827 (1981)). "Proviso" is then defined as "an
article or clause (as in a statute, contract or grant) that introduces a condition, qualifica-
tion, or limitation." Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S, supra, at 1827). "Stipulation" is defined as
"a condition, requirement, or item specified in a contract, treaty, deed, will or law." Id
(quoting WEBSTER'S, supra, at 2245).
27. See id.
28. See id at 98-99, 570 A.2d at 1238.
29. Id. at 99, 570 A.2d at 1238.
30. Id
31. Id
32. See id.
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tion.33 Because the MUGMA accounts were irrevocably and
indefeasibly vested in Adrienne, the court concluded that Adrienne
wholly owned the property.3 4 Even though he was the account cus-
todian, Irvin could not use the money to satisfy his independent ob-
ligation to provide Adrienne's education. 5
c. Modification of the Support Agreement.-The court also decided
that the judicial system had no jurisdiction to modify a divorce de-
cree's child support provisions after the child attained the age of
majority." Maryland's Family Law article provides that a divorce
decree may only be modified if it is for the support of a minor child
and if the modifications are in the child's best interests.3 7
Because Adrienne was older than eighteen when Irvin filed for
modification of the divorce decree to reduce his suoport obliga-
tion,3" the court held that it had no authority to modify the support
provisions. Irvin was bound by the agreement's terms.3 9
3. Analysis.-
a. Statutory Construction.-This case's resolution turned on the
interpretation of two words in section 13-302(b-1): "may pro-
vide."'40 As a case of first impression on the statute's interpretation,
Brodsky required the court to employ the rules of statutory construc-
33. See id at 99-100, 570 A.2d at 1238. Section 13-303(a) provides:
A gift made in a manner prescribed in this subtitle is irrevocable and conveys to
the minor indefeasibly vested legal title to the.. . money.., but no guardian of
the minor has any right, power, duty or authority with respect to the custodial
property except as provided in this subtitle.
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-303(a) (1974) (repealed 1989).
34. See Brodsky, 319 Md. at 99-100, 570 A.2d at 1238. Irvin treated the accounts as
vested in Adrienne: he provided her mother with annual tax information so that she
could file income tax returns for Adrienne. Id. at 99, 570 A.2d at 1238.
35. See id. at 100, 570 A.2d at 1238.
36. See id., 570 A.2d at 1238-39.
37. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-103(a) (1984), which provides that "[t]he court
may modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement with respect to the care,
custody, education, or support of any minor child of the spouses, if the modification
would be in the best interests of the child." Id.
38. Brodsky, 319 Md. at 100, 570 A.2d at 1238-39. Adrienne had reached the age of
majority, as defined by the Maryland Code, when she turned 18. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
1, § 24, (1984); supra note 21 and accompanying text.
39. See 319 Md. at 100, 570 A.2d at 1238-39.
40. If the court held that the intention required by section 13-302(b-1) could be
expressed orally, then the custodianship would last until Adrienne turned 21. Adrienne
would not reach this age until April 21, 1991, after a good portion of the MUGMA
account had been expended for her college education. See Appellee's Brief at 10-11,
Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 570 A.2d 1235 (1990) (No. 89-120).
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tion.4" "[T]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to deter-
mine legislative intent.' 42 In ascertaining legislative intent, courts
examine a statute's plain meaning.43 The parties in Brodsky diverged
fundamentally in explaining the legislative intent and plain meaning
of section 13-302(b-1). 44
Irvin Brodsky argued that courts should not correct defects in
legislation by inserting or deleting words. 45 The statute does not
indicate that the donor's intentions should be or must be in writ-
ing.4' Thus, he argued, it should be construed according to the or-
dinary and natural meaning of its language, without forcing subtle
interpretations to extend its reach.47
Although a statute's words are important in determining its ap-
propriate construction, external manifestations such as the bill's
function, amendments, and its relationship to earlier and subse-
quent legislation, favor an interpretation that does not require writ-
ten expression.48 Before the 1973 amendment lowered the age of
majority to eighteen,49 the statute did not provide for an optional
termination date; all custodianships ended when the minor reached
the age of twenty-one.50 Although the age for delivery of a
MUGMA account was lowered, it is likely that the legislators wanted
donors to have the easy option of extending the custodianship. In
1989 when the legislature repealed the Maryland Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act and enacted the Maryland Uniform Transfers to Minors
41. See 319 Md. at 97-99, 570 A.2d at 1237-38.
42. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 511, 525 A.2d 628, 631
(1987) (legislative intent should be ascertained from considering the statute's purpose
or objective; other statutes addressing the same subject matter should be read together
and harmonized) (citing Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., 303 Md. 280, 493 A.2d 341
(1985); Management Personnel Serv. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 478 A.2d 310 (1984)).
43. See, e.g., Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632 ("[Iln our efforts to dis-
cover purpose, aim, or policy we look at the words of the statute.").
44. Compare Appellee's Brief, supra note 40, at 12-14, with Appellant's Brief at 9-12,
Brodsky v. Brodsky, Court of Special Appeals (Sept. Term 1989) (No. 1067).
45. See Appellee's Brief, supra note 40, at 13 (citing Coleman v. State, 781 Md. 538,
546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977)).
46. See id. at 12.
47. See id. at 13 (citing Coleman, 781 Md. at 546, 380 A.2d at 54).
48. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33
(1987) ("When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the
words of the statute as they are printed in the Annotated Code. We may and often must
consider other 'external manifestations' or 'persuasive evidence,' including a bill's title
and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legisla-
ture, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly
bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal .... " Id.).
49. See supra notes 21, 38, and accompanying text.
50. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 92A, § 302 (1972) (repealed 1973).
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Act (MUTMA), the legislature again mandated that custodial ac-
counts be held until the minor reached twenty-one. 5' This evi-
dences the legislature's intent to allow custodians greater control
over the finances of young adults.
The court, however, followed Adrienne Brodsky's rationale,
holding that when the legislature has not defined a term, it should
be given its usual and natural meaning.5" This would make "may
provide" an optional clause or condition specified in a contract, stat-
ute, deed, or will.5" The court then leapt from this interpretation to
require a donor's active, written election at the time the gift is
made.54
When the statute is susceptible to more than one interpreta-
tion, the court should consider the words' literal and usual meaning,
as well as their purpose, intention, and effect in light of the legisla-
tion's objectives. 5 The court recognized the consequences of its
decision: without documenting the donor's intent to extend the
length of a custodianship, each party to the transaction could inter-
pret the situation differently, and confusion could result.56 More-
over, the donor's intent could easily change over the custodianship's
span, and if the intentions were not reduced to writing, courts could
not effectively carry out the donor's original plan and fairly dis-
tribute the MUGMA account.5 7
The statute's words are ambiguous enough so that either inter-
pretation could be correct, and there is no strong case law leading
to the conclusion that one answer is better than the other. By re-
quiring written evidence of the donor's intent to extend the custodi-
anship, the court expansively interpreted the statute, and favored
full disclosure of the trust's terms.
51. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-301 (Supp. 1989).
52. See Brodsky, 319 Md. at 98, 570 A.2d at 1237; see also Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md.
84, 92-93, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979) (stating "absent any indication from the statute
that the language is being used in a special sense, we assume that the statutory words
were intended to have their natural, ordinary and generally understood meaning").
53. See Brodsky, 319 Md. at 98, 570 A.2d at 1237.
54. See id. at 98-99, 570 A.2d 1237-38.
55. See Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)
(construing the meaning of the word "pedestrian" literally, as an individual traveling on
foot, or in light of the enactment's objectives and purposes, which would include a per-
son who is struck by a car while seated on the steps of a building adjacent to a public
highway) (citing State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975); Height v. State, 225
Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961)).
56. See Brodsky, 319 Md. at 99, 570 A.2d at 1238.
57. See id.
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b. Use of MUGMA Accounts for Independent Obligations.-Section
13-303 provides that once a gift is made pursuant to MUGMA's pro-
visions, it is irrevocable and conveys indefeasibly vested legal title.58
In Rudo v. Karp59 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that
MUGMA accounts are irrevocable if there is clear donative intent.'
Complying with MUGMA's provisions is prima facie evidence that
the donor clearly and unmistakably intended to relinquish all inter-
est in the gift.6 ' Once the gift is complete, it is irreversible, and the
donor retains no legal or equitable rights in the property.62
A custodian's duty to hold and preserve the MUGMA property
for the child's benefit is similar to a trustee's fiduciary duty.63 Sec-
tion 13-304 gives the custodian wide discretion in determining how
the property will be expended for the child's benefit.'
Although parents may serve as MUGMA custodians, they have
an independent duty to support their minor children. 65 The statute
58. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-303 (1974) (repealed 1989); supra note
33.
59. 80 Md. App. 424, 564 A.2d 100 (1989).
60. See id. at 429-30, 564 A.2d at 104 (the court found a father's clear donative intent
in opening savings accounts for his minor sons, so the gifts were irrevocable).
61. See Gordon v. Gordon, 70 A.D.2d 86, 91, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (1979)
("Although compliance with the procedures set forth by the UGMA is highly probative
on the issue of intent, in appropriate circumstances extrinsic evidence may be intro-
duced to rebut the prima facie showing afforded by the prescribed UGMA documenta-
tion .... Id.).
62. See Rudo, 80 Md. App. at 430, 564 A.2d at 103.
63. See, e.g., Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 404, 528 A.2d 1318, 1323 (1987) ("[A]
custodian's duties may be more properly analogous to those of a trustee with the
broadest possible discretionary powers. A trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the benefici-
ary."); Newman v. Newman, 123 Cal. App. 3d 618, 620, 176 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1981)
("The duty of a custodian under the Act is, as that of a trustee, to hold and preserve the
custodial property for the benefit of the minor.").
64. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-304(b) (1974) (repealed 1989). Section
13-304(b) provides:
The custodian shall pay over to the minor for expenditure by him, or ex-
pend for the minor's benefit, so much of or all the custodial property as the
custodian deems advisable for the support, maintenance, education, and bene-
fit of the minor in the manner, at the time or times, and to the extent that the
custodian in his discretion deems suitable and proper, with or without court
order, with or without regard to the duty of himself or any other person to
support the minor or his ability to do so ....
Id.
65. See In re Marriage Wolfert, 42 Colo. App. 433, 435-36, 598 P.2d 524, 526 (1979)
("The section [of UGMA] does not relieve a parent of the separate duty to support the
children . . . .); Sutliff, 515 Pa. at 398, 528 A.2d at 1320 ("[A] parent's obligation to
support minor children is independent of the minor's assets. UGMA funds may not be
used to fulfill the parent's support obligation when the parent has sufficient means to
discharge it himself."); see also Newman v. Newman, 123 Cal. App. 3d 618, 620-21, 176
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clearly recognizes that the duty of support is unrelated to the custo-
dian's duty, by providing that the custodian can make distributions
for the benefit of the minor "with or without" regard to his own or
another person's support obligation.66
In Sutliff v. Sutli '6 7 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that a father could not withdraw money from an UGMA account to
satisfy his portion of a support agreement. 68 The court held that an
UGMA account does not relieve a parent of the separate duty to
support his children. 69 Furthermore, it does not authorize the cus-
todian to use the funds to fulfill a parent's voluntary agreement; to
do so would violate the statutory mandate that the property is to be
held for the children's benefit. 70 It also would be analogous to re-
moving the parent's duty of support to the extent that the children
have UGMA accounts.7 '
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Erdmann v. Erdmann 72
that an UGMA account's use should only be authorized when to do
so will benefit the child.73 Usually, parents must support their chil-
dren whether or not there are trust funds. Whenever parents are
obligated to support their children and are required to use their
own funds, it is not in the children's best interests to use UGMA
funds for their support.7 ' Therefore, the statute cannot be inter-
preted as authorizing the use of custodial property to satisfy a par-
ent's personal obligation.75
Although this was a case of first impression for the Maryland
Court of Appeals, Brodsky v. Brodsky falls squarely in line with cases
from other jurisdictions. 76 The divorce agreement gave Irvin Brod-
Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1981); Erdmann v. Erdmann, 67 Wis. 2d 116, 122-24, 226 N.W.2d
439, 442-43 (1975).
66. See Newman, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 621, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
67. 515 Pa. 393, 528 A.2d 1318 (1987).
68. See id. at 402-04, 528 A.2d at 1322-23.
69. See id. at 398, 528 A.2d at 1320.
70. See id. at 403-04, 528 A.2d at 1323.
71. See id. at 406, 528 A.2d at 1324.
72. 67 Wis. 2d 116, 226 N.W.2d 439 (1975).
73. See id. at 122-23, 226 N.W.2d at 442.
74. See id. at 124, 226 N.W.2d at 443. If the statute allowed parents to use an UGMA
account to support their children, the account would become little more than a tax re-
duction strategy. Parents could transfer money into the UGMA account to pay taxes at a
lower rate, and use the money for the general maintenance of their children. See Rudo,
80 Md. App. at 431, 564 A.2d at 103.
75. See Erdmann, 67 Wis. at 124-25, 226 N.W.2d at 443.
76. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 123 Cal. App. 3d 618, 176 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1981).
In Newman, the California Court of Appeals recognized an obligation to support children
based on the role as a parent, apart from any other obligation imposed based on the role
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sky two roles: one was that of a parent who voluntarily agreed to
support and educate his minor daughter, and the other was that of
MUGMA accounts' custodian." The court held that Irvin could not
intertwine his obligations: a voluntary agreement providing for a
college education is independent of MUGMA custodial duties.78
The court, however, need not have gone so far in its decision.
In the first issue considered, the court decided that Irvin must de-
liver the MUGMA accounts to Adrienne because she had already
attained the age of majority.79 If the accounts are already legally
and indefeasibly Adrienne's, the issue of whether Irvin could have
used the accumulated monies to satisfy an independent obligation is
moot.
c. Modifying the Support Agreement.-A court may modify a sup-
port agreement with respect to the care, custody, education, or sup-
port of any minor child so long as it would be in the child's best
interests.80 When a child reaches the age of majority, courts no
longer have jurisdiction or authority to order payment of money.8,
In addition, unexpended MUGMA funds must be given to the
child when the child reaches the age of majority. 2 At that time it is
the child's decision how to use the funds.83
as an account custodian. See id. at 621, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 725. It is unclear, however,
what duty is imposed on parents regarding the costs of a college education and, when
state law imposes such a duty, whether custodial funds may be used.
In Brodsky, the Court of Appeals did not address this question because Irvin's obli-
gation to pay Adrienne's college expenses was derived from a separation agreement
incorporated into the divorce decree. 319 Md. at 94-95, 570 A.2d at 1235-26. See Mon-
ticello v. Monticello, 271 Md. 168, 173, 315 A.2d 520, 522-23 (1974) (if a written agree-
ment exists, its language will govern the parties' rights and responsibilities). This was
an independent personal duty that Irvin agreed to, and was not a court mandated order.
77. See Brodsky, 319 Md. at 99-100, 570 A.2d at 1237-38; see also Erdmann, 67 Wis. 2d
at 119, 226 N.W.2d at 441 (One hat was that of a "noncustodial father directed by the
court order to make certain payments for the support and education of his minor chil-
dren .... The other was the hat of a custodian of an investment fund established by the
divorce judgment for the support, maintenance, education and benefit of the same mi-
nor children.").
78. See 319 Md. at 99-100, 570 A.2d at 1237-38.
79. See id at 97-99, 570 A.2d at 1237-38.
80. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-103 (1984).
81. See Borchert v. Borchert, 185 Md. 586, 594, 45 A.2d 463, 466-67 (1946).
82. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-304(d) (1974) (repealed 1989).
83. Delorio, Estate Law: Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 112 MIL. L. REV. 159, 172 (1986)
("UGMA clearly states that when the child reaches the statutory age, the unexpended
funds must be given to him or her.... The fund will be accessible to the [child] to
spend as he wishes when he reaches the statutory age at which the funds must be deliv-
ered to him.").
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The Court of Special Appeals in Pumphrey v. Pumphrey"4 faced a
situation similar to Brodsky, as the father agreed in a separation
agreement to pay for his three sons' support and college expenses
until they reached twenty-one, or became self-supporting."5 One
son married while attending college, and the father petitioned for a
decree eliminating his support."6 The court in Pumphrey maintained
that if the child's best interests do not require the support agree-
ment's modification, the court is powerless to eliminate or reduce
the parent's support payment.8 7 The court found it unlikely that the
son's welfare would be enhanced by removing his support while he
is in college.8 8
Using this reasoning, the Brodsky court correctly decided that it
did not have jurisdiction to modify the divorce agreement.8 9 On
April 21, 1988, Adrienne reached the age of majority.9" Irvin, how-
ever, did not file for modification of the support agreement until
May 9, 1989-more than one year after the court's jurisdiction to
modify the support arrangements ended.9 ' Thus, the court had no
authority to reduce the amount of support Irvin was obligated to
provide for Adrienne's college expenses.92 In addition, it would not
be in Adrienne's best interest to remove her source of support while
she attends college.
4. Conclusion.-Brodsky v. Brodsky turned on legislative intent
and statutory construction of the Maryland Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act. Although section 13-302 does not clearly mandate documenta-
tion to extend a custodianship's duration, the Maryland Court of
Appeals expanded the statute by requiring that the donor evidence
his intent.
The court's decision could have been based solely on this issue;
there was no documentation of Irvin's intent to extend the custodi-
anship's duration, so the MUGMA accounts legally and indefeasibly
became Adrienne's on her eighteenth birthday. The court, how-
ever, chose to address the remaining issues and held that MUGMA's
custodial duties are independent of a parent's personal obligations,
84. 11 Md. App. 287, 273 A.2d 637 (1971).
85. Id. at 289, 273 A.2d at 638.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 292, 273 A.2d at 640.
88. See id
89. See 319 Md. at 100, 570 A.2d at 1238-39.
90. Id. at 94, 570 A.2d at 1235.
91. Id. at 100, 570 A.2d at 1238-39.
92. See i t
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and held that a court's authority to modify a support provision ends
when the child reaches the age of majority.
B. Goodwill of Professionals and Marital Property
In Prahinski v. Prahinski 93 the Court of Appeals for the first time
addressed whether the goodwill of a professional's practice consti-
tutes marital property subject to apportionment upon dissolution of
the professional's marriage. 94 In a split decision,95 the court held
that a solo law practice's goodwill is personal to the individual prac-
titioner, and thus is not marital property subject to division under
Maryland's equitable distribution statute. 96
The majority reasoned that if goodwill is to be considered mari-
tal property, it must be an asset with a value separate from the prac-
titioner's reputation,9 7 and concluded that a solo law practice's
goodwill is inseparable from the attorney's reputation. 98 The ma-
jority limited its holding to solo legal practitioners, pointing out that
the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from selling her
goodwill, and from forming law partnerships with nonlawyers.99
According to the majority, these provisions preclude including in
the marital estate a solo law practice's professional goodwill.'0°
The majority's reasoning seems convincing at first glance. But
as the dissent pointed out, much of the majority's opinion applies
equally to other professional practices, as well as to service
trades.' O' The spouse of a sole proprietor belonging to a trade or
profession may receive an equitable award in the proprietorship's
value.'°2 The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on the Rules
93. 321 Md. 227, 582 A.2d 784 (1990).
94. See id.
95. Id. Judge Cole wrote the majority opinion in a four-to-three decision. See id. at
228-42, 582 A.2d at 784-91. Judge Rodowsky wrote the dissenting opinion. See id. at
242-45, 582 A.2d at 791-93 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 239, 582 A.2d at 790. See infra notes 156-169 and accompanying text.
97. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 239, 582 A.2d at 790.
98. See id. Although the court did not expressly say that a solo law practice's good-
will could never be a marital asset, it said without qualification that it is personal to the
practitioner, and thus not a marital asset. Id.
99. See id. at 240-41, 582 A.2d at 790-91. The Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
hibit a lawyer from making an agreement that "restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice
after termination of the [employment] relationship." THE MARYLAND LAWYER'S RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 5.6(a) (1990) (reprinted in 2 MARYLAND RULES appendix(1991)). Rule 5.4 prohibits a lawyer from forming "a partnership with a nonlawyer if
any of the activities consist of the practice of law." Id.
100. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 240-41, 582 A.2d at 790-91.
101. See id. at 244, 582 A.2d at 792 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 242, 582 A.2d at 791 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
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of Professional Conduct to limit its holding to solo legal practition-
ers. "By mixing the Marital Property Act ... with the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct ... without giving effect to the purpose of either
ingredient, the court has produced an inequitable result."'10 3
Maryland case law prior to Prahinski established that the term
"marital property" is to be construed broadly to give its remedial
purposes effect. ' 0 4 Prahinski muddies the meaning of "marital prop-
erty" because it carves out a narrow exception to this broad con-
struction. By focusing its analysis on unique features of legal
practice, the majority failed to place Prahinski within the existing
marital property framework.
1. The Case.-Margaret and Leo Prahinski married in 1965."05
Margaret had just completed her freshman year of college, and
chose to discontinue her education in order to maintain the family
home.' 0 6 Leo completed his undergraduate education and eventu-
ally obtained a law degree.'0 7 In 1971, Leo started his own law
practice. Margaret initially worked with Leo as a legal secretary, but
as the practice grew, she became the office manager.'0 8
Margaret and Leo separated in 1983 after Leo became involved
with another woman. Margaret filed for divorce in November 1986.
The Circuit Court for Prince George's County filed a written order,
providing for distribution of their marital assets, and granting Mar-
garet a monetary award and alimony.'0° The court included in the
monetary award one-half of the law practice's value.' 1o
Leo appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, alleging that the
103. Id.
104. See Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 545 A.2d 35 (1988) (future renewal commis-
sions on insurance premiums are marital property); Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 521
A.2d 320 (1987) (marital property includes worker's compensation benefits compensat-
ing for loss of earning capacity); Unkle v. Unlde, 305 Md. 587, 505 A.2d 849 (1986) (an
unliquidated personal injury award is not marital property); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md.
347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985) (marital property does not include medical degrees and
licenses); Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, 301 Md. 283, 483 A.2d 1 (1984) (disability pen-
sions are marital property); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981) (ci-
vilian retirement benefits are marital property).
105. Prahinski, 321 Md. at 228, 582 A.2d at 784.
106. Prahinski v. Prahinski, 75 Md. App. 113, 121, 540 A.2d 833, 836 (1988). The
couple later had two children, and Margaret had primary responsibility for raising them.
Id.
107. Prahinski, 321 Md. at 228, 582 A.2d at 784.
108. Prahinski v. Prahinski, 75 Md. App. at 121, 540 A.2d at 837.
109. Prahinski, 321 Md. at 228, 582 A.2d at 784. The trial court found that the law
practice was worth $300,000, consisting entirely of goodwill. See 75 Md. App. at 122,
540 A.2d at 837.
110. See Prahinshi, 321 Md. at 228, 582 A.2d at 784.
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trial court erred by including Leo's law practice in the marital es-
tate. II The Court of Special Appeals found that the law practice's
value consisted entirely in Leo Prahinski's reputation as attorney-at-
law" 2 and therefore, it was personal to him and not subject to distri-
bution as part of the monetary award.'" 3 Nonetheless, the Court of
Special Appeals left open the possibility that the professional good-
will, even of a solo law practice, could be marital property if it could
be shown to have a value independent of the continued presence or
reputation of any particular individual." 4 On certiorari, the Court
of Appeals affirmed."I5
2. Legal Background.-
a. Marital Property In General.-In 1978, Maryland passed the
Marital Property Act, its version of an equitable distribution statute,
authorizing equity courts to determine upon a marriage's dissolu-
tion which property is marital property, and which is nonmarital
property."16 The statute authorized equity courts to determine the
value of all marital property,1 7 and to grant a monetary award as an
adjustment of the equities and rights of the spouses concerning
marital property." The courts have construed the Marital Property
111. 75 Md. App. at 126, 540 A.2d at 839.
112. See id. at 135, 540 A.2d at 844. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Court of
Special Appeals' finding. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 239-40, 582 A.2d at 790.
113. 75 Md. App. at 135, 540 A.2d at 844. The Court of Special Appeals noted that if
goodwill had no value separate from the practitioner, it merely represented future earn-
ing capacity. Id. Future earning capacity is not a marital asset subject to distribution on
divorce. See Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 357, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985).
114. See 75 Md. App. at 136, 540 A.2d at 844. The Court of Special Appeals expressly
adopted the case-by-case approach to determine whether an asset is marital property. A
small minority of jurisdictions follow this approach. See id. at 133-34, 540 A.2d at 843.
115. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 242, 582 A.2d at 791.
116. See Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304 (originally codified at MD.
CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6A-01 to -08 (1980 & Supp. 1983); recodified at MD.
Fm. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 8-201 to -213 (1984)). The Act greatly expanded the equity
courts' authority to dispose of property incidental to divorce. See id. Before 1978, eq-
uity courts had no authority to divide the spouses' property. An equity court could
award to the wife the property she had when she married, and could determine who
owned certain property, but it could not transfer property from one spouse to another,
nor adjust personal property rights if the wife made no monetary contributions toward
the property's purchase. See McClear v. McClear, 298 Md. 320, 332-33, 469 A.2d 1256,
1262 (1984).
117. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-204 (1984).
118. See id. § 8-205(a):
After the court determines which property is marital property, and the value of
the marital property, the court may grant a monetary award as an adjustment of
the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or
not alimony is awarded. The court shall determine the amount and the method
1202 [VOL. 50:1189
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Act to provide that distributions should be based on what is fair and
equitable, regardless of which spouse has legal title to the prop-
erty. 1 9 It reflects the view that marriage is a partnership, and each
spouse is entitled to an equitable share of the partnership property
upon dissolution of the marriage. 20
In an early decision interpreting the Act, the Court of Appeals
noted that the statutory term "marital property" encompassed by
section 8-201(e) "embraces everything which has exchangeable
value or goes to make up a man's wealth--every interest or estate
which the law regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition.' 12'
The Court of Appeals has also stated that "when used without ex-
press or implied qualifications, [property] may reasonably be con-
strued to ... [involve] obligations, rights and other intangibles as
of payment of a monetary award after considering each of the following factors:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the
well-being of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be
made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property was acquired, including the ef-
fort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property;
(9) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court
has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(10) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to
consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.
Id.
119. See, e.g., Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 595, 505 A.2d 849, 853 (1986) (objectives
of fair and equitable distribution necessitate abandoning Maryland's old tide system of
dividing marital property).
120. The preamble to Maryland's Marital Property Act states: "[m]arriage is a union
between a man and a woman having equal rights under the law. Both spouses owe a
duty to contribute his or her best efforts to the marriage, and both, by entering into the
marriage, undertake to benefit both spouses .... " Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978
Md. Laws 2305.
121. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 125, 437 A.2d 883, 889 (1981) (quoting Dif-
fendall v. Diffendall, 239 Md. 32, 36, 209 A.2d 914, 915 (1965)).
Section 8-201(e) provides:
(1) "Marital property" means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties
during the marriage.
(2) Marital property does not include property:
(i) acquired before the marriage;
(ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party;
(iii) excluded by valid agreement; or
(iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.
MD. F~m. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-201(e) (1984).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
well as physical things." 12 2
The Court of Appeals includes under this broad definition of
marital property: worker's compensation awards, 123 civilian retire-
ment benefit rights accumulated during the marriage, 24 work-re-
lated contributory disability plans, 125 and future commissions on
insurance renewal premiums.126 On the other hand, professional
degrees or licenses, and inchoate personal injury claims arising from
an accident during the marriage, have not been included as marital
property.' 2
7
If the court has found that the asset is marital property, it has
determined that the asset represents an enforceable property right.
For example, the right to receive money in the future is an enforcea-
ble property right, and thus is a marital asset.' 28 The court noted
that these assets have a present value, and are not mere conditional
expectations.121 It is insignificant that the right is contingent, or
might be divested by some future event.' 30
On the other hand, when the court determines that the asset
122. Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 356, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (1985) (quoting Bouse
v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767, 769 (1942)).
123. See Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 521 A.2d 320 (1987) (marital property in-
cludes the portion of a worker's compensation award for a permanent disability repre-
senting the amount of lost wages).
124. See Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981) (marital property
includes the right to receive retirement benefits acquired from efforts expended during
the marriage).
125. See Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, 301 Md. 283, 483 A.2d 1 (1984) (disability pay-
ments represent deferred compensation for deductions from income during marriage,
and therefore are marital property).
126. See Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 545 A.2d 35 (1988) (husband's right to receive
insurance renewal commissions represented future compensation for efforts expended
during the marriage, and therefore is marital property subject to distribution).
127. See Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985) (a medical degree and
license represent future earning capacity, and are not marital property); Unkle v. Unkle,
305 Md. 587, 505 A.2d 849 (1986) (spouse's unliquidated personal injury award arose
from purely fortuitous circumstances, and not from either spouse's continuing efforts).
128. The right to receive pension benefits, disability payments, insurance renewal
premiums, and worker's compensation benefits are all rights to receive money in the
future, and are marital assets. See infra notes 123-126.
129. See id.; Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 127-28, 437 A.2d 883, 890 (1981) (cit-
ing In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 845, 544 P.2d 561, 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
637, (1976) (en banc)). In Deering, the court noted that pension benefits are a contrac-
tual right and rise above a mere expectancy into a chose in action, a form of property.
Id.
130. See Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 236, 545 A.2d 35, 40 (1988) (the uncertainty of
renewal commissions was insignificant); Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, 301 Md. 283, 289,
483 A.2d 1, 4 (1984) (the fact that the husband's disability payments were contingent on
his health and earnings was not significant); Deering, 292 Md. at 128, 437 A.2d at 890 (it
is insignificant that a pension benefit may be contingent upon continued employment).
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has no present value, but merely represents future earning capacity,
it is not a marital asset. In Archer v. Archer,'' the court held that a
medical degree or license was not marital property subject to distri-
bution.'- 2 The professional degree and license did not possess any
of the basic characteristics of property.
[I]t is but an intellectual attainment; it is not a present
property interest. It is personal to the holder; it cannot be
sold, transferred, pledged or inherited. It does not have an
assignable value nor does it represent a guarantee of re-
ceipt of a set monetary amount in the future, such as pen-
sion benefits. Quite simply, a degree/license does not have
an exchange value on an open market. 33
Even though an asset is an enforceable property right, it may
nonetheless be excluded from the marital estate if it is personal to
the holder. In Unkle v. Unkle,' s 4 the Court of Appeals held that an
unliquidated personal injury claim was not marital property because
it was personal to the injured spouse."3 5 The Court of Appeals re-
jected the majority view that marital property includes claims and
awards for personal injuries incurred during the marriage.'
b. Goodwill.-Goodwill has been defined in many ways,13 7 but
Justice Story's definition is most often quoted:
[T]he advantage or benefit which is acquired by an estab-
lishment beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds,
or property employed therein, in consequence of the gen-
eral public patronage and encouragement which it receives
from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local
position or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or af-
fluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circum-
stances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or
131. 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985).
132. See id. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1079.
133. Id., 493 A.2d at 1080.
134. 305 Md. 587, 596, 505 A.2d 849, 854 (1986).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Hagan v. Dundore, 187 Md. 430, 442, 50 A.2d 570, 576 (1947) (noting vari-
ous definitions of goodwill, from "the probability that the old customers will resort to
the old place," to " 'the good-will of a business comprises those advantages which may
inure to the purchaser from holding himself out to the public as succeeding to an enter-
prise which has been identified in the past with the name and repute of his
predecessor.' ").
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prejudice.' 3 8
A commercial business's total worth includes the value of any
goodwill.'3 9 Maryland courts recognize commercial goodwill as an
asset that can be sold or transferred with the business. 40 Further-
more, when dividing marital assets upon a marriage's dissolution,
courts generally include the value of commercial goodwill in a
spouse's business.' 4 ' This is consistent with the view adopted by
the state's equitable property distribution schemes that marriage is a
partnership. 4
2
Controversy arises in considering whether a professional's
goodwill is marital property when it is inherently tied to the profes-
sional's skills and talents. Most states treat professional goodwill
similarly to commercial goodwill, including it as marital property for
the purpose of distribution on divorce.' 43 If the nonprofessional
138. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF PARTNERSHIP AS A BRANCH OF COMMER-
CIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE § 99, at 157 (7th ed. 1881).
139. Note, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital Property in Equitable Distribution States,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 561 (1983).
140. See Schill v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 179 Md. 83, 89-90, 17 A.2d 175, 178
(1941) (in a breach of contract claim under the Fair Trade Act, goodwill is a property
asset of the business existing apart from the commodity).
141. See Note, supra note 139, at 562. See generally T. OtLHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION
AND THE DIsTRaUTION OF PROPERTY § 10.03[l] (1990) (general discussion on commu-
nity goodwill and its valuation).
142. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
143. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981) (professional practice
in plastic surgery has a goodwill value subject to distribution upon divorce); In re Mar-
riage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974) (goodwill of a solo medi-
cal practice is marital property); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr.
735 (1969) (solo medical practice's goodwill is marital property); Mueller v. Mueller,
144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956) (dental laboratory's goodwill is marital prop-
erty); In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979) (goodwill of a
dental practice and other professional practices is marital property); In re Marriage of
White, 98 I1. App. 3d 380, 53 Ill. Dec. 786, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981) (dental corporation's
goodwill is marital property), appeal after remand, 151 Ill. App. 3d 778, 104 Ill. Dec. 424,
502 N.E.2d 1084 (1986); Porter v. Porter, 526 N.E.2d 219 (Ind. App. 1988) (corporate
medical practice's goodwill is marital property); Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1984) (accounting practice's goodwill is marital property); Rethman v.
Rethman, 429 Mich. 867, 413 N.W.2d 679 (1987) (remanding for further testimony on
value of a dental laboratory's goodwill); Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich. App. 151,
384 N.W.2d 112 (goodwill of a dental practice of unspecified form is marital property),
appeal denied, 425 Mich. 876 (1986)); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987)
(goodwill of an oral surgery partnership and other professional practices is a marital
asset); In re Marriage of Hull, 219 Mont. 480, 712 P.2d 1317 (1986) (incorporated medi-
cal practice's goodwill is marital property); Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d 1
(1983) (solo law practice's goodwill is marital property); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641,
615 P.2d 256 (1980) (professional practice's goodwill is marital property), overruled on
other grounds by Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 97 N.M. 133, 637 P.2d 564 (1981); Dorton v.
Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (1985) (dental practice's goodwill is marital
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spouse contributed to the practice's value in the same way that a
spouse might contribute to the acquisition of tangible assets, the
spouse ought to be compensated for the goodwill just as he would
be compensated for the increased value of stock in a family
business. 1
44
According to this view, it is unimportant whether the goodwill
could actually be sold.' 4  The professional spouse will continue to
practice after the divorce, thereby realizing the goodwill's value.' 46
It is no obstacle that the goodwill cannot be immediately realized;
courts have held in other contexts that an asset need not be realized
in order to constitute marital property. 147
These cases distinguish goodwill from a professional degree or
property); Jondahl v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1984) (tax service business's good-
will is marital property); Goger v. Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976) (dental
corporation's goodwill is marital property if the spouse was the sole shareholder); Sor-
enson v. Sorenson, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989), cert. granted, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah
1989) (dental practice's goodwill is marital property); In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.
2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979) (solo dental practice's goodwill is marital property); In re
Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976) (solo osteopathy practice's goodwill is
marital property).
Commentators support the majority view, and note that including professional
goodwill in the marital estate is consistent with the policy behind equitable distribution.
See L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUrION OF PROPERTY § 6.21, at 189 (1983 & Supp.
1990) ("If equitable distribution is to have vitality then [professional goodwill] must be
included within its scope."). See generally Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolu-
tion, 43 Mo. L. REv. 157 (1978) (professional goodwill developed during the marriage
should be included in the marital property, but courts must be careful not to count it
twice in awarding alimony); Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Good-
will as Community Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 TUL. L. REV. 313 (1981)
(an effective community property system must include professional goodwill); Note,
supra note 139 (professional goodwill should be treated the same as commercial good-
will because both represent a valuable portion of the business's total worth). But see
Note, Professional Corporation May Have Valuable Goodwill, Apart from Person of Individual
Member, That Must Be Considered in Property Settlement on Divorce, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 222
(1979) (goodwill's existence and value should be determined using a case-by-case
approach).
144. See Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738 (1969)
(sole medical practitioner's goodwill must be included in marital property because the
spouse is entitled to be recompensed for his contribution to the practice).
145. See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 434, 457 A.2d 1, 6 (1983) ("An individual prac-
titioner's inability to sell a law practice does not eliminate the existence of goodwill and
its value as an asset to be considered in equitable distribution. Obviously, equitable
distribution does not require conveyance or transfer of any particular asset.").
146. See In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 486, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976)
(goodwill of the husband's osteopathic practice was subject to distribution in a divorce,
and stating that "despite its unmarketability, [the husband] ... will continue to receive a
return on the goodwill associated with his name.").
147. See, e.g., Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 545 A.2d 35 (1988) (future commissions
on insurance renewal premiums are marital property).
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license by pointing out that goodwill is more than speculation as to
future earning capacity.' 4 Goodwill exists when "future earning
capacity has been enhanced because reputation leads to probable
future patronage from existing and potential clients ....
At the other extreme are states that equate professional good-
will with professional reputation.' 50 According to traditional com-
mercial goodwill theory, goodwill arising from an individual's
reputation is considered future earning capacity, and is not divisible
as marital property.'"
Some states also have noted that, in contrast to commercial
goodwill, professional goodwill cannot be sold.'" 2 These states rea-
son that the goodwill can only be realized by the individual's contin-
uing to practice. It is thus indistinguishable from future earning
capacity, and is not a divisible asset.' 3 This analogizes professional
goodwill to professional degrees and licenses.
The case-by-case approach lies between these extremes.
Courts adopting this view recognize that even a solo professional
practice may sometimes have divisible goodwill if it exists apart
from the owner's reputation.t " In this regard, the practitioner's
reputation is equated with ability to obtain future earnings. Because
future earnings are not considered marital property, goodwill that
represents only the owner's reputation is not marital property. 1 5
148. See cases cited supra note 143.
149. Dugan, 92 N.J. at 433, 457 A.2d at 6.
150. See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456, 463, 648 P.2d 218, 223 (1982) (goodwill
of husband's medical practice is not marital property); Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa. Super.
20, 36, 518 A.2d 545, 552 (1986) (sole proprietorship's goodwill, as distinguished from
that of a corporation, is not marital property), allocatur denied, 516 Pa. 631, 533 A.2d 90
(1987); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972) (goodwill is not marital property if
it is not an earned or vested right, or one that gives any fixed future benefit); Holbrook
v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 350, 309 N.W.2d 343, 355 (1981) (goodwill of husband's
partnership interest in law firm is not marital property).
151. See T. OLDHAM, supra note 141, at § 10.03[3][b].
152. See, e.g., Beasley, 359 Pa. Super. at 35, 518 A.2d at 552; Nail, 486 S.W.2d at 764;
Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d at 350, 309 N.W.2d at 355.
153. See supra note 152. In Holbrook, the court summarized the minority view. See 103
Wis. 2d at 350-51, 309 N.W.2d at 353-54.
154. See, e.g., Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Alaska 1989) (only mar-
ketable goodwill will be included in the marital estate); Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194,
205-06, 741 S.W.2d 640, 646-74 (1987) (the goodwill of a corporation in which the
husband owns one third of the stock is only distributable if salable or marketable);
Antolik v. Harvey, 7 Haw. App. 313, 308-09, 761 P.2d 305, 308-08 (1988) (a chiropractic
business's professional goodwill is marital property only if found to be marketable); Tay-
lor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721, 731-32, 386 N.W.2d 851, 858-59 (1986) (a medical labora-
tory's goodwill is divisible marital property when it is distinct from the doctor's
reputation).
155. See supra note 154.
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3. Analysis.-After reviewing these three positions, the Court
of Appeals held that because it has no value apart from the practi-
tioner's reputation, a solo law practice's professional goodwill is not
marital property. 56 Although Prahinski placed a solo law practice's
goodwill in the nonmarital property category, along with personal
injury claims and professional degrees and licenses, 157 the court did
not analogize its decision to these prior rulings. Nor did it distin-
guish cases in which the asset was found to be marital property.
Most notably, the court did not discuss how its decision fit in with
the Marital Property Act's policy objectives.' 58 Instead of placing
Prahinski within the existing marital property framework, the court
centered its analysis on the unique features of legal practice.' 59
The court identified three possible grounds to support its con-
clusion that goodwill of a solo law practice is not marital property.
First, it equated goodwill with professional reputation, and then
found that a professional's reputation is personal to the professional
and therefore, not divisible as marital property. 60 The dissent
noted, however, that this rationale is not limited to legal practice
and would (and perhaps should) apply to all professionals.'61 There
is no reason to distinguish a lawyer's goodwill from that of a dentist
or doctor because in each case, goodwill is inherently tied to the
156. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 239, 582 A.2d at 790.
157. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Although the court did not expressly
state that a solo law practice's goodwill can never be marital property, it said that it is
"personal to the individual practitioner .... We are not convinced that the goodwill of
a solo law practice can be separated from the reputation of the attorney." Prahinski, 321
Md. at 239, 582 A.2d at 790. In light of the court's position that "reputation" is not
marital property, the only reasonable conclusion to draw from these two statements is
that a solo law practice's professional goodwill can never be marital property.
158. The commission that wrote the original equitable distribution statute stated that
its goal was to achieve an equitable distribution of all the marital assets, based upon
both spouses' monetary and nonmonetary contributions. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON DOMESMc RELATIONS LAw 5 (Jan. 1978). In the great majority of cases
in which the court has applied the Marital Property Act, particularly those in which it has
been faced with determining whether an asset should be included in "marital property,"
the court compared the import of its decision with the Act's objectives. See supra note
104.
159. See infra notes 165-185 and accompanying text.
160. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 239, 582 A.2d at 790.
161. See id. at 244, 582 A.2d at 792 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). The rationale that
goodwill must be an asset with value independent of the practitioner's reputation has
been adopted in cases involving solo law practitioners, Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa.
Super. 20, 518 A.2d 545 (1986), law firms, Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211
(Alaska 1989), chiropractic businesses, Antolik v. Harvey, 7 Haw. App. 313, 761 P.2d
305 (1988), and a medical laboratory business, Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721, 386
N.W.2d 851 (1986).
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practitioner's skill and reputation. 162 Furthermore, according to the
dissent, this rationale would also preclude goodwill from being
characterized as marital property in a case involving a sole proprie-
tor engaged in a service business. "Where services are involved a
reputation for competently rendering the particular service is a
component of goodwill whether we deal with a trade, a business, or
a profession."'16  The dissent found this particularly troubling be-
cause the type of nonmonetary support provided by a spouse to
make it possible for the working spouse to develop a business repu-
tation is exactly what the Marital Property Act is designed to
cover. 164
It is unclear whether the court will extend this rationale to other
professionals and sole proprietors. Much of the uncertainty arises
because the court's finding was grounded in the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct for Lawyers.'16 Under the Rules, a lawyer is respon-
sible for all of the work going out of the office.' 6 By placing his
signature on the work, the attorney assumes liability for its accuracy
and authenticity. 67 According to the court, it is this professional
assurance that creates the goodwill.' 6 Because this assurance
would end if the practitioner withdrew from the solo practice, the
goodwill generated is personal, and not the kind of asset that can be
divided. 1
69
162. See Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. App. 2d 456, 463, 648 P.2d 218, 223 (1982) (a
doctor's goodwill is not a marital asset subject to distribution on divorce). The court
stated that: "[tihe very nature of a professional practice is that it is totally dependent
upon the professional." Id.
163. Prahinski, 321 Md. at 244, 582 A.2d at 792 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
164. See id. The dissent agreed with the Court of Special Appeals. "If, in fact, good-
will exists, it would be inequitable to ignore the contribution of the attorney's spouse to
the development of that goodwill during the marriage." Prahinski v. Prahinski, 75 Md.
App. 113, 130, 540 A.2d 833, 841 (1988).
165. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 239, 582 A.2d at 790; THE MARYLAND LAWYER'S RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.3(c) (1990).
166. THE MARYLAND LAWYER'S RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.3(c) (1990).
167. See Prahimki, 321 Md. at 239-40, 582 A.2d at 790. No other decision surveyed
herein relied on the fact that lawyers must sign the work that comes out of their offices
to hold that goodwill is personal to that practitioner.
168. See id.
169. Id. For many courts holding that professional goodwill is not a marital asset, a
key factor was that the professional goodwill would cease to exist on the practitioner's
death or retirement. See Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. App. 2d 456,463,648 P.2d 218, 223
(1982) (goodwill of a doctor's practice is not a divisible marital asset-"when he or she
dies or retires nothing remains"); Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa. Super. 21, 35, 518 A.2d
545, 552 (1986) (goodwill of a solo law practice is not marital property-"[w]hen a sole
proprietor terminates his activity, the lights go out, the value of the sole proprietorship
is extinguished .... ).
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The majority failed to recognize that any sole proprietorship,
professional or not, depends on the skilled practitioner's continued
presence. 170 Every solo practice creates its goodwill by providing
quality assurance and reliability. It is not the attorney's signature,
but customer satisfaction generated by the practitioner's skill, that
creates the goodwill.
The second basis of the court's holding is that goodwill is not
marital property because it is not a salable asset and has no commer-
cial value.'17  Unlike other professionals, a lawyer "may not cove-
nant to abstain from the practice of law, and therefore, may not sell
his or her goodwill."' 172 A lawyer's goodwill has no commercial
value because it is not an asset that can be sold, and thus it is not
marital property. 71
This marketability requirement was first announced in Archer, in
which the court found that a professional degree was not marital
property because it was not assignable, transferable, or inheritable,
and it could not be sold. 1 74 Because it could not be sold or trans-
ferred, the degree merely represented future earning capacity. 7 51 In
the wake of Archer and Prahinshi, it appears that the court views sala-
bility as an essential characteristic of marital property. If this is the
case, the court's holding could apply to law partnerships and corpo-
rations. A partner's share of a law firm's goodwill cannot be ex-
changed on an open market-it cannot be assigned, sold,
transferred, or pledged. 176
This reasoning is troublesome because it fails to distinguish
professional goodwill from other sorts of nonsalable assets that
courts include as marital property. For example, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals has determined that stock options are marital property
even though they cannot be assigned or sold. 1 7 7 By relying on the
nonsalable nature of the solo law practice, the court failed to recog-
170. See Note, supra note 139, at 563-64.
171. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 240-41, 582 A.2d 790-91. Nonmarketability is the most
often cited reason for excluding professional goodwill from the marital estate. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 205-06, 741 S.W.2d 640, 646-47 (1987); Antolik v.
Harvey, 7 Haw. App. 313, 761 P.2d 305 (1988); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d
327, 350, 309 N.W.2d 343, 355 (1981).
172. Prahinski, 321 Md. at 240, 582 A.2d at 790.
173. Id.
174. See 303 Md. 347, 357, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985); supra notes 131-133 and
accompanying text.
175. See Archer, 303 Md. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1080.
176. See Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 350, 309 N.W.2d 343, 355 (1981).
177. See Green v. Green, 64 Md. App. 122, 136-37, 494 A.2d 721, 728 (1985) (re-
stricted stock options are marital property, and, "[while an] unsalable option has no fair
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nize that although professional goodwill may not ethically be sold, it
nonetheless is an economic resource of considerable value to
practitioners. 171
The third basis of the majority's holding rested on rule 5.4 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.' 79 Rule 5.4 prohibits a lawyer
from forming a partnership with a nonlawyer for the purpose of
practicing law.' 8 ° The court ruled that this precluded Margaret
from claiming a partner's interest in Leo's practice.' 8 ' Because
Margaret cannot claim a partnership interest in the solo practice, its
goodwill may not be included as marital property.1 82
Rule 5.4(d) "prevent[s] business relationships with non-lawyers
from compromising a lawyer's independence of thought and ac-
tion."'' l8  But under Maryland's equitable distribution statute,
courts do not disturb ownership or title of marital property. 84 By
recognizing professional goodwill as a marital asset, courts merely
take into account all of each parties' economic resources in order to
market value, it is nonetheless an economic resource . . . to which a value can be
attributed.").
178. In Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 434, 457 A.2d 1, 6 (1983), the court held that a
solo law practice's goodwill is marital property. See supra note 145 and accompanying
text; accord, In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974)
(because a professional practice continues to benefit from the same goodwill developed
during the marriage, it is a marital asset subject to distribution).
179. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 241, 582 A.2d at 791.
180. See THE MARYLAND LAWYER'S RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1990).
Rule 5.4 provides in relevant part:
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activi-
ties of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation
or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if;
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary represen-
tative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a
reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment
of a lawyer.
Id
181. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 241,582 A.2d at 791. No otherjurisdiction holding that
a solo law practitioner's professional goodwill is not marital property relied on rule 5.4
to sustain its holding.
182. Id
183. G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 476 (Supp. 1988).
184. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-202(a)(3) (1984). "The court may not transfer
the ownership of personal or real property from 1 party to the other." Id. See Ward v.
Ward, 48 Md. App. 307, 311, 426 A.2d 443, 446 (1981) (§ 3-6A-04(a) [the predecessor
of § 8-202(a)(3)] "flatly forbids" the court from transferring ownership of property).
1212 [VOL. 50:1 189
FAMILY LAW
make an equitable monetary award. Nonprofessional spouses do
not receive a legal interest in practices, but equitable interests for
the purpose of granting a monetary award.' 8 5 It is unclear how
awarding this equitable interest would compromise the attorney's
independence of thought and action.
Moreover, this results in a strange distinction between lawyer
and nonlawyer spouses. Presumably, because rule 5.4(d) only pro-
hibits business relationships with nonlawyers, a solo law practi-
tioner's spouse who is also a lawyer would be entitled to claim an
equitable interest in the law practice's goodwill.
4. Conclusion.-Although the Court of Appeals' decision that
goodwill was not a divisible marital asset is limited to solo law prac-
tices,' 8 6 the core of the court's opinion would apply equally to the
goodwill of any trade, business, or practice providing a service to
customers. 187 The supporting rationales that the court used to limit
its holding are insufficient to distinguish lawyers from doctors, and
sole proprietorships from corporations. What remains to be seen is
whether these seemingly minor and misplaced distinctions will sur-
vive when the court faces a case involving the goodwill of a different
professional, or of a sole proprietor.
TERESA L. SOMMERFIELD
LINDA J. JENNINGS
185. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205(a).
186. See Prahinski, 321 Md. at 239, 582 A.2d at 790.
187. See id. at 244, 582 A.2d at 792 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). See supra notes 161-164
and accompanying text.
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VIII. GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
A. Impact Fees and Local Taxing Authority
In Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County,' the
Court of Appeals held that Montgomery County's development im-
pact fee2 was a tax and not a regulatory fee, and that the county
lacked authority to impose such a tax.' In delivering the opinion,
Chief Judge Murphy reversed the Montgomery County Circuit
Court's opinion, which held that the impact fees were part of the
county's regulatory process and were imposed pursuant to its home
rule powers.4 The court reasoned that because the development
impact fee was collected primarily to raise revenue, and no further
regulatory conditions were imposed, the fees were a tax that the
County had no authority to impose pursuant to its enumerated
powers.5
The Eastern Diversified decision prohibits charter counties from
imposing impact fees in the absence of specific state authority.6 In
so ruling, the court conformed to precedent in determining whether
a governmental fee is part of a regulatory measure, or a revenue
measure amounting to a tax.7 But the court's decision that Mont-
gomery County lacked authority to impose the impact fee as a tax
completely ignored Montgomery County Code section 52-17, in
which the State empowered the County to tax to the same extent
that the state does.8 This omission leaves unresolved section 52-
1. 319 Md. 45, 570 A.2d 850 (1990).
2. Developers pay development impact fees to defray some of the costs of upgrad-
ing infrastructures, such as roads and highways, so that they can accommodate the in-
creased burdens that new developments create. See generally Eveleth, The Cost of Growth:
Impact Fees, MD. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 16; Tiburzi, Impact Fees in Maryland, 17 U. BA.LT.
L. REV. 502 (1988). For additional commentary on Eastern Diversified, see Tiburzi, Impos-
ing Impact Fees, MD. BJ., July-Aug. 1990, at 26.
In response to the county's rapid growth rate, the Montgomery County Council
enacted chapter 49A, entitled "Development Impact Fees for Major Highways," to fi-
nance road construction by imposing fees on new developments within the "planning
policy areas." See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 49(A), §§ 1-14 (1984).
3. See 319 Md. at 55, 570 A.2d at 854-55.
4. See id. at 47-48, 570 A.2d at 854-55.
5. See id. at 55, 570 A.2d at 855. The Express Powers Act limits Montgomery
County's taxation powers. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(0) (1987). See infra notes
14-21 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 27-29.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 30-36.
8. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 52-17 (1984); infra text accompanying
notes 37-48.
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17's viability. Finally, the court failed to address the reasonableness
of development impact fee amounts. 9
1. The Case.-Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. (Diversified)
obtained approval of a proposed subdivision plat from the Mary-
land-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, and sought a
building permit from the Montgomery County Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection.o The Department of Environmental Protec-
tion approved the building permit on the condition that Diversified
pay a $118,006 development impact fee in accordance with Mont-
gomery County Code chapter 49A." Diversified appealed to the
County Board of Appeals, which concluded that the impact fee was a
valid regulatory fee and not a tax, and dismissed the appeal. Diver-
sified then appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
which affirmed the County Board of Appeals' decision.'" The Court
of Appeals granted certiorari to consider the issue prior to argu-
ment in the Court of Special Appeals. 3
2. Legal Background and the Court's Reasoning.-
a. Charter County's Home Rule Powers.-Article XI-A, section 2,
of the Maryland constitution requires the General Assembly to pro-
vide a grant of express powers to counties that elect to establish a
charter form of government.' 4 Pursuant to section 2, the General
Assembly passed the Express Powers Act,' which defines and gov-
erns the home rule powers permitted to charter counties. 6
9. See infra text accompanying notes 49-51.
10. Eastern Diversified, 319 Md. at 46-47, 570 A.2d at 851.
11. Id.; see MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 49(A) (1984). The county code
states that:
Imposing a development impact fee that requires new development in certain
impact fee areas to pay their pro rata share of the costs of impact highway im-
provements necessitated by such new development in conjunction with other
public funds is a reasonable method of raising the funds to build such improve-
ments in a timely manner.
Id. ch. 49A-2(f).
12. Eastern Diversified, 319 Md. at 48, 570 A.2d at 851.
13. Id.
14. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2. The chartered counties are: Anne Arundel, Balti-
more, Harford, Howard, Montgomery, Prince George's, Talbot, and Wicomico.
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5 (1987).
16. The Maryland Constitution provides that the charter county "subject to the Con-
stitution and Public General Laws of this State . . . shall have full power to enact local
laws of said.. . county including the power to repeal or amend local laws of... [the]
county enacted by the General Assembly, upon all matters covered by the express pow-
ers granted," with certain exceptions. MD. CoNsT. art. XI-A, § 3.
The Maryland Code also establishes code counties (Allegany, Caroline, Kent, and
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Section 5(0) of the Express Powers Act authorizes a charter
county to impose and collect property taxes.' 7 But this section has
not been interpreted as granting broad taxation powers to the char-
ter counties."'
Section 5(S) of the Express Powers Act states that the enumera-
tion of specific powers shall
not be held to limit the power of the county council .... to
pass all ordinances, resolutions or bylaws, not inconsistent
with the provisions of this article or the laws of the State, as
may be proper in executing and enforcing any of the pow-
ers enumerated .... as well as such ordinances as may be
deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good govern-
ment, health and welfare of the county.' 9
Worcester) whose powers derive from article XI-F of the Maryland constitution. These
counties enjoy limited home rule powers. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 25B, § 13 (1987).
Code counties need the General Assembly's express authorization to impose new taxes
or fees. See id. § 9. No code counties are authorized to impose development impact
fees. County commissioner counties (Calvert, Carroll, Cecil, Charles, Dorchester, Fred-
erick, Garrett, Queen Anne's, St. Mary's, Somerset, and Washington) have no home rule
powers. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § 1 (1987). Seven commissioner counties are au-
thorized to impose impact fees or similar fees thereof. See Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 468,
1990 Md. Laws 1908 (Frederick); Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 543, 1990 Md. Laws 2373
(Washington); Act of May 17, 1988, ch. 410, 1988 Md. Laws 3132 (Queen Anne's); Act
of Apr. 14, 1987, ch. 108, 1987 Md. Laws 536 (Carroll); Act of May 14, 1987, ch. 326,
1987 Md. Laws 1895 (Calvert); Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 814, 1974 Md. Laws 2729 (St.
Mary's); Act of May 21, 1973, ch. 642, 1973 Md. Laws 1291 (Charles). See also Tiburzi,
Impact Fees in Maryland, supra note 2, at 506-11; Moser, County Home Rule-Sharing the
State's Legislative Power with Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REv. 327 (1968).
17. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(0) (1987). Property taxes are taxes imposed
according to the land's value for the purposes of paying principal and interest on county
loans, creating sinking funds to meet the loan liabilities, and financially supporting the
county government. See id.
18. See Montgomery County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 287 Md.
101, 106-07, 411 A.2d 97, 100 (1980). Nevertheless, § 5(0) does not "cover the entire
field of taxation ... so as to bar any local legislation by the General Assembly on that
subject." Montgomery County v. Maryland Soft Drink Ass'n, 281 Md. 116, 130, 377
A.2d 486, 493 (1977). As a result, the General Assembly can enact public local laws
regarding taxation that apply to only one county, since article XI-A, § 4 of the Maryland
constitution prohibits local laws from being enacted only when they attempt to legislate
any subject "covered" by the Express Powers Act.
The legislature retains a right to enact local legislation permitting chartered coun-
ties to create other forms of taxes. See Reinhardt v. Anne Arundel County, 31 Md. App.
355, 373, 356 A.2d 917, 927, cert. denied, 278 Md. 731 (1976). In fact, the State passed
such an enabling law, codified as MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE § 52-17, see infra notes 37-
48 and accompanying text, which grants Montgomery County taxation powers within
the county to the same extent as the taxation powers of the State, with certain
exceptions.
19. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(S) (1987). Charter county police powers are lim-
ited to the extent that public general law does not already provide for the particular
powers. Id.
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Under this section of the statute, charter counties are granted broad
police powers, one of which is the right to impose "license taxes" or
fees for regulatory purposes. 21 Maryland courts interpret this gen-
eral grant of power as requiring liberal construction in order to cre-
ate wide discretion in a county's exercise of police power. 2,
b. Determining Whether Fee is a Valid Regulatory Fee.-A county's
authority to impose a particular fee depends upon whether the fee is
classified as part of a regulatory scheme, or as a revenue raising
measure amounting to a tax.2 2 When deciding a fee's proper classi-
fication, courts look to its actual purpose, rather than to how it is
labeled. 23 A regulatory fee's main purpose is to exact compliance
with a governmental scheme, and it usually requires that certain
other conditions be met in addition to payment of the prescribed
sum.
2 4 Conversely, a tax is a charge imposed primarily to raise reve-
nue, and has few or no other conditions that must be satisfied.25
Finally, if the fee's amount has little relation to the claimed regula-
tory measure's purpose, the court is more likely to consider it a
tax. 26
c. The Court's Reasoning.-By holding that the Montgomery
County impact fee was a tax, the Court of Appeals suggested that
impact fees are to be considered taxes rather than regulatory fees.
Consequently, a charter county cannot levy impact fees unless the
General Assembly gives it specific authorization to do so. 2 7 The
court's decision cannot be considered a surprise, given past com-
20. See Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 381, 24 A.2d 911, 913
(1942).
21. See Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 160-61, 252 A.2d
242, 247 (1969).
22. See Campbell v. City of Annapolis, 289 Md. 300, 304-05, 424 A.2d 738, 741
(1981); Anne Arundel County v. English, 182 Md. 514, 520, 35 A.2d 135, 138-39
(1943); Maryland Theatrical, 180 Md. at 380-82, 24 A.2d at 913-14.
23. See Campbell, 289 Md. at 305, 424 A.2d at 741. A regulatory fee may have inci-
dental revenue raising effect. This will not change the fee's nature provided that "the
amount [is] reasonable and [has] some definite relation to the purpose of the [fee]."
Maryland Theatrical, 180 Md. at 381, 24 A.2d at 914. Likewise, revenue measures may
have incidental regulatory effects, but the measures are still taxes if their main purpose
is revenue raising. See id.
24. See Maryland Theatrical, 180 Md. at 381-82, 24 A.2d at 914. Courts have held that
a fee collected pursuant to the police power cannot be greater than is necessary to carry
out its provisions. See id. at 385, 24 A.2d at 914.
25. See id. at 381-82, 24 A.2d at 914.
26. See id. at 381, 24 A.2d at 914.
27. See 319 Md. at 55, 570 A.2d at 855.
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mentary to that effect,28 and the attempts of several counties to ob-
tain such authorization. 9 Indeed, it now appears that any
controversy regarding a charter county's authority to impose impact
fees pursuant to its enumerated or home rule powers will be settled
against the charter county.
The court arrived at its decision by applying criteria developed
in previous cases. The court found that three specific aspects of the
Montgomery County impact fee statute suggest the fee is more
properly classified as a tax than a regulatory fee: revenue raising
measures were implemented without a regulatory purpose;3 ° fees
were not charged solely on the basis of service provided to the prop-
erty owner or for meeting expenses of the development regulatory
process;3 ' and the developer need meet no additional conditions.32
The court concluded that the fee was a tax even though the fees
were to be used only for road construction in the areas from which
they were collected. 3 Thus, earmarking the funds does not alter
their revenue raising character. Indeed, the fact that the revenues
would be used for public purposes that directly benefit the pro-
posed development comports with the general notion that a tax is
an exaction from a taxpayer for a public good.
The court quoted at length from Maryland Theatrical Corp. v.
Brennan, in which it set forth specific "criteria for determining
whether a governmental charge is a fee (regulatory measure) or a
tax (revenue measure)."3 4 The court in Maryland Theatrical recog-
nized the necessary overlap, but distinguished the two as follows:
In general... when it appears from the Act itself that reve-
nue is its main objective, and the amount of the tax sup-
28. See Tiburzi, Impact Fees in Maryland, supra note 2, at 509.
29. Before the court rendered the Eastern Diversified decision, Prince George's
County, Harford County, Howard County, and Washington County attempted to pass
impact fee legislation during the 1990 legislative session. Prince George's and Washing-
ton counties were successful. See Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 543, 1990 Md. Laws 2373
(Washington County); Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 596, 1990 Md. Laws 2619 (Prince
George's County). Charles County obtained impact fee authorization from the General
Assembly during the 1989 legislative session. See Act of Apr. 11, 1989, ch. 43, 1989 Md.
Laws 1616. Anne Arundel County obtained impact fee authorization during the 1986
legislative session. See Act of May 13, 1986, ch. 350, 1986 Md. Laws 1365. For more
discussion of the successful and unsuccessful impact fee proposals introduced in the
Maryland General Assembly, see Tiburzi, Imposing Impact Fees, supra note 2, at 26-27.
30. See Eastern Diversified, 319 Md. at 54-55, 570 A.2d at 855. The statute states that
the fees are "a reasonable method of raising funds." See supra note 11.
31. See Eastern Diversified, 319 Md. at 54-55, 570 A.2d at 855.
32. See id. at 55, 570 A.2d at 855.
33. See id. at 54, 570 A.2d at 854; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 49A-8 (1984).
34. 319 Md. at 53, 570 A.2d at 854.
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ports that theory, the enactment is a revenue measure...
[but] where the fee is imposed for the purpose of regula-
tion, and the statute requires compliance with certain con-
ditions in addition to the payment of the prescribed sum,
such sum is a license proper, imposed by virtue of the po-
lice power.35
Since the Montgomery County act flatly states that "imposing a de-
velopment impact fee . . . is a reasonable method of raising the
funds,"'s6 and imposes upon developers no regulatory require-
ments, the fees appear to fall more precisely into the category of
taxes.
3. Analysis.-The decision that impact fees are taxes should
not have ended the court's discussion of the issue. The court failed
to discuss section 52-17 of the Montgomery County Code,37 which
gave the Montgomery County Council taxation powers to the extent
that the state exercised such powers.38 This gap in the court's rea-
soning creates confusion as to the effect of section 52-17 on Mont-
gomery County's taxation powers, the only county to have such
powers. Absent a discussion of whether section 52-17 allows or
contemplates an impact fee, the home rule basis of the court's deci-
sion that the impact fee is a tax is insufficient to support a conclu-
sion that Montgomery County has no authority to impose this fee.
Indeed, in Montgomery County's case, the issue should not simply
be whether it is a valid regulatory fee or an invalid tax; rather, if it is
not a valid regulatory fee, a second issue that must be analyzed is
whether the tax comes under one of section 52-17's exceptions, 39 or
whether it is a property tax that is valid pursuant to the express
powers.4 °
In a cryptic footnote at the end of its decision,4 1 the court inex-
plicably stated that it did not decide "whether the tax in this case is
35. Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 381, 24 A.2d 911, 914 (1942).
36. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 49A-2(f) (1984).
37. See id. § 52-17 (1984).
38. Section 52-17 provides:
(a) Generally. The county council is hereby empowered and authorized to
have and exercise, within the limits of the county, in addition to any and all
taxing powers theretofore granted by the general assembly, the power to tax to
the same extent as the state has or could exercise such power within the limits
of the county as part of its general taxing power.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 52-17 (1984).
39. Section 52-17 lists exceptions, none of which seem to cover the fee at issue in
this case. See id. § 52-17(b).
40. See supra note 17.
41. See 319 Md. at 55 n.4, 570 A.2d at 855 n.4.
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an excise, a property, or another type of tax."'4 2 Even if section 52-
17 did not exist, the court still should have decided whether the im-
pact fee was a valid property tax. Although it is unlikely that the fee
at issue in this case could fall within the definition of a property
tax,43 this confusing footnote highlights the court's failure to con-
sider the impact fee's legality once it determined the fee's status as a
tax.
The court's holding that "Chapter 49A thus imposes a tax
which Montgomery County is without authority to enact, " 44 ignores
section 52-17's existence and contradicts the court's previous hold-
ing in Montgomery County v. Maryland Soft Drink Association.4 5 In that
case, the Court of Appeals said that section 52-17 did not violate the
Express Powers Act prohibitions "by granting the County the power
to impose additional forms of taxation beyond the property tax.' '46
Of course, the question that arises is just what type of tax section 52-
17 contemplates if not the development impact fee at issue here?
For purposes of imposing impact fees, the point is moot. Dur-
ing the 1990 legislative session the General Assembly passed a bill,
subsequently signed into law by the Governor, that added to section
52-17 the power to impose development impact "taxes." ' 47 It is un-
clear why the authority to impose a specific tax did not exist under
section 52-17 as it read at the time of the disposition of Eastern Diver-
sified. Section 52-17 is meaningless if the General Assembly must
grant specific authority for any new tax proposed by the county. No
rule of statutory construction permits such a reading.4" In addition,
42. Id.
43. See supra note 17 for a description of what constitutes a property tax.
44. 319 Md. at 55, 570 A.2d at 855. Although both parties briefed the § 52-17 issue,
the County argued that Diversified failed in the lower courts to preserve the issue for
appeal. The Court of Appeals did not indicate whether this was why it did not consider
§ 52-17. Regardless of when the parties raised the issue, the court ought not to have
issued without comment or explanation a holding that seems at odds with existing law.
45. See 281 Md. 101, 377 A.2d 486 (1977).
46. Id. at 130, 377 A.2d at 494.
47. See Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 707, 1990 Md. Laws 2926. This act repealed and
reenacted, with amendments, § 52-17. The amended version states that the county
council is
empowered . . . to have and exercise, . . . in addition to any and all taxing
powers heretofore granted .... the power to tax to the same extent as the state
.... which includes the power to impose and provide for the collection of development
impact taxes for financing, in whole or in part, the capital costs of additional or expanded
public transportation facilities required to accommodate new construction or
development; ....
Id. (emphasis added to show addition).
48. See Prince George's County v. Chillum-Adelphi, 275 Md. 374, 383, 340 A.2d 265,
271 (1975) ("courts will prefer the construction which will result in ... the effectiveness
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the fact that the impact "fee" has resurfaced as an impact "tax"
under the new section 52-17 makes the question even more puz-
zling. Unfortunately, the court's failure to discuss section 52-17 cre-
ates serious questions for any future fee or taxes that Montgomery
County may attempt to impose under section 52-17.
Because the court invalidated the Montgomery County impact
fee, it did not need to consider the reasonableness of the amount of
such fees. Consequently, there is no Maryland appellate case law on
this issue." 9 One commentator suggested that the best evidence of
an impact fee's reasonableness would be an independent rate study
to analyze the reason for the charge, and to determine the costs that
the fee will finance.5 ° Several bills passed by the General Assembly
in recent years include ceilings on the amount of money per resi-
dential unit that a county can impose as an impact fee.51 It is likely
that the courts will not specifically address the issue unless or until a
particular county is charged with imposing an unreasonable impact
fee.
4. Conclusion.-The holding in Eastern Diversified, that the de-
velopment impact fee as imposed by Montgomery County is an inva-
lid tax,52 is rendered somewhat inconsequential by the General
Assembly's recent enactment authorizing Montgomery County to
impose such fees.53 If one accepts the court's implication that im-
pact fees are inherently tax-like and require specific state authoriza-
tion, then the General Assembly must continue its slow county-by-
county approach. The court's analysis suggests that it would be im-
possible to construct an impact fee that is a valid regulatory mea-
sure. The court's inexplicable failure to address the effect of section
52-17 on Montgomery County's "taxing" effort leaves that statute in
limbo. Finally, the criteria for determining what constitutes a valid
impact fee formula awaits later determination.5
of the statutory provision being construed, rather than to adopt a construction which
would make such provision ... nugatory").
49. See Tiburzi, Imposing Impact Fees, supra note 2, at 528.
50. See Tiburzi, Impact Fees in Maryland, supra note 2, at 515.
51. The maximum amount of impact fees per unit in Charles County is $3500. See
Act of Apr. 11, 1989, ch. 43, 1989 Md. Laws 1616. The maximum amount of impact fees
per unit in Prince George's County is $1100, and revenue generated from impact fees
may not exceed one-half the cost of the project. See Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 596, 1990
Md. Laws 2616.
52. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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B. Local Employment Discrimination Remedies and Express Powers
Authority
In McCrory Corp. v. Fowler,55 the Court of Appeals held that a
Montgomery County ordinance 56 that created a private cause of ac-
tion for unlimited damages as a remedy for employment discrimina-
tion, was not a "local law" under the Maryland constitution's Home
Rule Amendment.57 The court found, therefore, that the County
exceeded its delegated authority under the Express Powers Act.58
Finding that creation of judicial remedies is a matter of state-wide
concern, and is a function within the sole domain of state institu-
tions, 9 the Court of Appeals retreated a little from its previous
broad readings of the Express Powers Act.' Nevertheless, the re-
treat was not absolute-the court indicated that in limited circum-
stances it would uphold a municipality's power to create private
55. 319 Md. 12, 570 A.2d 834 (1990). The decision answered questions of law certi-
fied from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. See Fowler v.
McCrory, 727 F. Supp. 228 (D. Md. 1989). The questions were certified pursuant to the
Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1989). See infra text accompanying note 71.
56. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-20(a) (1977). The ordinance provides,
in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who has been subjected to any act of discrimination
prohibited under this division shall be deemed to have been denied a civil right and shall
be entitled to sue for damages, injunction or other civil relief, including reasonable at-
torney's fees." Id.
57. See 319 Md. at 24, 570 A.2d at 840. The Home Rule Amendment provides in
pertinent part:
From and after the adoption of a charter by the City of Baltimore, or any
County of this State, as hereinbefore provided, the Mayor of Baltimore and
City Council of the City of Baltimore or the County Council of said County,
subject to the Constitution and Public General Laws of this State, shall have full
power to enact local laws of said city or county.., upon all matters covered by
the express powers granted as above provided.
MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3. The Maryland legislature proposed article XI-A in 1914 and
the voters ratified it on Nov. 2, 1915. See Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 416, 1914 Md. Laws
661.
58. See McCrory, 319 Md. at 24, 570 A.2d at 840; MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A (1990).
59. See McCrory, 319 Md. at 24, 570 A.2d at 840.
60. See, e.g., Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 252 A.2d 242
(1969). In Greenhaigh, the Court of Appeals held that § 5(S) of the Express Powers Act
authorized Montgomery County to enact a fair housing law prohibiting discriminatory
practices in the sale, rental, or lending of money in relation to housing transactions. See
id. at 160, 252 A.2d at 246. The court noted that "if the language of § 5(S) of Art. 25A
were not to be construed as a broad grant of power to legislate on matters not specifi-
cally enumerated in Art. 25A," then the purposes of home rule would not be satisfied.
Furthermore, "the language of that section clearly indicates that such a construction is
sound." Id. at 160-61, 252 A.2d at 247.
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causes of action.6' Nor did the court completely curtail a county's
power to legislate against employment discrimination; home rule
counties12 retain concurrent authority to fashion administrative
remedies so long as they do not conflict with state law.63
1. The Case.-Robert Fowler was the manager of a McCrory
Corporation store in Maryland. He alleged that McCrory harassed
and eventually constructively discharged him in retaliation for his
refusal to implement McCrory's discriminatory hiring practices.
64
Fowler sued McCrory in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
under 42 U.S.C. section 198165 and the common-law cause of action
of abusive discharge.66 McCrory removed the case to the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland, and there Fowler
filed two amended complaints. In the first, he deleted the abusive
discharge count, added a cause of action under Montgomery County
Code section 27-20(a), which creates a private cause of action to
remedy a county anti-discrimination ordinance,6 7 and asked for
more than $1.8 million in compensatory and punitive damages. 68 In
the second amended complaint, he added a count under title VII of
61. See McCrory, 319 Md. at 24, 570 A.2d at 840; see infra notes 90-95 and accompany-
ing text.
62. A home rule county is a county that has adopted a charter form of government
pursuant to the state constitution's Home Rule Amendment, MD. CONsT. art. XI-A, §§ 1,
IA, and the Express Powers Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A (1990). A county that adopts a
home rule charter may achieve a significant degree of political self-determination, and
the charter transfers to the home rule county the General Assembly's power to enact
many types of county public local laws. See 319 Md. at 16, 570 A.2d at 835-36; see also
infra note 74.
63. McCrory, 319 Md. at 21, 570 A.2d at 838; see also infta note 72 and accompanying
text.
64. McCrory, 319 Md. at 14, 570 A.2d at 835. Fowler claimed that a McCrory man-
ager told him not to hire any more black persons or persons under 35 years of age. Id.
65. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
Id.
66. McCrory, 319 Md. at 14, 570 A.2d at 835. The Court of Appeals first recognized a
cause of action for the tort of abusive discharge in Adler v. American Standard Corp.,
291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). The court held that a cause of action exists when the
employer's motivation for discharging an at-will employee "contravenes some clear
mandate of public policy." Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
67. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-20(a), quoted supra note 56.
68. McCrory, 319 Md. at 14-15, 570 A.2d at 835.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.69
McCrory moved to dismiss the first count, arguing that the
county exceeded its delegated powers as a chartered home rule
county by enacting the ordinance. 70 The district court certified to
the Court of Appeals the following two questions:
(1) Did enactment of Section 27-20(a) of the Mont-
gomery County Code, which creates a private cause of ac-
tion for employment discrimination entitling a claimant to
sue for damages, injunctive or other civil relief, exceed the
authority delegated to chartered home rule counties by the
Express Powers Act?
(2) If enactment of Section 27-20(a) did not exceed
the authority delegated by the Express Powers Act, is it
nevertheless invalid under Article XI-A, Section 3 of the
Maryland Constitution because it conflicts with or is pre-
empted by the laws and policies of the State as set forth in
Article 49B of the Maryland Code?
7
'
The Court of Appeals quickly resolved that article 49B did not
preempt the county ordinance, and cited three recent decisions
holding that when it enacted article 49B, the General Assembly did
not intend to preempt local discrimination laws.7 2 The court then
considered whether section 27-20(a)'s enactment was outside the
county's powers as a chartered home rule county, and determined
that it was not a local law, and it therefore was not within the
county's power to enact.73
2. Legal Background.-Under the Maryland constitution's
Home Rule Amendment, Baltimore City and each Maryland county
may adopt a charter form of local government.74 The constitution
69. Id. at 14, 570 A.2d at 835. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
intentional employment discrimination, and provides limited remedies in the form of an
injunction or other affirmative action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
70. McCrory, 319 Md. at 14, 570 A.2d at 835.
71. Id. at 13, 570 A.2d at 834 (citation omitted).
72. See id. at 14 & n.2, 570 A.2d at 834 & n.2. The court cited Makovi v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 608, 561 A.2d 179, 181 (1989) (legislation enacting an an-
tidiscriminatory policy does not preclude additional remedies against violation of the
policy); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 27,
511 A.2d 1079, 1092 (1986) (a state employee claiming race discrimination may assert a
claim independent of article 49B); National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Prince George's
County, 292 Md. 75, 80, 437 A.2d 651, 653-54 (1981) (the General Assembly did not
intend to preempt the field of employment discrimination when it enacted legislation
prohibiting discriminatory employment practices).
73. See McCroy, 319 Md. at 24, 570 A.2d at 840.
74. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A, §§ 1, IA. The Home Rule Amendment's purpose was
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also requires the General Assembly to grant express powers to
counties adopting charters pursuant to the Home Rule Amend-
ment.7" The public general law defining a home rule county's pow-
ers is commonly known as the Express Powers Act.76 The Act
enumerates the counties' express powers,77 as well as the following
implied powers:
The foregoing or other enumeration of powers in this arti-
cle shall not be held to limit the power of the county coun-
cil, in addition thereto, to pass all ordinances, resolutions
or bylaws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this arti-
cle or the laws of the State, as may be proper in executing
and enforcing any of the powers enumerated in this section
or elsewhere in this article, as well as such ordinances as
may be deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good
government, health and welfare of the county. 78
Once it adopts a charter, a home rule government has "full
power to enact local laws" upon all matters covered by the express
powers granted.7 9 The Maryland constitution's only definition of a
"local law" is that it is not "[a]ny law so drawn as to apply to two or
more of the geographical subdivisions of this State."' Because this
language is so broad, courts have significant latitude in determining
to "share with the counties and Baltimore City, within well-defined limits, powers for-
merly reserved to the General Assembly so as to afford the subdivisions certain powers
of self government." Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 597, 415 A.2d 255, 256
(1980).
75. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2.
76. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A (1990).
77. For example, the express powers include the power to enact local laws upon the
following matters: protection of county property; building and control of county "hos-
pitals, almshouses, pesthouses" and jails; drainage of swamp and lowlands; creation of
election districts and precincts; maintenance of roads; assessment and collection of
county taxes; enactment of local fish and game laws; and the enactment of planning and
zoning laws. See id § 5.
78. Id. § 5(S). In the leading case interpreting this clause, Montgomery Citizens
League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 252 A.2d 242 (1969), the court stated that "[t]he
broadest grant of powers customarily is to home rule Counties . . .and cases holding
that a delegation was restricted or narrow are concerned almost always with delegations
to municipalities that do not enjoy home rule." Id. at 162, 252 A.2d at 247. See also
County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 411-
15, 312 A.2d 225, 230-32 (1973) (discussing the expansive nature of the legislative pow-
ers conferred by § 5(S), in relation to the county ordinance governing landlord-tenant
relations).
79. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A § 3.
80. Id. § 4. The text defines a "geographical subdivision" as "the City of Baltimore
or any of the counties of this State." Id.
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whether or not a statute is a local law and within the county's power
to enact, or a general law, and not within its enactment power.
The Court of Appeals has developed a nebulous test to deter-
mine whether a statute is a local or a general law. A law is local if
"in subject matter and substance, [it] is confined in its operation to
prescribed territorial limits and is equally applicable to all persons
within [such limits]."'" On the other hand, a general law is one
"which deals with the general public welfare, a subject which is of
significant interest not just to any one county, but rather to more
than one geographical subdivision, or even to the entire state."182
Although this local-or-general-law test provides courts with loose
guidelines, the Court of Appeals in several older decisions con-
cluded that a number of apparently local laws were general laws. 83
More recently, the court has tended to find that borderline statutes
are local, rather than general, laws.8 4 The court's decision in Mc-
Croiy limits this trend.
3. Analysis.-In McCrory, the Court of Appeals applied the lo-
cal-or-general-law test to section 27-20(a) of the Montgomery
County Code, and concluded that it is not a local law.85 Although it
recognized that in establishing administrative remedies, local gov-
ernments might address employment discrimination, the court held
that creating a new judicial cause of action between private individu-
81. Steimel v. Board of Election Supervisors of Prince George's County, 278 Md. 1,
5, 357 A.2d 386, 388 (1976).
82. Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 435, 240 A.2d 272, 278 (1968).
83. See Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 172 Md. 667, 192 A. 531 (1937) (overturning a
Baltimore City ordinance directing the purchase and use of voting machines); Dasch v.
Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936) (overturning a Baltimore City ordinance pro-
viding for the licensing and regulation of paperhangers); Gaither v. Jackson, 147 Md.
655, 128 A. 769 (1925) (overturning a Baltimore City ordinance licensing auctioneers);
Bradshaw v. Lankford, 73 Md. 428, 21 A. 66 (1891) (overturning a Somerset County
ordinance prohibiting oyster dredging in county waters). Although "the immediate ob-
jective sought to be achieved was local in character" these laws were general because
they "indirectly affected matters of significant interest to the entire state: i.e., regulation
of elections, control of natural resources, and protection of state revenues derived from
licenses." Cole, 249 Md. at 435, 240 A.2d at 278.
84. See Mayor of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 435 A.2d 425 (1981) (up-
holding a county ordinance licensing fortune tellers); Steimel, 278 Md. 1, 357 A.2d 386
(1976) (upholding a county ordinance requiring Prince George's County businesses to
close on Sunday); Mayor of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969)
(upholding a Baltimore City ordinance establishing minimum wage standards); Cole, 249
Md. 425, 240 A.2d 272 (1968) (upholding statutes transferring civil and criminal juris-
diction from state-appointed judicial officers to the People's Court of Cecil County).
85. See McCroMy, 319 Md. at 24, 570 A.2d at 840.
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als encroached upon the province of state agencies.8 6
The court followed the general rule "that a municipal corpora-
tion cannot create by ordinance a right of action between third per-
sons or enlarge the common law or statutory duty or liability of
citizens among themselves. 8 7 This rule's justification lies in the de-
sire for consistency and predictability in private legal relationships.
The court in McCrory suggested that allowing municipalities to cre-
ate private causes of action would open the door for them to change
well-established legal doctrines, such as those relating to contribu-
tory negligence and parol evidence. 8 If home rule counties enacted
their own rules relating to these doctrines, the state law eventually
would become inoperative; therefore, home rule ordinances must
have "uniform application in state courts. '"89
But the Court of Appeals did not completely preclude home
rule counties from authorizing a private cause of action as a remedy.
When the ordinances address "subject matters of a peculiarly local
nature," the court indicated that these statutes are local law and,
hence, within a county's power to enact. 90 The court noted that
courts in Oregon9' and Colorado, 92 as well as the Maryland Attor-
ney General,93 have recognized that municipalities may in limited
86. See id. at 20, 570 A.2d at 838.
87. 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 22.01 (1988) (quoted in McCroty, 319
Md. at 23, 570 A.2d at 839). The court also cited a number of cases from jurisdictions
throughout the United States that invalidated local government laws creating private
rights of action. See, e.g., Bain v. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co., 116 Ark. 125, 133-34,
172 S.W. 843, 845-46 (1915) (violation of an ordinance that created liability against
street railway companies did not give rise to liability where no state statute conferred
upon municipal corporations the power to pass such an ordinance); Tynes v. Gogos, 144
A.2d 412, 417 (D.C. 1958) (antidiscrimination ordinances do not give rise to a civil ac-
tion for damages); City ofJoplin v. Wheeler, 173 Mo. App. 590, 604, 158 S.W. 924, 928
(1913) (an ordinance regulating a water company's performance cannot create new du-
ties); Orr v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 168 App. Div. 548, 550, 153 N.Y.S. 920, 921
(1915) (an ordinance stating that storing a certain quantity of nitrate soda without a
license should constitute a nuisance was ineffective to constitute such storage a
nuisance).
88. See 319 Md. at 21, 570 A.2d at 838.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 24, 570 A.2d at 840.
91. See Papen v. Karpow, 56 Or. App. 673, 677, 643 P.2d 375, 377-78 (1982)
(although a city snow removal ordinance did not create a private cause of action, the city
may, by express provision, give third parties a right of action against the abutting land
owner).
92. See Bittle v. Brunetti, 750 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1988) (a snow removal ordinance did
not create a duty to pedestrians, but a municipality could expressly create a right of
action against abutting land owners).
93. See 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 101 (1988). Montgomery County's county attorney re-
quested the Attorney General's opinion on the validity of Montgomery County Code
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circumstances create a right of action.94 According to the court,
snow removal and towing ordinances address exclusively local mat-
ters, and aid the counties in carrying out their express legal duties;
therefore, they are valid local laws.95
In addition, remedies provided in snow removal and towing or-
dinances are extremely limited, unlike section 27-20's remedy,
which could include unlimited monetary damages.96 The court in
McCrory seemed concerned about this aspect of the ordinance, espe-
cially in light of Fowler's request for more than $1.8 million in dam-
ages.9 7 The court was perhaps also concerned that "forum
shopping" would result if it permitted counties to create new judi-
cial remedies above and beyond those provided by state law.9 8
4. Conclusion.-The McCrory decision limits victims of employ-
ment discrimination to state and federal judicial remedies and local
administrative remedies. In so doing, the court has assured uniform
application of law by denying counties the ability to create private
causes of action for unlimited damages. Uniformity is important in
§ 30c-9(a), which creates a private right of action for a vehicle owner whose vehicle is
improperly towed or damaged:
Any trespass towing service, and any private property owner who authorizes,
expressly or under a standing authorization, the towing of a vehicle from pri-
vate property, are both liable for . .. (3) any damages to a towed vehicle in-
curred during the tow or storage and caused by a lack of reasonable care by the
towing service, the property owner or an agent of either.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 30c-9(a). The ordinance specifies that damages will
be "3 times the amount of any towing, release or storage fees charged." Id. § 30C-9(e).
The Attorney General concluded that "Montgomery County has a legitimate public pol-
icy objective in ensuring that private vehicles are not improperly towed" and that the
private right of action created by this ordinance did not overstep the county's police
power conferred by the Express Powers Act. See 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 101, 106 (1988).
94. See McCrory, 319 Md. at 23-24, 570 A.2d at 839-40.
95. See id. at 24, 570 A.2d at 840.
96. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-20(a) (1977), quoted supra note 56.
97. See McCrory, 319 Md. at 21-22, 570 A.2d at 838-39. The court noted that in
County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 312
A.2d 225 (1973), it upheld a chartered county's authority to enact local laws to revise the
common law and provide enforcement remedies. In that case, however, the remedial
powers "to terminate leases, order repairs and award limited damages" were limited
compared to those in issue here. See 319 Md. at 21-22, 570 A.2d at 838-39.
98. The court hinted that forum shopping was a concern when it noted that certain
matters are "of significant interest to the entire state, calling for uniform application in
state courts." McCroty, 319 Md. at 21, 570 A.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
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employment discrimination law because it encompasses issues of
significant interest to the entire state.
DAVID TIGER
KAREN L. BENEDETI
IX. LEGISLATION
A. The Maryland International Commercial Arbitration Act
On May 2, 1990, Governor William Donald Schaefer signed
into law the Maryland International Commercial Arbitration Act
(MICA).' Initially drafted and endorsed by the Maryland State Bar
Association's (MSBA) International Commercial Law Section,2 the
Act seeks to make Maryland more attractive for international com-
merce by adopting an arbitration model that defers to federal pro-
cess and enforcement methods.3 Prior to MICA's enactment, it was
uncertain whether international arbitrations could be heard in Mary-
land. Section 3-202 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article4 outlines jurisdiction for domestic arbitrations, but
neither confirms nor denies jurisdiction for international arbitra-
tion, merely stating that: "An agreement providing for arbitration
under the law of the State confers jurisdiction on a court to enforce
the agreement and enter judgment on an arbitration award." 5 By
clarifying and simplifying Maryland law on international commercial
arbitration, the Act provides international businesses an element of
certainty and ease, giving them incentive to do business in
Maryland.
In a memorandum to the legislature outlining the Act's pur-
poses,6 the MSBA International Commercial Law Section main-
tained that the applicability of a single body of law (federal law) to
the process and enforcement of international arbitrations in Mary-
land would improve the state's business climate by promoting cer-
tainty and uniformity.7 Maryland's reputation as an international
commercial and legal center would be boosted if its law encouraged
swift and uncomplicated dispute resolution.' Other organizations
1. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2B-01 to -09 (Supp. 1990); see Gorman,
Arbitration Act Makes Maryland Attractive for Settling Disputes, The Daily Record, June 6,
1990, at 22, col. 3. The Act took effect July 1, 1990.
2. See Memorandum from the Maryland State Bar Association Section of Interna-
tional Commercial Law to the Maryland HouseJudiciary Committee (Feb. 1990) [here-
inafter MSBA Memorandum] (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
3. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2B-02 to -03; MSBA Memorandum,
supra note 2; Gorman, supra note 1.
4. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1989).
5. Id. § 3-202.
6. See MSBA Memorandum, supra note 2.
7. See id. at 1.
8. Id. at 2.
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supported the MSBA-sponsored proposal and now anticipate a
boon to the state's economy and business climate.9 The Act's ex-
plicit purpose is to promote international commercial arbitration,
enforce arbitration agreements, facilitate dispute resolution, and
promote uniformity of law.' 0
In choosing federal law" as MICA's principal model, Maryland
follows a path different from other states that have adopted interna-
tional commercial arbitration legislation.' 2 Other states have based
their arbitration laws on models such as the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules,'" the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration,' 4 or expanded versions of their domestic arbitration
provisions.'5 By doing so, these states may cause international busi-
nesses unnecessary confusion and uncertainty.' 6 Maryland avoided
this problem by enacting MICA. Though tangible benefits will be
difficult to detect in the short term, Maryland chose the most pru-
dent course.
9. The Maryland Chamber of Commerce, Maryland Economic Growth Associates,
an economic development organization comprised of the chief executive officers of
prominent Maryland corporations, and the Maryland Department of Economic & Em-
ployment Development all expressed support for the Act to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee or the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. See International Commercial
Arbitration: Hearings on H.B. 528 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 13, 1990)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Peggy Chaplin, Esq., for the Maryland Chamber of
Commerce; testimony of Donald P. Hutchinson, President of the Maryland Economic
Growth Associates) (copies on file with Maryland Law Review); Letter from J. Randall
Evans, Secretary of the Maryland Department of Economic and Employment Develop-
ment to Hon. Daniel Long, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 12,
1990); Letter fromJ. Randall Evans to Hon. Walter Baker, Chairman of the Senate Judi-
cial Proceedings Committee (Mar. 29, 1990).
10. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2B-02 (Supp. 1990).
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988). See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
12. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 3 (testimony of Peggy Chaplin, Esq., for the Mary-
land Chamber of Commerce).
13. See Report of the United National Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
its Ninth Session, April 12-May 7, 1976, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), at 57, U.N. Doc
A/31/17, Annex 11 (1976), UNCITRAL ARBrrRATiON RuLEs, U.N. Sales No. E.77.V.6
(1976).
14. See Report of the United National Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
its Eighteenth Session, June 3-21, 1985, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), at 81-93, U.N. Doc
A/40/17, Annex 1 (1985).
15. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 1 (Maryland's adoption of federal law in the process
and enforcement of international commercial arbitration reduces the possibility of con-
fusion and uncertainty for international businesses).
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1. Key Provisions of MICA.' 7 -Several states have adopted legis-
lation to attract international commercial arbitration, but Maryland
is the first expressly to adopt federal law for its process and enforce-
ment. MICA, as codified at section 3-2B-03 of the Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article, reads: "In all matters relating to the
process and enforcement of international commercial arbitration
and awards, the laws of Maryland shall be the arbitration statutes
and laws of the United States."'" Maryland substantive law remains
available to resolve disputes concerning contract interpretation or
performance.' 9
Although MICA defers to federal law for rules governing inter-
national arbitration, ° it departs from federal law in the provisions
concerning posting of security, the standard of review applicable to
security orders, and making determinations without a jury. First,
section 3-2B-06 allows Maryland arbitral tribunals21 in an interna-
tional commercial arbitration matter to order either party to post
pre-award security if there is good cause to require security.22
Though not in the federal statute, this provision does not conflict
with the federal statute; rather, the provision enlarges the parties'
rights in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model Law." Second,
the Maryland statute establishes abuse of discretion as the proper
standard of review for court challenges to a pre-award security or-
der.24 Finally, section 3-2B-07 directs the court to make any neces-
sary determinations without a jury.2' Although this provision is
contrary to federal law, it conforms to the existing Maryland Uni-
form Arbitration Act,26 and it is consistent with the process in many
foreign countries.2 7 Thus, the Maryland statute incorporates fed-
eral law on international arbitration, but makes minor changes that
17. For a section by section analysis of the Maryland International Commercial Arbi-
tration Act, see Gorman, supra note 1.
18. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN, § 3-2B-03 (Supp. 1990).
19. See MSBA Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2-3; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 186-188 (1971) (the law of the state chosen by the parties governs
most contract issues).
20. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
21. "Arbitral tribunal" refers to either a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators. See
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2B-01(C) (Supp. 1990).
22. See id. § 3-2B-06.
23. See Articles 9 and 17 of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration; see supra note 14.
24. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2B-06(2) (Supp. 1990).
25. See id. § 3-2B-07(b).
26. See id. § 3-204 (1989) ("The court shall make any determination provided for in
this subtitle without a jury.").
27. See Gorman, supra note 1.
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provide parties with more rights, in accord with the UNCITRAL
Model Law and clearly established Maryland policy.
2. Development of International Arbitration.-During the past four
decades, international arbitration has become the favored means of
dispute resolution in international commercial circles.2 ' Arbitration
is viewed as more flexible, more efficient, and quicker than
litigation. 9
The comparative advantages and disadvantages of ar-
bitration as opposed to litigation have been well rehearsed.
Arbitration is a private process, an advantage in the eyes of
those who do not want details of their quarrels (accompa-
nied almost inevitably by attacks on their competence or
good faith) to be disclosed in open court, with the possibil-
ity of further publication elsewhere. Arbitration also offers
the parties the opportunity to choose their own judge, in a
way which is not usually possible in court proceedings.
One or more arbitrators may be chosen for their special
skill and expertise in commercial law, civil engineering or
some other relevant discipline. An experienced arbitral tri-
bunal of this kind should be able to grasp quickly the sali-
ent issues of fact or law in dispute and so save the parties
both time and money, as well as offering them the prospect
of a sensible award.
30
Many of those involved in international commercial arbitration an-
ticipate substantial increases in the number of disputes submitted to
arbitration.3 ' In response to this anticipated rise, many nations and
international groups have developed laws and procedures for set-
tling international commercial disputes.3 2
The most important work in this field originated in the United
Nations (UN). In 1958, the UN's New York Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New
28. See Thieffry, Europe 1992: Arbitration Expected to Increase, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 19, 1990,
at 21, col. 1.
29. See id.
30. A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 17 (1986) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also A. VAN DEN
BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, 1 (1981) (rules governing
international commercial arbitration are key to its effectiveness); Note, International Com-
mercial Arbitration in the United States: Considering Whether to Adopt UNCITRAL 's Model Law,
10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 912, 924 (1989) (listing advantages of arbitration over litigation).
31. See Thieffry, supra note 28, at 21.
32. Id. at 23.
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York Convention) 3 was signed, simplifying enforcement of arbitral
awards abroad, 4 and thus enhancing the advantages of interna-
tional arbitration over international litigation.3 5 In 1970, Congress
adopted the New York Conivention in chapter 2 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.3 6 In addition to the United States, eighty nations have
adopted the New York Convention.37
In 1966, the UN General Assembly established by resolution
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL), in response to a proposal that the United Nations assume
a stronger role in reducing legal obstacles to international trade.3 8
During the mid 1970s, UNCITRAL prepared a set of arbitration
rules designed for "optional use in ad hoc arbitration relating to
international trade."3 9 These rules were adopted as the UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules at its ninth session in 1976.40 By June
1985, UNCITRAL had developed the UNCITRAL Model Law on
33. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done June 10, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
34. Two ways in which the New York Convention simplified arbitral awards enforce-
ment are: first, the arbitration law of the country where the arbitration took place does
not have to be taken into account if the parties made an agreement regarding the arbi-
tral tribunal's composition or the arbitration procedure; and second, the burden of
proof is shifted from the party seeking enforcement to the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought (all the party seeking enforcement need do is supply the arbitration
agreement and award). See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 30, at 8-10.
35. See Hoellering, International Commercial Arbitration: A Peaceful Method of Dispute Set-
tlement, 40 ARB. J. 19, 20 (1985).
36. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988). This chapter took effect on December 29, 1970.
Id.
37. The New York Convention's eighty-three signatories are Algeria, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria,
Burkina-Faso, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central Afri-
can Republic, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Kuwait, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, San Marino, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Sweden,
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United King-
dom, United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN
FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATEs IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1990, at 282 (1990).
38. See Fleischhauer, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 41
ARB. J. 17, 17 (1986).
39. UNCITRAL: THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW,
at 27-28, U.N. Sales No. E.86.V.8 (1986) [hereinafter UNCITRAL].
40. See supra note 13.
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International Commercial Arbitration 4' to treat problems arising
from dissimilar national laws, such as the restriction of "disputes
which can be submitted to arbitration, the selection and appoint-
ment of arbitrators, as well as the operation of the arbitration pro-
ceedings."'4 2 On December 11, 1985, the UN General Assembly
recommended that nations seriously consider adopting the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law.43
As a consequence of these developments and the increased at-
tention paid to international commercial matters, nations compete
as possible arbitration venues, including most notably France, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.44
3. United States Law.-United States arbitration law is con-
tained in the Federal Arbitration Act,45 which incorporates the New
York Convention. Other conventions or treaties to which the
United States is a party also constitute federal law.46 The United
States has signed, but not ratified, the Inter-American Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration (the Panama Conven-
tion.)47 Created by the Organization of American States in 1975,
41. See supra note 14.
42. McNerney & Esplugues, International Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL Model
Law, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 47, 47 (1986).
43. See A. Broches, Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 4 (P. Sanders ed. 1984). The Washington For-
eign Law Society's Committee to Study the United Nations Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration recommended that Congress not adopt the Model Law as a
whole, but instead append particular articles to the Federal Arbitration Act, excluding
the others. The Committee maintained that "[e]xisting federal arbitration law is
strongly supportive in its enforcement of international agreements and recognition and
enforcement of foreign awards." Report to the Washington Foreign Law Society on the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. DisPUTE REs. 303,
311-16 (1988); see also Note, supra note 30, at 912 (discussing the history of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law).
44. Hoellering, supra note 35, at 21.
45. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988).
46. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending federal judicial power to cases aris-
ing under United States treaties).
47. OAS/Ser.A/20 (SEPF), opened for signature Jan. 30, 1975, reprinted in 14 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS [I.L.M.] 336 (1975).
In 1987, it appeared that the United States was on the verge of ratifying the Panama
Convention. See Comment, Seeking Its Place in the Sun: Florida's Emerging Role in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363, 364 & n.5 (1987-88). If
the United States adopts the Panama Convention, it will be codified as chapter 3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act. See id at 386-87 n.158.
The Panama Convention's 17 signatories as of 1986 were Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co-
lumbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See
AMERICAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT: A COMPILATION
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the Panama Convention, much like the New York Convention, pro-
motes arbitral awards enforcement between citizens of member
states.4 8 The United States has also entered into numerous bilateral
commercial treaties that provide for reciprocal enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements and awards. 4
United States efforts to facilitate international arbitration have
been generally successful. Most commentators believe that the
United States provides a favorable climate for the growth of interna-
tional arbitration, "largely due to legislation favoring arbitration,
and a judiciary supportive of arbitration. 50
Just as rival nations compete internationally, competition
among the states has emerged from their efforts to secure a share of
international arbitrations and an anticipated greater amount of in-
ternational trade. In addition to Maryland, California,5 Connecti-
OF BASIC AND FREQUENTLY REQUESTED DOCUMENTS 23 (L. Brown ed. 1986) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT]. Of these, only nine have ratified the Convention:
Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. Id. The treaty was first submitted to the United States Senate on June 18,
1981. Id. at 19.
48. See THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT, supra note 47, at 19.
49. As of 1990, the United States had entered 18 bilateral commercial treaties: Ire-
land, 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S No. 2155 (Jan. 21, 1950); Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S.
No. 3057 (Aug. 31, 1951); Israel, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948 (Aug. 23, 1951); Italy,
12 U.S.T. 131, T.I.A.S. No. 4685 (Sept. 26, 1951); Denmark, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No.
4797 (Oct. 1, 1951); Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (Apr. 2, 1953); Federal
Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (Oct. 29, 1954); Iran, 8 U.S.T.
899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 (Aug. 15, 1955); Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 499, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 (Jan.
21, 1956); Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (May 26, 1956); Korea, 8
U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947 (Nov. 28, 1956); Pakistan, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No.
4683 (Nov. 12, 1959); France, 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625 (Nov. 25, 1959);
Belgium, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432 (Feb. 21, 1961); Vietnam, 12 U.S.T. 1703,
T.I.A.S. No. 4890 (Apr. 3, 1961); Luxembourg, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306 (Feb.
23, 1967); Togo, 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193 (Feb. 8, 1966); Thailand, 19 U.S.T.
5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540 (May 29, 1966). See INTERNATIONAL ARBIrrRATION KIT, supra note
47, at 53.
50. Note, supra note 30, at 922-23. The author offered several Supreme Court deci-
sions enforcing agreements to arbitrate despite either federal law or public policy favor-
ing litigation. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 629 (1985) (holding that claims involving anti-trust issues, although nonarbitrable
when domestic, are arbitrable if the contract is international); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (securities claims, although nonarbitrable when do-
mestic, are arbitrable if the contract is international). See also Hoellering, supra note 35,
at 23 (citing Scherk and Mitsubishi).
51. See California International Arbitration and Conciliation Act, CAL. Cirv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1297.11 to .342 (West Supp. 1990).
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cut,5" Florida,53 Georgia,54 Hawaii, 55 and Texas56 have adopted
international arbitration legislation. Unlike the nations competing
at the international level, these states take markedly dissimilar
approaches.
4. MICA and the Other Models.-Although six states have inter-
national arbitration legislation, no state other than Maryland has ex-
pressly adopted federal law. Florida, the first state to adopt
international arbitration legislation, consulted the arbitration rules
of various organizations and jurisdictions, most notably the UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules and Federal Arbitration Act, 58 before creat-
ing a largely homespun international arbitration act.59 California
has adopted a modified version of UNCITRAL's Arbitration
52. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, reprinted in
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 30 (West Supp. 1990).
53. See Florida International Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 684.01 to .35 (1989).
54. See Georgia Arbitration Code (International Transactions), GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-
9-30 to -43 (Supp. 1990).
55. Hawaii International Arbitration, Mediation, and Conciliation Act, HAw. REV.
STAT. §§ 658D-1 to -9 (1988).
56. Texas International Arbitration Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 249-1 to -43
(Vernon Supp. 1990).
57. One commentator asserted that New York legislation is broad enough to encom-
pass international parties although it was not specifically enacted as an international
commercial arbitration statute. See Comment, supra note 47, at 375-76 n.66. Sections 5-
1401 and 5-1402 of New York's General Obligations article recognize "New York
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in contracts in excess of $250,000 in which
neither the parties nor the transaction have any connection to New York." Id. (citing
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §§ 5-1401 to -1402 (McKinney 1989)).
58. The task force drafting Florida's statute also reviewed the following sources: the
arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association and the International Chamber
of Commerce; the current or then-proposed laws of New York, California, France, the
United Kingdom, and Hong Kong; the existing Florida Arbitration Code; the Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration; and a draft of the UN-
CITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. See Loumiet, O'Naghten
& Swan, Proposed Florida International Arbitration Act, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 591,
594 n.2 (1985).
The non-state law sources listed above can be found as follows: AMERICAN ARBITRA-
TION Ass'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1982), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION Krr, supra note 47, at 191-204; INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC RULES OF
CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, reprinted in, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC ARBI-
TRATION: THE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES, at 38-43
(1977); France, CODE DE PROC.DURE CivlLE art. 1442-1507 (Codes Dalloz 1990); United
Kingdom, Arbitration Act of 1950, Arbitration Act of 1975, Arbitration Act of 1979;
Hong Kong, Arbitration Ordinance, 1982 (ch. 341); Panama Convention, Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, OAS/Ser.A/20 (SEPF) opened
for signature Jan. 30, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975); UNCITRAL draft, INTERNA-
TIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, UNCITRAL's PROJECT FOR A MODEL
LAw ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-12 (P. Sanders ed. 1984).
59. See Florida International Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT. § 684.01 to .35 (1989).
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Rules." Connecticut's international arbitration act follows the UN-
CITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,6 ' as
does, to a lesser degree, Texas' international arbitration statute.62
Georgia's international statute supplements its domestic arbitration
code by selective adoption of UNCITRAL language. Finally, Ha-
waii's approach is unique. Instead of providing detailed rules for
international arbitrations, Hawaii channels all matters to the Hawaii
Center for International Commercial Dispute Resolution. 63 Mary-
land is thus alone in deferring to federal law.'
The question remains whether Maryland has adopted the best
approach. Only Hawaii's statute approaches the Maryland statute's
textual simplicity. Every other state statute consists of lengthy, de-
tailed rules for arbitration proceedings. How this will affect pro-
spective international business officials cannot be accurately
measured. But for the average layperson concerned with arbitra--
tion, complicated rules are likely to produce confusion and appre-
hension. Good arbitration rules should have the opposite effect.
Because business executives already must be familiar with federal
law generally, requiring them to learn complex state rules seems un-
necessarily burdensome.
Several Florida commentators have cited potential gaps in arbi-
trability coverage, and concluded that federal law is inadequate. 65
Nations that are not signatories of either the New York or Panama
Conventions, or are not engaged in business with a United States
citizen, are not eligible for arbitration under federal law. An exam-
ple often cited is the following: A dispute between a Brazilian and
an Argentine arising from a contract to ship goods from Peru to
England would not be arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration
Act. 66 With respect to attracting international arbitrations unre-
60. See Wright, California's International Commercial Arbitration Act: New Procedures for the
Arbitration and Conciliation of International Commercial Disputes, 17 INT'L Bus. LAW. 45, 45
(1989).
61. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1989
CONN. PUB. Acrs 89-179, reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app. at 30 (West Supp.
1990).
62. See Hoyt, Proposed Texas International Arbitration Act, 52 TEX. B.J. 148 (1989).
63. The Hawaii Center for International Commercial Dispute Resolution is a project
comprising the Hawaii State Bar Association, the University of Hawaii Program on Con-
flict Resolution, the University of Hawaii William S. Richardson School of Law, the Hon-
olulu office of the American Arbitration Association and the Hawaii state judiciary. See
Comment, supra note 47, at 375 n.66.
64. See Hearings, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
65. See Comment, supra note 47, at 387; see also Loumiet, O'Naghten & Swan, supra
note 58, at 619-20 (state law should fill gaps in federal law).
66. See Comment, supra note 47, at 387.
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lated to the jurisdiction, the federal law is not as effective as statutes
that offer greater coverage. But failure to attract the international
arbitration of matters unrelated to the jurisdiction's international
trade does not detract from the statutes' primary goal, which is to
enhance prospects for international trade by fostering a better legal
and business climate. It would seem more important to appeal to a
potential trading partner than to attract a forum-shopper who is un-
likely to engage in future trade in the state.
States that have been influenced by the UNCITRAL Model
Law-- Connecticut, Texas, and, arguably, Georgia-may have arbi-
tration statutes containing rules that are more familiar than United
States federal law to foreign parties. Because the UNCITRAL
Model Law received the UN General Assembly's recommendation,
international parties probably will have encountered it before.
These states, however, take the risk that their arbitration laws will
conflict with federal law, in which case federal law will likely pre-
vail.67 These states risk confusing and alienating foreign business
customers, and burdening them with researching both federal and
state law, and anticipating conflicts. Similar problems exist with
California's and Hawaii's statutes. These state statutes, though per-
haps more initially recognizable and favorable to international par-
ties, do not offer the certainty that Maryland law provides by its
adherence to federal law.
5. Effects of MICA-This legislation's economic effects are diffi-
cult to gauge. The simplification and streamlining of legal dispute
resolution should improve the state's international business climate'.
The Act will do nothing to hinder international trade. Favorable
arbitration statutes are, however, only one component of an attrac-
tive business climate.
A state's reputation for being on the cutting edge of interna-
tional commerce may also be a plus. International arbitration in-
creased in California after it enacted its arbitration statute.68 Time
will tell whether Maryland's act increases the number of arbitra-
67. See Hoellering, supra note 35, at 23. Hoellering asserted that a Supreme Court
decision holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law when interstate
commerce is involved (see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)), would also
preempt state law for international commerce. See also Comment, Preemption of State Law
Under the FederalArbitration Act, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 129, 144-46 (1985) (discussing South-
land's effect on arbitration in Maryland).
68. See Hoyt, supra note 62, at 148.
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tions69 held in Maryland, and benefits the business community at
large.
6. Conclusion.-When it enacted the Maryland International
Commercial Arbitration Act, the Maryland legislature ensured that
in Maryland only one body of law would govern international com-
mercial arbitration. Significant departures from this general rule
are the provisions for security posting, standard of review, and de-
terminations of fact by the court, which accord with either the UN-
CITRAL Model Law or established Maryland policy. MICA will
have the practical effect of harmonizing Maryland law with federal
law. 70 Because of this uniformity, Maryland international arbitra-
tion will be easier for foreign parties to understand, reducing confu-
sion and promoting certainty.
Considering the alternatives, the Maryland legislature took the
most prudent course in responding to the need for international ar-
bitration legislation. Adopting a clearly syncaphonous position with
regard to federal law gives Maryland flexibility as federal law
changes. Maryland will avoid the confusion and uncertainty created
when state and federal law conflict, where "the dicey atmosphere of
such a legal no-man's land would surely damage the fabric of inter-
national commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability
of businessmen to enter into international commercial agree-
ments."' 71 The legislature is to be commended for making the state
a leader in this area.
B. The Drug Enforcement Act of 1990
1. Introduction .- The Drug Enforcement Act of 199071 reflects
the Maryland Legislature's determination to strengthen drug en-
forcement efforts with strict, innovative new laws. The Act's most
important provisions restrict a judge's ability to grant drug offend-
69. An increase in the number of international arbitration hearings in Maryland is
unlikely to seriously affect the case load of Maryland circuit courts. See Letter from Chief
Judge Robert Murphy, Maryland Court of Appeals, to Geoffrey Tobias, Chair of the
International Commercial Law Section of the Maryland State Bar Ass'n (Dec. 22, 1989)
(copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
70. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2B-03 (Supp. 1990) ("This subtitle
shall be interpreted and construed as to promote uniformity in the law of international
commercial arbitration in the United States.").
71. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) (stating the likely effects
of a refusal of one country's courts to honor the decisions of foreign courts).
72. The Drug Enforcement Act of 1990, ch. 410, 1990 Md. Laws 1666 (effectiveJan.
1, 1991).
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ers probation before judgment, and impose licensing sanctions
against convicted offenders who hold occupational and professional
licenses." The Act seeks to deter the demand for drugs and weaken
the "demand side" of Maryland's illegal drug market by raising the
legal consequences of drug use.7 4
Most innovative legislation raises new constitutional issues, and
the Drug Enforcement Act of 1990 is no exception. In particular,
the Act requires courts to make decisions concerning occupational
and professional licenses, and this may conflict with Article 8 of the
Maryland Constitution's Declaration of Rights,75 which requires
separation of power between the three branches of state govern-
ment. The Court of Appeals has held that the judicial function does
not properly include deciding certain licensing issues, and it has
struck down statutes that required courts to make such decisions on
the grounds that they violated the separation of powers doctrine.76
The Drug Enforcement Act of 1990 appears vulnerable to the same
sort of constitutional challenge.
2. The Act.-The Drug Enforcement Act of 1990 began as an
Administration bill, introduced into the legislature as House Bill
515.77 The Administration envisioned that the Act would imple-
ment the Governor's Drug and Alcohol Abuse Commission's recom-
mendations to change society's behavior and attitudes toward drug
use.78 The Act would "1. requir[e] drug-free accountability for in-
dividuals who seek and hold State licenses to engage in professions,
occupations, trades, or businesses; and 2. restrict[] the use of pro-
bation before judg[ment] in controlled dangerous substance offense
",79
cases ....
The Act reflects a change in the legislature's strategy for com-
batting illegal drug use.80 Whereas other recent legislation concen-
73. See id. § 4.
74. Masters, Drug Enforcement, MD. B.J., July-Aug. 1990, at 7-8. The author was Vice
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which approved the Act's passage.
75. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 8.
76. See infra notes 102-122 and accompanying text.
77. Md. H.B. 515, 1990 Sess.
78. See The Drug Enforcement Act of 1990, ch. 410, 1990 Md. Laws 1666, 1670
(preamble); see also GOVERNOR'S DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE COMM'N, MARYLAND'S DRUG
AND ALCOHOL ABUSE CONTROL PLAN 56, 98-99 (1990). Executive Order No.
01.01.1989.04 in February 1989 established the Governor's Drug and Alcohol Abuse
Commission, composed of public officials and private citizens, to develop a comprehen-
sive plan for reducing illegal drug-related activities, and drug and alcohol abuse in Mary-
land. Id.
79. Ch. 410, 1990 Md. Laws at 1670.
80. See Masters, supra note 74, at 7-8.
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trated on drug traffickers, the Drug Enforcement Act of 1990
focuses on drug users, and makes the legal consequences more se-
vere."' The Act eliminates an older provision of the Maryland Code
designed to spare "casual" drug users the stigma of a criminal rec-
ord, 2 and it bars courts from granting probation before judgment
for any second or subsequent drug offense." The Act also requires
courts to order drug treatment when ordering probation, probation
before judgment, or a suspended sentence for drug offenders.8 4
The Act's licensing provisions are the first in the nation to link
state-issued professional and occupational licenses to drug enforce-
ment.8 5 When an offender is sentenced for any drug offense,86 the
Act requires a court to determine whether the defendant holds an
occupational or professional license.87 If the defendant is a license
holder and it is her first drug offense since the Act's effective date,
the Act directs the court to:
make a prima facie finding of fact as to whether there is a
relationship between the conviction and the license includ-
ing: (i) The individual's ability to perform the tasks author-
ized by the license; (ii) Whether the public will be
protected if the individual continues to perform the tasks
authorized by the license; (iii) Whether the nature and the
circumstances of the . offense warrant referral to the li-
81. Id
82. See id. at 8. Section 1 of the Act repealed the existing Maryland Code Article 27,
§ 292, which allowed courts to grant probation before judgment for first time drug of-
fenders, and expunge their criminal arrest records at the end of the probationary period.
Consequently, probation before judgment now can be granted only pursuant to Article
27, § 641, as amended by the Act. See ch. 410, § 1, 1990 Md. Laws at 1670.
83. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641(a)(3) (Supp. 1990).
84. See id. at §§ 639(d), 641(a)(1)(iii), 641A(d).
85. See Masters, supra note 74, at 7. The Act defines "license" as "a license, permit,
certification, registration, or other legal authorization:
(i) Issued to or granted to an individual by a licensing authority; and
(ii) Required for engaging in employment or an occupation or profession."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1-403(c)(1) (1990). "License" includes a commercial driver's
license but does not include an ordinary motor vehicle operator's license. See id. § 1-
403(c)(2), (3). The definition expressly excludes a stock broker's license. See id. § 1-
403(c)(3)(ii). The definition includes a license to practice law. See id. § 1-407(a)(2).
86. The Act applies to any offense under the "Health- Controlled Dangerous Sub-
stances" subheading in Article 27 (Q§ 277-303), or any offense in another jurisdiction
that would be an offense under that subheading if committed in Maryland. See id. § 1-
403(b)(1), (2). This subheading includes all offenses for illegally trafficking, using, and
possessing drugs and drug paraphernalia.
87. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 298A(c) (Supp. 1990).
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censing authority; and (iv) Any other facts that the court
deems relevant.88
If the court finds a "relationship" between the conviction and the
individual's occupational or professional license, the clerk of the
court must report the conviction to the administrative agency that
issued the license.8 In the case of a second or subsequent drug
conviction, the clerk must report the conviction to the licensing
agency without the court determining whether there was a relation-
ship between the conviction and the license.90
Once the sentencing court's clerk informs a state administrative
agency that a licensee was convicted of a drug offense, the agency
may sanction the licensee by revoking or suspending the license,
placing the licensee on probation, or taking any other action author-
ized by law.9 ' In considering whether to impose sanctions, the li-
censing agency must consider the same four criteria the trial court
used to determine whether there was a relationship between the
conviction and the licensee's ability to perform tasks authorized by
the license, as well as the effect sanctions might have on innocent
third persons.92
The Act also authorizes licensing agencies to require new appli-
cants and applicants for license renewals to disclose whether they
have been convicted of a drug offense since the Act's effective
date." If an applicant has been convicted of a drug offense, the
88. Id. § 298A(d)(2)(i)-(iv). The Act does not define "prima facie finding of fact," an
expression that appears nowhere else in the Maryland Code or in the statutes of any
other state. The term "prima fade" means literally "at first sight." BLAcK's LAw Dic-
TioNARY 1071 (5th ed. 1979). It is usually used to describe the evidence offered in a
case, however, and not the court's findings. For example, a "prima fade case" is evi-
dence sufficient on its face, unless rebutted or contradicted. See idl Presumably the Act
contemplates that a court will make such a "prima facie finding," without rigorous inves-
tigation, because the court's finding does not bind the licensee. The administrative
agency that issued the license retains complete authority to sanction the licensee, and
must conduct an independent investigation before doing so. See Opinion of the Attor-
ney General addressed to the Honorable William Donald Schaefer at 3 (May 7, 1990)
(unpublished; copy on file at Maryland Law Review); infra notes 91-92 and accompanying
text. The fact that the court's finding is not definitive has constitutional implications,
however. See infra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
89. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 298A(e) (1990). The Act originally contained an
incorrect cross-reference. Where it referred to "a prima fade finding ... under subsec-
tion (c)," it should have referred to subsection (d). The legislature was advised to cor-
rect this error at the 1991 session. See Opinion of the Attorney General, supra note 88, at
3-4.
90. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 298A(e) (Supp. 1990).
91. See id art. 41, § 1-405.
92. See id § 1-407(b), (c); supra text accompanying note 88.
93. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1-404 (1990).
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agency may refuse to grant a license or grant it subject to
restrictions.'
3. The Separation of Powers Question.-The doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, articulated in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Maryland Constitution, 5 "has long been a cornerstone of this
State's concept of government. "96 Article 8 states: "That the Legis-
lative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be
forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exer-
cising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or dis-
charge the duties of any other." ' 7
In interpreting this constitutional provision, the Court of Ap-
peals consistently has held unconstitutional statutes imposing a
"nonjudicial function" on the State's courts.9 8 A precise definition
of "nonjudicial function" has, however, eluded the Court of Ap-
peals, which has generally relied on a "we know it when we see it"
approach. 99 In Board of Supervisors of Election v. Todd,t °° one of the
oldest and most frequently cited cases addressing this issue, the
Court of Appeals declared:
It is quite unnecessary to undertake to define here the es-
sential qualities of a judicial act or to prescribe the precise
94. See id.
95. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 8.
96. Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md.
211, 218, 334 A.2d 514, 520 (1975).
97. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 8.
98. See, e.g., Duffy v. Conway, 295 Md. 242, 262, 455 A.2d 958, 965 (1983) (judicial
function did not include collecting evidence and making findings regarding a contested
election that only the House of Delegates was constitutionally authorized to decide);
Linchester Sand & Gravel, 274 Md. at 229, 344 A.2d at 525 (trying de novo the Department
of Natural Resources' determination regarding an application for a building permit was
a nonjudicial function); Cromwell v.Jackson, 188 Md. 8, 27, 52 A.2d 79, 88 (1947) (de-
termining whether an applicant is fit to be issued a liquor license was a nonjudicial func-
tion); Close v. Southern Md. Agricultural Assoc., 134 Md. 629, 644, 108 A. 209, 215
(1919) (issuing licenses for betting on horse races was a nonjudicial function); Board of
Supervisors of Election v. Todd, 97 Md. 247, 264, 54 A. 963, 965 (1903) (determining
whether there should be a referendum on granting liquor licenses was a nonjudicial
function); Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 660, 52 A. 61, 66 (1902) (appointing supervi-
sors of the county jail was a nonjudicial function); Baltimore v. Bonaparte, 93 Md. 156,
163, 48 A. 735, 737 (1901) (performing duties tantamount to a board of review in as-
sessing property for tax purposes was a nonjudicial function); Robey v. Prince George's
County, 92 Md. 150, 160, 48 A. 48, 50 (1900) (auditing county officers' accounts was a
nonjudicial function).
99. See Tomlinson, Constitutional Limits on the Decisional Powers of Courts and Administra-
tive Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REv. 414, 425 (1976); see also Duff, 295 Md. at 260,
455 A. 2d at 964 ("no precise definition of 'judicial function' exists").
100. 97 Md. 247, 54 A. 963 (1903).
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limits to be observed by the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment in assigning duties to the judiciary.... It would
not be practicable to lay down a rule for all cases .... It is
only necessary ... to say that [the duty assigned the courts
by the legislature in this case] is not a judicial function, is a
proposition that would seem too plain to need argument to
enforce it.' 0 '
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals' opinions as to whether a
statute imposes on the courts a nonjudicial function provide some
guidance in analyzing the constitutionality of the courts' role under
the Drug Enforcement Act of 1990. These cases suggest that courts
may construe as a nonjudicial function the Act's requirement that
judges make a prima facie finding whether there is a relationship
between an individual's drug conviction and his occupational or
professional license.
a. Case Law.-In Robey v. County Commissioners,102 the Court of
Appeals struck down a statute that required courts to investigate the
financial accounts of certain county officers. The court asserted that
even though courts generally operate by investigating the issues
before them, and the legislature had required that a court investi-
gate these accounts before they could be paid, the "power" to audit
county officers' accounts belonged to the county commissioners.10 3
If courts performed this function, they would appropriate the func-
tion of another branch of government.' °4 The court stated that
"[siuch a union of functions would be a menace to civil liberty. ' 05
Robey stressed that the types of tasks courts are required to perform
do not determine whether the duty assigned is a judicial function.
The nature of the court's duty, and ultimately its constitutionality,
depends on the power it exercises in performing those tasks.' °6
101. Id. at 264, 54 A. at 965.
102. 92 Md. 150, 48 A. 48 (1900).
103. See id. at 162, 48 A. at 51.
104. See id
105. Id. at 161, 48 A. at 50.
106. The court stated:
The mere fact that a Judge is called on by statute to execute a certain function
does not make the function a judicial function.... As said in ex parte Candee, 48
Ala. 399, "It by no means follows that a duty is judicial because it is to be
performed by a Judge; if in its performance he does not exercise the powers
that appropriately appertain to his judicial office, it is ... not judicial, although
its performance requires the exercise of his judgment."
Robey, 92 Md. at 162-63, 48 A. at 51 (emphasis in original).
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In Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand and Gravel
Corp.,°107 the Court of Appeals explained how the state courts' power
relates to the power of various state administrative agencies that is-
sue permits and licenses. The court described administrative
agency power as arising from a legislative delegation to promote the
"health, safety, welfare and morals of the citizens of this State."' 10 8
With respect to these agencies, the power of the court is limited to
seeing that the agencies do not exceed their delegated power, and
that they exercise it with procedural and substantive fairness.' 0 9
Thus, in Linchester, the Court of Appeals struck down a statute
entitling applicants who were denied building permits by the De-
partment of Natural Resources to a de novo trial in the circuit
court. 110 Noting that the decision whether to grant a permit is made
pursuant to the state's police power, the court held that this decision
belonged exclusively to the legislature or the legislature's delegees,
the administrative agencies."1 ' The courts simply had no power to
decide a question that was exclusively within the purview of another
branch of government." 2
In Cromwell v. Jackson, " 3 the Court of Appeals struck down a
statute requiring a court to determine whether an applicant for a
liquor license was "fit" to hold such a license. The court held that
this is a question of public policy requiring the legislature's discre-
tion."' The court was especially concerned with the absence of
statutory standards to guide a court in making such a decision, and
it distinguished determining "fitness for licensing" from a proper
judicial question on the ground that the former was too subjective
for a court to decide. 115
The Court of Appeals has also considered the sort of product
that would result if courts were to perform particular tasks. In Duffy
v. Conway, 16 the court held that an essential element of the judicial
function is the production of a definitive ruling that cannot be re-
viewed by another branch of government." " Thus, the Duff court
107. 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975).
108. Id. at 222, 334 A.2d at 522.
109. Id. at 223, 334 A.2d at 522-23.
110. See id. at 229, 334 A.2d at 525.
111. See id. at 227-28, 334 A.2d at 525.
112. See id. at 228, 334 A.2d at 525.
113. 188 Md. 8, 52 A.2d 79 (1947).
114. See id. at 26, 52 A.2d at 88 (citing Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 52 A. 61
(1902)).
115. See id. at 26-27, 52 A.2d at 88.
116. 295 Md. 242, 455 A.2d 955 (1983).
117. See id. at 261-62, 455 A.2d at 964-65.
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declared unconstitutional a statute that required a court to investi-
gate allegations of illegal campaign practices and then to transfer its
findings to the House of Delegates,"' the body constitutionally em-
powered to judge elections for the office in question." 9 The court
noted that a "court's order under that [statute] 'binds nobody and
determines nothing,' "120 and held that the statute imposed on the
courts a nonjudicial function.' 2 ' A statute that requires a court to
make a ruling wholly subject to the legislature's review violated the
constitutionally mandated separation of the legislative and judicial
branches.
22
b. Application .- The principles derived from these cases when
applied to the Drug Enforcement Act of 1990 suggest that by re-
quiring courts to make a "prima facie finding of fact as to whether
there is a relationship between [a drug] conviction and [an occupa-
tional or professional] license," the Act may also be imposing on the
courts a nonjudicial function.' 2 -
In Cromwell v. Jackson,' 24 the Court of Appeals stated that
licenses are granted pursuant to the state's police power, and the
legislature is the body properly empowered to regulate their issu-
ance.125 Courts may assist the legislature in this function by decid-
ing questions of fact and law when called upon to do so,' 26 but they
are without authority to decide whether a person is "fit" to hold a
license because that is a question of public policy requiring the leg-
islature's discretion.' 2 7
118. The statute at issue was a section of the "Fair Elections Practices" subtitle of the
Election Code, MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 26-1 to -21 (1976). The courts' duties pursu-
ant to that statute are discussed in Duffy, 295 Md. at 247-59, 455 A.2d at 957-64.
119. See 295 Md. at 249 & n.4, 455 A.2d at 958 & n.4.
120. Id. at 261, 455 A.2d at 964 (quoting State ex rel Haines v. Searle, 59 Minn. 489,
492, 61 N.W. 553, 554 (1894)).
121. See id. at 262, 455 A.2d at 965.
122. See id. at 261-62, 455 A.2d at 965.
123. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 298A(d)(2) (Supp. 1990).
124. 188 Md. 8, 52 A.2d 79 (1947); see supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
125. See 188 Md. at 25, 52 A.2d at 87.
126. See id. at 20-21, 52 A.2d at 85. In an earlier case, McCrea v. Roberts, 89 Md. 238,
43 A. 39 (1899), the Court of Appeals upheld a licensing statute requiring a court to
determine such questions as whether applicants for liquor licenses were freeholders, and
whether they lived in the neighborhood in which they proposed to sell alcohol, because
these were questions of fact and law.
127. Cromwell, 188 Md. at 26, 52 A.2d at 88; see also id. at 24, 52 A.2d at 87 ("One must
be careful, however, not to confuse this legislative discretion with judicial discretion."
(quoting Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1946)).
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Although the Drug Enforcement Act of 1990 refers to the
courts' new duty as "mak[ing] a prima facie finding of fact"' 28
whether there is a relationship between a drug conviction and an
occupational or professional license, the court is asked to make a
finding that closely resembles the "fitness for licensing" question
the Cromwell court described as a question of neither fact nor law
and, therefore, beyond the judiciary's purview. 29
The Act provides four criteria for determining whether a "rela-
tionship" exists between an individual's drug conviction and the in-
dividual's occupational or professional license: (1) "[t]he
individual's ability to perform the tasks authorized by the license;"
(2) whether the public will be protected if the individual continues
to perform those tasks; (3) the nature and circumstance of the drug
offense; and (4) "[a]ny other facts that the court deems relevant.' ', 30
The Act is similar to the statute struck down in Cromwell, however,
because it provides no standards by which a court can determine
whether the facts of a case constitute a "relationship."' 3'1 What the
Act refers to as a "finding of fact" is really a discretionary determi-
nation as to whether the licensee is still fit to hold a license, the
outcome of which must depend on the judge's individual views con-
cerning drug use, and the judge's personal impression of the occu-
pation in which the defendant is licensed to work.'3 2 The Cromwell
court made clear that the judicial function does not appropriately
include decisionmaking based on the judge's individual views:' 33
128. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 298A(e) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
129. See 188 Md. at 26, 52 A.2d at 88.
130. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
131. See 188 Md. at 26, 52 A.2d at 88.
132. The subjective nature of the finding the legislature asks the courts to make be-
comes clear when one imagines the types of cases they would have to decide. In the case
of a licensed surgeon, see MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-301 (1991) (licensing doc-
tors), convicted of possessing drugs before an operation, presumably there would be a
relationship between his license and the conviction. But is there a relationship if he is
arrested while on vacation? Are the standards the same for a dentist? See MD. HEALTH
OCC. CODE ANN. § 4-301 (1991). An acupuncturist? See MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 14-506 (1991). A barber? See MD. Bus. Occ. CODE ANN. § 4-301 (1989). A tree doc-
tor? See MD. NAT. RES. § 5-416 (1989). What about beekeepers? See MD. AGRIC. CODE
ANN. § 5-503 (1985).
133. Addressing a court's ability to determine whether an applicant was fit to hold a
liquor license, the court stated: "Surely the Court, if acting judicially, cannot be gov-
erned by the individual views of the judges as to drinking." Cromwell, 188 Md. at 26, 52
A.2d at 88 (citing Close v. Southern Md. Agricultural Ass'n, 134 Md. 629, 642, 108 A.
209, 214 (1919)).
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such decisions are questions of public policy for the legislative
branch, not the courts, to decide.1 34
It has been suggested that under the Drug Enforcement Act of
1990 the courts' role does not violate the separation of powers doc-
trine because a court does not determine whether a licensee will be
sanctioned, but merely informs the licensing agency that it has made
a prima facie finding of a relationship between the licensee's drug
conviction and the license.' 35 Following the court's reasoning in
Duffy v. Conway, however, the fact that the courts' findings are not
binding is itself a violation of the constitutional requirement of sep-
aration of powers.'3 6
The Act stipulates that after a court has notified a licensing
agency of a licensee's drug conviction, the agency must conduct its
own investigation to determine the appropriateness of sanctions, 137
basing its decision on the same four criteria the court applied in its
prima facie finding.' 3 8 Thus, the agency hears de novo the same
issue heard by the court, but only the agency's decision is binding
on the licensee.
This procedure closely resembles the procedure struck down by
the Court of Appeals in Duffy because it imposed on the courts a
nonjudicial function.' 3 9 The Duffy court stated:
But [the legislature] cannot require the judiciary as a
co-ordinate department of government to hold a trial and
render a decision which in its nature must be purely tenta-
tive or advisory and wholly subject to its own review, revi-
sion, retrial or inaction.... It would subject a proceeding
134. In Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md.
211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975), the Court of Appeals pointed out that the legislature is not
only the body constitutionally empowered to decide the appropriate conditions for li-
censure, but its delegation of this power to experts in various administrative agencies
has enabled it to competently cope with the technical, fact-specific cases that are com-
mon in our increasingly complex society. See id. at 218-20, 334 A.2d at 520-21. Al-
lowing courts to apply their discretion to issues that administrative agencies are expert
in deciding would only impede the effectiveness by which agencies can fulfill their mis-
sions to promote the public good. See id. at 228-29, 334 A.2d at 525.
135. See Opinion of the Attorney General, supra note 88, at 3. Although a court does
not determine whether a licensee will be sanctioned, it determines that a licensee will not
be sanctioned when it fails to find a relationship between the conviction and the license
and, therefore, does not notify the licensing agency.
136. See Duffy, 295 Md. 242, 261-62, 455 A.2d 955, 964-65 (1983).
137. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1-407 (1990); see also Opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral, supra note 88, at 3 ("the [Act] clearly contemplates an independent assessment by
the [licensing agency]").
138. See MD. ANN. CODE. art. 42, § 1-407(b) (1990).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 118-119.
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arising in a court to modification, suspension, annulment
or affirmation by a part of the legislative department of
government before it would possess any definitive force.
Manifestly this is a contravention of art. [8] of the Declara-
tion of Rights which marks the entire separation of the leg-
islative and judicial departments of the government.' 40
The Drug Enforcement Act of 1990 is similar to the statute
struck down in Duf because it requires a court to make a finding
that has no "definitive force" until another branch of government
reviews it.' 4 ' The licensing agency retains complete power to sanc-
tion the licensee, and it is in no way bound by the court's "prima
facie finding."'' 4 2 As the Court of Appeals said in DuJff: "The
court's order under that section 'binds nobody and determines
nothing.' This is not a judicial function under our holdings that a
controversy, to be justiciable, must be 'capable of final adjudication
by the judgment or decree to be rendered.' "143
The procedures prescribed by the Drug Enforcement Act of
1990 subordinate a court's power to that of an administrative
agency by requiring the court to make a decision that has no force
unless an administrative agency concurs in its findings. Regardless
of whether it is a judicial function for a court to decide whether
there is a "relationship" between a drug conviction and an occupa-
tional or professional license, putting the matter before a court
while denying it the power to render a binding decision violates the
constitutional requirement of separation of powers. 
144
140. 295 Md. at 261-62, 455 A.2d at 965 (quoting Dinan v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516, 520,
112 N.E. 91, 94 (1916) (first brackets in original)).
141. For a discussion of how the administrative agencies fit into the three-branch divi-
sion of state government, see Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand &
Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 218-23, 334 A.2d 514, 520-22 (1975).
142. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 1-407 (1990)); see also Opinion of the Attorney
General, supra note 88, at 3 ("findings by the court are not binding on the [licensing
agency]").
143. 295 Md. at 261, 455 A.2d at 964 (respectively quoting State ex rel. Haines v.
Searle, 59 Minn. 489, 492, 61 N.W. 553, 554 (1894), and Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md.
569, 576-77, 97 A.2d 449, 452 (1953)).
144. In addition to the constitutional implications of the court's duties under the Act,
it is worth noting that the procedures prescribed by the Act are extremely inefficient. If
a court finds a relationship between the conviction and the license, the court must notify
the licensing agency of the conviction. The licensing agency must then investigate the
issue already considered by the court. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
If the court fails to find a relationship, the licensing agency will still learn of the licen-
see's conviction when the licensee applies for a renewal, and the agency must then inves-
tigate the relationship between the conviction and license. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
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4. Conclusion.-The Drug Enforcement Act of 1990 is the
State's innovative effort to respond to the problems caused by ille-
gal drug use. But the Act prescribes a dubious role for the courts.
Indeed, given the Court of Appeals' resistance to the imposition on
the courts of nonjudicial functions, the governor and the legislature
may find the courts reluctant to perform the new duties assigned to
them.
H. BRUCE DORSEY
MARTIN SCHREIBER
§ 1-404 (1990). Most occupational and professional licenses must be renewed every
two years. Opinion of the Attorney General, supra note 88, at 3 n.4.
It would be more efficient if the clerk of the court notified licensing agencies of all
licensee drug convictions. An automatic notification procedure such as this already ex-
ists for traffic violations, whereby the District Court notifies the Department of Motor
Vehicles of all traffic convictions pursuant to section 1-605 (d)(4) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article. See MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-605 (1989). In
fact, until the Drug Enforcement Act of 1990 repealed it, section 298(c) of Article 27
required the clerk of the court to notify the licensing agency when someone holding an
occupational or professional license was convicted of a drug offense. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 298(c), 298(c) (amendment) (Supp. 1990). Apparently, the courts largely
ignored this section of the Code. See Masters, supra note 74, at 9.
Considering the burden that drug cases impose on the judicial system, it seems
especially wasteful to involve the courts in this redundant process. Indeed, the opinions
in which the Court of Appeals struck down statutes for imposing on the courts nonjudi-
cial functions also reveal a concern about burdening the court with extra duties. See, e.g.,
Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Todd, 97 Md. 247, 265, 54 A. 963, 965 (1903)
(stating: "duties . . . could be imposed to such an extent as to seriously interfere with
the duties of the judicial office"); Robey v. Prince George's County, 92 Md. 150, 160-61,
48 A. 48, 50 (1900) (a judge who performs nonjudicial tasks may "neglect his real judi-
cial functions."). Requiring courts to notify licensing agencies of all drug convictions
not only would avoid the troublesome constitutional conflicts discussed here; it also
would prevent further burdening the courts with post-trial prima facie findings.
X. PROPERTY
A. Residential Exception to the Mechanics' Lien Statute
In Reisterstown Lumber Co. v. Tsao,' the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed whether the mechanics' lien statute's residential exception
applies when homeowners who contracted to have a house built on
their land and originally intended to use it as their residence, during
construction placed it on the market for sale.2 The case required
the court to render its first interpretation of Real Property Article
section 9-104(a)(2), 3 which protects from a subcontractor's mechan-
ics' lien houses constructed for the landowner's residential use.4
The court held that the owner's intent as of the time the subcontrac-
tor entered into a "substantially uninterrupted performance" of the
construction contract determines whether the residential exception
applies.5 Here the court denied one of the subcontractors a lien6
because the exception at issue applied to the homeowners.
Although the court appeared to leave intact the doctrine favor-
ing lien claimants under the mechanics' lien statute,7 it clarified the
principle that residential exceptions are construed in the home-
owner's favor. Consequently, Maryland subcontractors must be
aware of the residential exception provisions, and demand protec-
tions from general contractors or homeowners before entering con-
tracts to which section 9-104(a) (2) could apply.
1. The Case.-In 1986, the Tsaos contracted with L.W. Marino,
Incorporated (Marino), a general contractor, to construct a single
1. 319 Md. 623, 574 A.2d 307 (1990).
2. See id. at 624-25, 574 A.2d at 308.
3. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(a)(2) (1988) provides that:
A subcontractor doing work or furnishing materials or both for or about a
single family dwelling being erected on the owner's land for his own residence
is not entitled to a lien under this subtitle unless, within 90 days after doing
work or furnishing materials for or about that single family dwelling, the sub-
contractor gives written notice of an intention to claim a lien in accordance with
subsection (a)(1) of this section and the owner has not made full payment to the
contractor prior to receiving the notice.
Id.
4. The legislature added the residential exceptions to the mechanics' lien statute in
1982. See Act of May 20, 1982, ch. 251, 1982 Md. Laws 2520 (codified at'MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(a)(2), (f)(3) (1988)). For the text of the two subsections, see
supra note 3, infra note 39.
5. See 319 Md. at 631, 574 A.2d at 311.
6. See id.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 35-41.
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family dwelling on their land.' When they entered the contract, the
Tsaos intended to live in the completed house. They obtained a
construction loan to finance the construction, and the lender ad-
vanced funds at scheduled progress points. The lender issued
checks to the Tsaos, who then indorsed them to Marino. 9
The Reisterstown Lumber Company (Reisterstown Lumber)
was a subcontractor for construction of the Tsao residence, and sup-
plied Marino with materials from January 1987 to December 1987.
From January through June, Marino's obligations to Reisterstown
Lumber were paid within the required thirty days. These payments
totalled approximately $44,995. 0 From July through the final deliv-
ery it received in December, however, Marino did not pay for mater-
ials delivered by Reisterstown Lumber. Excluding late fees, the
unpaid bills amounted to approximately $14,887.1
In early March 1987, the Tsaos discovered that a cemetery was
visible from the second floor bedroom window.' 2 The Tsaos' cul-
tural and religious beliefs prohibited them from living in direct view
of a cemetery. Accordingly, during the summer of 1987, they de-
cided to sell the house upon its completion.' 3 They listed the house
with a real estate broker from October 1987 until approximately
eight months later, when they took it off the market. During that
time, they were not offered any contract of sale. The house re-
mained vacant until they moved in during August 1988. They still
occupied the house as of the date of the Court of Appeals'
decision. 4
The Tsaos made final payment to Marino on the construction
contract in November 1987, which relieved them of all contractual
obligations. 5 Marino suffered financial difficulties, however, and
8. Reisterstown Lumber, 319 Md. at 626, 574 A.2d at 309.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 626-27, 574 A.2d at 309. The majority of these charges, in total, were due
in July, the first month during which Marino failed to pay. Id. at 627, 574 A.2d at 309.
12. Id.
13. Id. The court did not state the Tsaos' religion but accepted without discussion
that their religious convictions prompted their decision in the summer of 1987 to sell
the house. See id.
14. See id. The court did not explain how the Tsaos overcame their cultural and
religious objections to living in the house.
15. Id. at 627 & n.3, 574 A.2d at 309 & n.3. Although Marino had not furnished a
required release of lien, see MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-114(a) (1988), all parties
agreed that the Tsaos had made "full payment to the contractor," a requirement that the
homeowner must meet when invoking § 9-104(a)(2). See id. § 9-104(a)(2); 319 Md. at
627 n.3, 574 A.2d at 309 n.3.
12531991] PROPERTY
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
was unable to complete the construction. Work ceased in January
1988.16 Because Marino failed to pay for supplies furnished by
Reisterstown Lumber, the subcontractor notified the Tsaos on
March 22, 1988 of its intention to claim a mechanics' lien. Reister-
stown Lumber subsequently filed suit to enforce the lien on their
property. 17
At trial, the Tsaos invoked section 9-104(a)(2), which provides
that "[a] subcontractor doing work or furnishing materials or both
for or about a single family dwelling being erected on the owner's
land for his own residence is not entitled to a lien . ".. ,,8 Reister-
stown Lumber argued that the residential exception did not protect
the Tsaos because the house was not constructed for their residen-
tial use. 19 The trial court determined that the owner's intent was
the key factor in determining section 9-104(a)(2)'s applicability.
The court found that the phrase "being erected . . . for his own
residence" 20 could require the court to measure the owner's intent
in three possible ways: "(1) intent when the construction contract
was signed, (2) the dominant intent over the total period of con-
struction, and (3) intent when the subcontractor furnished materi-
als for which the lien is sought."12'
The trial court concluded that the second alternative best satis-
fied the legislative purpose for the residential exception, i.e., mea-
suring the owner's dominant intent over the construction time.22
Applying this test, the trial court determined that the Tsao's "pri-
mary and driving motivation" was to construct a house to use as
their residence.23 Consequently, the court denied the mechanics'
lien. Reisterstown Lumber appealed the trial court's ruling, and the
Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion before
the case reached the Court of Special Appeals.24
The issue before the Court of Appeals was "whether the 'resi-
dential exception' to the mechanics' lien law... applies when home-
16. 319 Md. at 626, 574 A.2d at 309. Apparently th; Tsaos either engaged another
contractor to complete the construction, or it was sufficiently completed when Marino
ceased construction, because in August of 1988 they moved into the house. See id. at
627, 574 A.2d at 309.
17. id.
18. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(a)(2) (1988); see Reisterstown Lumber, 319 Md.
at 625, 574 A.2d at 308.
19. See 319 Md. at 625-26, 574 A.2d at 308.
20. MD. REAL. PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(a)(2) (1988).
21. 319 Md. at 626, 574 A.2d at 308.
22. See id. at 626, 574 A.2d at 309.
23. Id.
24. See id.
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owners contract to have a single family dwelling built on their land
with the intent to make it their residence, but, during the course of
construction, decide to place the house on the market for sale."'25
The court based its decision primarily on legislative intent, and held
"that whether the improvements are 'for [the owner's] own resi-
dence' is determined as of the time when the subcontractor com-
mences an otherwise substantially uninterrupted performance of
work for, or selling of materials to, the contractor."'26 Accordingly,
the court permitted the Tsaos to invoke the residential exception to
the mechanics' lien law, and denied Reisterstown Lumber a lien on
their home.
2. Legal Background.-
a. Statutoy.-Mechanics' liens were unknown at common law
and are purely statutory creations. 27 In 1791, Maryland became the
nation's first state to enact a mechanics' lien statute.2 8 Today, all
fifty states have some form of mechanics' lien legislation.2 9 These
25. Id. at 624-25, 574 A.2d at 308 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 631, 574 A.2d at 311 (brackets in original).
27. See S. PHILLIPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MECHANICS' LIENS ON REAL AND PER-
SONAL PROPERTY 3 (1874); accord Comment, Mechanics' Liens-Potential Pitfallfor the Home-
owner, 62 Ky. L.J. 278, 279 (1973) [hereinafter Comment, Mechanics' Liens]; Comment,
The Nebraska Construction Lien Act: Which Way to Lien?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 86, 87 & n.7 (1983)
[hereinafter Comment, The Nebraska Construction Lien Act]. See also Freeform Pools, Inc. v.
Strawbridge Home for Boys, 228 Md. 297, 303, 179 A.2d 683, 686 (1962) (denying a
mechanics' lien on a swimming pool because such structures were not explicitly lienable
under the Maryland mechanics' lien statute, and because no common-law principles for
mechanics' liens exist); In re Louisville Daily News & Enquirer, 20 F. Supp. 465, 466
(W.D. Ky. 1937) (denying the claimant a mechanics' lien because the Kentucky mechan-
ics' lien law requirements had not been satisfied, and no common law or equity princi-
ples could save the plaintiff's claim).
28. See Act of Dec. 19, 1791, ch. 45, § 10, 1791 Md. Laws. See S. PHIILIPS, supra note
27, at 11 & n.2 (the General Assembly passed the mechanics' lien statute at the urging of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison); Comment, The Nebraska Construction Lien Act,
supra note 27, at 88 & n.10 (Maryland's first mechanics' lien statute "was enacted to
stimulate and encourage the construction of Washington D.C.").
29. See ALA. CODE §§ 35-11-210 to -234 (1975 & Supp. 1990); AL.ASKA STAT.
§§ 34.35.050-.120 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-981 to -1007 (1990); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-44-101 to -508 (1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3110-3153 (West
1974 & Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-22-101 to -133 (1973 & Supp. 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-33 to -92f (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2701-2736 (1989
& Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. §§ 713.01-.37 (1989 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-14-
360 to -365 (1982 & Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 507-41 to -49 (1988 & Supp.
1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 45-501 to -517 (1977 & Supp. 1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, 1-
39 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-8-3-1 to -15 (Bums 1980 & Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE
§§ 572.1-.29 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1101 to -1112 (1983 & Supp. 1990); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.010 (Baldwin 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4801-:4855 (West
1983 & Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3251-3269 (1980 & Supp. 1990);
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statutes vary greatly from state to state; however, they generally fol-
low the New York system or the Pennsylvania system.30
Under the New York system, a mechanics' lien is limited to the
amount the homeowner owes the general contractor under the con-
struction contract."' Thus, the subcontractor asserting a lien must
demonstrate that the owner is still obligated to pay the general con-
tractor at least the amount of the lien sought. The New York system
protects the owner from being forced to pay twice for work per-
formed on his property.3 2
The Pennsylvania system, which represents the majority view,
offers homeowners no such protection. The system permits subcon-
tractors to establish a lien for the value of work performed, regard-
less of how much, if anything, the owner owes to the general
contractor."3 This system is based on a theory of unjust enrichment:
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to -114 (1988 & Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
254, §§ 1-32 (1990); MICH. CUMP. LAws §§ 570.01-.30 (1967 & Supp. 1990); MINN.
STAT. §§ 514.01-.17 (1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 85-7-131 to -201 (1973 & Supp. 1990);
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 429.010-.430 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-521 to -563 (1989);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 52-125 to -159 (1988 & Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 108.221-
.246 (1986 & Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 88 447:1-:18 (1983 & Supp. 1990); N.J.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:44-64 to -142 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-2-1 to -19 (1978 &
Supp. 1990); N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 3-39c (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 44A-7 to -23 (1984 & Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 35-27-01 to -28 (1980 &
Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1311.01-.33 (Baldwin 1980 & Supp. 1990);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, §§ 141-154 (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 87.001-.093 (1988); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 49, §§ 1101-1902 (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-28-1 to
-36 (1984 & Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-10 to -430 (Law. Co-op. 1977 &
Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 44-9-1 to -49 (1983 & Supp. 1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 66-11-101 to -207 (1982); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452-5472c
(Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-1-1 to -26 (1974 & Supp. 1990);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 1921-1928 (1984 & Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1 to
-23.2 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.010-.255 (1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-1 to -39
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 779.01 to .17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. §§ 29-
2-101 to -109 (1988).
30. See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics'Liens § 8 (1970).
31. See Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the Building Trades, 68 YALE L.J.
138, 142 (1958) [hereinafter Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds]; see also Com-
ment, Mechanics' Liens, supra note 27, at 279; Comment, The Nebraska Construction Lien Act,
supra note 27, at 90 (the amount owed is determined as of the time notice of the lien is
given).
32. See Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds, supra note 31, at 142-43. For
cases applying the New York rule, see State v. Tabasso Homes, Inc., 42 Del. 110, 28
A.2d 248 (1942); Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, 61 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1952); Larkin v.
McMullin, 120 N.Y. 206, 24 N.E. 447 (1890); Michael Flynn Mfg. Co. v.J.L. Coe Constr.
Co., 259 N.C. 649, 131 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Knight v. Ferrante, 202 Va. 243, 117 S.E.2d
283 (1960).
33. See Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds, supra note 31, at 144-45; see also
Comment, Mechanics' Liens, supra note 27, at 279; Comment, The Nebraska Construction Lien
Act, supra note 27, at 91.
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the owner receives the benefit of the subcontractor's work, and con-
sequently must pay the subcontractor the value of the work
performed. 4
Maryland followed the Pennsylvania system until 1982. s 1 Mary-
land subcontractors could establish a lien for the work's value upon
proof of performance and nonpayment; the amount of the owner's
remaining obligation to the general contractor was irrelevant.3 6
The Court of Appeals has stated that because the mechanics' lien
statute was created for the benefit and protection of subcontractors
and materialmen, it should be interpreted in their favor.3 7
In 1982, legislation was passed converting Maryland to the New
York system."8 The residential exceptions to the mechanics' lien
statute limit a subcontractor's lien to the amount the owner owes
the general contractor under the construction contract.3 9 Thus, the
subcontractor cannot establish a lien if the owner paid the general
34. See Comment, Nebraska Construction Lien Act, supra note 27, at 91; see also Com-
ment, Mechanics' Liens, supra note 27, at 279. For cases applying the Pennsylvania rule,
see Petaluma Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Foremost Properties, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 2d 83, 4
Cal. Rptr. 268 (1960); Bowen v. Phinney, 162 Mass. 593, 39 N.E. 283 (1895); Baldridge
v. Morgan, 15 N.M. 249, 106 P. 342 (1910); Bryan v. Stempkowski, 88 Pa. Super. 390
(1926); H. & M. Heating Co. v. Andrae, 35 Wis. 2d 1, 150 N.W.2d 379 (1967).
35. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104 (1974) (amended 1982).
36. Before its 1982 amendment, § 9-104(a) provided in relevant part that "[a] sub-
contractor is not entitled to a lien under this subtitle unless, within 90 days after doing
the work or furnishing the materials, he gives written notice of his intention to claim a
lien substantially in the form specified .... " Id. § 9-104(a).
37. SeeJohnson v. Metcalfe, 209 Md. 537, 543, 121 A.2d 825, 828 (1956) (although a
contractor is liable to the homeowner for inadequacies in performance, the contractor
may still recover amounts due based on work performed properly); see also FrankJ. Klein
& Sons v. Laudeman, 270 Md. 152, 162, 311 A.2d 780, 785-86 (1973) (minimal grading
and pouring of concrete footers, and the owner's intent to continue construction, satisfy
the requirement that there be a "commencement of a building" before a mechanics' lien
can attach); Clarke Certified Concrete Co. v. Lindberg, 216 Md. 576, 582, 141 A.2d 685,
688 (1958) (enforcing a lien on the homeowners' property if prior to the date of the
homeowner's purchase, the supplier provided materials for construction of the develop-
ment that included the homeowner's dwelling); T. Dan Kolker, Inc. v. Shure, 209 Md.
290, 296, 121 A.2d 223, 226 (1956) (if lumber was delivered at different times pursuant
to a vague offer and acceptance, the deliveries would constitute a single matter for set-
tlement through a mechanics' lien action).
38. See Act of May 20, 1982, ch. 251, 1982 Md. Laws 2520 (codified at MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(a)(2), (f)(3) (1988)).
39. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(f)(3) (1988). This section states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the
lien of the subcontractor against a single family dwelling being erected on the
land of the owner for his own residence shall not exceed the amount by which
the owner is indebted under the contract at the time the notice is given.
Id. The Court of Appeals refers to this section and § 9-104(a)(2) as the "residential
exception provisions."
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contractor in full on the construction contract. The new legisla-
tion's scope is limited, because it applies only to situations involving
a contract for construction of a single family dwelling, to be built on
the owner's land, and to be used as the owner's residence.4 ° The
residential exception's effect on an owner's liability to a subcontrac-
tor is not fully developed because Maryland courts have addressed
only one relevant case.4'
b. Case Law.-Ridge Sheet Metal Co. v. Morrell42 is the only case
prior to Reisterstown Lumber that required interpretation of the resi-
dential exceptions. In that case, the Morrells contracted with a gen-
eral contractor, Hunter, for construction of a single family dwelling
on their land and for use as their residence.4" The contract pro-
vided that the Morrells would pay eighty percent of the contract
price in scheduled progress payments. The Morrells would hold the
twenty percent balance until Hunter completed construction, at
which time the twenty percent would serve as the final payment. 44
Hunter hired Ridge to install a heat pump in the Morrell's
house.4 5 Ridge completed the first phase of the job and billed
Hunter for the work as provided in the contract, but Hunter did not
pay.46 After receiving the Morrells' last progress payment, Hunter
ceased work before he finished the house.47
Ridge properly notified the Morrells, and filed for a mechanics'
lien. The Morrells opposed the lien, arguing that they had paid
Hunter all that the contract required, and were entitled to keep the
twenty percent until work was completed.4' They based this argu-
ment on section 9-104(f)(3), which limits the amount of a subcon-
tractor's lien to "the amount by which the owner is indebted under
the contract at the time the notice is given." 49
The court addressed the question whether the twenty percent
retained by the Morrells was to be considered in determining
whether they had made full payment when the lien notice was re-
40. See supra note 3.
41. See Ridge Sheet Metal Co. v. Morrell, 69 Md. App. 364, 372-73, 517 A.2d 1133,
1137 (1986) (interpreting MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(0(3) (1988)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 366, 517 A.2d at 1134.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 367, 517 A.2d at 1134.
47. Id.
48. Id., 517 A.2d at 1135.
49. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(0(3) (1988). For the full text of this section,
see supra note 39.
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ceived.5 ° The court ruled in the Morrells' favor, stating that under
section 9-104(f)(3), "a subcontractor may only establish a lien up to
the amount of an enforceable obligation of the owner to the prime
contractor.... This holding is based on the language of the con-
tract, the legislative intent behind the applicable statutory provi-
sions, and manifest fairness."51 The discussion following the
holding indicated that courts would construe the provisions in the
homeowner's favor when the residential exception is at issue.52
According to the Ridge Sheet Metal court, by enacting the resi-
dential exception the legislature intended in limited situations to
shift the risk of loss from homeowners to subcontractors. 53 Mani-
fest fairness places the risk of loss on the party that can best protect
itself.' The court reasoned that the subcontractor has knowledge
of the construction trade and its local players, and is therefore bet-
ter able to determine when a contractor is financially unstable.55 A
subcontractor can protect itself from nonpayment by requiring that
56the owner pay it and the general contractor as joint payees, or by
filing suit against the general contractor to collect amounts owed.
5 7
The Ridge Sheet Metal case suggests that when the residential excep-
tion provisions are at issue, courts will override the old rule favoring
materialmen, and find for the homeowner.
3. Analysis.-
a. Legislative Intent.-In Reisterstown Lumber Co., the Court of
Appeals supported its holding by pointing to the legislative purpose
of the residential exceptions to the mechanics' lien law. It noted
that their "clear purpose is to protect from double payment the
owner of a 'single family dwelling being erected on the owner's land
for his own residence'' "58 Although the court offered little support
for its conclusions regarding legislative intent, the support does
50. See Ridge Sheet Metal, 69 Md. App. at 368, 517 A.2d at 1135. If the amount re-
tained was considered an existing obligation under the contract, a lien could be estab-
lished up to that amount. If the Morrells were not considered indebted under the
contract, no lien could be established. See id. at 371, 517 A.2d at 1136-37.
51. Id. at 372-73, 517 A.2d at 1137.
52. See id. at 374-75, 517 A.2d at 1138.
53. See id. at 374, 517 A.2d at 1138.
54. See id. at 375, 517 A.2d at 1138.
55. See id. at 374-75, 517 A.2d at 1138.
56. Id. at 375, 517 A.2d at 1138.
57. Id., 517 A.2d at 1138-39. Whether this is a practical option is another matter,
considering the length and cost of litigation.
58. 319 Md. 623, 628, 574 A.2d 307, 309 (1990) (quoting MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 9-104(a)(2) (1988)).
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exist.59
The court supported its conclusion that legislative intent fa-
vored homeowners by discussing analogous situations in which it
denied liens because of legislative policy. 60 For example, under sec-
tion 9-102(d),6 realty conveyed to a bona fide purchaser for value
will not be subjected to a lien for the seller's antecedent debts; this
is true even if the building is residential.62 And courts may not issue
a mechanics' lien for the seller's antecedent debts when only the
property's equitable title has been transferred to a bona fide pur-
chaser for value."3 This holds true even if the lien petition is filed
before the purchaser acquires the deed.'
In these examples, the purchaser paid for the dwelling in part
or in full and received an interest in the land; therefore, a mechan-
ics' lien based on antecedent debts could not attach. Although not
directly related to section 9-104(a)(2), these circumstances indicate
that courts need not always favor the materialman in a mechanics'
lien case. By drawing these analogies, the court seems to indicate
that it is legislative and not judicial policy which, in special circum-
stances, favors the homeowner over the materialman.
However valid the court's analogy, there is more substantial ev-
idence of the legislature's intent behind section 9-104(a)(2). Sena-
tor Dorman of Prince George's County, sponsor of the residential
59. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
60. See Reisterstown Lumber, 319 Md. at 630, 574 A.2d at 310-11.
61. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-102(d) (1988). This section provides: "[A]
building or the land on which the building is erected may not be subjected to a lien
under this subtitle if, prior to the establishment of a lien in accordance with this subtitle,
legal title has been granted to a bona fide purchaser for value." Id.
62. See Reisterstown Lumber, 319 Md. at 630, 574 A.2d at 310-11.
63. See id. at 630, 574 A.2d at 311; see also Himmighoefer v. Medallion Indus., Inc.,
302 Md. 270, 281, 487 A.2d 282, 287-88 (1985). In Himmighoefer, the subcontractor,
Medallion, furnished work and materials to construction sites owned by Ridgely Build-
ers. See id. at 271, 487 A.2d at 282. Ridgely contracted to sell one of its properties to
the Himmighoefers, pursuant to which the Himmighoefers gave Ridgely a $5,000 de-
posit. Id., 487 A.2d at 283. After the parties signed the sale contract, the subcontractor
petitioned to establish a lien naming only Ridgely as the defendant. Ridgely then con-
veyed the property to the Himmighoefers, who paid Ridgely the full purchase price.
When Ridgely failed to respond to a show cause order on the subcontractor's petition, a
default decree was entered establishing a lien on the Himmighoefer's home. The Him-
mighoefers received notice of the lien when they saw that their properties were adver-
tised for sale. Id. After permitting the Himmighoefers intervention and vacating the
original lien judgment, the trial court issued a new order establishing the lien, effective
against the Himmighoefers. Id. at 271-72, 487 A.2d at 283. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that because the Himmighoefers obtained equitable title before the peti-
tion for the lien was filed, a mechanics' lien could not reach their interest in the prop-
erty. See id. at 281, 487 A.2d at 287-88.
64. See Himmighoefer, 302 Md. at 281, 487 A.2d at 287-88, discussed supra note 63.
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exception legislation, stated its intended purpose in a letter to Car-
vel Payne.65 Senator Dorman asked Mr. Payne whether they could
"draft a bill that removes the property owner from any type of liabil-
ity in regard to mechanic[s'] liens if the property owner pays the
prime contractor in full?" 66 Dorman expressed his concern about
subjecting property owners to double payment for construction on
their homes.67 Additionally, the senate bill containing the residen-
tial exceptions states that its purpose is to limit an owner's liability
to subcontractors to the extent that the owner has paid the general
contractor. 68
The legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly
amended the mechanics' lien statute to protect homeowners by
shifting the risk of loss to the subcontractor. Thus, although the
Reisterstown Lumber court made conclusions without adequate sup-
port about the legislative intent behind section 9-104(a)(2), there is
evidence to substantiate its conclusion.
- b. The Homeowner's Intent.-The court also discussed problems
with relying heavily on the owner's subjective intent over the con-
struction period as the basis for determining section 9-104(a)(2)'s
applicability.69 The court observed that normal events alter peo-
ple's plans, and it is not unusual for a couple having a house built to
vary their intent throughout the construction period.7" The court
concluded that the General Assembly did not envision basing the
residential exception on the owners' subjective intent during the
construction period."' Not only would the claimant's burden of
proving the owners' subjective intent over the entire course of con-
struction be extremely difficult, but the residential exception would
depend too heavily on the unpredictable conduct of persons with
whom the lien claimant has no privity.7 2 The Court of Appeals
therefore rejected the predominant intent approach taken by the
lower court. The court did not believe that the legislature intended
65. See letter from Senator Arthur Dorman to Carvel Payne, Director of the Depart-
ment of Legislative Reference (Nov. 6, 1981), concerning Maryland Senate Bill 135
(1982 Sess.) (available on microfilm in the University of Maryland Marshall Law
Library).
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See Act of May 20, 1982, ch. 251, 1982 Md. Laws 2520.
69. See Reisterstown Lumber, 319 Md. at 631, 574 A.2d at 311.
70. See id. at 630-31, 574 A.2d at 311.
71. See id. at 631, 574 A.2d at 311.
72. See id. The court seemed concerned about the potentially onerous burden upon
a subcontractor of proving a third party's subjective intent. Id.
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the residential exception to be a complex, difficult piece of legisla-
tion: a simple approach should be taken.7" Considering the alterna-
tive approach's possible complexity, the court chose a method that
preserves judicial efficiency and does not overburden homeowners
or subcontractors.
c. Contract Law.-The court presented a final reason for its de-
cision, based on principles of contract law. When Reisterstown
Lumber entered into the contract with Marino, the Tsaos intended
to use the house as their residence. 74 Reisterstown Lumber, there-
fore, entered into the contract with the knowledge that its only re-
course would be against the contractor, provided that the Tsaos
paid the construction contract in full. By continuing to extend
credit to Marino after the Tsaos decided to sell the house, Reister-
stown Lumber showed that it believed Marino likely would be its
only source of payment. The subcontractor could not later force the
Tsaos to take responsibility for its poor judgment.75
Although valid, the court's reasoning would have had more
force had it been coupled with the "manifest fairness" concept
presented in Ridge Sheet Metal.76 The facts of the Reisterstown Lumber
case fit squarely within the manifest fairness framework. Reister-
stown Lumber knew in August 1987 that Marino was having finan-
cial difficulties; the Tsaos were unaware of the problems until
January 1988. 7 7 If Reisterstown Lumber wanted to protect itself
from further losses, it could have sought Marino's assurance of per-
formance, and ceased deliveries if Marino failed to provide the as-
surance and pay off its balance.78 Instead, the subcontractor
73. See id. The court's approach is much simpler than the predominant intent ap-
proach because it allows the subcontractor, contractor, and homeowner to rely on the
owner's initial intent.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Ridge Sheet Metal, 69 Md. App. at 374-76, 517 A.2d at 1138-39. For some
unstated reason, Reisterstown Lumber does not mention Ridge Sheet Metal. While Ridge
Sheet Metal concerned § 9-104(f(3), and Reisterstown Lumber concerned § 9-104(a)(2), the
provisions had the same purpose and were enacted together. In addition, the court in
Reisterstown Lumber used the same analysis employed in Ridge Sheet Metal. See generally id.
77. See Reisterstown Lumber, 319 Md. at 626-27, 574 A.2d at 309. Reisterstown Lum-
ber required Marino to pay each bill within 30 days. Reisterstown Lumber therefore
should have known in August 1987 that its July bill had not been paid. Nothing in the
opinion indicates that the Tsaos were aware of Marino's financial difficulties. The fact
that the Tsaos paid the final draw to Marino in November 1987 indicates that they were
unaware at that time of Marino's problems. See id. at 627, 547 A.2d at 309.
78. See MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-609(1) (1975). This section provides:
A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's
expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reason-
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allowed Marino's debt to become overdue for five months of deliv-
eries.79 Alternatively, Reisterstown Lumber could have filed for a
mechanics' lien when Marino first defaulted in July 1987. If Reister-
stown Lumber had acted promptly, the Tsaos would have been
aware of the problem, and could have withheld payments to Marino
to cover the debt owed Reisterstown Lumber. It would be unjust to
force the Tsaos, the party lacking knowledge of Marino's financial
difficulties, to reimburse the subcontractor that failed to protect it-
self in spite of knowing that the general contractor was in financial
trouble.
Notwithstanding the court's failure to recognize the import of
the Ridge Sheet Metal decision, and the absence of substantive sup-
port for its conclusions about legislative intent, the court made a
logical decision in finding for the Tsaos. It concluded that, in order
to further the "fair and workable legislative purpose" of section 9-
104(a)(2),80 whether the owners intend to use the dwelling as their
residence is to be determined as of the time that the subcontractor
begins a substantially uninterrupted performance of the construc-
tion contract.8 ' Reisterstown Lumber was denied a mechanics' lien
against the Tsaos' house because in January 1987, when it began
substantially uninterrupted performance, the Tsaos intended to use
the single family dwelling as their residence.8 2
d. Consequences.-Reisterstown Lumber limits homeowners' liabil-
ity to subcontractors to the extent that the owner has paid the gen-
eral contractor. Although the new legislation offers homeowners
some protection, Maryland lower courts still view the mechanics'
lien statute as a protection to materialmen and subcontractors and,
in general, continue to construe the statute in their favor.83 The
Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates a movement away from the
able grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party
the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and
until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any
performance for which he has not already received the agreed return.
Id.
79. See Reisterstown Lumber, 319 Md. at 627, 574 A.2d at 309. In fact, the earliest
unpaid bills were also the highest. See supra note 11.
80. Reisterstown Lumber, 319 Md. at 631, 574 A.2d at 311.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Ridge Sheet Metal Co. v. Morrell, 69 Md. App. 364, 369, 517 A.2d 1133,
1136 (1986); see also Cabana, Inc. v. Eastern Air Control, Inc., 61 Md. App. 609, 619, 487
A.2d 1209, 1213-14 (1985) (enforcing a mechanics' lien on the lessee's building against
a lessor, after the building was forfeited to the lessor upon the lessee's breach of the
lease).
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doctrine favoring materialmen. The Reisterstown Lumber decision,
along with the Ridge Sheet Metal decision and legislative history of
section 9-104(a)(2), has established that when a residential excep-
tion is at issue, the mechanics' lien statute will be liberally construed
in the homeowner's favor.
The decision is not overly burdensome to subcontractors; there
are many ways in which a subcontractor can protect itself against
loss. If a subcontractor enters into a contract involving the con-
struction of a single family dwelling, it should determine whether
the residential exception applies. If the exception applies, the sub-
contractor should require the owner to issue progress payment
checks payable jointly to the subcontractor and the general contrac-
tor.14 Alternatively, the subcontractor could require the general
contractor to obtain a surety or performance bond 5 such that if the
general contractor becomes insolvent, the surety company will pay
amounts owed to subcontractors, or complete the contract's per-
formance. Subject to time and monetary constraints, a subcontrac-
tor could also file a suit against the general contractor to recover
debts owed for work performed.8 6 In any case, the prudent subcon-
tractor must be aware of the nature of the construction project in
which it is involved, and should seek alternate methods of protec-
tion when section 9-104(a)(2) prevents a mechanics' lien.
4. Conclusion.-The residential exceptions provide necessary
protection to homeowners who enter construction contracts with
little or no knowledge of the general contractor's financial status, or
the operations of the construction industry. In granting liberal con-
struction of section 9-104(a)(2) in favor of the homeowner, the
Reisterstown Lumber court assured effective enforcement of the legis-
lature's intended protections.
KATHLEEN S. HOKE
84. See Ridge Sheet Metal, 69 Md. App. at 375, 517 A.2d at 1138.
85. A surety bond is "a bond issued by one party, the surety, guaranteeing that he
will perform certain acts promised by another or pay a stipulated sum, up to the bond
limit, in lieu of performance, should the principle fail to perform." BARRON'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 52 (2d ed. 1984). A performance bond is a "contractor's bond, guaranteeing
that the contractor will perform the contract and providing that, in the event of default,
the surety may complete the contract or pay damages up to the bond limit." Id. at 52.
86. See Ridge Sheet Metal, 69 Md. App. at 375, 517 A.2d at 1138-39.
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XI. TAXATION
A. Workers' Compensation Assessments
In Workmen's Compensation Commission v. Property & Casualty Insur-
ance Guarantee Corp.,' the Court of Appeals considered in light of ar-
ticle 48A, section 515,2 which exempts the Property and Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Corporation (PCIGC) from tax payments,
whether PCIGC is required to pay assessments levied by the Work-
men's Compensation Commission.' The Workmen's Compensation
Commission attempted to collect assessment payments from
PCIGC, as it does from other employers or their insurers, to fund
the Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) and the Uninsured Employers'
Fund (UEF).4 The court held that SIF and UEF assessments are
taxes from which PCIGC is exempt.5 Thus, without departing sub-
stantially from prior law,6 the court brought Maryland into conform-
ity with other states that have considered similar issues.7
The Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation is
a statutorily created, nonprofit entity designed "to provide a mecha-
nism for the prompt payment of covered claims under certain insur-
ance policies and to avoid financial loss to residents of Maryland
who are claimants or policyholders of an insurer ... which has be-
come insolvent .... -8 Subject to applicable policy limits and condi-
tions, PCIGC is liable for "covered claims" that could have been
brought against the insurer, including workers' compensation
claims.9 PCIGC is statutorily exempt from paying all fees and taxes
imposed by the State or any of its subdivisions, except for taxes lev-
1. 319 Md. 1, 570 A.2d 323 (1990).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 515 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
3. See 319 Md. at 2-4, 570 A.2d at 323-24.
4. Id. at 4, 570 A.2d at 324.
5. See id. at 11, 570 A.2d at 328.
6. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 504 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
9. See id. § 508(a)(1)(i). This subsection provides that PCIGC shall:
Except as to surety bonds, be obligated to the extent of the covered claims
existing prior to the determination of insolvency and arising within 30 days
after the determination of insolvency .... [Blut such obligation shall include
only that amount of each covered claim which is in excess of $100 and less than
$300,000. However, [PCIGC] shall pay the full amount of any covered claim
arising out of a workmen's compensation policy. In no event shall [PCIGC] be
obligated to a policyholder or claimant in an amount in excess of the obligation
of the insolvent insurer under the policy from which the claim arises.
Id.
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ied on real or personal property.' °
Maryland Workers' Compensation law" requires employers, or
the employer's insurance carrier, to pay a percentage of all awards
or settlement agreements for permanent disability, to the SIF 12 and
the UEF. 13 Employers pay these assessments in addition to any
compensation they pay to employees,' 4 and the State Treasurer
holds, manages, and disburses these funds.' 5
The legislature created the Subsequent Injury Fund to en-
courage employers to hire handicapped workers by limiting the em-
ployer's liability for worker's compensation.' 6 When a previously
disabled or injured employee sustains work related injuries, the em-
ployer is liable for normal workers' compensation if the employee
suffers the injury while in the employer's service. " The SIF then
pays the employee an additional amount to make the total compen-
10. See id § 515. "The [PCIGC] shall be exempt from payment of all fees and all
taxes levied by this State or any of its subdivisions except taxes levied on real or per-
sonal property." Id.
11. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 (1985 & Supp. 1990).
12. See id. § 66(2)(a). SIF assessments are calculated as six and one-half percent of
all awards rendered against the employer:
The Workmen's Compensation Commission shall assess a percentage amount,
to be made payable to the Subsequent Injury Fund, on all awards rendered
against an employer, or, if insured, the employer's insurance carrier or the In-
jured Workers' Insurance Fund, for permanent disability and death.., and also
on all amounts payable ... pursuant to settlement agreements ... as follows:
(i) .5 percent as to awards and settlement agreements approved on and
after June 1, 1963 and prior to July 1, 1987; and
(ii) 6-'/2 percent as to all awards and settlement agreements approved on
and after July 1, 1987....
Id.
13. See id. § 91(d)(3)(i). UEF assessments are calculated as one percent of awards:
An employer, or, if insured, the employer's insurance carrier or the Injured
Workers' Insurance Fund, as the case may be, shall pay to the Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund an amount equal to 1 percent of all awards rendered against the
employer for permanent disability or death, including awards for disfigurement
or mutilation, and 1 percent of all amounts payable by the employer (or his
insurance carrier or the Injured Workers' Insurance Fund) pursuant to settle-
ment agreements approved by the Commission....
Id.
14. See id. §§ 66(2)(c), 91(d)(3)(iii).
15. See id. §§ 66(2)(d), 92.
16. See McKenzie v. C.C. Kottcamp & Sons, 311 Md. 54, 57, 532 A.2d 703, 704
(1987) (the SIF's purpose in limiting liability is to encourage employers to hire handi-
capped persons); Subsequent Injury Fund v. Thomas, 275 Md. 628, 633-34, 342 A.2d
671, 674-75 (1975) (SIF's purpose is to persuade employers to hire handicapped indi-
viduals by limiting the employer's liability). Although cited for this proposition in Prop-
erty & Casualty Insurance, article 101 does not state explicitly that the SIF's purpose is to
encourage employers to hire the handicapped.
17. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 66(1) (1985 & Supp. 1990). The Workers' Coin-
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sation equal to the amount that would be due for the combined ef-
fects of the employee's impairment and subsequent injury. 8
The statutorily-created Uninsured Employers' Fund was
designed to pay workers' compensation claims against uninsured
employers. 9 The UEF has a statutory ceiling of $2,500,000; if the
fund reaches this amount, the Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sion discontinues making assessments. 2° The UEF also has a statu-
tory floor of one million dollars; if the fund drops below this,
assessments resume.
2
'
1. The Case.-The suit arose after the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commission (the Commission) repeatedly, but unsuccessfully,
charged the PCIGC for claims PCIGC paid on behalf of insolvent
insurers-claims that otherwise would have been subject to SIF and
UEF assessments.22 PCIGC protested, arguing that the assessments
were taxes within the meaning of its statutory tax exemption."
PCIGC filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
seeking a declaratory judgment exempting it from paying the
pensation law provides a schedule of worker's compensation awards based on the nature
and extent of a worker's injuries. See id. § 36.
18. See id. § 66(1). The section provides in part:
Whenever an employee who has a permanent impairment due to previous
accident or disease or any congenital condition, which is or is likely to be a
hindrance or obstacle to his employment, incurs subsequent disability by rea-
son of a personal injury, for which compensation is required by this article re-
sulting in permanent partial or permanent total disability that is substantially
greater by reason of the combined effects of the impairment and subsequent
injury than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone,
the employer or his insurance carrier shall be liable only for the compensation
payable under this article for such injury. However, in addition to such com-
pensation to which the employer or his insurance carrier is liable ... the em-
ployee shall be entitled to receive and shall be paid additional compensation
from a special fund to be known as the "Subsequent Injury Fund," ... it being
the intent of this section to make the total payments to which such employee
shall become entitled equal to the compensation that would be due for the
combined effects of the impairment and subsequent injury resulting in perma-
nent total disability or a substantially greater permanent partial disability ....
Id.
19. See id. § 91(a) (articulating the UEF's purpose); Uninsured Employer's Fund v.
Hoy, 23 Md. App. 1, 5, 325 A.2d 446, 449 (1974) (the UEF's purpose is to provide
payment of awards against uninsured defaulting employers).
20. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 91(d)(4) (1985 & Supp. 1990); infra note 81 and
accompanying text.
21. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 91(d)(4) (1985 & Supp. 1990).
22. Property & Casualty Ins., 319 Md. at 4, 570 A.2d at 324.
23. See id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 515 (1986 & Supp. 1990) (quoted supra
note 10).
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assessments.24
The Baltimore County Circuit Court held that the assessments
were taxes within the meaning of the statutory exemption, and
granted PCIGC the relief it requested. 25 The Court of Special Ap-
peals affirmed this decision. 26 The Court of Appeals granted the
Commission's petition for certiorari and affirmed, holding that the
assessments plainly fell within PCIGC's exemption from tax under
article 48A, section 515.27
The Court of Appeals based its determination on several fac-
tors. First, the court looked to the definition of the statutory term
"taxes" in other Maryland cases. 28 The court decided that the as-
sessments fell within the definition, and noted that "the Legisla-
ture's use of the word 'assessment' in no way indicates that a
governmental charge imposed for a public purpose is not a 'tax.' "29
The court pointed out that the SIF and the UEF assessments are
similar to other assessments that have been viewed as taxes,3" in-
cluding assessments to the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund 3'
and employer contributions to unemployment compensation. 2
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have held that similar assessments
24. roperty & Casualty Ins., 319 Md. at 4, 570 A.2d at 324.
25. Id. at 5, 570 A.2d at 324-25.
26. See Workmen's Compensation Comm'n v. Property & Casualty Ins. Guar. Corp.,
74 Md. App. 99, 105, 536 A.2d 714, 717 (1988), aft'd, 319 Md. 1, 570 A.2d 323 (1990).
27. See Pperty & Casualty Ins., 319 Md. at 11, 570 A.2d at 327-28.
28. See id. at 5, 570 A.2d at 325; see also Mayor of Baltimore v. Greenmount Ceme-
tery, 7 Md. 517, 535 (1855); infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
29. 319 Md. at 5, 570 A.2d at 325.
30. See id. at 6, 570 A.2d at 325.
31. See id. The Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund compensated victims of auto-
mobile accidents in which the responsible party was uninsured. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
66-1/2, § 151 (1957) (repealed 1977). It was funded in part by assessments on automo-
bile liability insurers determined as a percentage of premiums on liability policies. See
id.; see also Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219
Md. 607, 616, 150 A.2d 421, 427 (1959) (assessments for the UCJF are a valid exercise
of the State's taxing power); State Ins. Comm'r v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Md.
108, 116, 215 A.2d 749, 754 (1966) (UCJF assessments are similar in character to both
"taxes" and "licenses"); infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
32. See 319 Md. at 6, 570 A.2d at 325-26. The Unemployment Compensation Act
imposes upon employers an obligation to pay a percentage of their payrolls into the
unemployment compensation fund. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 8(b) (1985). See also
infra note 63 and accompanying text; see Standard Properties, Inc. v. Employment Sec.
Bd. of Md., 201 Md. 1, 7, 92 A.2d 459, 462 (1952) (the unemployment compensation
law is an exercise of the State's taxing power); Maryland Unemployment Compensation
Bd. v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 89, 36 A.2d 666, 667 (1944) (unemployment compensation
contributions demanded from an employer are an excise tax imposed by the legislature
in the exercise of the State's police power).
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are taxes. 3
Finally, the court rejected the Commission's argument that the
SIF and UEF assessments are part of the "covered claims" PCIGC is
statutorily obligated to pay under article 48A, section 508(a). 4 The
court rejected the argument that the requirement that PCIGC pay
"covered claims" conflicts with article 48A, section 515, which ex-
empts PCIGC from paying taxes,35 noting that this reading of the
statutes would ignore section 515's clear intent.36
2. Legal Background.-
a. Maryland.-In Mayor of Baltimore v. Greenmount Cemetery,3 7 the
Court of Appeals construed broadly the term "taxes." The court
considered whether assessments for street paving were taxes,3 8 and
defined "taxes" as "burdens, charges or impositions, put or set
upon persons or property for public uses."'3 9 The court noted that
use of the term "assessments" is not determinative:
The distinction, if any, between a tax and an assessment is not
very palpable. The meaning of the words is the same in
our laws. When a man is assessed to pay a certain sum, it is
equivalent to, and nothing more than, the imposition of a
tax on him to that amount.4 °
Subsequent cases cite with approval the Greenmount Cemetery def-
33. See, e.g., American Alliance Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 134 Cal. App. 3d
601, 606-08, 184 Cal. Rptr. 674, 676-77 (1982) (assessments for a workers' compensa-
tion fund may be used in computing retaliatory tax returns); Price v. All American Eng'g
Co., 320 A.2d 336, 338 (Del. 1974) (referring to contributions to an Industrial Accident
Board Second Injury and Contingency Fund as taxes); Beth-Elkhorn Corp. v. Ross, 552
S.W.2d 656, 657 (Ky. 1977) (referring to a maintenance fund and a special claim fund
assessment as taxes); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 NJ. Tax 326, 337
(1983), aff'd, 6 N.J. Tax 613 (NJ. Super. 1984) (assessments for a Second Injury Fund
are an obligation sufficiently similar to taxes to be used in computing retaliatory tax
returns); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Comm'r Dept. of Rev., 75 Pa.
Commw. 463, 471-72, 463 A.2d 68, 72 (1983) (assessments for a workers' compensation
fund are an obligation similar to taxes, and therefore may be used in computing retalia-
tory tax returns), aff'd, 504 Pa. 506, 475 A.2d 741 (1984).
34. See Property & Casualty Ins., 319 Md. at 11, 570 A.2d at 327. The Commission
argued that PCIGC must pay obligations that the insolvent insurer was required to pay
on behalf of its insured under the policy's terms. See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Property &
Casualty Ins., 319 Md. 1, 570 A.2d 323 (1990) (No. 8831).
35. See Property & Casualty Ins., 319 Md. at 10-11, 570 A.2d at 327-28.
36. See id. at 10, 570 A.2d at 327.
37. 7 Md. 517 (1855).
38. See id. at 533. The court found that the assessments for street paving were pay-
ments for benefits conferred on property owners rather than taxes. See id. at 536.
39. Id. at 535.
40. Id. (emphasis in original).
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inition.4 1 Others have joined the Greenmount Cemetery court in
broadly defining the term. For example, in Mayor of Baltimore v.
Fine,42 the court defined "tax" as a "charge imposed upon the tax-
payer as an act of sovereignty, without his consent, and for the pub-
lic use."' 43 Maryland courts have applied these broad definitions to
assessments that are similar but not identical to the SIF and the
UEF.44
b. OtherJurisdictions.-Other jurisdictions have determined that
assessments similar to the SIF and the UEF assessments are taxes.
Several of these cases specifically address funds nearly identical to
the SIF. In Price v. All American Engineering Co. ,4 the Supreme Court
of Delaware analyzed assessments for an "Industrial Accident Board
Second Injury and Contingency Fund," and referred to these as
taxes: "insurance carriers... will be taxed a sum not to exceed one
half of one percent of all [workers'] compensation or employer lia-
bility premiums received by the carrier .... "46 Similarly, in Employ-
ers' Fire Insurance Co. v. Taxation Division Director,47 the New Jersey
Tax Court addressed the characterization of payments made to a
"Second Injury Fund." The court held that the payments should be
taken into account in computing retaliatory tax liability.48 The court
did not need to determine whether the payments were specifically
"taxes," however, because the New Jersey statute only required
41. E.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Russell, 284 Md. 174, 178, 395 A.2d 488,
490 (1978) ("the word 'tax' means a burden, charge or imposition put or set upon a
person or property for public uses").
42. 148 Md. 324, 129 A. 356 (1925).
43. l at 328, 129 A. at 358 (citing Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465, 470-71 (1885)).
44. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
45. 320 A.2d 336 (Del. 1974).
46. Id at 338 (emphasis added); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2395 (1985 & Supp.
1990).
47. 5 NJ. Tax 326 (1983), aff'd, 6 NJ. Tax 613 (NJ. Super. 1984).
48. See id. at 337; see generally NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:32-15 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
A "retaliatory law" refers to "[riestraints placed by state law on foreign companies equal
to the restraints placed by such foreign jurisdictions on companies doing business in
such states." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1183 (5th ed. 1979). For example, Maryland's
retaliatory tax statute provides that when a foreign state's laws impose any tax or other
obligation on Maryland insurance companies doing business in that state, Maryland im-
poses the same taxes and obligations on insurance companies from that state doing
business here. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 61 (1986 & Supp. 1990). The majority of
states have enacted retaliatory tax laws "to promote the interstate business of domestic
insurers by deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes."
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 451 U.S.
648, 668 .(1981).
For a discussion of the steps taken in calculating the retaliatory tax due, see State
Ins. Comm'r v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Md. 108, 111, 215 A.2d 749, 751 (1966).
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that they be sufficiently like a tax so as to constitute "other
obligations."49
In American Alliance Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization,50
the California Court of Appeals also addressed characterizing
assessments as "taxes" for purposes of retaliatory tax calculations.5
The assessment in question was an Arizona premium tax on work-
ers' compensation insurers that Arizona earmarked for an adminis-
trative fund.52 The court stated that "[t]he distinction between
taxes and assessments is clear. Taxes are imposed for the general
public good. On the contrary, assessments are levied for benefits
conferred."5 " Thus, the court held that this premium tax was not a
special purpose obligation or assessment because it was not a
charge for benefits conferred.'
3. Analysis.-
a. Assessments as Taxes .- The primary issue in Property & Casualty
Insurance was the statutory construction of article 48A, section 515:
whether the SIF and the UEF assessments are "taxes" within the
meaning of PCIGC's statutory exemption from tax payment.55 The
court's analysis of this issue consisted of three parts. First, the court
looked at how Maryland courts have defined "taxes," and found that
the SIF and the UEF assessments appropriately fit the definition.56
They are involuntary charges imposed by the State upon
insurers and employers . . . . The benefit of the general
public is served by both of these funds because the burden
of the circumstances they are intended to relieve would
otherwise be shouldered in part by the general public. Ac-
cordingly, the assessment proceeds which fund the SIF and
the UEF constitute government revenue raised by legally
required payments to be expended for public purposes. As
such, they are "taxes." 5 7
49. 5 N.J. Tax at 336.
50. 134 Cal. App. 3d 601, 184 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1982).
51. See id at 605-06, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 675-76.
52. See id. at 606, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
53. Id
54. See id. at 607, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 676-77. California's constitution and retaliatory
tax statute specifically exclude special purpose obligations or assessments. See CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § 28(f(3); CAL. INS. CODE § 685.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1991).
55. See 319 Md. at 2, 570 A.2d at 323.
56. Id. at 5-6, 570 A.2d at 325. For a discussion of previous Maryland cases that have
defined "taxes," see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
57. 319 Md. at 6, 570 A.2d at 325.
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Consistent with prior Maryland case law, the court invoked
what amounted to a three part test to determine whether the
charges fit the definition of a "tax": is the assessment (1) an invol-
untary charge, (2) made by the State, and (3) intended to raise reve-
nue for public purposes?5 8 The SIF and the UEF assessments are
involuntary, as evidenced by PCIGC's attempts to avoid payment.
The State makes the assessments, because the Workmen's Compen-
sation Commission is a creation of the State. Finally, the assess-
ments are expended for "public purposes." Therefore, the court
properly characterized these assessments as "taxes." 59
Second, the court compared the SIF and the UEF assessments
to other assessments that Maryland courts have viewed as taxes. 
60
The court cited cases concerning the Unsatisfied Claim and Judg-
ment Fund (UCJF), which assessed insurers a percentage of automo-
bile premiums in order to indemnify innocent victims of uninsured
motorists. 6' The two UCJF cases that the court cited in Prperty &
Casualty Insurance, however, furnish only general support for the
proposition that assessments are taxes, because neither explicitly
calls UCJF assessments a "tax., 62
The court also cited cases in which employer contributions to
unemployment compensation funds were more definitively termed
"taxes." 6 In those cases, however, the court emphasized that con-
tributions to unemployment compensation funds are a lawful exer-
cise of the State's police power, given the strong public policy of
protecting citizens and the public from the hazards of unemploy-
ment." The court did not need to make a distinction between taxes
58. See id. Compare the definition of "tax" in Mayor of Baltimore v. Greenmount
Cemetery, 7 Md. 517, 535 (1855) with that in Mayor of Baltimore v. Fine, 148 Md. 324,
328, 129 A. 356, 358 (1925).
59. See 319 Md. at 6, 570 A.2d at 325.
60. See id.
61. See id.; supra note 31.
62. One case asserted that UCJF assessments are within the state's taxing power, and
thus implicitly labeled them as taxes. See Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 616, 150 A.2d 421, 427 (1959). The other case
called the UCJF assessments "similar in character to both 'taxes' and 'licenses.' " See
State Ins. Comm'r v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Md. 108, 116, 215 A.2d 749, 754
(1966).
63. Both cases refer to the unemployment compensation contribution as an "excise
tax." See Standard Properties, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Bd. of Md., 201 Md. 1, 7, 92
A.2d 459, 462 (1952); Maryland Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Albrecht, 183 Md.
87, 89, 36 A.2d 666, 667 (1944).
64. See Standard Properties, 201 Md. at 7, 92 A.2d at 462; Albrecht, 183 Md. at 89, 36
A.2d at 667.
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and assessments in either case; both taxes and assessments are
within the State's police power.
The court also turned to other jurisdictions to support its hold-
ing,65 and noted that several states characterize as "taxes" assess-
ments for funds substantially similar to the SIF.66 The cases cited by
the court can be distinguished, however, because none addressed
this classification with respect to an entity such as PCIGC.6 7
b. Assessments as Covered Claims.-The court rejected the Com-
mission's argument that the SIF and the UEF were part of the "cov-
ered claims" that PCIGC is required by statute to pay.68 The court
noted that the statute specifically distinguished assessments from
workers' compensation awards, 69 and concluded that assessments
are not part of "overall workers' compensation. ' 70 The court also
disagreed with the Commission's argument that the assessments
"[a]rise out of the insurance policy contracts of the insolvent in-
surer," 71 and instead asserted that they are wholly creatures of
statute.72
In arriving at this conclusion, however, the Court of Appeals
avoided addressing an important distinction. The SIF and the UEF
assessments are an employer's obligation unless the employer is in-
sured, in which case they are the insurance company's obligation. 73
When an employer contracts for insurance and when insurance
companies establish premiums, both parties presumably consider
SIF and UEF assessment payments as part of the contracted-for ben-
efits.74 As such, they arguably are part of covered claims that arise
out of a workers' compensation policy.75 The court should have in-
65. See Property & Casualty Ins., 319 Md. at 8, 570 A.2d at 326.
66. See id. (citing sources listed supra note 33).
67. Several of the other jurisdictions addressing the characterization of assessments
similar to the SIF and the UEF have done so in the context of determining retaliatory tax
liability. See supra note 33 and notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
68. See Property & Casualty Ins., 319 Md. at 10, 570 A.2d at 327; see also MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, § 504 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
69. See 319 Md. at 10, 570 A.2d at 27; MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ 62(c)(2),
91(d)(3)(iii) (1986 & Supp. 1990).
70. 319 Md. at 10, 570 A.2d at 327 (quoting Petitioner's Brief, supra note 34, at 4-5).
71. Id. at 9, 570 A.2d at 327.
72. See id. at 10, 570 A.2d at 327.
73. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ 66(2)(a), 91(d)(3)(i) (1985 & Supp. 1990).
74. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 34, at 6-7.
75. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 505(c)(1) (1986 & Supp. 1990), which provides:
"Covered claims" means obligations, including unearned premiums, of an insol-
vent insurer which:
(i) 1. Arise out of the insurance policy contracts of the insolvent insurer issued
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yoked the rules of statutory construction to determine which of the
two conflicting statutes is controlling.
The court's decision in Property & Casualty Insurance has limited
implications because PCIGC is the only entity of its type in Mary-
land; PCIGC is the only corporation established by the General As-
sembly to pay claims against insolvent insurers, including, but not
limited to, workers' compensation insurers. Also, the decision's ef-
fect upon state income tax revenue will be minimal, because private
insurance companies may deduct the SIF and the UEF assessments
regardless of whether they are characterized as "taxes." 76 Finally,
because the legislature has excluded from retaliatory tax calcula-
tions "special purpose obligations or assessments imposed by an-
other state in connection with particular kinds of insurance, 77 the
Property & Casualty Insurance decision does not allow out-of-state in-
surance companies licensed to do business in Maryland to obtain a
retaliatory tax credit for payments made to the SIF and the UEF.78
Although the court held that PCIGC is exempt because assess-
ments are taxes,79 it did not address who will contribute to the SIF
and the UEF the assessments that PCIGC does not have to pay."°
Absent future legislation to the contrary, solvent employers and in-
surance companies probably will not have to pay additional amounts
because assessments are calculated as a percentage of awards ren-
dered against individual employers or insurers, not as a function of
total compensation paid out by the funds.8 '
to residents of this State or which are payable to residents of this State on be-
half of insureds of the insolvent insurer....
Id. (emphasis in original). See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 34, at 8.
76. See I.R.C. § 832(c)(1) (West 1990) (allowing insurance companies a deduction
from income for both ordinary business expenses and taxes); see also id. § 162(a) (dis-
cussing deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses); id. § 164(a) (discussing
deductible taxes).
77. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 61(2) (1985 & Supp. 1990) (providing for exceptions
to the Retaliatory Tax Law).
78. See, e.g., Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 326, 337
(1983), aff'd, 6 N.J. Tax 613 (N.J. Super. 1984).
79. See Iroperty & Casualty Ins., 319 Md. at 11, 570 A.2d at 328.
80. But see infra note 84.
81. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the UEF has a statu-
tory provision that discontinues the assessments when the fund reaches $2,500,000, and
resumes them when the fund drops below $1,000,000. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§ 91 (d)(4) (1985 & Supp. 1990). If PCIGC were required to pay the UEF assessments, it
would be easier to reach the $2,500,000 limit in a given year. Therefore, without
PCIGC's contributions, a burden might in fact fall on employers if they are forced to pay
UEF assessments on more awards than they otherwise would. The SIF's cap and floor
provisions were repealed in 1987. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 66(4) (1986) (repealed
1987).
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Also, PCIGC is funded by its member insurers8 2 and is empow-
ered to "assess member insurers . . . in amounts necessary to pay
the obligation of [PCIGC]."'83 This assessment allows PCIGC to
meet its obligations; but with fewer obligations, insurance compa-
nies should reap the benefits of lower assessments.
The solution to the possible problem of an SIF and UEF fund-
ing shortfall lies with the state legislature. 4 , If the problem arises
and the legislature chooses to act, it presumably will either increase
the percentages that private insurers pay to SIF and UEF, or negate
the court's ruling by requiring PCIGC to pay the assessments. In
either case, assuming that most employers maintain workers' com-
pensation insurance, the ultimate burden will fall on the solvent in-
surance companies either through higher SIF and UEF assessments,
or through higher payments to PCIGC when PCIGC passes its costs
on to its members.
The legislature's choice will also have an effect on self-insured
employers because they do not fund the PCIGC. s5 If the legislature
increases SIF and UEF percentages, self-insured employers will be
hurt because they will have to pay higher SIF and UEF assessments,
but will not benefit from reduced PCIGC assessments.
4. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals' decision in Property &
Casualty Insurance considers a new issue, PCIGC's statutory exemp-
tion from paying taxes, in light of prior Maryland law.8 6 It brings
Maryland into line with other states that have considered the same
or substantially similar issues relating to the characterization of
assessments as "taxes." Absent legislative action, solvent insurance
82. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 508(a)(3) (1986).
83. Id. (1986 & Supp. 1990). Note that a "member insurer" is any insurer that "(i)
[w]rites any kind of insurance to which this subtitle applies... ; and (ii) [is licensed to
transact insurance in this State." Id. § 505(e)(1). PCIGC divides claims paid and ex-
penses incurred into four accounts--title insurance, motor vehicle insurance, workmen's
compensation, and all other applicable types of insurance, see id. § 506(d), and it assesses
member insurers separately for each account based on the amount of premiums the
member insurer collects for that type of insurance. See id. § 508(a)(3). Therefore, a
decrease in claims paid and expenses incurred in the workers' compensation account
will directly benefit workers' compensation insurers.
84. The Court of Special Appeals did not address the issue of who would pay the
assessments if PCIGC did not do so because the issue was not raised before the trial
court. See Workmen's Compensation Comm'n v. Property & Casualty Ins. Guar. Corp.,
74 Md. App. 99, 106, 536 A.2d 714, 717-18 (1988), aff'd, 319 Md. 1, 570 A.2d 323
(1990). The Court of Special Appeals noted that the issue's resolution should be left to
the General Assembly. See id.
85. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
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companies that provide PCIGC's funding may receive a windfall.8 7
The court's opinion may have limited precedential effect on fu-
ture Maryland case law because the issue is narrow and fact specific:
PCIGC is the only entity established by the General Assembly to pay
insolvent insurers' claims. On the other hand, legislative action may
be necessary to keep the SIF and the UEF adequately funded, and
the legislature could create other entities similar to the PCIGC. The
legislature's choice of action undoubtedly will affect insurance com-
panies and self-insured employers doing business in Maryland.
LAuRA L. HENNINGER
87. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
1276 [VOL. 50:1265
XII. TORTS
A. Vicarious Liability of Franchisors
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Lesch,' the Court of Appeals ruled that
Chevron could not be held vicariously liable under a theory of ap-
parent agency for a negligent auto repair performed at a Chevron-
branded service station.2 The court found the plaintiffs' belief that
the service station operator was a Chevron employee was unjustified
by the facts and unreasonable as a matter of law.' The court also
held that the defendant, Bay Oil Inc., an independent jobber4 and
lessor of the service station, did not possess or exercise sufficient
control over the service station operator to establish vicarious liabil-
ity on actual agency grounds.5
Oil company liability for the wrongful acts of service station op-
erators has received considerable attention in the courts and among
legal commentators.6 The problem's difficulty arises from the na-
ture of the distribution system employed by the major oil compa-
nies, and the business relationships between oil companies and
service station operators.' Judicial attempts to analyze these rela-
1. 319 Md. 25, 570 A.2d 840 (1990).
2. See id. at 35, 570 A.2d at 845. A "branded station" displays a particular brand's
signs and colors, and sells only that brand of gasoline and oil. Id. at 27, 570 A.2d at 841.
3. See id. at 35, 570 A.2d at 845.
4. A 'jobber" is an individual or corporation who purchases from a wholesaler gas-
oline products for resale to a dealer. MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 11-301(h) (1983).
5. See 319 Md. at 33, 570 A.2d at 844 (1990).
6. See generally Comment, Service Station Torts: Time for the Oil Companies to Assume
Their Share of the Responsibility, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 382 (1974) [hereinafter Service Station
Torts] (analyzing liability theories developed by the courts, and offering alternatives);
Comment, Liability of Oil Companies for Torts of Service Station Operators, 7 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 263 (1972) [hereinafter Liability of Oil Companies] (same); Comment, Liability of Oil
Company for Its Lessee's Torts, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 915 (1965) (oil companies should be liable
for service station torts because they are better able to pay judgments); Comment, Vicari-
ous Liability of Filling Station Oil Companies Under Respondeat Superior, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 88
(1964) (traditional agency law is an inappropriate basis for determining oil company
liability); Note, You Can Trust Your Car to the Man Who Wears the Star--Or Can You?: The Use
of Apparent Authority to Establish a Princpal's Tort Liability, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 257 (1971)
(discussing the role of advertising in creating an agency relationship between oil compa-
nies and their franchisee service stations); Annotation, Status of Gasoline and Oil Distributor
or Dealer as Agent, Employee, Independent Contractor, or Independent Dealer as Regards Responsi-
bility for Injury to Person or Damage to Property, 83 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1962 & Supp. 1990)
(surveying the relevant cases).
7. These relationships generally fall into three categories: (1) company-operated
stations, in which the oil company owns or leases the station and the oil company pays
employees on a salary basis; (2) dealer-operated stations, in which the company owns or
leases the station and rents it along with the necessary equipment to the dealer; and (3)
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tionships using established theories of agency liability have pro-
duced unpredictable and sometimes inconsistent results.8
The conflicting opinions of the Court of Appeals and the Court
of Special Appeals in Lesch illustrate the deficiencies of common law
agency principles as applied to franchisor-franchisee relationships.9
The two courts applied the same law to the same facts, but reached
entirely different results. The Court of Appeals interpreted the facts
and selected precedents so as to reaffirm a narrow construction of
the limits of oil company vicarious liability in the service station
context.
1. The Case.--On July 14, 1985, Dr. Warren Lesch noticed that
his automobile's gas tank was leaking. 0 The following day, Dr.
Lesch had the car towed to Walker's Chevron Inc. (Walker's Chev-
ron), where mechanic Malcolm Weeks "fixed" the leak."' On July
16, 1985, Dr. Lesch retrieved the car, and checked the fuel tank sev-
eral times throughout the day.' 2 He observed no leaking and
"contractor" stations, in which the station operator owns or leases the station and sim-
ply has a supply contract with the oil company. In the first category the oil company
clearly is liable for the operator's tortious acts; the question of oil company vicarious
liability arises in the last two categories. See Comment, Liability of Oil Companies, supra
note 6, at 265.
Maryland law prohibits petroleum product refiners and producers from operating
retail service stations. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E (1988). In response to the 1973
petroleum shortage, this "Divestiture Act" was designed to prevent inequitable petro-
leum distribution and pricing among retail stations. See Lesch v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,
75 Md. App. 669, 692-95, 542 A.2d 1292, 1304-05 (1988) (Divestiture Act does not
insulate oil companies from liability for wrongful acts of apparent agents).
8. See, e.g., Comment, Liability of Oil Companies, supra note 6, at 267-68 (surveying
cases and concluding that the presence of no single fact or combination of facts deter-
mines the oil company's liability or nonliability).
9. Service station cases are only one part of the broader topic of franchisor liability
for a franchisee's torts. See generally Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx.
L. REV. 650 (1971) (the law should require franchisors to promote franchise economic
interests); Comment, Theories of Liability for Retail Franchisors: A Theme and Four Variations,
39 MD. L. REV. 264 (1979) [hereinafter Theories of Liability] (comparing various theories
of franchisor liability); Comment, Franchiser's Liability for the Torts of His Franchisee, 5
U.S.F. L. REV. 118 (1970) (comparing theories of franchisor liability); Comment, Dealer
Franchising in the Gasoline Industry: Current Developments, 4 U.S.F. L. REV. 65, (1969) (dis-
cussing the development of service station franchising and its relationship to antitrust
law); Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisor, A.L.R.3d 764 (1977) (surveying
the relevant cases).
10. Lesch, 319 Md. at 28, 570 A.2d at 842. The tank probably was punctured earlier
that day when Dr. Lesch inadvertently drove over a metal rod lying in the roadway. Id
11. Id. Weeks apparently attempted to repair the leak by pressing air conditioning
duct tape into or over the hole and inserting a screw into it. He then sealed the area
with a multi-purpose epoxy, filled the tank, and checked it for leaks.
12. Id. at 29, 570 A.2d at 842.
parked the car in his garage for the night.
The following morning, Dr. Lesch and his wife noticed a gaso-
line odor in their house.' 3 They walked downstairs to the garage,
where Dr. Lesch observed a "little puddling" of gasoline under-
neath the car.' 4 As Dr. Lesch manually raised the garage door, it
triggered an electric light, causing an instantaneous explosion.' 5
The Lesches were severely burned, and the ensuing fire destroyed
their house and all of its contents. 16
Alleging that Weeks' negligence caused the explosion, the
Lesches filed suit against Weeks, Walker's Chevron, Bay Oil, Inc.
(Bay Oil), and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron).' 7 Walker's Chevron
owned and operated the service station business. Bay Oil leased the
premises to Walker's Chevron, and supplied it gasoline and other
Chevron products.' 8
The Lesches' claim against Bay Oil was based on a theory of
actual agency-that Walker's Chevron and its employees were ser-
vants of Bay Oil and subject-in-fact to its control.' 9 As for Chevron
U.S.A., the Lesches did not contend that an actual master-servant
relationship existed. Rather, their claim was based on a theory of
apparent agency, or agency by estoppel.2 ° The trial judge granted
motions for summary judgment in favor of both Bay Oil and Chev-
ron.2 ' The Court of Special Appeals reversed, finding that the evi-
dence relating to both claims presented issues for determination by
the trier of facts. 22 On certiorari, the Court of Appeals reinstated
the judgments in favor of Bay Oil and Chevron. 23
13. Id.
14. Lesch v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 75 Md. App. 669, 674, 542 A.2d 1292, 1294
(1988). Dr. Lesch said that because he smelled gasoline, he was careful not to turn on
any lights or to activate the electric garage door opener. Lesch, 319 Md. at 29, 570 A.2d
at 842.
15. Lesch, 319 Md. at 29, 570 A.2d at 842.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 27, 570 A.2d at 841.
18. Id.
19. See id. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
20. See Lesch, 319 Md. at 27, 570 A.2d at 841. See infra notes 33-46 and accompany-
ing text.
21. Lesch, 319 Md. at 28, 570 A.2d at 841.
22. See Lesch v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 75 Md. App. 669, 694-95, 700, 542 A.2d
1292, 1305, 1307 (1988).
23. See Lesch, 319 Md. at 44, 570 A.2d at 850.
1991] 1279TORTS
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
2. Legal Background.-
a. Actual Agency: The Control Test.-According to the principle
of respondeat superior, a master is vicariously liable for torts com-
mitted by his servant acting within the scope of employment.24 As a
general rule, an employer is not liable when the tortfeasor is an in-
dependent contractor. 25  The test in Maryland for determining
whether a master and servant relationship exists is whether the em-
ployer has "the right to control and direct the servant in the per-
formance of his work and in the manner in which the work is to be
done."
2 6
In service station tort cases, courts in most jurisdictions first ex-
amine lease provisions and dealer agreements for evidence of con-
trol.27  Although no single factor has been held determinative,
provisions usually considered include those relating to payment ar-
rangements, termination, required hours of operation, exclusive
sale of company products, actual ownership of the outlet and equip-
ment, and the franchisor's rights to perform inspections of the out-
let and make suggestions regarding its operation. Contractual
provisions describing the franchisee as an independent contractor
usually are held not controlling, although they may assist in deter-
mining the contracting parties' intent.29
Because no single fact or combination of facts controls the clas-
sification of a service station operator as either an independent con-
tractor or a servant, many commentators argue that the cases cannot
be synthesized."0 In most reported decisions, however, courts have
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 40 (1965).
26. Keitz v. National Paving Co., 214 Md. 479, 491, 134 A.2d 296, 301 (1977) (fac-
tual question existed as to whether paving contractor had unlimited right to control and
direct truck driver in the performance of contractor's work). Accord Brady v. Ralph Par-
sons Co., 308 Md. 486, 510, 520 A.2d 717, 730 (1987); Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md.
221, 230, 443 A.2d 98, 103 (1982). Courts have formulated a variety of tests for deter-
mining whether a master-servant relationship exists in the franchisor/franchisee con-
text. See Comment, Theories of Liability, supra note 9, at 268 n.23. Although the
differences are largely semantic, courts, such as the Maryland courts, using the "right to
control" test, tend to look only to the franchise agreement for evidence of control. Id.
27. Comment, Service Station Torts, supra note 6, at 384. Courts also may look to the
circumstances or the parties' conduct to see if the relationship is other than that indi-
cated by the written agreements. Id.
28. Comment, Theories of Liability, supra note 9, at 268-69; see also Comment, Service
Station Torts, supra note 6, at 384-87 (surveying some of the results courts have reached
under various facts).
29. See, e.g., Lesch, 319 Md. at 31, 570 A.2d at 843.
30. See, e.g., Comment, Liability of Oil Companies, supra note 6, at 269 (suggesting that
in light of the "almost complete lack of correspondence between sets of facts and the
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found that the only reasonable inference is that the operator is the
oil company's independent contractor."' Thus, the issue is resolved
as a question of law, and the plaintiff is precluded from obtaining a
jury resolution of the case.32
b. Apparent Agency or Agency by Estoppel.-As an alternative to the
master-servant theory, plaintiffs may assert a theory of apparent
agency, or agency by estoppel. 33 In the 1977 case of B.P. Oil Corp. v.
Mabe,34 the Court of Appeals endorsed section 267 of the Second Re-
statement of Agency, 35 which provides as follows:
One who represents that another is his servant or other
agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely
upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other
agent as if he were such.36
Plaintiffs across the country have advanced the agency-by-es-
toppel theory in service station tort cases, beginning as early as
1939.37 The oil company is alleged to hold the operator out as its
agent through its signs, uniforms, credit cards, and advertising. 38 If
the consumer reasonably relies on such representations of authority
and is injured, vicarious liability for the operator's acts is imposed
on the oil company.39 Using the control test, most courts have de-
cided the apparent agency issue as a matter of law.4" These deci-
sions generally conclude that the plaintiff's reliance on oil company
results of these cases," courts stress the control factor according to their predilection for
or against allowing recovery).
31. See Comment, Service Station Torts, supra note 6, at 384 ("most courts have become
so stagnated in their application of the factually-complex control test that they are un-
willing to hold the companies liable").
32. See id. Conversely, if the facts are susceptible to more than one inference, the
issue is regarded as a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Id.
33. There is a narrow distinction between apparent agency, based on contract law,
and agency by estoppel, based on tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8,
8B, comments & comment d to § 8 (1958). Nevertheless, courts tend to blend them into
a single test. See Lesch, 319 Md. at 34 n.4, 570 A.2d at 845 n.4.
34. 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d 554 (1955).
35. See id. at 643, 370 A.2d at 560-61.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). Maryland first recognized a
form of the agency by estoppel theory in 1919. See Pugh v. Washington Ry. & Elec., 134
Md. 196, 106 A. 522 (1919) (permitting an injured passenger to recover from a common
carrier on a theory of agency by estoppel).
37. E.g., Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823 (1939).
38. See Comment, Service Station Torts, supra note 6, at 391.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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representations was unreasonable because it is "common knowl-
edge" that service stations are merely independent sellers of the
company's products.4
The 1971 case of Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc.42 was one of the first re-
ported decisions in which an apparent agency question was allowed
to go to the jury.43 The plaintiff in Gizzi alleged that he relied on
Texaco's representations that it stood behind the repair and sale of
a used Volkswagen bus purchased from a Texaco dealer.44 A deci-
sive factor was the company's national advertising campaign, partic-
ularly the slogan, "You Can Trust Your Car to the Man Who Wears
the Star."' 45 But the Gizzi decision did not start a strong trend to-
ward increased oil company liability: the majority of cases since
Gizzi have continued to apply the "common knowledge" rule.46
c. The Law in Maryland.-B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe47 is the only
service station case of this type arising in Maryland prior to Lesch. In
Mabe, the plaintiff was injured when a filling station attendant inad-
vertently filled his radiator with gasoline, causing an explosion.48
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to establish either
actual agency or agency by estoppel.49 Addressing first the issue of
actual agency, the court ruled that based on the facts of the case,
particularly the written lease agreement's provisions,5 ° the evidence
did not warrant a finding that British Petroleum (BP) controlled the
41. See, e.g., Reynolds, 227 Iowa at 171, 287 N.W. at 827 (applying the "common
knowledge" rule to reject the plaintiff's agency by estoppel claim); Lesch, 319 Md. at 37,
570 A.2d at 846 (noting other cases that have applied the "common knowledge" rule).
42. 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971).
43. See id. at 310. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 241 Ala. 62, 65, 1 So. 2d 29, 31
(1941) (the defendant operated the station until three-and-a-half months before the inci-
dent giving rise to the suit, creating for the jury an agency by estoppel issue).
44. See 437 F.2d at 309. As a term of the sale, the station operator agreed to replace
part of the vehicle's braking system, and test it for reliability. The brakes subsequently
failed, injuring Gizzi and his passenger. Id.
45. Id. at 310. The Second Restatement of Agency recognizes that manifestations such as
signs and advertising may imply to the community that an agency relationship exists.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958).
46. See generally Annotation, supra note 6, at 1291 (cataloguing cases decided in favor
of plaintiffs and defendant service stations). See also Green v. Shell Oil Co., 181 Mich.
App. 439, 446, 450 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1989) (factual question raised as to the existence of
agency by estoppel; no mention of the "common knowledge" rule).
47. 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d 554 (1977).
48. Id. at 634, 370 A.2d at 556.
49. See id. at 649, 370 A.2d at 564.
50. The service station operator leased the station building to BP, which in turn
leased it back to the operator. Id at 634, 370 A.2d at 556.
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station's operation. 5
Turning next to the apparent agency claim, the court found that
the plaintiff had "fallen far short" of establishing the necessary ele-
ment of reliance.52 The court declared:
[t]he statement of [the plaintiff] that his reason for choos-
ing the station in question was that he "always buy[s] BP
gasoline, always deal[s] with BP, [was] but little different
from a statement that one always buys a particular make of
shoes, wears clothes with a certain label, drives an automo-
bile produced by a certain manufacturer, eats a certain
brand of breakfast cereal, or smokes a certain kind of
cigarette.13
In an apparent acknowledgment of Gizzi, the court noted that no
evidence had been introduced as to any of BP's advertising.
54
d. Bases of the Lesch Decision.-(i). Actual Agency.-The
Lesches based their claim against Bay Oil on an actual agency the-
ory: that Walker's Chevron and its employees were Bay Oil's ser-
vants, subject-in-fact to its control.55 There were two written
agreements between Bay Oil and Walker's Chevron: a reseller's
contract and a lease agreement. 56 Both documents included provi-
sions characterizing Walker as an independent contractor and deny-
ing Bay Oil "any right to exercise any control" over the operation of
Walker's Chevron.
The key evidence supporting the Lesches' claim of actual
agency was a letter from Bay Oil to Walker dated December 16,
1982.58 The letter cited "certain problems regarding the operation
of [the] service station," and imposed conditions with which Walker
was expected to comply if he wished to continue to occupy the
51. See id. at 643, 370 A.2d at 560. The court quoted Westre v. De Buhr & Sinclair
Ref. Co., 82 S.D. 276, 278-79, 144 N.W.2d 734, 735 (1966), which held, based on sub-
stantially similar facts, that "[slimilar types of clauses are found in many leases. None of
these indicate the type of control sufficient to establish anything but a landlord-tenant
relationship." Id. at 642, 370 A.2d at 560.
52. Mabe, 279 Md. at 647, 370 A.2d at 563.
53. Id. at 649, 370 A.2d at 564.
54. See id. The Mabe court seems to have required a specific advertising campaign
along the lines of the one in Gizzi. Comment, Theories of Liability, supra note 9, at 282
n.94.
55. See Lesch, 319 Md. at 27, 570 A.2d at 841.
56. See id. at 30-31, 570 A.2d at 843.
57. Id., 570 A.2d at 843. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
58. See id. at 31, 570 A.2d at 843.
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premises.59 The Court of Special Appeals characterized this letter
as an "ultimatum," and found that it constituted sufficient evidence
of Bay Oil's power to control the conduct of Walker's Chevron to
permit a trier of fact to find a master-servant relationship.6 °
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that such provisions are
customary in lease agreements, and that the letter merely "an-
nounced the change in terms as a condition to the continuation of
the [month-to-month] lease."'" The court held that these condi-
tions, individually or collectively, did not demonstrate a claim to, or
exercise of, the degree of control necessary to establish a master-
servant relationship. 62
(ii). Apparent Agency.-The Lesches also contended that Chev-
ron caused them reasonably to believe that Weeks was its employee,
and therefore had the skill one would expect of a major oil com-
pany's employee. 6' The Lesches alleged that because of their belief,
they entrusted the repair work to Weeks and Walker's Chevron, and
suffered damage as a result.64
In addition to the indicia of apparent authority typically relied
upon in service station cases,6 5 the Lesches pointed to Chevron
59. Id. The letter set forth the following conditions:
1. The station will be kept clean and free of debris and trash at all times.
2. The station will be opened seven days per week no later than 7:00 a.m. and
closed no earlier than 8:00 p.m.
3. The station will be properly lighted in a manner to give the appearance the
station is open for business between sundown and 8:00 p.m.
4. All junk cars will be removed immediately, no more than three motor vehi-
cles shall remain outside overnight and no automobile shall remain on the
premises for more than one week.
5. You will be expected to furnish a deposit of $700.00 as security for future
payments of rent.
6. Gas will be paid for in full at the time of delivery.
7. Monthly rent will be calculated based on the previous month's sales accord-
ing to the attached schedule.
8. We will bill you for rent at the beginning of each month. Your rent shall be
due upon receipt of the bill.
Id. at 31-32, 570 A.2d at 843.
60. Lesch v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 75 Md. App. 669, 698-700, 542 A.2d 1292, 1306-
07 (1988).
61. Lesch, 319 Md. at 33, 570 A.2d at 844. B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370
A.2d 554 (1977) followed this line of reasoning. See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
62. Lesch, 319 Md. at 33, 570 A.2d at 844.
63. See id. at 27, 570 A.2d at 841.
64. See id.
65. These included display of Chevron insignia and slogans throughout the service
station, Chevron uniforms, Chevron-imprinted charge tickets, and a local yellow pages
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company literature acknowledging that "[t]he public is often unable
to distinguish between a jobber station and one of ours." 66 The
Lesches also produced an internal memorandum revealing a com-
pany policy prohibiting Chevron-branded dealers from using
"Chevron" in their incorporated names because this was mislead-
ing, and had unacceptable agency implications. 67 As early as Febru-
ary 1983, Chevron had actual knowledge that Walker's Chevron
used "Chevron" in its corporate name, but did nothing to seek a
change.68
Determining that the evidence was sufficient to allow a fact find-
ing of apparent agency, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
evidence established a reasonable inference that Chevron followed a
course intended to make company operated and branded stations
indistinguishable to the public.69
The Court of Appeals again disagreed, holding that any belief
entertained by the Lesches that the employees of Walker's Chevron
were employees of Chevron was not objectively reasonable.7 ° In
reaching this determination, the court relied upon the "common
knowledge" rule, and quoted with approval from Reynolds v. Skelly
Oil Co. ,7 where it appears to have originated:
The argument of appellee that the Skelly Oil Company was
estopped because of the signs displayed and that, because
of such signs, there was a presumption that the station was
owned by the Skelly Oil Company has no support in reason
or authority. [One may as] well argue, that because the
word "Chevrolet" or "Buick" is displayed in front of a
place of business, General Motors would be estopped to
claim that it was not the owner of the business. It is a mat-
ter of common knowledge that these trademark signs are
advertisement identifying the station as a Chevron service station. Id. at 36, 570 A.2d
845.
66. Lesch v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 75 Md. App. 669, 679, 542 A.2d 1292, 1297
(1988). This statement was excerpted from Chevron's "Station Acquisition Manual" of
March 1984, in a section discussing the importance of consistently applying the Chevron
retail identification system. Id.
67. See id. at 689-90, 542 A.2d at 1302. Despite the memo's explicit reference to the
agency issue, the Court of Appeals characterized this policy as Chevron's effort to pro-
tect its trademark from infringement. See 319 Md. at 38-39, 570 A.2d at 847.
68. 75 Md. App. at 690, 542 A.2d at 1302-03.
69. Id. at 678, 542 A.2d at 1296 (emphasis in original).
70. See 319 Md. at 35, 570 A.2d at 845. The court assumed, without deciding, that
summary judgment could not properly have been entered on the questions of whether
the Lesches subjectively entertained such a belief, and whether they relied on that belief
when entrusting the repair work to Walker's Chevron. See id.
71. 227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823 (1939).
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displayed throughout the country by independent
dealers.72
The court conceded that one of the Lesches' arguments, "given
slightly altered circumstances, might have proven persuasive." 7 3
The court was referring to a 1976 point-of-sale Chevron advertising
campaign incorporating a "We Care" theme. 74 Stating that the rec-
ord did not suggest that the Lesches ever saw any of these nine-
year-old promotional materials (except decals), the court reasoned
that the campaign did nothing to bolster the Lesches' case. 75 This
was in spite of the court's recognition that "[i]t is in the area of ad-
vertising that some courts have found that major oil companies, al-
ready perilously close to broad liability by reason of what appears to
be rather than what really is, have occasionally gone over the
precipice. -76
3. Analysis.-Without straining agency law principles, the Lesch
court could have held both Bay Oil and Chevron potentially liable
by allowing the jury to decide the essentially factual issue of whether
the Lesches' reliance was reasonable. The facts pertaining to the
issue of control do not support the neat determination that the
court's language suggests. This is especially true of an item in Bay
Oil's letter to Walker mandating the hours of station operation.77
Many courts addressing this question have cited the oil company's
authority to prescribe station hours as supporting a finding of
agency status.78
Additionally, the tone of Bay Oil's letter implicates the eco-
72. Lesch, 319 Md. at 36-37, 570 A.2d at 846 (quoting Reynolds, 227 Iowa at 171, 287
N.W. at 827).
73. 319 Md. at 39, 570 A.2d at 847.
74. See id. at 39-40, 570 A.2d at 847-48. The campaign was designed to encourage
Chevron customers to utilize the service facilities of their dealers in addition to purchas-
ing Chevron products. Id. at 39, 570 A.2d at 847.
75. See id. at 41, 570 A.2d at 848. The decals were visible on the service island, on
the office desk, and on a service bay door. Id. at 40, 570 A.2d at 848.
76. Id. at 39, 570 A.2d at 847 (citing Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971), and Chevron Oil Company v. Sutton, 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d
1283 (1973)).
77. See 319 Md. at 31, 570 A.2d at 843.
78. See, e.g., Dorsic v. Kurtin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1971)
(franchisor's prescription of gasoline stations' operating hours was evidence of agency);
Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963) (operator's determination of operating hours
was evidence of independent contractor status), overruled on other grounds, D.T.S. Tank
Serv., Inc. v. Vanderveen, 683 P.2d 1345 (Okla. 1984). In B.P. v. Mabe, the court noted
that BP had no control over the hours of station operation. B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 279
Md. 632, 635, 370 A.2d 554, 557 (1977) (holding that no actual agency had been
established).
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nomic control that oil companies exercise over station operators.
Because there are virtually no multi-brand service stations in the
United States today, an oil company's refusal to renew a supply con-
tract may lead to economic disaster for the operator.79 As one com-
mentator asserted, oil companies have the operators "in virtual
bondage, hinged on the constant threat that their short-term con-
tracts will not be renewed unless they submit to burdensome
franchisor-imposed practices."80
The court gave equally constricted consideration to the facts
pertaining to the apparent agency issue. Despite recognizing that
advertising plays a decisive role in apparent agency cases, the court
refused to give weight to Chevron's "We Care" campaign, even
though decals bearing the slogan were clearly visible on the prem-
ises at the time of the injury. 8' Moreover, by adopting the common
knowledge line of reasoning, the court was able to dismiss the ap-
parent agency claim as a matter of law. As the record indicated,
however, Chevron was aware that company-operated and company-
branded stations often are indistinguishable to the public.8" In light
of these facts, blanket application of the common knowledge rule
seems unjustified.
Outside of the service station context, courts are much less in-
clined to dismiss apparent agency claims.8" In Orlando Executive Park,
Inc. v. Robbins, 4 the Florida Supreme Court refused to apply the
common knowledge line of reasoning to a case involving a national
hotel franchise's apparent agency liability.8" Stating that oil com-
pany cases must be limited to their facts, the court held that "[t]he
existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question to be
determined by a jury ... on a case by case basis."8 6 Other courts
have attempted to distinguish the oil company cases on a product-
79. Comment, Liability of Oil Companies, supra note 6, at 283.
80. Brown, supra note 9, at 655, 657 (characterizing the gasoline station situation as
"a prime example of the worst abuses in franchising").
81. See supra note 74-75 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 795 (3d Cir.
1978) (factual question existed as to apparent agency when evidence showed that store
bags, prescription labels, cash register receipts, and local advertising all featured "Union
Prescription Center" with no mention of the franchisee's name); Wood v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 508 F.2d 167, 176 (5th Cir. 1975) (factual question for the jury was created when a
franchise agreement provided that a motel should be constructed and operated so as to
be "readily recognizable by the public as part of the national system of Holiday Inns").
84. 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983).
85. See id. at 494. Accord Drexel, 582 F.2d at 796 n.23.
86. 433 So. 2d at 494 (citations omitted) (distinguishing "oil company cases" from
other apparent agency situations).
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versus-service rationale. 7
The pertinent question, therefore, is not whether the court
could have allowed the jury to determine the liability of Bay Oil or
Chevron, but why it did not do so. Service station cases employing
similarly restrictive interpretations of the agency liability tests usu-
ally fail to articulate any policy basis for their decisions.88
Many commentators have criticized courts for perpetuating an
unnecessarily narrow application of the agency liability tests in ser-
vice station cases.8 9 This approach often results in harsh conse-
quences for injured plaintiffs, because station operators frequently
lack the financial resources or insurance necessary to provide ade-
quate compensation.9" The primary argument advanced in favor of
liberalizing these tests is one of fundamental fairness. 91 The argu-
ment is that because of the many benefits oil companies derive from
the present distribution system,9 2 it is "not particularly unfair or im-
moral" to require that some of the benefits be returned to those
87. See, e.g., Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977). Mehlman in-
volved the issue of whether a hospital may be held liable on apparent agency grounds
for a tortious act committed by an emergency-room physician engaged as an independ-
ent contractor. The court distinguished B.P. Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d
554 (1977), as follows: "The mere fact that BPproducts are advertised for sale does not,
in itself, justify the inference that BP is as well directly providing automotive services.
The Hospital, however, is engaged in the business of providing health care services."
Mehlman, 281 Md. at 274, 378 A.2d at 1124 (emphasis in original). The assertion that
the general public does not associate automotive service with nationally-branded service
stations is at least questionable. Consider the following excerpt from Chevron's "Sta-
tion Acquisition Manual" of March 1984: "In our industry, a branded station has be-
come a visual statement to the world about our products and services." Lesch v. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 75 Md. App. 669, 678, 542 A.2d 1292, 1296 (1988) (emphasis added)
(quoting the manual as evidence that Chevron intended to assure that company-branded
stations would be "indistinguishable in the public mind").
88. See Comment, Liability of Oil Companies, supra note 6, at 269. The Lesch court justi-
fied its decision by stating that it is "inefficient to impose liability on sellers for illogical
or unreasonable beliefs of buyers." 319 Md. 25, 44, 570 A.2d 840, 849-50 (1990) (quot-
ing from Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1277 (1984)). This
argument is predicated on the validity of the court's prior determination that the
Lesches' belief was in fact "unreasonable."
89. See supra notes 6, 9.
90. See Comment, Service Station Torts, supra note 6, at 406 (proposing a legislative
approach to risk allocation whereby oil companies would be required to procure ade-
quate insurance to compensate for injuries incurred at stations they own); Comment,
Liability of Oil Companies, supra note 6, at 284-85 (criticizing the oil industry for failing to
require that franchisees be financially responsible).
91. See Comment, Liability of Oil Companies, supra note 6, at 281.
92. These benefits include: control over business without full investment responsi-
bility, credit card systems, a necessary outlet for company products, and insulation from
tort liability. Id.
harmed in the process.93
4. Conclusion.-The approach adopted by the Lesch court, with
its narrow reading of the facts and interpretation of the tests of
agency liability, diminishes the prospect that similar cases will with-
stand summary judgment motions. By advocating the common
knowledge rule's blanket application to service station cases, the
court effectively closed the door to most future claims based on an
apparent agency theory. While nonservice station claims will con-
tinue to enjoy more favorable case-by-case treatment, plaintiffs with
claims against service stations will have to present an extraordinary
case in order to reach the jury.
B. Willful Misconduct in Negligence Claims
In Saba v. Darling,9 4 the Court of Appeals considered whether
the plaintiff had a viable negligence claim if the defendant's willful
misconduct arguably was partially attributable to his intoxication.95
Although the misconduct consisted of a punch that fractured the
plaintiff's jaw, the plaintiff proceeded against the defendant on a
negligence theory in order to reach his insurance coverage.96
The court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to connect the causa-
tion claim to the defendant's alcohol consumption.97 The court also
rejected the argument that the defendant, knowing he had a pro-
pensity to fight while under the influence of alcohol, acted with reck-
less disregard for the safety of others when he began drinking.98
Rather, the court found that the defendant's assault on the plaintiff
was an intentional act, and thus precluded any negligence theory. 99
The decision is a minor victory for insurance companies, because
they clearly will not be held to monitor the drinking habits of their
policy holders.
1. The Case.-Markus Saba and Charles Darling, who had
never met, were both out drinking with friends in Washington, D.C.
on June 16, 1984.10' Saba drank beer at a friend's house before
93. Id.
94. 320 Md. 45, 575 A.2d 1240 (1990).
95. See id. at 46, 575 A.2d at 1241.
96. Id. at 47, 575 A.2d at 1241.
97. See id. at 51, 575 A.2d at 1243-44.
98. See id., 575 A.2d at 1243.
99. Id., 575 A.2d at 1243-44.
100. Id. at 46, 575 A.2d at 1241. The court did not explain why it applied Maryland
law to a case that arose in Washington, D.C. Ordinarily, Maryland adopts the principle
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travelling to a bar, where he consumed two to three additional beers
within an hour. Darling and a friend shared a six-pack of beer
before travelling to the same bar, where Darling consumed about
five additional beers.'
0
'
Darling and Saba left the bar at about the same time.' 0 2 There
is disagreement as to exactly what happened next.' It appears that
Saba, who has no recollection of what happened, was "shadowbox-
ing" and making karate motions near Darling. Saba and Darling
may have exchanged profanities, and Saba may have touched Dar-
ling. In any event, Darling punched Saba in the face, fracturing
Saba's jaw. Darling subsequently admitted that he had a history of
fighting when under the influence of alcohol." 4
Saba sued Darling in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, alleging both negligence, and assault and battery.' 0 5 Saba
voluntarily dismissed the assault and battery claim after he discov-
ered that Darling's insurance policy specifically excluded payment to
others if the insured meant to cause bodily injury."16 The negli-
gence claim went to the jury, which decided in favor of Darling, ap-
parently because they found Saba contributorily negligent. 0 7 In his
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Saba asserted that the trial
judge should have instructed the jury that simple contributory negli-
gence does not bar a claim of gross negligence.'0 8
The Court of Special Appeals declined to decide whether sim-
ple contributory negligence bars a gross negligence action, instead
holding that there was no evidence of Darling's negligence, and that
the case should not even have been submitted to the jury on the
of lex loci in tort cases, and thus applies the substantive law of the jurisdiction where the
tort occurred. See Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). Maryland
statutory law requires litigants to provide notice when they intend to argue that the law
of another jurisdiction applies to their case. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-501
to -507 (1989). When notice is not given, the court may in its discretion assume that
Maryland law applies, or that the law of the jurisdiction in question is identical to Mary-
land's. See Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975). Pre-
sumably, in this case the court applied this discretionary doctrine.
101. 320 Md. at 46, 575 A.2d at 1241.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 47, 575 A.2d at 1241.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Saba v. Darling, 72 Md. App. 487, 488-89, 531 A.2d 696, 696 (1987), aff'd, 320
Md. 45, 575 A.2d 1240 (1990).
107. Saba, 320 Md. at 47, 575 A.2d at 1241. During their deliberations, the jury sent a
note to the judge concerning contributory negligence, which the judge declined to an-
swer. Id. at 47 n.1, 575 A.2d at 1241 n.l.
108. Id. at 47, 575 A.2d at 1241-42.
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negligence theory.' 0 9 Because the jury found for the defendant any-
way, the court simply affirmed the lower court's judgment." 0 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari,"' and affirmed the Court of
Special Appeals' decision.' 
1 2
2. The Case.-In his appeal, Saba advanced two arguments to
support his negligence cause of action. First, he argued that Dar-
ling's drinking created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
others, in light of his admitted history of fighting when under the
influence of alcohol." 3 According to Saba, Darling acted with reck-
less disregard for the safety of others as defined by the Second Re-
statement of Torts, section 500.14 The negligence cause of action,
therefore, was predicated upon the reckless act of drinking, which
had the unintended but foreseeable result of injury to another." 5
Second, Saba argued that the holding of Nast v. Lockett 116
should be extended to cover this case." 7 In Nast, the Court of Ap-
peals held that reckless disregard for human life may be inferred
109. Saba v. Darling, 72 Md. App. at 492, 531 A.2d at 698. The court noted that
when Saba dismissed his assault and battery claim, "he effectively terminated his viable
cause of action." Id.
110. See id. at 493, 531 A.2d at 698.
111. Saba v. Darling, 311 Md. 698, 537 A.2d 262 (1988) (granting certiorari).
112. Saba, 320 Md. at 51, 575 A.2d at 1244.
113. See id. at 48, 575 A.2d at 1242.
114. Section 500 of the Restatement provides:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does
an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which
is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
115. See Saba, 320 Md. at 48, 575 A.2d at 1242. Saba contended that comment f to
Restatement § 500 applies:
Reckless misconduct differs from intentional wrongdoing in a very important
particular. While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor
does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he
realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong
probability that harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that his
conduct will prove harmless. However, a strong probability is a different thing
from the substantial certainty without which he cannot be said to intend the
harm in which his act results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 comment f (1965). The Court of Appeals has
cited comment f for the proposition that "[r]eckless, wanton or wilful misconduct differs
from intentional wrongdoing." Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md.
246, 253, 503 A.2d 708, 712 (1986) (element of desire distinguishes intentional from
reckless acts).
116. 312 Md. 343, 539 A.2d 1113 (1988).
117. Saba, 320 Md. at 48-49, 575 A.2d at 1242.
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when an individual drives while intoxicated." 8 Saba suggested that
it might sometimes be appropriate to infer recklessness from the act
of becoming intoxicated, even if the intoxicated person does not get
behind the wheel of a car."1 9
Both of Saba's arguments attempted to portray Darling's
drunkenness as the cause of Saba's injuries. The Court of Appeals
was not persuaded by either argument because it was convinced that
Saba's injuries were the result of an intentional battery. 120 In the
court's view, there was not a strong probability that such a battery
would result from Darling becoming intoxicated,' 21 and the intoxi-
cation was independent of the intentional battery. 22 The court re-
jected the negligence cause of action because "the nexus between
Darling's drinking and the battery upon Saba is too flimsy a thread
to support an action of gross negligence."'123
3. Analysis.-The court correctly refused Saba's request to ap-
ply the Nast v. Lockett holding because Nast involved a question fun-
damentally different from that in the case at bar. The injuries in
Nast resulted from an unintentional, negligent act. 124 The question
presented on appeal was whether the defendant's intoxication was a
sufficient basis to allow the jury to consider the issue of punitive
damages. 2 5 In no way does Nast hold or even suggest that intoxica-
tion might convert an intentional act into a negligent one, as Saba
unsuccessfully tried to argue. To the contrary, Nast suggests that in
some situations, the act of drinking and driving may cause a negli-
118. See 312 Md. at 362-63, 539 A.2d at 1123. In Nast, the plaintiff sought an infer-
ence of recklessness in order to supply the legal malice necessary to obtain punitive
damages. Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122. The Court of Appeals held that an inference of a
drunk driver's wanton or reckless disregard for human life must be measured on a slid-
ing scale. Id. Whether such an inference is permissible in an individual case depends on
the manner in which the vehicle was operated and the degree of the operator's intoxica-
tion. Id. at 362-63, 539 A.2d at 1122-23.
119. See Saba, 320 Md. at 48-49, 575 A.2d at 1242.
120. See id. at 49, 575 A.2d at 1242. The intentional tort of battery requires an injury
resulting from intended harmful or offensive contact. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 13 (1965). If the contact was intentional, it does not matter that any resulting
injuries were far greater than intended. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 com-
ment c (1965).
121. See Saba, 320 Md. at 51, 575 A.2d at 1243.
122. See id.
123. Id. (quoting with approval Saba v. Darling, 72 Md. App. 487, 491, 531 A.2d 696,
698 (1987)).
124. 312 Md. 343, 361, 539 A.2d 1113, 1122 (1988).
125. Id. at 348, 539 A.2d at 1116.
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gent act to fall "just short of willful or intentional.' t2 6
Similarly, Saba's reliance on section 500 of the Restatement was
misplaced. Section 500 defines a standard of conduct surpassing
mere negligence, but falling short of intentional misconduct. 7 Be-
cause the facts show an intentional battery, neither Nast v. Lockett
nor section 500 is on point.
To prevail on his theory that Darling's intoxication caused his
injuries, Saba would have had to convince the court that Darling's
punch was either negligent, mistaken, or inadvertent, or that Dar-
ling was so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the con-
scious intent necessary for an act of battery. 12  Saba did not argue
either of these theories,' 29 but the court made clear that these argu-
ments would have failed, given the evidence in the case.'3 0
The court implicitly assumed that battery and negligence are
mutually exclusive-that if the act was a battery there can be no re-
covery in negligence. Although the Court of Special Appeals has
previously indicated that "the presence of an intent to do an act
does not preclude negligence,"'' t there is little authority on this
question. Because the Saba court based its decision on a fact situa-
tion that it deemed was a clear battery, it presumes too much to
conclude that battery and negligence can never overlap in Maryland.
4. Conclusion.-As this case demonstrates, distinguishing negli-
gence from intentional torts is sometimes of great practical impor-
tance. Liability insurance policies usually exclude coverage for
intentional acts.'3 2 Plaintiffs such as Saba often seek to establish
126. Id. at 351, 539 A.2d at 1117 (quoting Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md.
149, 168, 297 A.2d 721, 731 (1972)).
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 comment a (1965).
128. See Saba, 320 Md. at 50, 575 A.2d at 1243. Maryland recognizes voluntary intoxi-
cation as a defense to a criminal action under the theory that voluntary intoxication may
prevent a defendant from forming the mens rea required of a specific intent crime. See
Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 512 A.2d 358 (1986) (examining whether voluntary intoxica-
tion negated the offender's intent to transport handguns); see also Developments in Mary-
land Law, 1986-87, 47 MD. L. REV. 855 (1988) (discussing Shell).
129. See Saba, 320 Md. at 50, 575 A.2d at 1243.
130. See id.
131. Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 52 Md. App. 31, 40, 447 A.2d 84, 89 (1982). The plain-
tiff in Ghassemieh sought to recover in negligence for an intentionally inflicted injury (the
defendant pulled a chair out from under the plaintiff while she was in the act of sitting
down), apparently because the one-year statute of limitations for battery had run. Ghas-
semieh, 52 Md. App. at 33 n.2, 447 A.2d at 86 n.2; see MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 5-105 (1980).
132. See Note, The Intentional Injury Exclusion: When Is There No Intent Behind the Inten-
tion?, 11 AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 527 (1988).
1991] TORTS 1293
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
negligence rather than an intentional tort in order to reach the
"deep pocket" of the insurance company.1 33
Because the duty to defend extends to all claims potentially
within the policy's coverage, 3 4 insurance companies must pay to
defend any suit against the insured that contains allegations which,
if proven, the policy would cover.'33 To the extent that Saba v. Dar-
ling establishes a bright-line test distinguishing battery from negli-
gence, plaintiffs will find it more difficult to make good faith
allegations of negligence.' 36 Saba, therefore, may provide some re-
lief to insurance companies unfairly saddled with defending claims
that in fact are outside the coverage of their policies.
C. Insurer Intervention on the Issue of Policy Coverage
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Atwood,' 37 the Court of Appeals
held that an insurance company is entitled to relitigate insurance
coverage issues that have not been fairly litigated in a tort trial in-
volving its insured. 38 The court reversed the Court of Special Ap-
peals, which found appropriate the insurer's intervention in the tort
trial. 3 9 Instead, the court approved a procedure allowing an in-
surer to bring a post-judgment complaint for declaratory relief with-
out prior intervention. 4 ° Under this new procedure, the insurer
must file a motion to intervene and a complaint for declaratory relief
within ten days after entry of judgment in the tort trial.' 4 ' If the
trial judge finds that the tort trial fairly litigated the coverage issue,
then the trial judgment binds the insurer; if not, relitigation of the
issue may proceed in the declaratory judgment action.' 41 In this
133. As a result, problems of plaintiff-defendant collusion, and of potential conflict of
interest often arise, a problem the Court of Appeals addressed in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Atwood, 319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990). Plaintiffs also may want to establish negli-
gence, rather than an intentional tort, because the statutory limitations period may dif-
fer. See supra note 131.
134. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d 842, 850-51
(1975). See generally Janquitto, Insurer's Duty to Defend in Maryland, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 1
(1988).
135. Brohawn, 276 Md. at 407-08, 347 A.2d at 850.
136. When claims are made in bad faith to invoke insurance coverage, the insurer has
recourse against the claimant and his attorney under Maryland Rule 1-341. MD. R. 1-
341.
137. 319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990).
138. See id. at 262, 572 A.2d at 161.
139. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 113-14, 523 A.2d 1066, 1069
(1987), rev'd, 319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990).
140. See 319 Md. at 264, 572 A.2d at 162.
141. Id.; see infra note 194 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 263, 572 A.2d at 162.
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manner, the insurer's interests can be protected without the poten-
tial unfairness to the litigants that pre-judgment intervention would
pose. 143
1. The Case.-John Atwood struck Raymond Dacek in the face
on October 31, 1983. 4 4 Dacek filed suit against Atwood in the Cir-
cuit Court for Montgomery County, alternatively alleging that he
was injured by Atwood's negligence or by intentional assault and
battery. Although Atwood was covered by his parents' home-
owner's insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company (All-
state), the policy excluded from its coverage intentionally caused
injuries. 45 Before the suit came to trial, Allstate filed a declaratory
judgment action contending that Atwood's deposition testimony ad-
mitted intentional assault and battery, and therefore its policy did
not cover Dacek's injuries.' 46 The court dismissed as premature
Allstate's declaratory action, and a jury eventually found in Dacek's
favor on the negligence claim. Allstate brought a second declara-
tory judgment action, which the court dismissed, and Allstate subse-
quently appealed.' 47
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the declaratory judg-
ment action's dismissal, and held that Allstate was bound by the
jury's determination that Atwood acted negligently.' 48 This implic-
itly decided the coverage issue. 149 The court relied on Brohawn v.
Transamerica Insurance Co., 150 and said that Allstate could have pro-
tected its interests by hiring independent counsel to represent
Atwood, then intervening as a party in the tort trial.' 5 ' Having
failed to exercise this option, Allstate was bound by the trial court's
determination.' 52 The Court of Appeals granted Allstate's petition
for certiorari.15 3
143. See infra notes 170-177 and accompanying text.
144. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 108, 523 A.2d 1066, 1067 (1987),
rev'd, 319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990).
145. Allstate, 319 Md. at 249-50, 572 A.2d at 155. The policy provided that Allstate
"will pay all sums arising from the same loss which an insured person becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage covered by
this part of the policy," but contained an exclusion for "bodily injury ... intentionally
caused by an insured person." Id. at 250, 572 A.2d at 155.
146. 71 Md. App. at 109, 523 A.2d at 1067.
147. 319 Md. at 250-51, 572 A.2d at 155-56; 71 Md. App. at 109, 523 A.2d at 1067.
148. See 71 Md. App. at 114, 523 A.2d at 1070.
149. See id.
150. 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975).
151. See 71 Md. App. at 111-12, 523 A.2d at 1068.
152. Id. at 114, 523 A.2d at 1070.
153. See Allstate, 319 Md. at 251, 572 A.2d at 156.
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2. Legal Background and the Court's Reasoning.-
a. Declaratory Judgments.-The Maryland Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act' authorizes courts to construe written contracts,' 55
declare parties' rights, 1 56 and end actual controversies by granting
discretionary relief.' 57 Insurers often use declaratory judgment ac-
tions to determine whether they have a duty to defend their in-
sured.'15  Despite the Declaratory Judgments Act's broad language,
the Court of Appeals has limited insurers' ability to obtain declara-
tory judgments by finding that a declaratory judgment is inappropri-
ate if the issue to be decided will be resolved in the pending tort
action.' 59
b. The Duty to Defend.-A liability insurer usually has a contrac-
tual duty to defend claims against those it insures. 6 ° The pending
tort action's allegations determine the insurer's duty to defend:' 6 '
the insurer "must defend if there is a potentiality that the claim could
be covered by the policy.' 62 An insurer may be relieved of its duty
to defend the insured if there is evidence of the insured's collusion
or bad faith.' 63
When a plaintiff's complaint against an insured contains allega-
tions that the insured negligently or intentionally inflicted injuries,
154. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-401 to -415 (1989).
155. See id. at § 3-406.
156. See id.
157. See id. § 3-409(a); see, e.g., Northern Assurance Co. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md.
217, 222-24, 533 A.2d 682, 685 (1987) (court acted properly to authorize declaratory
judgment when ajusticiable controversy existed). For a general discussion of the appro-
priateness of a declaratory judgment action, see Harpy v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
76 Md. App. 474, 477, 545 A.2d 718, 720 (1988).
158. See Note, Use of Declaratoiy Judgment to Determine a Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend-
Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87, 95-98 (1965); see generally Comment, The Insurer's Duty
to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734 (1966) (review of the
effect of collateral issues upon the duty to defend).
159. See Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 405, 347 A.2d 842, 848
(1975). A pre-trial declaratory action is still available if the coverage issue is independ-
ent and separable from the questions presented in the pending suit. See id.
160. See Janquitto, Insurer's Duty to Defend in Maryland, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 3-6
(1988).
161. See Brohawn, 276 Md. at 407, 347 A.2d at 850.
162. Id. at 408, 347 A.2d at 850 (emphasis in original) (citing U.S.F.& G. v. National
Paving & Contracting Co., 228 Md. 40, 54, 178 A.2d 872, 879 (1962)).
163. See Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch., 67 Md. App. 712, 719-20, 509 A.2d 711, 715
(1986). See also Janquitto, supra note 160, at 14 n.70 (Oweiss suggested that collusion
between the insured and the claimant might abrogate the insurer's duty to defend the
insured).
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the insurer potentially faces a conflict of interests.'"4 Although both
insured and insurer would prefer a jury finding of no liability, their
interests diverge if the jury finds the insured liable.' 6 If this hap-
pens, the insured party would be served best by a finding of liability
based on negligence, which would obligate the insurer to settle the
claim. Conversely, the insurer wants a finding that the harm was
inflicted intentionally, which frees it from indemnification obliga-
tions.'6 6 Collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant may
also occur, because each has incentive to characterize the action so
that it comes within the insurance policy's coverage. 6 7
The insurer's counsel may have mixed loyalties in this situation.
Recognizing this, the Court of Appeals held in Brohawn that in order
to avoid attorney conflicts of interests, the insurer may be required
to provide the insured with independent counsel.' 68 The court
made clear that a conflict of interest did not relieve an insurer's
contractual duty to defend the insured.' 69
c. Pre-Trial Declaratory Judgments.-In Brohawn, Transamerica
Insurance Company sought to extricate itself from the suit by hav-
ing the coverage issue resolved by declaratory judgment before the
case went to trial. 170 In considering the appropriateness of a pre-
trial proceeding concerning questions at issue in the trial, the Court
of Appeals stressed the proceeding's potential unfairness to the
principal parties. 17 ' The plaintiffs would be inconvenienced, be-
cause they would lose control of the litigation to the insurer. More
significantly, the defendant would be successively forced to defend
against the insurance company and the plaintiff. i72 Because of this
arrangement's "essential unfairness," 17 the court held that declara-
164. See Brohawn, 276 Md. at 409, 347 A.2d at 851.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. The insured seeks to avoid personal liability, and the plaintiff seeks a collectible
judgment. Even absent collusion, a defense attorney protecting the insured's interests
may be tempted to settle claims by admitting negligence rather than risk a trial. See
Allstate, 319 Md. at 253, 572 A.2d at 157 (citing Petitioner's Brief, No. 87-84, at 15).
168. See 276 Md. 396, 411, 347 A.2d 842, 852 (1975).
169. See id. at 412, 347 A.2d at 853. Because the insurer's duty to defend is contrac-
tual, it could limit its obligation through the contract's language. See id. at 410, 347 A.2d
at 851.
170. See id. at 400-01, 347 A.2d at 846.
171. See id. at 406-07, 347 A.2d at 849-50.
172. See id. The insurance company may expose its insured to punitive damages if it
seeks to establish that the insured intentionally inflicted the plaintiff's injuries. See id. at
406, 347 A.2d at 849.
173. Id. at 407, 347 A.2d at 850.
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tory relief was unavailable. 174
d. Intervention.-Generally, an insurer is bound by tort trial
findings against its insured. 75 Because pre-trial declaratory judg-
ment actions are permitted only in limited circumstances, an insurer
seemingly has no means to protect its interests, other than to inter-
vene as a party in the trial. The Court of Special Appeals recog-
nized this dilemma and held that an insurer was entitled to
intervene in a conflict of interest situation arising in a tort action as
long as it provided the insured with independent counsel. 76
e. The Court's Reasoning.-In resolving Allstate, the Court of Ap-
peals first considered Brohawn's prohibition against pre-trial deter-
mination of issues to be litigated in a pending lawsuit.' 77 The court
reaffirmed this prohibition, 7 1 with one new exception: a declaratory
judgment now is available for claims that are patent attempts to
characterize intentional acts as negligent acts.' 79 This exception is
designed to reach claims of "negligent" sexual assault and the like,
in which "the nature and character of the act is such that the intent
to inflict injury may be inferred as a matter of law."' 80 By masking
these intentional actions in a complaint alleging only negligence, an
174. See id Pre-trial declaratory actions would be appropriate, however, when the
coverage issue related to an interpretation of the insurance contract, or was otherwise
independent from the allegations in the pending lawsuit. See id. at 405, 347 A.2d at 848;
see, e.g., Northern Assurance Co. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 223, 533 A.2d 682,
685 (1986) (declaratory judgment appropriate when the insured had a material interest
in seeking an interpretation of its policy's exclusionary language, to determine which of
its insurance carriers to look to for coverage and defense; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 194, 438 A.2d 282, 286 (1981) (action was appropriate if the
question of interpretation was whether the term "occurrence" includes intentional tor-
tious conduct); Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Electro Enters., 287 Md. 641, 644-45,
415 A.2d 278, 281 (1980) (action was appropriate to determine whether a clause which
excluded coverage unless two specific individuals were operating the plane was effective
to deny coverage if only one of the named individuals was on the plane when it crashed).
175. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 675-77, 273 A.2d 431, 435-36
(1971) (insurer was bound by the principle of collateral estoppel on the issues litigated
and determined in the first trial); Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. American Oil Co., 254 Md. 120,
134-35, 254 A.2d 658, 666 (1969) (according to the rule of collateral estoppel, the
named party and any unnamed participants in the litigation are bound by the trial
determination).
176. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 111-12, 523 A.2d 1066, 1068
(1987), rev'd, 319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990).
177. See Allstate, 319 Md. at 251, 572 A.2d at 156.
178. See id. at 255, 572 A.2d at 158.
179. See id. at 253, 572 A.2d at 157.
180. Id. (quoting Troelstrup v. District Court, 712 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Colo. 1986) (be-
cause the plaintiff alleged more than the defendant's negligence, including claims of
homosexual acts and sexual assault on a minor, which were acts outside the terms of the
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insurer would be obligated to defend its insured under the "potenti-
ality" rule. t '' The court also held that an insurer's failure to seek
pre-trial relief does not impair its post-trial proceeding rights. 8 2
The court reviewed the Court of Special Appeals' opinion,
which held that insurer intervention was appropriate in a conflict of
interest situation.' The Court of Appeals reversed this holding
and stated that the intermediate court failed to consider the policies
underlying Brohawn's prohibition against an insurer's pre-trial ac-
tions. 184 In the court's view, these policy considerations applied
with equal force to the question of whether an insurer could inter-
vene. 185 Furthermore, inserting the issue of insurance coverage
into a tort trial would be unfairly prejudicial.' 86
The court also considered whether an insurer could obtain
post-trial relief.'87 The court held that in a conflict of interest situa-
tion an insurer was entitled to bring a post-trial declaratory judg-
defendant's insurance policy, the insurer was entitled to a declaratory judgment prior to
the personal injury trial).
181. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
182. See Allstate, 319 Md. at 255, 572 A.2d at 158. The court wanted to discourage
insurers' unnecessary pre-trial declaratory judgment actions; therefore, even when no
action is filed, an insurer can obtain a post-trial declaratory judgment if the issues
presented were not fairly litigated in the tort trial. Id. at 255, 262, 572 A.2d at 158, 161.
183. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 111-12, 523 A.2d 1066, 1068
(1987), rev'd, 319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990). The Court of Special Appeals rea-
soned that the Brohawn decision, requiring the insurance company to provide independ-
ent counsel when a conflict of interest arises, raises the "inference that the insurer might
also be represented at trial so as to protect its interest." Id. at 112, 523 A.2d at 1068.
Consequently, an insurer is not prevented from intervening in the tort case against the
insured "as long as the insured is not cast adrift and left to fend for himself or herself
against the wealth and resources of the carrier." Id. at 113, 523 A.2d at 1069.
184. See Allstate, 319 Md. at 256, 572 A.2d at 158. The court summarized the policies
that would preclude insurance company intervention in the tort case. First, the court
considered the "essential unfairness" to both the plaintiff and the defendant. When the
insurance companies took over prosecuting the claims, plaintiffs would be stripped of
control over their own cases and would be forced to defend against both the plaintiff
and their own insurance companies. See id. at 257, 572 A.2d at 159. Second, allowing
insurance companies to intervene would "be tantamount to authorizing direct actions by
plaintiffs against defendants' liability insurers," and these are actions that Maryland law
specifically prohibits. Id. Finally, because "the matter of liability insurance is irrelevant
to the issue of defendant's liability and is highly prejudicial," Maryland courts in tort
trials usually exclude evidence relating to insurance. Id. at 258, 572 A.2d at 159. Al-
lowing insurance companies to intervene would be tantamount to admitting insurance
evidence. Id. at 256-58, 572 A.2d at 159.
185. See id. at 257, 572 A.2d at 159.
186. See id. at 258, 572 A.2d at 159. The court noted that in tort trials, evidence of
insurance coverage is inadmissible. Id.
187. See id. at 259-63, 572 A.2d at 160-62.
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ment action.'"8 The court reasoned that although an insurer
ordinarily was bound by a judgment against its insured,' 89 it was
unfair to bind an insurer to the trial's outcome if it had no opportu-
nity to litigate its issues.'9° Thus, if the judge hearing Allstate's ac-
tion finds that the coverage issue was not fairly litigated in the tort
trial, Allstate will be entitled to relitigate that issue.' 9 '
Even though it held that Allstate was entitled to bring a post-
trial declaratory judgment action, the court noted that there were
"undesirable aspects to this procedure," and added that in the fu-
ture, actions of this sort would not be permitted. 19 2 Instead, insur-
ers seeking this type of relief should intervene in the tort trial, after
the entry ofjudgment.193 The insurer must file its motion to inter-
vene, along with a motion under Maryland Rules 2-532, 2-533, or 2-
534,194 and a complaint for declaratory relief, after the jury's verdict
or the court's decision in the tort case, but no later than ten days
after the entry of judgment.1 95
3. Analysis.-In resolving these conflict of interests situations,
a court must consider the interests of three parties: the injured
plaintiff, the insured defendant, and the insurer. In Brohawn, the
Court of Appeals held that an insurer was not entitled to a pre-trial
declaratory judgment proceeding concerning a coverage question
that would be at issue in the subsequent tort trial, because this
would be unfair to the plaintiff and the insured defendant.' 9 6
Brohawn did not address the question of what relief, if any, was avail-
able to an insurer victimized by fraud or collusion between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
The Court of Special Appeals read Brohawn as suggesting that
188. See id. at 262, 572 A.2d at 161.
189. See id. at 260, 572 A.2d at 160.
190. See id. at 262-63, 572 A.2d at 161-62. Unfairness could result if the plaintiff and
the defendant cooperated to convince the fact-finder that an act was negligent rather
than intentional, thus making the insurance company liable. Id.
191. See id. at 262, 572 A.2d at 161.
192. See id. at 263-64, 572 A.2d at 162. The "undesirable aspects" include the possi-
bility of conflicting final judgments, the multiplicity of appeals, and the likelihood that
the declaratory action would not be held before the same judge who presided over the
trial. See id.
193. See id. at 264, 572 A.2d at 162.
194. See MD. R. 2-532 (motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); 2-533 (mo-
tion for new trial); and 2-534 (motion to alter or amend a judgment). These rules
render the tort judgment nonfinal. After the tort judgment is determined to be nonfinal,
the insurer may intervene as a party and request declaratory relief.
195. Allstate, 319 Md. at 264, 572 A.2d at 162.
196. See Brohawn, 276 Md. at 406-07, 347 A.2d at 849-50.
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an insurer could intervene in the tort trial as a third party.' 97 The
Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation, because it realized
that this procedure would be even more prejudicial to the insured
party than the pre-trial procedure rejected in Brohawn.l'
If the availability of a pre-trial declaratory judgment is limited,
and an insurer may not intervene in the trial, then some sort of post-
trial relief is needed to protect the insurer from fraud or collusion.
Recognizing this, the court held that an insurer is entitled to file a
post-trial declaratory judgment motion.'99 Upon such motion the
trial court must then determine, as a matter of law, whether the tort
trial fairly litigated the insurance coverage issue.2 ° ° If it was fairly
litigated, the trial determination is binding on the insurer.2 0 ' If the
judge finds that the issue was not fairly litigated, however, the in-
surer may relitigate the coverage question in a declaratory judgment
action.202
Authority from other jurisdictions is consistent with the Court
of Appeals' view that pre-trial declaratory judgments and insurer in-
tervention in tort trials are not appropriate.2 °3 Few decisions, how-
ever, have sanctioned post-trial relief,2 4 and Allstate v. Atwood
197. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 71 Md. App. 107, 111-12, 523 A.2d 1066, 1068
(1987), rev'd, 319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990).
198. See Allstate, 319 Md. at 256, 572 A.2d at 158; see also supra note 184.
199. See Allstate, 319 Md. at 262-63, 572 A.2d at 161-62.
200. Id. at 262, 572 A.2d at 161.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Restor-a-Dent Dental Lab v. Certified Alloy Prods., 725 F.2d 871, 875 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding that an insurer has no right to intervene because it had no direct
interest in the litigation until the liability of its insured was determined); Cromer v. Sef-
ton, 471 N.E.2d 700, 704 (Ind. App. 1984) ("To permit intervention by the insurer to
litigate coverage in the principal tort case against its insured would distract the trier and
literally force the plaintiff to become embroiled in a matter in which she does not yet
have an interest."); Kaczmarek v. Shoffstall, 119 App. Div. 2d 1001, 1002, 500 N.Y.S.2d
902, 903 (1986) (insurer cannot intervene where its interests are "unrelated to the sub-
ject matter of the action and can in no way be characterized as claims or defenses to the
action.").
204. See Allstate, 319 Md. at 263, 572 A.2d at 162. The Allstate opinion cited only three
cases to support its proposition that a declaratory judgment action is permissible after
the tort trial closes. See id. They are: Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz.
443, 448, 675 P.2d 703, 708 (1983) ("where there is a conflict of interest between an
insured and his insurer, the parties will not be estopped from litigating in a subsequent
proceeding those issues as to which there was a conflict of interest, whether or not the
insurer defended in the original tort claim"); Spears v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins., 291
Ark. 465, 469, 725 S.W.2d 835, 837 (1987) (when the interests of the insured and the
insurance company conflict, res judicata does not prevent a second suit); Strickland v.
Hughes, 273 N.C. 481, 487, 160 S.E.2d 313, 318 (1968) (the insurer's action of defend-
ing its insured according to its contractual obligation does not estop the insurer from
bringing a subsequent action alleging fraud or collusion).
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appears to be the first to provide a detailed procedure for resolving
the conflict of interests problem. 20 5 If other jurisdictions view this
procedure with favor, Allstate could be an influential decision in the
insurance liability field.
As Brohawn did, Allstate makes clear that a conflict of interest
does not lessen the insurer's contractual duty to defend the insured
and to pay any judgments within the policy's coverage.20 6 Only
when the insured party takes unfair advantage of the situation is the
insurer entitled to relief. For example, if an insured fails to disclose
facts, and this falsely brings the action within the insurance policy's
coverage, then it is unfair to bind the insurer.20 7
The court's new procedure seems a reasonable solution to a dif-
ficult problem. Because the procedure delays intervention until af-
ter the trial court reaches its judgment, and relitigation is allowed
only upon a finding that the trial court did not fairly litigate the cov-
erage issue, the potential for prejudice to the insured is minimal.
Furthermore, by requiring that the insurer act within ten days of the
entry of judgment, the decision ensures that the trial judge, who is
in the best position to do so, will rule on the insurer's allegations.
But the court's solution suffers from one procedural problem.
The decision provides that when an insurer intervenes following en-
try of judgment based upon a jury verdict, the insurer may file a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 2" According to
the Maryland Rules, the motion may be filed by a party "only if that
party made a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence
and only on the grounds advanced in support of the earlier mo-
tion."' 20 9 The insurer cannot satisfy this condition because it was
not and could not have been a party at an earlier time. It is unclear
whether the court intended to waive this requirement, or simply did
not consider it.
4. Conclusion.-Fifteen years ago the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals decided that a pre-trial declaratory judgment was inappropri-
ate if the issue would be resolved in a pending tort trial.21 0 In
Allstate, the court refined that earlier ruling by establishing a proce-
dure that protects the rights of all parties. By holding that a post-
205. See supra note 193.
206. See 319 Md. at 261, 572 A.2d at 161.
207. See id. at 262, 572 A.2d at 161.
208. See id. at 264, 572 A.2d at 162; MD. R. 2-532.
209. MD. R. 2-532(a).
210. See Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975).
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trial declaratory judgment action is appropriate to determine the lit-
igation's fairness, the court protects the insurer from being bound
in cases of fraud and collusion. The holding is consistent with ex-
isting Maryland law, and provides a necessary alternative to pre-trial
declaratory judgment actions, or insurer intervention in the tort
trial.
D. Executive Immunity
In Mandel v. O'Hara,21" ' the Court of Appeals held that as a mat-
ter of common law, Maryland's governor enjoys absolute immunity
from liability for damages for nonconstitutional torts caused by the
legislative function of vetoing or approving legislation.21 2 The
court concluded that there is no difference between the discretion
exercised by a governor performing the veto or approval function
and the discretion legislators exercise in deciding when to vote for
or against a bill. 21" The court also held that Governor Mandel could
interlocutorily appeal the order denying his motion for summary
judgment because review after final judgment did not protect his
right to avoid trial. 2 4 This Note discusses the court's functional
analysis,2 1 5 and the sound reasoning underlying its narrow holding.
1. The Case.-James F. O'Hara and Michael P. O'Hara (the
O'Haras), were stockholders in the Southern Maryland Agricultural
Fair Association, Inc. (Marlboro), which owned the Marlboro race-
track.2 16 The O'Haras claimed that former Governor Marvin
Mandel, and others, collectively known as the Kovens Group, prac-
ticed common-law deceit upon them in the December 31, 1971 sale
of their Marlboro stock.21 7
Before, or during the Maryland General Assembly's 1971 ses-
211. 320 Md. 103, 576 A.2d 766 (1990).
212. See id.
213. See id at 118, 576 A.2d at 781.
214. See id.
215. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), the Supreme Court first held that in
civil suits against executive officials, the title of the executive's office does not determine
the applicable scope of immunity. Instead, the privilege depends on the particular func-
tion the executive is exercising. Whether a function deserves absolute immunity is an
objective, rather than a subjective, determination. See id. at 498-99. The function at
issue in this case was the governor's power to veto or approve legislation.
216. O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 282, 503 A.2d 1313, 1315 (1986). The
O'Haras' combined holdings constituted approximately 30% of Marlboro's then out-
standing stock. Id. On December 31, 1971, the O'Haras, together with others who held
an additional 52% of the outstanding stock, sold 82% of Marlboro's stock. Id.
217. See Mandel, 320 Md. at 105-06, 576 A.2d at 767.
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sion, Marlboro and Hagerstown, two entities that conducted horse
racing with parimutuel betting, agreed that Hagerstown would sell
eighteen of its racing days to Marlboro.21 8 As a result, Marlboro
would benefit from thirty-six days of racing. Marlboro and Hagers-
town needed legislative approval during either the 1971 or 1972
session of the Maryland General Assembly to transfer the Hagers-
town days. House Bill 1128, enacted at the 1971 legislative session,
conferred the necessary approval. On May 28, 1971, then-Governor
Mandel vetoed the bill. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sold their Marl-
boro stock. On January 12, 1972, the General Assembly overrode
the veto. In December 1972, Marlboro merged with another corpo-
ration that conducted horse racing with parimutuel betting at the
Bowie racetrack. On November 24, 1975, the federal government
filed indictments against Governor Mandel and others of the Kovens
Group.219
In 1978, the O'Haras filed suit alleging that there was a conspir-
acy between Governor Mandel and others of the Kovens Group that
antedated Mandel's veto of House Bill 1128. The essence of the
conspiracy was to have the Governor's veto depress the stock's
value; to acquire the stock at a depressed price; and to restore its
value by having Governor Mandel induce the General Assembly to
override the veto.22 °
After the defendants were denied judgment on limitations
grounds,2 2 ' Governor Mandel moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that absolute immunity protected his official actions from
liability.222 The trial court denied the motion, and Governor
Mandel appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That court
granted a stay, and he petitioned the Court of Appeals, which
granted certiorari, to determine the question of applicable immu-
nity, and to decide whether the order denying the motion for sum-
218. Id.
219. Id. The indictment charged that Mandel acted "with intent to aid and assist cer-
tain legislation and legislative matters financially beneficial [] to the other codefendants
in their capacities as alleged owners of the Marlboro Race Track." United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (D. Md. 1976).
220. See Mandel, 320 Md. at 105-06, 576 A.2d at 767.
221. See O'Hara v. Kovans, 305 Md. 280, 503 A.2d 1313 (1986) (the question of when
plaintiffs in a securities fraud action were on notice was a question of fact for the jury).
For a history of the prosecution on federal criminal charges, see United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976) (summarizing indictment); United States v.
Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) (reversing convictions), vacated on reh'g, 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir.) (affirming convictions by evenly divided en banc court),further en banc reh g
denied, 609 F.2d 1076 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
222. Mandel, 320 Md. at 107, 576 A.2d at 768.
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mary judgment was appealable.223
2. Legal Background and The Court's Reasoning.-"Absolute im-
munity is appropriate when the threat of liability may bias the deci-
sionmaker in ways that are adverse to the public interest.-2 24
Traditionally, this defense has been available to judges22 5 and legis-
lators226 when their acts are "judicial" or "legislative" in nature,
and within the scope of their jurisdiction. 227 The law has not been
as clear, however, with regard to executive officials. 2 8
Absolute immunity removes from judicial scrutiny all acts com-
223. See id.
224. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 788 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (the Consti-
tution confers on the President of the United States absolute immunity from damages
liability predicated on his official acts).
225. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
(Section 1983 suits did not invalidate the absolute immunity awarded to state judges); see
also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 350 (1871) (judges are not liable for their
judicial acts in civil suits); Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity
must be accorded state prosecutors with respect to the initiation and pursuit of
prosecutions).
226. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). In granting absolute immunity to
state legislators, the Court explained the privilege's history:
The privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what
they do or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the Parliamentary
struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries .... Freedom of speech
and action in the legislature was taken as a matter of course by those who sev-
ered the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation. It was deemed so
essential for representatives of the people that it was written into the Articles of
Confederation and later into the Constitution .... The reason for the privilege
is clear .... "In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably neces-
sary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offence."
Id. at 372-73 (quoting 2 WORKS OFJAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed. 1896)).
227. See generally W. PIOSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 1056-57 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D comment c (1979) (a judge or legislator "is
not liable for [that official's] discretionary acts or omissions even though [the official] is
found to have acted with malicious or other improper motives").
228. The common law did not distinguish between public officials and private citizens
in suits for personal tort liability. See 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw OF
TORTS § 29.8, at 653-54 (2d ed. 1986). The development of public official immunity has
expanded, however, and now, "[a] high-level executive officer is usually accorded the
same type of immunity as that given the judge and for the same reasons." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D comment d (1979). In addition, Prosser explained:
The judicial immunity is not granted wholesale to officials of the executive de-
partments, who normally enjoy only a qualified immunity if any at all.... [T]he
dominant approach seems to follow the "functional analysis," and the absolute
immunity is granted or denied according to whether the officer's functions are
judicial in nature.
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mitted in the discharge of official duties. The official's underlying
motives are not subject to judicial review. 22 9 This doctrine rests on
the principle that executive officials will be unable properly to ad-
minister public affairs if they perform their duties under the fear of
damage suits for acts done in the course of their official duties. 3 °
To avoid inhibiting the "fearless, vigorous, and effective administra-
tion of policies of government, "231 the executive official cannot be
subject to the restraint accompanying judicial inquiry into the mo-
tives that control his conduct. 2  Hence, the principle evolved that
it is "better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest of-
ficers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant
dread of retaliation. "233
a. Executive Official Immunity in Maryland.-The Court of Ap-
peals has never had occasion to decide whether absolute immunity
protects the Governor of Maryland in civil suits, 23 4 but it has con-
fronted the issue in cases involving state officials of lesser rank. 3 5
In Walker v. D'Alesandro,236 the court considered whether absolute
immunity protected the Mayor of Baltimore City.23 7 The court
stated: "We may assume, without deciding, that the privilege does
PROSSER, supra note 227, § 132, at 1056-58. See infra notes 245-267 and accompanying
text.
229. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896). Qualified immunity, on the
other hand, protects officials only if the executive acted in good faith or had reasonable
grounds to believe that his conduct would not violate another individual's constitutional
rights. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 313-22 (1975).
230. See Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
231. Id.
232. See Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498-99; see also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). Judge Learned Hand stated in Gregoire:
"Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded
on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy
a jury of his good faith." Id.
233. Id.
234. See Mandel, 320 Md. at 113, 576 A.2d at 768.
235. See, e.g., Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince George's County, 262
Md. 342, 278 A.2d 71 (1971) (defense of governmental immunity extends to police of-
ficers' nonmalicious acts performed within the scope of their law enforcement function);
Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 151 A.2d 137 (1959) (the superintendent of the Maryland
State Reformatory for Males was a public officer whose duties in safely confining inmates
involved the exercise of discretion and, thus, immunity from liability for injuries inflicted
by one prisoner upon another); Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 A. 104 (1898) (a
sheriff is not civilly liable for injury to a prisoner if, in the honest exercise of discretion,
he fails to remove a prisoner in time to avert a threatened danger).
236. 212 Md. 163, 129 A.2d 148 (1957).
237. See id.
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apply .... "238 The court in that case did not have to decide the
question because the Mayor's conduct exceeded the scope of his au-
thority.239 Nevertheless, the court noted that absolute immunity is
accorded to "judicial . .. and to legislative proceedings and to the
activities of high executive officers .... 40
In most instances involving lesser executive officials, however,
Maryland courts have permitted only qualified immunity. In Carr v.
Watkins,2 4 ' the Court of Appeals held that qualified immunity, rather
than absolute immunity, appropriately protected Montgomery
County police officers against tort liability.2 4 2 In another action
against two police officers, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Robin-
son v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County243 reaf-
firmed the rule in Carr, and found no reason why a public official
should not be liable for malicious actions performed within the offi-
cial's discretionary authority. 244
b. Supreme Court Rulings on Executive Immunity.-The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized that high-level executive officials
are entitled to some degree of immunity from civil suits. In Spalding
v. Vilas,2 145 it granted absolute immunity to all cabinet-level officials
who acted within the scope of their authority. 46 Spalding involved a
suit for damages against the Postmaster General, alleging that he
maliciously circulated to other postmasters false information that ul-
238. Id. at 170, 129 A.2d at 151.
239. See id. at 173, 129 A.2d at 153. In Walker, the plaintiff, an artist, brought an
action against the Mayor of Baltimore alleging wrongful removal of one of his paintings
from an art exhibit at a museum, interference with contractual relations, slander and
libel. See id. at 166-67, 129 A.2d at 149-50. The court concluded that the mayor's pow-
ers did not extend to "censorship of works of art." Id at 171, 129 A.2d at 152.
240. Id. at 170, 129 A.2d at 151.
241. 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962).
242. See id A federal security officer and two county police officers were charged with
transmitting certain information to the plaintiff's employer, and this led to the plaintiff's
dismissal. See id. at 581, 177 A.2d at 842. The court refused to extend absolute immu-
nity to the two county police officers, reasoning that it has been reluctant to grant the
privilege to officials of a higher rank than these defendants. See id. at 585-86, 177 A.2d
at 844-45. As authority, however, the court cited Walker, in which it specifically indi-
cated that absolute immunity applied to high executive officials. See id.; supra notes 238-
240 and accompanying text.
243. 262 Md. 342, 278 A.2d 71 (1971).
244. See id at 348, 278 A.2d at 74.
245. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
246. See id. at 498. The scope of authority was limited to any action "having more or
less connection with the general matters committed by law to [the officer's] control or
supervision." Id
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timately harmed the plaintiff.24 7 Finding that the Postmaster Gen-
eral acted within the scope of his authority, the Court awarded him
absolute immunity.248
The Court's decision in Barr v. Mateo249 extended the rule es-
tablished in Spalding to other federal officials,2 50 and reaffirmed that
"[ilt is not the title of his office but the duties... [of] the particular
officer ' 25 ' that determines whether immunity will protect the execu-
tive official. 252 In Barr, two employees suspended for misconduct
sued the acting director of the Office for Rent Stabilization, charg-
ing the Director with malicious defamation for informing the press
of their suspensions. 253  Finding that the press conference was
within the "outer perimeter of [his] line of duty,' 254 the Court rea-
soned that absolute immunity protected the official from liability de-
spite the allegations of malice.255
In 1974, the Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes256 narrowed its reason-
ing and restricted absolute immunity in section 1983 actions.257 In
Scheuer, the Court refused to allow the Governor of Ohio the de-
fense of absolute immunity for his discretionary actions during an
anti-war demonstration at Kent State University. 258 The Court de-
cided that only qualified immunity was available to state executive
officials sued for federal constitutional violations.259 Wood v. Strick-
land 26 reaffirmed that an official acting in bad faith would be denied
immunity from liability for constitutional violations, but also denied
immunity, regardless of the official's intentions or good faith, if the
official reasonably should have known that his act would violate an
247. See id. at 484-86.
248. See id. at 498.
249. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
250. See id. at 572-73.
251. Id. at 573.
252. See id. at 573-74; Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498.
253. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 566-68.
254. Id. at 575.
255. See id.
256. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
258. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 238-49.
259. See id. at 247. The legislative and the judicial branches of state governments
already enjoyed absolute immunity for both constitutional and common law claims. See
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). The
Scheuer Court reasoned that section 1983 would serve no purpose if state executive offi-
cials were granted absolute immunity. The Court also compared the governor's func-
tion to a police officer's exercise of discretion in possible arrest situations, and noted
that police officers traditionally have been awarded only qualified immunity. See Scheuer,
416 U.S. at 244-49.
260. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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individual's constitutional right.2"'
Narrowing the standard developed in Scheuer, the Court in Butz
v. Economou,262 reconciled its prior holdings and supplied the princi-
ples that now govern immunity privileges for executive officials.
Butz established the general rule that like state officials, federal offi-
cials have only a qualified immunity in suits for constitutional viola-
tions,263 but stated that "there are some officials whose special
functions require a full exemption from liability. ' 2 1
Four years later, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 6 the Court followed the
principles governing the functional analysis, and held that the Presi-
dent was absolutely immune from civil liability for all conduct within
the scope of his authority.266 The Court concluded that this broad
application of absolute immunity was "a functionally mandated inci-
dent of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional
tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our
history. "267
261. See id. at 321-22.
262. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
263. See id Butz was a "Bivens" action. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971), the Court awarded damages to a plaintiff who alleged that
federal narcotics agents violated his fourth amendment rights by conducting a warrant-
less search of his residence. Although section 1983 allows a cause of action to plaintiffs
deprived of constitutional rights by a state executive official, Bives held that the Consti-
tution affords a similar right against federal executive officials. See 403 U.S. at 397. In
Butz, Department of Agriculture officials were sued by a commodity futures commission
merchant who alleged that the unauthorized proceedings instituted against him violated
his constitutional rights. See 438 U.S. at 481-83." The court upheld the absolute immu-
nity claim for those officials performing quasi-judicial functions. See id. at 512-14. Thus,
the privilege awarded to officials involved in judicial proceedings was equally appropri-
ate for executives performing similar adjudicatory functions, such as the administrative
agency proceedings at issue in Butz. See id. at 513-17.
264. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508. The Butz Court reconciled its holding with the rules estab-
lished in Spalding and Barr by stating that when a federal official violates a constitutional
right, the officer has overstepped the bounds of official authority. See id. at 485-96. This
decision implies a distinction between common law and constitutional claims against
federal executive officials. By not overruling Barr, absolute immunity is still the rule for
common law tort claims. Although Butz did not overrule Spalding either, it restricted the
available level of immunity. See id.
265. 457 U.S. 731 (1981).
266. See id.
267. Id. at 749. The dissent in Nixon argued that the Court has "abandoned" the
functional approach. Justice White stated: "Indeed, the majority turns this rule on its
head by declaring that because the functions of the President's office are so varied and
diverse.., the office is unique and must be clothed with officewide, absolute immunity."
Ia at 770 (White, J., dissenting).
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c. Legislative Character of the Veto or Approval Function.-In Her-
nandez v. City of Lafayette, 68 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a mayor enjoys absolute immunity from
damages for an alleged tort based upon the exercise of veto
power.269 In that case, the plaintiff owned land through which the
municipality planned to build a highway. 270 The mayor vetoed the
city council's decision to rezone the land, and the council did not
override it.2 7 ' The plaintiff claimed that the decision to rezone was
delayed to keep the value of the land depressed, and therefore
lessen the cost of acquiring the right of way for the highway.272
The Hernandez court held that the mayor was entitled to abso-
lute immunity from suit for acts performed in a legislative capac-
ity.2 73 The court reasoned that "[t]he mayor's veto, like the veto of
the President or a state governor, is undeniably a part of the legisla-
tive process. It differs only in that it takes place on the local
level."' 274 The First, 275 Sixth,2 76 Seventh,277 and Eleventh 278 Cir-
cuits followed Hernandez' holding and conferred on the executive
veto absolute legislative immunity to section 1983 actions.
d. The Court's Reasoning.-In an opinion by Judge Rodowsky,
the Court of Appeals in Mandel found that the civil immunity appli-
cable to the gubernatorial veto or approval function is as complete
as the immunity enjoyed by General Assembly members when per-
forming their legislative function. 279 This decision gives the gover-
nor immunity from judicial scrutiny of the motives underlying
268. 643 F.2d 1188, reh'gdenied, 649 F.2d 336(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907
(1982).
269. See id. at 1193.
270. See id. at 1190-91.
271. Id.
272. See id
273. See id at 1193-94.
274. Id at 1194.
275. See Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1984) (the absolute immunity ex-
tended to the executive veto does not protect members of a town planning board from
damage suits).
276. See Shoultes v. Laidlaw, 886 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1989) (local legislators who voted
for a zoning ordinance that was later declared invalid are protected by absolute immu-
nity in a subsequent civil rights action against them).
277. See Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983) (the president
and other trustees of a village board of trustees were entitled to absolute immunity for
legislative action in reducing the number of village liquor licenses).
278. See Healy v. Pembroke Park, 831 F.2d 989 (11 th Cir. 1987) (the mayor and mu-
nicipal commissioners were legislatively immune from liability to discharged policemen
suing under a federal civil rights provision).
279. See 320 Md. at 105, 576 A.2d at 766.
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decisions to veto or approve legislation.2 0 The court decided that
exercise of the veto power is, in essence, a legislative function. 28 '
Because the common law has granted absolute immunity to legisla-
tors for public policy reasons, 2 2 the court decided that there is no
reason why this defense should be unavailable to a governor exer-
cising the legislative decision-making power inherent in the veto or
approval function.
2 8 3
Presented with this question for the first time, the court con-
fined its holding on the issue of immunity to the narrow point of
"intersection or overlap" between executive and legislative pow-
ers. 284 Consequently, the court rejected the O'Haras' argument
that if the veto power was treated as a legislative action, this would
violate the separation of powers doctrine.2 8 5 In the court's view, a
partial overlap of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers is
entirely reasonable, and even necessary for special purposes such as
a governor's exercise of the veto power.286
The court also rejected the O'Haras' additional claim that a
governor cannot assert absolute immunity unless he "exercises all
of the state's legislative power on the subject matter at issue. ' 287
The court reasoned that if legislative immunity were predicated on
an exercise of a state's entire legislative authority, then "legislators
themselves would never have immunity in any state in which legisla-
tive power is shared under a constitutional requirement that the
Governor either sign or veto legislative enactments. "288
280. See id.
281. See id. at 133-34, 576 A.2d at 781.
282. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (speech or debate clause of the federal Constitution
grants congressmen and their aides immunity for conduct within the scope of their legis-
lative function); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (absolute immunity granted
to state legislators); supra note 226 and accompanying text.
283. See Mandel, 320 Md. at 134, 576 A.2d at 781.
284. See id. at 125, 576 A.2d at 777. Governor Mandel argued that the governor's
veto power is a legislative function. Id. at 108, 576 A.2d at 768.
285. See id at 129, 576 A.2d at 779. The O'Haras made this argument in specific
reference to the separation of powers as embodied in the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, art. 8, which states:
That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought
to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising
the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties
of any other.
See 320 Md. at 129 n.9, 576 A.2d at 779 n.9.
286. See id.
287. Id. at 130, 576 A.2d at 779. To make this claim, the O'Haras relied on England
v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 142-43, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Young v. Lynch, 846
F.2d 960, 962 (4th Cir. 1984). See 320 Md. at 130, 576 A.2d at 779.
288. Mandel, 320 Md. at 132, 576 A.2d at 780.
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Essentially, the court decided that legislators' discretion in vot-
ing for or against a bill does not differ from a governor's discretion
in deciding whether to approve or veto legislation. 89 Once the
court reached this conclusion, it held that absent public policy rea-
sons, there was no basis for granting legislators absolute immunity
to vote for or against legislative acts while denying it to governors
engaged in making identical judgments. 290
The court also reasoned that because review after final judg-
ment would not protect Governor Mandel's right to avoid trial, his
interlocutory appeal was appropriate. 29' From a procedural stand-
point, the court viewed the Governor's assertion of absolute immu-
nity to be the same as a defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.292 Furthermore, because that defense
may be asserted in a motion for summary judgment, it is not waived,
even if first made at trial on the merits. 93 Although Governor
Mandel did not argue at the trial that the veto is a legislative func-
tion, the court reasoned that it would be "inefficient to remand"
because the parties have already presented this "pure point of law"
to this court.2 94
3. Analysis.-The court's decision to grant the governor abso-
lute immunity for his exercise of the veto power was one of first
impression in Maryland. It approved absolute immunity for legisla-
tive acts performed by a governor in civil suits for nonconstitutional
torts. 2 9' The decision is important because it applies a functional
analysis to questions of executive official immunity.296 The court
reached its result by adhering to precedent and principles used by
federal courts in determining the scope and credibility of an abso-
lute immunity defense.297 With these in mind, the court found the
289. See id at 133-34, 576 A.2d at 781.
290. See id.
291. See id.; see also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Patuxent Valley Conservation League, 300
Md. 200, 477 A.2d 759 (1984).
292. See 320 Md. at 134, 576 A.2d at 781.
293. See id. Specifically, the defense will not be waived under MD. R. 2-324.
294. See id.
295. The court specifically noted that the holding does not address criminal proceed-
ings, claims for equitable relief, declaratory judgment, restitution, or for damages based
on an alleged constitutional violation. See id. at 134 n.11, 576 A.2d at 781 n.l 1.
296. Butz set forth the correct test: an official's absolute immunity should extend only
to acts in performance of particular functions of his office. See Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 508-12 (1978).
297. See supra notes 245-267 and accompanying text. In Nixon, the Supreme Court
explained that "[o]ur decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from
civil damages liability have been guided by the Constitution, federal statutes, and his-
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Governor's veto power among those "special functions" deserving
absolute immunity addressed by the Supreme Court in Butz.29
a. Importance of the Functional Approach.-The court could have
recognized that a governor is protected from liability for all torts by
a general rule of absolute immunity, or a general rule of qualified
immunity.299 Instead, the court followed federal court decisions
and applied a functional analysis to determine the scope and credi-
bility of a governor's immunity defense. 0 0
The federal cases held that the defense's scope varied in pro-
portion to the nature of the executive official's functions, and the
range of decisions that the official may be required to make within
that function. 0 ' This "functional approach" required continued
recognition of absolute immunity for the especially sensitive respon-
sibilities of certain officials-namely judges, prosecutors, legislators,
and those executive officials engaged in analogous functions.3 °2
By using a functional analysis to examine questions of executive
immunity, the court implicitly refused to award blanket immunity to
a high-level official, yet also recognized that qualified immunity will
not adequately serve all the public interests at stake. 03 Specifically,
the court's adoption of a functional approach allowed it to balance
the public's interest in the governor's uninhibited exercise of the
veto function, and the interests of individuals harmed by the execu-
tory." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 747 (1981). In addition, Supreme Court deci-
sions granting immunity to executive officials rest in part on judicial conclusions as to
what privileges are necessary if a certain function is to be performed in the public inter-
est. See id. at 747-48.
298. See Mandel, 320 Md. at 133-34, 576 A.2d at 781. Butz held that although federal
officials generally will have a qualified immunity for nonconstitutional torts, absolute
immunity will be extended to certain "special functions" when it is shown that exposure
to liability is inconsistent with the proper performance of the official's duties. See Butz,
438 U.S. at 508-15.
299. See supra notes 234-244 and accompanying text. The court noted that "[t]he de-
cisions of this Court neither compel nor foreclose the conclusion that a Governor of
Maryland has an absolute civil immunity when vetoing or approving legislation."
Mandel, 320 Md. at 113, 576 A.2d at 768. See also MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-
399.2(b) (Supp. 1990).
300. See supra notes 245-267 and accompanying text.
301. Thus, a proper analysis is not simply to ask whether an action is within the offi-
cial's constitutional and statutory duty, but rather to determine if the act falls within the
judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial functions to which absolute immunity attaches.
302. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 746-47 (1981).
303. In Scheuer, the Supreme Court noted that throughout the development of execu-
tive immunity, one policy consideration underlies the analysis: "the public interest re-
quires decisions and action to enforce laws for the protection of the public." Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974).
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tive's tortious acts, committed maliciously or in bad faith., °
This ruling did not draw novel functional lines. Because the
veto power is at the center of a governor's duties, the immunity has
not been extended to an area outside the perimeter of the gover-
nor's responsibility or of his traditional role in the legislative pro-
cess.3 0 5 Furthermore, the decision does not deprive the public of its
own power to deter possible future misconduct by those elected to
legislative positions. As the Supreme Court in Tenney v.
Brandhove306 pointed out: "In times of political passion, dishonest
or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct
and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such controver-
sies. Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for
discouraging or correcting such abuses. °307 Similar reasoning ap-
plies to the governor's exercise of veto power, correctly deemed
"legislative" in nature.
b. Guidance for Maryland Courts.-Although the holding is con-
fined narrowly to the facts, the decision provides guidance for Mary-
land courts faced with immunity questions involving high-level
executive officials. Maryland courts will know to examine the spe-
cific circumstances and acts underlying liability claims, and deter-
mine whether the effective administration of government would be
impaired if the executive must perform the particular function with-
out absolute immunity.308 In this way, courts will be able to take a
reasoned balancing approach to the policies and issues involved
before determining the scope of immunity.
4. Conclusion.-Had the court refused to grant absolute immu-
nity, any citizen injured by a gubernatorial veto-or approval-
304. "Public officials, whether governors, mayors or police, legislators or judges, who
fail to make decisions when they are needed ... do not fully and faithfully perform the
duties of their offices." Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 241-42. Moreover, the theory of absolute
immunity assumes that officials may err, but decides that "it is better to risk some error
and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at all." Id. at 242.
305. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
306. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
307. Id. at 378.
308. The most noted policy considerations for justifying absolute immunity are: the
injustice of subjecting to liability an official who is obligated to perform discretionary
functions; and the danger that officials, when threatened by personal liability, would be
less willing to make decisions with the decisiveness and the judgment required for the
public good. See supra notes 224-233 and accompanying text.
309. This approach seems more reasonable than simply applying a blanket immunity
or a qualified privilege to a high-level official based on that official's office before consid-
ering the function involved.
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would be free to bring a civil suit for damages alleging improper
motive. The governor's decisions would be subject to constant judi-
cial review, questioning their underlying motives. In the court's
view, this result would be more costly than leaving open the possi-
bility that the governor's malicious conduct would go un-
redressed.3"' As Chief Justice Burger stated in Nixon, "[w]hen
litigation processes are not tightly controlled-and often they are
not-they can be and are used as mechanisms of extortion. Ulti-
mate vindication on the merits does not repair the damage." '' Be-
cause the functional analysis of immunity questions reconciles the
conflicting interests at stake, the court properly viewed private inter-
ests within the broader perspective of the state's political system.
E. Punitive Damages Awards May Include Attorney Fees
In St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Smith,312 a divided
Court of Appeals held that a jury may consider attorney fees in fix-
ing a punitive damages award. 13 The court reasoned that this is
proper because it will aid the jury in calculating the punitive damage
award, and the plaintiff "can be made truly whole in . . . cases in
which the defendant's wrongful conduct is found to be at its most
flagrant. '"314 Thus, St. Luke expands Maryland law by adopting a
limited exception to the "American rule" that parties to a lawsuit
must pay their own attorney fees.315 The case may also signal the
beginning of an effort by the court to provide to juries greater gui-
dance concerning the size of punitive damage awards.
1. The Case.-Ginny Ann Smith was employed as the associate
director of youth ministry at St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran
Church. 1 6 One day while Ms. Smith was away, Assistant Pastor
David Buchenroth discovered a file in her office containing personal
correspondence to Ms. Smith from Assistant Pastor David Shaheen,
310. See Mandel, 320 Md. at 133-34, 576 A.2d at 781.
311. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 763 (1981).
312. 318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990).
313. See id. at 339, 568 A.2d at 36. Judge Blackwell wrote the court's opinion, and was
joined by Judges Eldridge, Cole, and Adkins. Judge Rodowsky dissented, joined by
Chief Judge Murphy and Judge McAuliffe. See id. at 337, 568 A.2d at 35.
314. Id. at 354, 568 A.2d at 43.
315. See id. at 337-38, 568 A.2d at 35-36; infra notes 330-351 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the American rule.
316. St. Luke, 318 Md. at 339, 568 A.2d at 36. Ms. Smith also volunteered as adminis-
trative assistant for the church's traveling drama group. Pastor Shaheen directed the
group. Id.
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also of St. Luke.3 17 Pastor Buchenroth read the letters and notes in
the file, and concluded that Pastor Shaheen and Ms. Smith were in-
volved in a sexual relationship.
Pastor Buchenroth told several church members, including Pas-
tor Shaheen's wife, that he believed Pastor Shaheen and Ms. Smith
were having an affair.318 After reviewing the correspondence and
discussing the matter with her husband, Mrs. Shaheen told Pastor
Buchenroth that she did not believe that her husband and Ms. Smith
were sexually involved.
Pastor Buchenroth professed to accept Mrs. Shaheen's conclu-
sion, apologized to Ms. Smith and Pastor Shaheen for the pain he
had caused them, and promised to keep his earlier suspicions confi-
dential. Despite his promise, however, Pastor Buchenroth repeated
his original allegations to other church members. Most of the con-
gregation soon knew about Pastor Buchenroth's allegations. 3 9
Subsequently, the church dismissed Ms. Smith.
Ms. Smith brought a defamation and invasion of privacy suit
against St. Luke and Pastor Buchenroth in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County. The jury returned a verdict for Ms. Smith,
and awarded her $228,904 in compensatory damages, and punitive
damages in the amount of $105,875 against St. Luke, and $2000
against Pastor Buchenroth.12' The jury found that, when Pastor
Buchenroth repeated his allegations after promising not to, he acted
with malice while acting within the scope of his employment. 32 The
court permitted the jury to consider Ms. Smith's attorney fees of
$68,441 in determining the amount of punitive damages to award
her.322
Both defendants appealed. 323 The Court of Special Appeals re-
versed the judgment against St. Luke, holding that the Circuit Court
erroneously allowed Ms. Smith double the permitted number of
peremptory challenges.324 The court affirmed the judgment against
317. Id. at 340-41, 568 A.2d at 36-37. Ms. Smith and Pastor Shaheen were then trav-
eling on a church sponsored trip to the Holy Land. Id.
318. Id. Pastor Buchenroth showed the correspondence to Mrs. Shaheen, told his
allegations to Ms. Smith's mother, and expressed his opinion that Pastor Shaheen and
Ms. Smith might not return from the church excursion. Id.
319. Id. Ms. Smith received "unsettling telephone calls and mail from members of the
congregation." Id.
320. Id.
321. St. Luke Evangelical Church, Inc. v. Smith, 74 Md. App. 353, 355, 537 A.2d
1196, 1197 (1988), rev'd, 318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990).
322. St. Luke, 318 Md. at 341-42, 568 A.2d at 37.
323. Id. at 341, 568 A.2d at 37.
324. 74 Md. App. at 366, 537 A.2d at 1202. Maryland Rule of Procedure 2-512(h)
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Buchenroth. 2 5
Ms. Smith petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari on the
peremptory strike issue. St. Luke also petitioned for certiorari, ar-
guing that the circuit court erroneously permitted the jury to con-
sider Ms. Smith's attorney fees in setting the punitive damages
award. 12 6 The Court of Appeals granted both petitions for certio-
rari.3 2 7 The court reversed the Court of Special Appeals' decision
as to St. Luke's liability,3 28 and reinstated the compensatory and pu-
nitive damage awards.3 29
2. Legal Background.-
a. The American Rule.-The American rule, under which parties
pay their own legal fees, is the prevailing rule in the United
States. 330 By contrast, the English rule allows the successful party to
permits each party four peremptory challenges, and treats coplaintiffs and codefendants
as a single party, unless they have adverse interests, in which case they each may be
allowed as many as four peremptory strikes each. See MD. R. 2-512(h). The trial judge
properly granted each codefendant four strikes, after finding a "'potential' for conflict
between the two codefendants," St. Luke, 318 Md. at 343, 568 A.2d at 37, but in an
attempt to be "fair," improperly gave Ms. Smith an additional four strikes for a total of
eight. Id.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment against St. Luke
on this ground. It did not reverse the judgment against Pastor Buchenroth because he
failed to preserve the peremptory challenge issue for review. See 74 Md. App. at 366,
537 A.2d at 1202.
325. 74 Md. App. at 376, 537 A.2d at 1207.
326. See 318 Md. at 341-42, 568 A.2d at 37. Buchenroth did not petition the Court of
Appeals from the adverse decision of the Court of Special Appeals. See id. at 342, 568
A.2d at 37.
327. See St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Smith, 313 Md. 9, 542 A.2d 845
(1988).
328. The Court of Appeals held that granting additional strikes to Ms. Smith
"presented no significant deviation from prescribed procedure," 318 Md. at 344, 568
A.2d at 38, and therefore reversal was only appropriate upon a showing of prejudice. Id.
But cf. King v. State Roads Comm'n, 284 Md. 368, 371, 396 A.2d 267, 269 (1979) (signif-
icant deviation that impairs or denies peremptory challenge privilege ordinarily requires
reversal even without a showing of prejudice). No prejudice was proven because the
jury strike list showing how many strikes Ms. Smith actually used was not in the record.
See St. Luke, 318 Md. at 344, 568 A.2d at 38. The court consequently held that the error,
if any, of allowing Ms. Smith eight peremptory strikes was harmless. See id.
329. See id. at 354, 568 A.2d at 43.
330. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). In
some states, statutes have modified the American rule's observance. For example, in
Alaska, the court may at its discretion award attorney fees to a prevailing party. See
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1986). Another Alaska statute requires trial courts to award
attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff in an action for damages when the amount claimed
is $1000 or less. See id. § 09.60.015(a) (1973). Oregon has a similar statute. See OR.
REV. STAT. § 20.080 (1977). Nevada courts have discretion to award attorney fees in
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recover attorney fees from the losing party.33' The English rule
originated in 1275, when a statute was enacted providing for recov-
ery of attorney fees by successful plaintiffs. 32 In England, the right
to recover attorney fees was extended to successful defendants in
1607. 333
The American rule's history is difficult to trace. 34 It is unclear
whether the American colonies adopted the English rule and then
abandoned it, or whether the English rule was never used in this
country. 3 5 Although it is likely that the English rule was used to
some extent in colonial America, it did not gain widespread accept-
ance, and the American rule replaced it soon after the American
Revolution. 3 6 Commentators have suggested that the individualis-
tic attitudes of early Americans3 3 7 and the distrust they felt for law-
yers contributed to the American rule's development.33 8
In 1796, the Supreme Court adopted the American rule in Ar-
cambel v. Wiseman.33 9 The Court reversed a lower federal court's
$1,600 award to the plaintiff for attorney fees, stating that "the gen-
eral practice of the United States is in opposition to [awarding attor-
actions involving $10,000 or less. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 18.010 (1967). See Note, Theories
of Recovering Attorney's Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 47 UMKC L. REV. 566, 585
(1979).
331. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 60 (1935) (the court
has discretion to award costs; under the English system, costs include court fees, attor-
neys' fees, and other expenses associated with preparing for trial). The United States is
one of the few countries in the world that observes the American rule. Note, Attorney's
Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1223-24 (1967). See also
McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 782 (1972) ("[America] is probably alone in failing to allow coun-
sel fees to the victorious litigant."). Japan follows the American rule, but it allows fee
shifting in favor of prevailing tort plaintiffs. Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting,
A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 651 n.1.
332. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 852 (1929).
333. Id. at 853.
334. See Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (1984) (tracing the history of the American rule of costs from
colonial America to the present). See also Goodhart, supra note 332 (comprehensive ac-
count of the English rule's history).
335. See Note, supra note 330, at 567 (discussing the history of fee shifting).
336. Id.
337. See id. In colonial times, laymen often tried their own cases, and this eliminated
the need for recovery of attorney fees. See also Comment, A Giant Step Backwards: Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society and Its Effect on Public Interest Litigation, 35 MD. L.
REV. 675, 681 (1976).
338. See Comment, supra note 337, at 681. "In every one of the colonies, practically
throughout the Seventeenth Century, a lawyer... was a character of disrepute and of
suspicion." C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4 (1966).
339. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
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ney fees to prevailing litigants]." 4 '
The American rule has persisted, but there is no generally ac-
cepted justification for it. 4 ' A number of explanations have been
advanced over the years. Justice Goldberg once described the
American rule as "a deliberate choice to insure that access to the
Courts be not effectively denied to those of moderate means. '3 42 In
other words, the American rule forecloses the possibility that an im-
poverished plaintiff will be deterred from suing by the prospect of
having to pay both his own and his opponent's attorney fees in the
event that he loses the case. But others have argued that the Ameri-
can rule actually hinders access to the courts because impoverished
litigants will be precluded from bringing suit by the prospect of hav-
ing to pay their own attorney fees whether they win or lose. 43
In Maryland, as elsewhere, there are a number of exceptions to
the American rule.34 4 For example, attorney fees may be awarded if
a relevant statute provides for such an award.3 45 Also, attorney fees
340. Id. at 306. Some commentators assert that the American rule evolved gradually
from the English rule as pre-colonial statutes, which allowed for recovery of attorney
fees but with fixed maximum levels, failed to keep pace with inflation. See Note, supra
note 331, at 1218-19; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 334, at 10-17 (discussing colonial
legislation of fees, Arcambel v. Wiseman, and the American rule's emergence); C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 331, § 60 (discussing the history and scope of costs awarded at common
law). This theory appears inconsistent with Arcambel, which indicated that the American
rule was established before 1800. See 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 306.
341. See Leubsdorf, supra note 334, at 9 ("the justification of this rule and its signifi-
cance in the economy of litigation have varied over the years"); Comment, supra note
337, at 681 (it has been argued both that the shifting of fees was the result of a "gradual
forgetting," and conversely that it was a "deliberate choice").
342. Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 237 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); accord Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967) ("In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is at
best uncertain, one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
lawsuit.").
343. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV.
792, 793 (1966) ("[The] United States ... which has taken it on itself to play the decisive
role in building the Rule of Law through the world, has forgotten the little man in his
struggle for civil justice."); see also Cosway, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U.
CIN. L. REV. 313, 314-15 (1941) (discussing reasons for adopting the English rule over
the American rule); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
HARV. L. REv. 849, 849 (1975) ("Our legislatures have recently been quite ready to
create private causes of action which are thought to serve some public interest .... [In
the context of such private actions . . . the usual American rule ... is felt to be a severe
and unwelcome restraint."). For a comprehensive discussion of policy arguments for
and against the American rule, see Rowe, supra note 331.
344. St. Luke, 318 Md. at 345, 568 A.2d at 39.
345. See Freedman v. Seidler, 233 Md. 39, 47, 194 A.2d 778, 783 (1963). For a list of
Maryland statutes that provide for awards of attorney fees, see St. Luke, 318 Md. at 346
n.6, 568 A.2d at 39 n.6.
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may be awarded if parties to a contract have agreed to the payment
of attorney fees.346 Courts may award attorney fees if there are
"special circumstances. ' 4 7 Special circumstances have been found
in cases in which the defendant's prior wrongful conduct has forced
a plaintiff into litigation with a third party,348 in certain implied in-
demnity actions, 4 9 and in actions resulting in a declaratory judg-
ment that a liability insurer must defend the insured.35 ° In addition,
under Maryland's Rules of Procedure, courts may impose reason-
able attorney fees on either party when a proceeding is brought or
defended in bad faith or without substantial justification.35 '
b. Punitive Damages.-Punitive damages are awarded "to pun-
ish the wrongdoer, to teach him not to repeat his wrongful conduct
and to deter others from engaging in the same conduct. 's52
Though the Court of Appeals has also stated that their amount
''must relate to the degree of culpability exhibited by a particular
defendant and that party's ability to pay, ' 353 the jury usually is given
unfettered discretion in determining the size of punitive damage
awards.3 54 The lack of control over juries making these awards has
come to be regarded as a serious problem.355
346. See Empire Realty Co. v. Fleisher, 269 Md. 278, 286, 305 A.2d 144, 148 (1973)
(attorney's fees are not recoverable in an action for damages absent special circum-
stances such as parties to a contract agreeing to the payment of fees).
347. See, e.g., Freedman, 233 Md. at 47, 194 A.2d at 783 ("the general rule is that costs
and expenses other than the usual and ordinary court costs are not recoverable in an
action for damages, and, in the absence of special circumstances or statutory require-
ment, counsel fees are not a proper element of damages in an action for breach of
contract").
348. See, e.g., McGaw v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co., 111 Md. 153, 160, 73 A. 731,
734 (1909) (plaintiff allowed to recover fees and costs that were incurred in securing the
new lease in its own name after defendant wrongfully secured in his own name a lease
on the property).
349. See, e.g., Jones v. Calvin B. Taylor Baking Co., 253 Md. 430, 441, 253 A.2d 742,
748 (1969) ("unless the indemnity contract provides otherwise, an indemnitee is entitled
to recover, as part of the damages, reasonable attorney's fees" (citing 41 AM. JuR. 2D,
Indemnity § 36 (1968)).
350. See, e.g., Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Electro Enters., 287 Md. 641, 661, 415
A.2d 278, 289 (1980) ("the attorneys' fees and expenses, incurred in defending the un-
derlying judgment action, constitute those resulting damages and are recoverable").
351. See MD. R. 1-341; see also Tully v. Dasher, 250 Md. 424, 442, 244 A.2d 207, 217
(1968) (attorney fees may be awarded when a plaintiff has been forced to defend against
a malicious prosecution).
352. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 531, 366 A.2d 7, 12 (1976).
353. Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 141-42, 442 A.2d 966, 973 (1982).
354. See St. Luke, 318 Md. at 350, 568 A.2d at 41.
355. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2909, 2923 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Without statutory (or at least common-
law) standards for the determination of how large an award of punitive damages is ap-
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Of the states that have considered the issue presented in St.
Luke, eleven have allowed juries to consider attorney fees when
awarding punitive damages, 5 6 and six have refused. 57 Of the re-
maining states that permit punitive damages, 58 the American rule
presumably applies, preventing juries from considering attorney
fees as part of the award.3 59 The Second Restatement of Torts supports
allowing juries to consider the plaintiff's expenses when punitive
damages are allowed. 3c
propriate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves in making this important,
and potentially devastating, decision."); see also AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS,
REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OFJUSTICE 3-4 (1989) ("[s]erious consideration should be given to raising the
standard of proof, to developing better jury instructions and to greater judicial supervi-
sion concerning punitive damage awards"); Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Puni-
tive Damages, 56 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37-39 (1982) (the variety and vagueness of the terms
used to characterize the criteria for punitive damages would create enough confusion
when used by judges alone, but juries are the ones most often assessing punitive dam-
ages and jury instructions as to how to assess damages are often unclear); Jeffries, A
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 13, 139 (1986)
("[P]unitive damages are out of control. Certainly recent awards have been unprece-
dented both in incidence and amount.").
356. See Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985); Umphrey v.
Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Suss v. Schammel, 375 N.W.2d 252
(Iowa 1985); Newton v. Hornblower, 224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978); Central Bank
of Mississippi v. Butler, 517 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 1987); Senn v. Manchester Bank of St.
Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1979); Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d 36,
543 N.E.2d 464 (1989); Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (rex. 1984); Debry & Hilton
Travel Servs., Inc. v. Capitol Int'l Airways, Inc., 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978); Kemp v.
Miller, 166 Va. 661, 186 S.E. 99 (1936); Olds v. Hosford, 354 P.2d 947 (Wyo. 1960),
reh 'g denied, 359 P.2d 406 (1961). In St. Luke, the dissent argued that Connecticut should
be considered separately, because that state permits punitive damages only to the extent
of attorney fees. See 318 Md. at 362 n.5, 568 A.2d at 47 n.5 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
357. See Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal. 2d 261, 158 P.2d 3 (1945); Reintsma v. Lawson,
223 Mont. 520, 727 P.2d 1323 (1986); Kinane v. Fay, 111 N.J.L. 553, 168 A. 724 (1933);
International Elec. Co. v. N.S.T. Metal Prods. Co., 370 Pa. 213, 88 A.2d 40 (1952); Earl
v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873); Fairbanks v. Witter, 18 Wis. 287 (1864). These decisions
reason that punitive damages should not encompass compensatory considerations, and
that juries should have complete discretion in setting punitive awards. See St. Luke, 318
Md. at 350, 568 A.2d at 41.
358. Louisiana and Nebraska do not permit punitive awards. See McCoy v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932); Abel
v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960). Massachusetts and Washington per-
mit punitive damages only when specifically authorized by statute. See City of Lowell v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47 N.E.2d 265 (1943); Spokane
Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891). By statute, New Hampshire
also has abolished punitive damages except where specifically authorized by another
statute. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1986). See generallyJ. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 4 (1990) (summary of states' positions on punitive
damages).
359. See 318 Md. at 362, 568 A.2d at 47 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
360. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 (1979).
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3. Analysis.-The majority offers three reasons for permitting
juries to consider attorney fees when determining the amount of pu-
nitive damages. First, punitive damages and awards of attorney fees
share a common goal of punishment.3 6 ' Second, allowing juries to
consider attorney fees will provide them guidance in setting punitive
awards.3 6 2 Third, plaintiffs can be made whole in cases in which the
defendant's conduct is most egregious.3 63
The court's first rationale, that an award of attorney fees is pu-
nitive because most Maryland statutory provisions providing for at-
torney fee recovery are found in the statutes' penalty sections, is
weak in two respects. First, as the dissent argued, many of the Mary-
land statutory provisions for attorney fees awards are contained in
consumer protection statutes. s64 These statutes allow a prevailing
plaintiff to obtain attorney fees in order to equalize the parties' posi-
tions, rather than to punish the defendant.3 6 5
The rationale's other weakness is that the amount of a plain-
tiff's attorney fees bears no clear relation to either the particular
defendant's culpability, or the defendant's ability to pay.3 6 These
are the factors that ought to guide juries in awarding punitive dam-
ages. 67 Though awards of attorney fees are in a sense punitive,
they do not correspond with the traditional purposes of punitive
damages.
The court's second rationale, that juries will be guided in set-
ting punitive damage awards by considering the attorney fees, ad-
dresses the substantial concern about the vague instructions given
to juries charged with calculating punitive awards.368 One proposed
solution to this problem is to require that punitive damages bear a
proportional relationship to compensatory damages; for example,
that punitive damages be set at two times compensatory damages,
similar to the way that statutory treble damages are imposed. 69 But
361. See St. Luke, 318 Md. at 347, 568 A.2d at 40. The court noted that statutory
provisions authorizing recovery of attorney fees are usually contained in the statute's
penalty or liability section. See id. at 346-47, 568 A.2d at 39.
362. See id. at 352-53, 568 A.2d at 42-43.
363. See id. at 354, 568 A.2d at 43.
364. See id. at 360, 568 A.2d at 46 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
365. See id.
366. See 318 Md. at 357-58, 568 A.2d at 45 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). The dissent
noted that each plaintiff in a case may have a different contingent fee arrangement with
her counsel. See id.
367. See Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 141-42, 442 A.2d 966, 973 (1982).
368. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
369. The American College of Trial Lawyers recommends that the amount of punitive
damages be limited by a flexible formula based on the amount of compensatory dam-
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there are two potential problems with a proportional relationship
scheme: it does not attempt to measure the wrongfulness of the
particular defendant's conduct, and it strips juries of all autonomy
in setting punitive awards. A policy allowing juries merely to con-
sider attorney fees as an aid in calculating punitive damages enjoys
an advantage over the proportional relationship approach in that
juries are provided with some guidance, but they maintain their abil-
ity to take into account other circumstances in determining the most
appropriate punitive award.
The dissent predicted that implementating the majority's hold-
ing will establish the amount of attorney fees as a floor for punitive
damages.3 7 0 Rather than producing more accurate punitive damage
awards, allowing juries to consider the amount of the victim's attor-
ney fees will tend to increase punitive awards and to discourage set-
tlement of disputes, as plaintiffs are encouraged to seek a
"bonanza" from the jury.' This criticism ignores the widely-held
view that juries already covertly take attorney fees into account
when awarding punitive damages.3 72 In addition, the jury can be
instructed that the amount of attorney fees is only one factor to be
considered, and is not necessarily a floor, a ceiling, or a benchmark
for a punitive award.
The majority's third rationale, that the plaintiff will be made
whole in cases involving exceptionally wrongful conduct, appeals to
a sense of fairness.37 3 This rationale, however, runs counter to the
American rule, which inherently rejects making plaintiffs truly
ages. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 355, at 13-15. Missouri
assesses punitive damages that are a multiple of one and one-half times actual damages.
See Senn v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119, 139 (Mo. 1979). Maryland
has rejected suggestions that there should be a ratio between the amounts of compensa-
tory damages and punitive damages. See D.C. Transit Sys. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 589-
90, 287 A.2d 251, 257 (1972).
370. See 318 Md. at 356, 568 A.2d at 44 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
371. See id., 568 A.2d at 44-45 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
372. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 343, at 797 ("juries in making their assessments
now probably quite generally take into account the plaintiff's counsel fees and would be
likely to reduce their verdicts correspondingly if instructed as to plaintiff's right to re-
cover his fees in addition to the sum assessed"); Leubsdorf, supra note 334, at 14 ("it is
quite likely that juries took legal expenses into consideration when they assessed dam-
ages as indeed is probably the case today").
373. See First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, II MAss. L.Q. 64 (1925).
On what principle of justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public
highway recover his doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill? And on what princi-
ple ofjustice is a defendant who has been wrongfully haled into court made to
pay out of his own pocket the expense of showing that he was wrongfully sued?
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whole.- 74 The majority viewed the American rule as allowing for an
exception when the primary rationale is punishment3 75 The dis-
sent, citing the American rule's long history in Maryland,3 76 argued
that exceptions to the rule should only come through legislative or
rulemaking action.17 7 The majority seems to have the better of this
argument. Of the various justifications advanced by commentators
for the American rule 3 7 none apply with any great force to a situa-
tion in which punitive damages are to be awarded. By merely rely-
ing upon tradition, without a policy justification for the rule's
application, the dissent failed to effectively counter the majority
opinion. 79
The dissent's argument that the General Assembly should make
any changes to the American rule38 0 is also unconvincing. Both the
rule and the concept of punitive damages are creations of common
law, so judicially-created changes are appropriate. And the dissent's
statement that "[h]istorically, in Maryland, creation of exceptions to
the American rule has been allocated to legislative or rulemaking
action ' 38 1 is belied by the fact that the court has created numerous
exceptions under the rubric of "special circumstances."' 2
4. Conclusion.-St. Luke breaks with the tradition of the Ameri-
can rule by sanctioning "making-whole" the prevailing litigants in
actions in which punitive damages are awarded. The case also
374. See Rowe, supra note 331, at 660.
375. See 318 Md. at 349, 568 A.2d at 41.
376. See id. at 358-59, 568 A.2d at 45-46 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
377. See id. at 360-61, 568 A.2d at 46-47 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
378. See Goodhart, supra note 332, at 876-77 ("[a]nother objection to the introduction
of substantial costs is based on the view that the law at best is a gamble, and that it is
unfair to penalize the losing party"); Rowe, supra note 331 at 659-61 (The idea behind
fee shifting and making-whole is to compensate for a legal wrong, whether for the plain-
tiff or the defendant. Shifting fees to the defendant doesn't seem to be justified, how-
ever, because the system does not regard bringing a losing case as an infliction of a legal
wrong.); Note, supra note 331, at 1220, 1231 (discussing the early American attitude that
litigation was a "sport" and several criticisms of fee shifting); Note, supra note 330, at
591 ("A related justification for the American Rule is that a party should not be pun-
ished by being assessed the opponent's counsel fees for merely bringing or defending a
lawsuit."); Comment, supra note 337, at 681 ("[M]any attorneys today support the Amer-
ican Rule as 'part of our democratic tradition and a bulwark of equality.' ").
379. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) ("It is revolting
to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.")
380. See 318 Md. at 360, 568 A.2d at 47 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
381. Id. at 359, 568 A.2d at 46-47 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
382. See supra notes 347-350 and accompanying text.
1324 [VOL. 50:1277
TORTS
shows that the Court of Appeals is cognizant of the problem of un-
controlled awards of punitive damages. 383 Though allowing the
jury to consider attorney fees is hardly a complete cure, it represents
an affirmative effort to address the problem.
F. Parent-Child Immunity
In Smith v. Gross,384 a divided Court of Appeals1 5 held that the
parent-child immunity defense bars survival and wrongful death ac-
tions against a parent when a child is killed as a result of the parent's
negligence. 386  The court reasoned that Maryland's wrongful
death 387 and survival statuteS3 88 allow only those actions that could
have been pursued by the decedent if he or she had survived.389
Thus, the parent-child immunity rule, which would have prevented
the child from bringing a personal injury suit against his parent, also
precludes any action after the child's death. 9 ° In considering
whether parent-child immunity should apply despite the child's
death, the court examined the rule's public policy justifications and
its history in Maryland. 39' The majority opinion purported to pro-
mote familial tranquility and harmony, but ignored the dissent's
strong argument that public policy no longer justifies parent-child
immunity when the child has died.39 The court's decision is also
unfortunate in that it left the rule's modification to the legislature,
although it was judicially created. 93
1. The Case.-Virginia Lee Smith and Roland Randolph Gross
were the natural parents of Roland Randolph Gross, Jr.394 The
child was born out of wedlock and his parents never married. 95 Ro-
383. The dissent did not disagree with the majority on this point. See 318 Md. at 363,
568 A.2d at 48 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting) ("the law of punitive damages is 'broke' and
needs 'fixing' ").
384. 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990).
385. Judge Orth wrote the court's opinion, and was joined by Chief Judge Murphy
and Judges Cole, Rodowsky, and McAuliffe. Judge Eldridge wrote in dissent, joined by
Judge Adkins.
386. See 319 Md. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
387. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-901 to -904 (1989).
388. Id. § 6-401.
389. See 319 Md. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
390. Id. at 149-50, 571 A.2d at 1224.
391. See id. at 145-48, 571 A.2d at 1222-24.
392. See id. at 150-56, 571 A.2d at 1224-27 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
393. See infra notes 456-461 and accompanying text.
394. 319 Md. at 140, 571 A.2d. at 1220.
395. Id. at 147, 571 A.2d at 1223.
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land Jr. was killed several days after his second birthday3 96 in an
automobile accident allegedly caused by his father's negligence.3 97
Smith instituted survival and wrongful death actions against Gross
in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County.3 98 Gross moved for dis-
missal for failure to state a claim, asserting that he was immune from
suit because he was the child's natural father. The court granted the
father's motion and dismissed the claim. Smith appealed, and the
Court of Appeals certified the case of its own motion prior to a deci-
sion by the Court of Special Appeals, and affirmed the circuit court's
judgment. 399
2. Legal Background and the Court's Reasoning.-
a. The Inception of Parent-Child Immunity.-Parent-child immu-
nity is a common-law rule that prevents plaintiffs from pursuing in-
trafamily tort actions. 4° The rule first was recognized in the 1891
Mississippi case of Hewlett v. George.4 ' In Hewlett, the court refused
to allow a daughter to sue her mother for compensation after the
mother placed the daughter in an insane asylum in order to acquire
her property.4 °2 The court justified its holding by explaining the
underlying public policy: "[tihe peace of society . . . forbid[s] [to]
the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim
to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hand of a
parent.''403
Despite the decision's novelty,4°4 other states embraced the
rule, citing overriding public policy considerations.4 °5 Courts gen-
erally justify the rule in three ways: "(1) protection of the family's
396. Id. at 141, 571 A.2d at 1220.
397. Id. Smith alleged in her complaint that Roland Sr. "operat[ed] his automobile
while under the influence of alcohol... [and] in a careless and reckless manner." Id. at
150, 571 A.2d at 1224.
398. Id. at 141, 571 A.2d at 1220.
399. See id. at 150, 571 A.2d at 1224.
400. W. PROSSER, D. DoBBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 12.2, at 905 (5th ed. 1984).
401. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
402. See id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
403. Id.
404. See Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: Time for Maryland to Abrogate an Anachro-
nism, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 439 (1982). For a discussion of the history of parent-child
legal relations, see Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search ofJustification, 50
FORDHAm L. REV. 489 (1982).
405. See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (barring a child's
action against the father and stepmother for cruel and inhuman treatment); Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (barring a daughter's action against her father
for rape).
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resources from the disproportionate enrichment of the plaintiff fam-
ily member; (2) protection of family integrity and harmony; and (3)
protection of parental discretion in the discipline and care of the
child."'40 6 The rule's critics have charged that these policy concerns
are either too nebulous or outdated.40 7 They have argued for the
rule's complete abrogation,408 significant amendment,40 9 or the cre-
ation of a new rule based on a "reasonable parent" standard.
4 t0
Over the past century, many courts have either entirely abro-
gated the rule or carved out exceptions when the public policy justi-
fications are no longer served.4 t ' Smith v. Gross gave the court an
opportunity to apply such an exception, but the court refused to
amend or abolish the antiquated rule.
b. Survival and Wrongful Death Statutes.-The court primarily
based its refusal to amend parent-child immunity on the language of
the survival and wrongful death statutes. The survival statute pro-
vides that except as to an action for slander, "a cause of action at
law, whether real, personal, or mixed, survives the death of either
party. '4 12 As a personal representative of the decedent's estate,
Smith is authorized to prosecute "a personal action which the decedent
might have commenced or prosecuted ....
The wrongful death statute provides that "[a]n action may be
maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death of
another. '41 4 Wrongful act is defined as "an act, neglect or default
including a felonious act which would have entitled the party injured to
406. Comment, supra note 404, at 440.
407. See Hollister, supra note 404, at 496-508.
408. See Comment, supra note 404; Comment, Parent-Child Immunity: The CaseforAboli-
tion, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 286 (1969).
409. See McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 ViLL. L. REV. 521 (1960); McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930); Comment, Tort
Actions Between Members of the Family---Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152
(1961).
410. See Hollister, supra note 404, at 525-27.
411. The rule's four most common exceptions are found in cases involving emanci-
pated children, intentional torts or gross negligence, the business or employment con-
text, and motor vehicle torts. See, e.g., Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244,
253-54, 288 P.2d 868, 873 (1955) (exception for emancipated children); Trevarton v.
Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 423, 378 P.2d 640, 643 (1963) (business or employment ex-
ception); Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 51, 316 A.2d 783, 785 (1972) (statutory motor
vehicle exception); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (exception for
intentional tort).
412. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-401(a) (1989).
413. Smith, 319 Md. at 142, 571 A.2d at 1221 (quoting MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§ 7-401(x) (1974)) (emphasis by court).
414. MD. CTS. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 3-902(a) (1989).
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maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued."41 5 As a
primary beneficiary, Roland Jr.'s mother is authorized to sue and
recover for his wrongful death. 41 6
The court noted that these statutes authorize actions after the
child's death only if the child might have maintained the action
while he was alive. 4 17 Assuming that parent-child immunity would
have precluded this suit if Roland Jr. were still alive,41 8 the statutes'
language could prevent his mother from pursuing this action after
his death.
The court also stated that as a general rule in wrongful death or
survival actions, a defense that would have been good against the
decedent had he or she survived, will be good against the decedent's
personal representative. 4' 9 Thus the issue was narrowed to whether
parent-child immunity would be an exception to this rule; if not, the
immunity would survive Roland Jr.'s death and bar his mother's
action.
c. The Development of Parent-Child Immunity.-To determine
whether parent-child immunity should bar the mother's action, the
court examined the rule's history in Maryland and its public policy
justification. The court noted that in 1930 Maryland courts adopted
parent-child immunity in Schneider v. Schneider.420 The court in
Schneider refused to allow a mother to sue her son for injuries proxi-
mately caused by his negligent driving.42 ' Citing Hewlett and its line
of case law, the Schneider court approved the rule's public policy ba-
sis: "We need not dwell upon the importance of maintaining the
family relation free for other reasons from the antagonisms which
such suits imply. 'Both natural and politic law, morality, and the
precepts of revealed religion alike demand the preservation of this
relation in its full strength and purity.' "422
415. Smith, 319 Md. at 143, 571 A.2d at 1221 (quoting MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-901(e) (1989)) (emphasis by court).
416. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(a) (1989).
417. See Smith, 319 Md. at 143, 571 A.2d at 1221.
418. Even the dissent conceded that parent-child immunity would preclude any per-
sonal injury action by Roland Jr. against his father if Roland Jr. had survived. See id. at
150, 571 A.2d at 1224 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
419. See id. at 144, 571 A.2d at 1221. The court used contributory negligence and
assumption of risk as examples of defenses good against a decedent's personal represen-
tative. See id. at 144-45, 571 A.2d at 1221-22.
420. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
421. See id. at 20, 152 A. at 499.
422. id. at 23-24, 152 A. at 500 (quotingJ. SCHOULER, DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 223, at
345 (5th ed. 1895)).
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Over the next sixty years, Maryland recognized only two excep-
tions to the parent-child immunity doctrine. First, in Waltzinger v.
Brisner,4 23 the court held that children who were emancipated at the
time of the tortious conduct could pursue an action against their
parents and vice versa.424 Second, in Mahnke v. Moore,425 the court
held that children who are the victims of cruel and inhuman, or wan-
ton and malicious conduct, will not be prevented from recovering
from their parents for their injuries.426
Since establishing these two early exceptions to the defense,42 7
the Maryland courts have refused five times to amend the rule, or
reconsider its underlying public policy principles. Each time, the
court has looked to the legislature as the appropriate body for
change. First, in a 1971 case, Latz v. Latz,428 the Court of Special
Appeals refused to create an exception for torts involving
automobiles when the driver was covered by insurance.429 In justi-
fying its action in Latz, the court said "[i]f there is a need for change
let it come by legislative enactment."43  Next, in Montz v.
Mendoloff, 3' t the court declined to make an exception to the rule for
torts involving alleged gross negligence.432 Again, the court
pointed to the legislature's inaction and claimed that, "[the rule] is
now more firmly embedded in the law of Maryland and we decline
423. 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1956).
424. See id. at 126, 128 A.2d at 627. The plaintiff in Waltzinger sued her adult son for
injuries caused by his negligent operation of an automobile. See id. at 110-11, 128 A.2d
at 618.
425. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
426. See id. at 70, 77 A.2d at 927. In Mahnke, the plaintiff daughter was allowed to
recover from her father's estate for shock, mental anguish, and permanent nervous and
physical injuries after the father shot the mother in the child's presence, left the child
with the mother's body for six days, and finally committed suicide in front of her. See id.
at 63, 77 A.2d at 924.
427. The Mahnke decision is considered a "hallmark" case, and the Maryland court's
novel approach has had a "pervasive" effect on other states' application of immunity.
Comment, supra note 404, at 451.
428. 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435, cert. denied, 261 Md. 726, 276 A.2d 642 (1971).
429. Latz cited Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930), for the proposi-
tion that the presence of liability insurance does not affect the suit. See 10 Md. App. at
729-30, 272 A.2d at 440. For a critique of this position, see Hollister, supra note 404, at
500-04; see generally Fleming, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE LJ. 549 (1948).
430. 10 Md. App. at 734, 272 A.2d at 443.
431. 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568, cert. denied, 283 Md. 736 (1978).
432. The gross negligence alleged in Montz was reckless operation of an automobile.
The court believed that the tortious behavior did not fall within the Mahnke standard for
wanton and willful misconduct, nor did it find any indication of an abandonment of
parental authority. See id. at 225, 388 A.2d at 571.
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to change it."4 ' In 1979, the Court of Special Appeals in Shell Oil
Co. v. Ryckman4 4 refused to create a business or contractual excep-
tion to the parent-child immunity rule.4 5 This case involved an oil
company's claim for contribution from a lessor of one of its gas sta-
tions for damages paid to the lessor's son for injuries incurred on
the business premises. 43 6 The court held that parent-child immu-
nity prevented the indemnification action after the company had set-
tled with the child. 43 7 In Frye v. Frye43 8 the Court of Appeals
reexamined in detail the rationale for parent-child immunity, and
refused to abrogate it despite the court's recent abrogation of the
interspousal immunity rule.43 9 Although it acknowledged that many
other states have abrogated the immunity, the court again passed on
its responsibility, asking, "who can best resolve [the issues], the
seven judges of this Court or the members of the General Assem-
bly? "' 44 ' Finally, the court reaffirmed the rule in Smith v. Gross, ex-
plaining that despite changing values, "both this Court and the
legislature have been faithful to the promotion of the stability, har-
mony and peace of the family and to the preservation of parental
authority and the family unity as a matter of public policy in the best
interests of society."
441
d. The Court's Reasoning.-In this case, Smith argued that no
public policy barred liability because no parent-child relationship
existed for the court to protect since Roland Jr. was born out of
wedlock442 and is no longer alive.443 The court rejected her argu-
ment that RolandJr.'s illegitimacy denied Roland Sr. the right to the
433. Id. at 224, 388 A.2d at 570.
434. 43 Md. App. 1, 403 A.2d 379 (1979).
435. See id. at 4, 403 A.2d at 381. But see Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550
A.2d 947 (1988) (creating a narrow exception for a child to maintain action against her
father's business partnership for injuries sustained at place of business). For a detailed
discussion, see Survey, Developments in Maryland Law, 49 MD. L. REV. 509, 761 (1989).
436. See 43 Md. App. at 2, 403 A.2d at 380.
437. See id. at 5, 403 A.2d at 381.
438. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986).
439. The court abrogated the interspousal immunity rule as to cases sounding in neg-
ligence in Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983). The court rejected
comparison between the interspousal and the parent-child immunities as "not pertinent
or relevant." 305 Md. at 553, 505 A.2d at 832.
440. 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 838.
441. 319 Md. at 147, 571 A.2d at 1223 (quoting Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 561, 505
A.2d 826, 836 (1986)).
442. See id.
443. See id. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
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parental immunity defense. 444 The court explained that "[t]he
maintenance of a common home is not the sine qua non of the ele-
ments of parenthood. The primary requisite of a father-child rela-
tionship is not that a person reside with the child but that the person
is, in fact, the father of the child." 4 45 The court also rejected the
mother's claim that the child's death argued against parental immu-
nity. The court simply stated that the "personal tort action by the
child while alive was killed by the rule. The death of the child did
not serve to remove the immunity dictated by the rule and resurrect
the action." 44 6
The court thus concluded that the statutes' language is clear
and the public policy justifications are still compelling. The court
pointed out that although the legislature has been aware of the par-
ent-child immunity rule for more than fifty years, it has never modi-
fied the wrongful death and survival statutes to allow for the type of
action brought in this case.4 47 Because the statutes stand "legisla-
tively unsullied," they prevent Roland Jr.'s mother from proceeding
against the father both in her own right as a parent, and as the per-
sonal representative of the child's estate.4 4 8
3. Analysis.-The court grounded its refusal to modify the par-
ent-child immunity rule on a literal reading of the survival and
wrongful death statutes, and the continued soundness of the public
policy justification. The court dismissed the plaintiff's argument
that the public policy behind the immunity rule no longer is served
in this case. 449 But as the dissenting opinion recognized, Roland
Jr.'s death drastically altered the situation.45 ° When the boy died,
there was no "family discipline to impair or home tranquility to
preserve." 451
444. See id. at 147-48, 571 A.2d at 1223. Mahnke also discussed the illegitimacy issue.
See 197 Md. 61, 64, 77 A.2d 923, 924 (1951).
445. Smith, 319 Md. at 147-48, 571 A.2d at 1223. The court was careful to distinguish
this case from the Mahnke situation, in which the parent has forfeited parental obliga-
tions or forsworn parental authority, rights, and privileges. See id. Although the details
of the father's participation in Roland Jr.'s life are unknown, the court noted that,
"[c]learly, he had not completely abandoned the parental relationship; the child was
with him at the time of the accident." Id. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1223.
446. Id at 149-50, 571 A.2d at 1224.
447. See id. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224.
448. Id.
449. See id.
450. See id. at 150, 571 A.2d at 1224 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
451. Id. In this case, Roland Jr.'s death effectively ended the family relationship. It is
unclear how the dissenting judges would view a situation in which other surviving chil-
dren continued to live with one of the parents.
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When the parent-child relationship no longer exists, or is sev-
ered beyond repair, public policy should not prevent a child from
recovering from the parent. This argument is not new to the Mary-
land court, for it was the basis for the Waltzinger and Mahnke excep-
tions. In Waltzinger, which involved a suit between an adult child
and a parent,4 52 the court cited with approval the language of a Mis-
sissippi decision involving similar facts: "[I]n this case both parties
are adults and each may be sued by the other, there being no ques-
tion of control or services between them . . . . - Similarly, the
exception to the parent-child immunity for cruel and malicious acts
adopted in Mahnke was based upon the parent-child relationship's
deterioration.454 Given the father's atrocious acts, the daughter's
suit against her father's estate was not contrary to public policy, for
the simple reason that "there [was] no home at all in which disci-
pline and tranquility [were] to be preserved. '455 The death of one
of the parties is a situation in which no family is left to protect, yet
the majority refused to consider seriously another exception to the
immunity rule.
As for the argument that the legislature is responsible for
changing the rule, the dissent pointed out that parent-child immu-
nity is a judicially-created rule adopted by the court in 1930.456 The
survival and wrongful death statutes, however, remain substantially
unchanged since their passage in 1798 and 1852, respectively.
457
These statutes were drafted many years prior to the immunity rule's
adoption. Thus, the statutory language allowing only those actions
that a decedent could have pursued had he or she survived, could
not have been intended to cover parent-child immunity. Instead,
this language was intended to apply to defenses such as contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk, which bar every tort action
regardless of the parties' identities. 458 In contrast, parent-child im-
munity only bars an action by certain parties because of overriding
public policy considerations.45 9 It is doubtful that the legislature in-
tended the statutes to incorporate all immunities or public policy
defenses unless the public policy would be served by incorpora-
452. See supra note 424.
453. Weyen v. Weyen, 165 Miss. 257, 267, 139 So. 608, 610 (1932).
454. See 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951).
455. Id.
456. See Smith, 319 Md. at 153, 571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, J., dissenting); see supra
notes 420-422 and accompanying text.
457. Smith, 319 Md. at 152, 571 A.2d at 1225 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
458. See id., 571 A.2d at 1225-26 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
459. See id., 571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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tion. 460 The court willingly amended the rule in other situations in
which public policy was no longer served;46 1 there was no reason for
its refusal to do so in this case.
Maryland has fallen behind the modem trend toward amending
or eliminating the parent-child immunity rule. Recently, in Frye v.
Frye,462 the court assessed other states' positions on the rule and
attached a summary of its findings.463 Only nine states retain the
immunity intact, fourteen states have either completely abrogated
the rule or never adopted it, and twenty-six states have abrogated it
in part.46 4 Eleven state courts have allowed parent-child actions af-
ter one of the parties has died; only five courts have taken Mary-
land's position and blocked such actions.465 In spite of this, given
the court's persistent refusal to amend the rule, it is unlikely that it
will recognize any further exceptions to the parent-child immunity
rule.
4. Conclusion.-Smith v. Gross presented an opportunity for the
court to create a logical exception to parent-child immunity without
significantly departing from its previous reasoning. Instead, the ma-
jority chose to rest its holding on statutory language that predated
460. Id. at 152-53, 571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
461. See supra notes 423-426 and accompanying text.
462. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986). For a detailed discussion, see Note, Frye v.
Frye: Maryland Sacrifices the Child for the Sake of the Family, 46 MD. L. REV. 194 (1986).
463. See 305 Md. at 568-86, 505 A.2d at 840-49.
464. Id. States that have retained parent-child immunity are Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Tennessee. States
that have abrogated the immunity entirely are California, Minnesota, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. Immunity was
never adopted in Hawaii, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. All other states
have amended the rule or abrogated it in part. Id.
465. For cases disagreeing with the Maryland position, see Johnson v. Myers, 2 I1.
App. 3d 844, 846, 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972); Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d
482, 483 (Ky. 1961); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich. App. 26, 30, 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-53
(1971), aft'd, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d
68, 73 (Mo. 1960); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551, 553, 215 A.2d 695, 697
(1965); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 NJ. Super. 294, 299, 176 A.2d 818, 820 (1962); Dorsey v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 27, 30, 457 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (1984);
Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 297, 135 A.2d 65, 71 (1957); Sisler v. Seeberger, 23 Wash.
App. 612, 614, 596 P.2d 1362, 1364 (1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 895G, comment g (1977), 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 8.11, at 574 (2d ed. 1986). For cases agreeing with the Maryland position, see McNeal
v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521, 523-24 (Miss. 1971); Skinner v.
Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 484, 189 S.E.2d 230, 234 (1972); Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96
R.I. 34, 37, 188 A.2d 467, 469 (1963); Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 222 Tenn. 133, 139-
40, 432 S.W.2d 894, 897-900 (1968); Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 650, 294 N.W.
33, 35 (1940).
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Maryland's adoption of parent-child immunity. Thus, even though
the immunity rule is a judicial creation, the rule's future modifica-
tion must await legislative action.
G. Post-Bankruptcy Survivability of Personal Injury Claim Assignments
In Hernandez v. Suburban Hospital,466 the Court of Appeals held
valid the assignment of tort claim proceeds to a hospital,467 and
found that a patient's subsequent discharge in bankruptcy did not
preclude the assignment's enforcement.468 In addressing the as-
signment issue, the court recognized that in Maryland a chose in
action in tort is generally assignable if it would survive the assignor's
death, and could be enforced by the assignor's personal representa-
tive.469 The court based its decision on the Maryland statute provid-
ing for survivorship, 470 and on policy reasons that support
upholding such assignments.4 7' In addressing the discharge in
bankruptcy issue, the court followed the modern and widely ac-
cepted rule that unless disallowed or voided, an equitable lien sur-
vives bankruptcy, and held that discharge in bankruptcy did not
preclude enforcement of the assignment.4 72
The court properly recognized the need to uphold the assign-
ment to hospitals of tort claim proceeds. Nevertheless, the court
did not indicate whether it based its holding on public policy or stat-
utory grounds. Consequently, Maryland law remains unclear as to
whether, in addition to tort proceeds, a tort cause of action is assign-
able. Furthermore, the court only addressed public policy consider-
ations in regard to assignments to hospitals, implicitly leaving open
the possibility that it would not enforce assignments to other
parties.
1. The Case.-Giovanna Garcia twice was a patient at Suburban
Hospital 473 to receive treatment for injuries she sustained in an au-
tomobile accident.474 The total hospital fee for services was
$18,499. Garcia retained Arturo Hernandez to represent her in a
466. 319 Md. 226, 572 A.2d 144 (1990).
467. See id. at 235, 572 A.2d at 148.
468. See id. at 237, 572 A.2d at 149.
469. See id. at 234, 572 A.2d at 148.
470. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-401 (1989).
471. See 319 Md. at 235, 572 A.2d at 147.
472. See id. at 237, 572 A.2d at 149.
473. Garcia was hospitalized from September 7, 1985, to October 9, 1985, and from
May 27, 1986, to May 30, 1986. Id. at 228, 572 A.2d at 145.
474. Id.
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personal injuries claim arising from the accident.47 5
In October 1985, Garcia and Hernandez signed a document en-
titled "Authorization and Assignment," and delivered it to the hos-
pital. Garcia signed the first part of the document, which stated in
pertinent part: "I further irrevocably assign to you and authorize
and direct said attorneys to pay from the proceeds of any recovery
in my case all reasonable fees for services provided by you, includ-
ing fees for preparation and testimony, as a result of the injuries or
conditions heretofore mentioned. ' 476 Hernandez signed the sec-
ond part, agreeing to comply with the authorization and to notify
the hospital of the claim's status within ten days of request. 477
On October 16, 1986, Garcia filed for bankruptcy under the
Bankruptcy Act's Chapter 7.478 She listed the hospital as an un-
secured creditor on her schedule of debts. 479 The hospital received
notice of Garcia's bankruptcy filing, which contained the statement:
"Creditors: Do NOT file claims at this time. Debtor schedules indi-
cate no assets exist from which to receive a dividend. 48 0
Garcia was discharged in bankruptcy on March 7, 1987. On
June 5, 1987, she settled her personal injury claim for the sum of
$35,000, and Hernandez received the settlement check from Gar-
cia's insurer.48 ' Hernandez deducted his fees and disbursed the re-
mainder to Garcia, without notifying the hospital of the settlement
or payment.48 2
On June 11, 1987, Hernandez notified the hospital that Garcia's
debt had been discharged in bankruptcy and advised it that further
attempts to collect the debt were prohibited. The hospital then de-
manded from Hernandez $18,499 pursuant to the Authorization
and Assignment.483
Hernandez declined to pay the bill, and the hospital subse-
quently filed its complaint against him in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County.48 4 The court entered judgment for the hospi-
tal in the amount of its bill plus interest. The court concluded that
475. Id. at 229, 572 A.2d at 145.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 230, 572 A.2d at 145; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
479. Hernandez, 319 Md. at 230, 572 A.2d at 145-46.
480. Id.
481. Brief for Appellee at 4, Hernandez v. Suburban Hosp., 319 Md. 226, 572 A.2d
144 (1990) (No. 89-37).
482. Hernandez, 319 Md. at 230, 572 A.2d at 146.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 231, 572 A.2d at 146.
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by signing the authorization and assignment, Hernandez agreed to a
"separate and collateral undertaking" not part of the debtor's pri-
mary responsibility. 485 Hernandez appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals, but the Court of Appeals intervened and granted certio-
rari4 8 6 of its own motion. In an opinion written by ChiefJudge Mur-
phy, the court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, and held that
the assignment of tort proceeds was valid and not contrary to public
policy,48 7 and that a discharge in bankruptcy did not render the as-
signment unenforceable.48 8
2. Legal Background and the Court's Reasoning.-
a. Assignment of Tort Proceeds.-According to the common law, a
chose in action for torts involving personal injuries could not be
assigned.48 9 The rule's principal justification was that such actions
did not survive the injured person's death, and therefore were not
assignable.49 ° Public policy reasons also supported the rule against
assignability-primarily the avoidance of champerty49 1 and mainte-
nance. 492 It was feared that unscrupulous people would purchase
claims and thereby deal in lawsuits for human pain and suffering.493
Although acknowledging that personal injury actions could not
be assigned, several courts have distinguished between assignment
of a cause of action, and assignment of the proceeds that may be
recovered in the action. In the early case of Hutchinson v. Brown, 4
485. Id.
486. Id. at 232, 572 A.2d at 146.
487. See id. at 235, 572 A.2d at 148.
488. See id. at 237, 572 A.2d at 149.
489. Id. at 233, 572 A.2d at 147. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 37 (1963); Annota-
tion, Assignability of Proceeds of Claim for Personal Injury or Death, 33 A.L.R. 4th 82, 85
(1984).
490. See, e.g., Karp v. Speizer, 132 Ariz. 599, 600, 647 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Ct. App.
1982); see also City of Richmond v. Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 122 S.E.2d 895 (1961) (only
claims for wrongs to real or personal property, or resulting from breach of contract were
assignable).
491. See Karp, 132 Ariz. at 600, 647 P.2d at 1199. Champerty is defined as "a bargain
by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on the
litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of
the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 119 (5th ed.
1983).
492. Maintenance is defined as "an improper and officious intermeddling by a non-
party in a suit which in no way belongs to such person, by maintaining or assisting either
party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
490 (5th ed. 1983). See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wright Oil Co., 248
Ark. 803, 804-05, 454 S.W.2d 69, 70 (1970).
493. See Southern Farm Bureau, 248 Ark. at 805, 454 S.W.2d at 70.
494. 8 App. D.C. 157 (1896).
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the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that regardless of
the invalidity of an assignment of a personal injury cause of action,
equity may recognize an assignment of proceeds as an assignment of
a possibility or expectancy, capable of enforcement as an assign-
ment of a subsequent judgment or a charge against its proceeds.495
Likewise, in Richard v. National Transportation Co. ,496 the Municipal
Court of New York found that an assignment to a hospital of poten-
tial proceeds resulting from a personal injury claim was a valid equi-
table assignment, notwithstanding the existence of a statute
expressly barring assignment of the underlying personal injury
cause of action. 497 The theory behind the distinction was that an
assignment of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment was not
an assignment of an existing cause of action, but an assignment of
future property. 498 The court emphasized that the assignor retained
complete control of any lawsuit, or consummation of any settle-
ment. 49 9 The law merely gave the hospital the right to demand that
the assignor take the proper steps to enforce the cause of action.500
The court found, therefore, that the assignment did not violate the
basis of the rule against assigning tort claims.5 0' The United States
district court in In re Musser5 2 also found a legally significant dis-
tinction between assignment of a personal injury cause of action,
and assignment of the proceeds thereof.50 3 The court emphasized
that the hospital sought recoveries limited to the actual value of
services rendered, and its right existed only in the proceeds.5 °4
Moreover, the hospital had no right to bring an action against a
third party if the debtor failed to do so independently. 5
A number of courts, however, have been unwilling to recognize
the distinction.50 6 For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas in
495. See id. at 163.
496. 158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 870 (1936).
497. See id. at 330.
498. See id. at 328.
499. See id. at 330.
500. Id.; see also Block v. California, 244 Cal. App. 2d 266, 53 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1966)
(holding enforceable an agreement issued by a physicians' service obligating injured
members to reimburse the service upon collection of any damages, and to provide the
service with a lien to the extent of the benefits provided).
501. See id.
502. 24 Bankr. 913 (W.D. Va. 1982).
503. See id. at 920.
504. See id. at 921.
505. Id. The court analogized proceeds assignments with an attorney's contingent fee
contract. See id. Courts have enforced these contracts, which do not transfer any part of
the cause of action, and operate solely on proceeds recovered from third parties. Id.
506. See, e.g., Harvey v. Cleman, 65 Wash. 2d 853, 858, 400 P.2d 87, 90 (1965).
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Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Wright Oil Co. ,507 refused
to make the distinction because the cause of action's only value was
its possible conversion to a collectible money judgment.5"'
In Grossman v. Schlosser,50 9 the New York Supreme Court reluc-
tantly adhered to state precedent holding valid the assignment of a
personal injury action's proceeds. 510 The court nevertheless noted
that the distinction was based on form rather than substance, was
devoid of all reality, and allowed exactly what the New York statute
and common law intended to forbid.5"'
b. Discharge in Bankruptcy.-The minority rule holds that equi-
table assignments51 2 do not survive subsequent discharge in bank-
ruptcy because they do not confer any property right.513 Because an
equitable lien cannot attach until the property comes into being, the
lien must fail if the debt is previously discharged.5" 4 Only "actually
existing" liens upon a bankrupt person's property survive a dis-
charge in bankruptcy.51 5 The Bankruptcy Act's purpose supports
this view because it allows a debtor to be free from past obligations,
and this enables the debtor to start afresh, unburdened by pre-ex-
isting debt.5 16
The majority of courts follow the more modern rule that an eq-
uitable assignment is a valid lien which, unless disallowed or
avoided, survives the underlying debt's discharge in bankruptcy.51 7
507. 248 Ark. 803, 454 S.W.2d 69 (1970).
508. See id. at 809, 454 S.W.2d at 72.
509. 19 A.D.2d 893, 244 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1963).
510. See id. at 894, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
511. See id.
512. An assignment for value of a future right operates as an equitable assignment.
SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNRucrs § 18-9 (3d ed. 1987). An equita-
ble assignment may be defined as "any order, writing, or act by the assignor which
makes an absolute appropriation of a chose in action or fund to the use of the assignee
with the intent of transferring a present interest, but not amounting to a legal assign-
ment. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 1 (1990). In contrast, a legal assignment is an owner's
manifestation to an assignee of her intent to make a present transfer of a right. See J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra, § 18-3.
513. See, e.g., Gannon v. Graham, 211 Iowa 516, 527, 231 N.W. 675, 679 (1930).
514. See Brown v. Cunningham, 303 I1. App. 307, 313, 25 N.E.2d 113, 115-16 (1940).
See also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934) (assignment of wages does not
survive bankruptcy).
515. See Gannon, 211 Iowa at 526, 231 N.W. at 679.
516. See Brown, 303 Ill. App. at 312-13, 25 N.E.2d at 115.
517. See, e.g., Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 811 F.2d 186, 189
(3d Cir. 1987) (assignment of life insurance proceeds survives bankruptcy even though
policy has not matured and is contingent).
1338 [VOL. 50:1277
In Bridge v. Kedon,5 t s the California Supreme Court held that the
continued existence of the debt as a personal obligation to pay
money is unnecessary to enforcement of an equitable charge or lien
upon specific property. 5 9 In Estate of Lellock v. Prudential Insurance
Co. of America,520 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit asserted that the Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history
clearly support the modem rule.5 2' The court specifically referred
to Bankruptcy Code sections 506(d) and 522, pointing out that the
legislative history of the original section 506(d) states that the sub-
section allows liens to pass unaffected through the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.5 22 In addition, section 522's legislative history states that
discharge in bankruptcy will not prevent enforcement of valid
liens.5 23 The federal district court in United Presidential Life Insurance
Co. v. Barker 524 stated that by interpreting the code provisions in this
way, the goals of the bankruptcy process are met: to relieve debtors
from their obligations and to protect creditors' secured property
rights. 2 '5 The court held that even though the underlying debt se-
curing proceeds was discharged, the lien created prior to the bank-
ruptcy discharge survived. 26
c. Reasoning of the Court.-Before it addressed whether a per-
sonal injury cause of action was assignable, the court made the pre-
liminary determination that the assignment and authorization,
signed by Garcia and Hernandez, constituted a valid assignment. 527
The court then focused on the common law rule that causes of ac-
tion for personal injuries could not be assigned.528 It acknowledged
that although some courts have upheld the common law rule, many
have distinguished between assignment of the claim itself and as-
518. 163 Cal. 493, 126 P. 149 (1912).
519. See id. at 501, 126 P. at 153.
520. 811 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1987).
521. See id. at 188-89.
522. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(d), 522 (1988); see 811 F.2d at 188.
523. See 811 F.2d at 188.
524. 31 Bankr. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
525. See id. at 147.
526. See id. at 148. See also In re Bouchelle, 98 Bankr. 81 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding
enforceable a valid lien on property created prior to discharge in bankruptcy).
527. See Hernandez, 319 Md. at 232-33, 572 A.2d at 147. The court stated that "[a] fair
and reasonable reading of [the] language can leave little doubt that the document signed
by Garcia and Hernandez was intended to constitute an assignment, the subject of which
was 'the proceeds' from any monetary recovery obtained in Garcia's tort case. The lan-
guage cannot reasonably be read otherwise." Id. at 233, 572 A.2d at 147.
528. See id. at 233-35, 572 A.2d at 147-48.
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signment of the proceeds that might be recovered from the claim. 52 9
The court did not specifically state whether it followed the reason-
ing of those courts making the distinction. Rather, it seemed to
base its reasoning on two considerations. First, a tort claim for
damages is a chose in action, 53 0 and Maryland follows the modem
rule recognizing that a chose in action is assignable in the absence
of a statutory prohibition, if it is a right that would survive the as-
signor and could be enforced by his personal representative.5 3 t The
court read the Maryland statute regarding survival of actions to al-
low such assignments.53 2 Second, such assignments are not con-
trary to public policy.53 3 The court rejected the argument that
assignments of expected tort proceeds would result in champerty or
maintenance.53 4 To the contrary, policy reasons support enforce-
ment of these assignments: such assignments may prevent health
care providers from seeking immediate action against patients who,
at the time of their accidents, may lack adequate financial resources
to pay for their care.53 5
Having determined that assignment of personal injury benefits
was enforceable, the court found that the hospital had been as-
signed all of Garcia's interest in any proceeds recovered from her
personal injury claim, 536 and that Hernandez had not fulfilled his
obligation under the assignment.53 7
529. See id. at 233-34, 572 A.2d at 147.
530. See Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 594, 505 A.2d 849, 853 (1986) (an unliquidated
tort claim for damages falls within the definition of a chose in action).
531. See Hernandez, 319 Md. at 234, 572 A.2d at 148 (quoting Summers v. Freishtat,
274 Md. 404, 409, 335 A.2d 89, 92 (1975)).
532. See id. at 234, 572 A.2d at 145. The statute provides that causes of action other
than slander survive either party's death. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-401
(1989).
533. Hernandez, 319 Md. at 235, 572 A.2d at 148.
534. See id.; supra notes 491 and 492.
535. See Hernandez, 319 Md. at 235, 572 A.2d at 148.
536. See id.; see also James v. Goldberg, 256 Md. 520, 527, 261 A.2d 753, 757 (1970)
("An unqualified assignment generally operates to transfer to the assignee all of the
right, title and interest of the assignor in the subject of the assignment."). In Hernandez,
the assigned interest extended only to the amount of the hospital's bill for medical serv-
ices. See 319 Md. at 236, 572 A.2d at 148.
537. See Hernandez, 319 Md. at 236, 572 A.2d at 148-49. The court stated that the
document specifically directed Hernandez to use the proceeds to pay the hospital. See
id.; see also Goldwater v. Fisch, 261 A.D. 226, 25 N.Y.S.2d 84, reh'g and app. denied, 261
A.D. 1056, 27 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1941).
When the proceeds of the settlement were paid over to defendant, as attorney
for [the patient], the equitable title of the city of New York for the amount of its
claim ripened into a legal title and defendant, having full knowledge of the
city's interest, was obligated to pay to the plaintiff the sum to which the city was
entitled.
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In addressing whether Garcia's obligation to the hospital sur-
vived her discharge in bankruptcy, the court followed the modern
rule that a chose in action's assignee acquires an equitable lien
which, unless disallowed or avoided, survives the underlying debt's
discharge.5"' The court therefore held that the hospital could con-
tinue to seek enforcement of the assignment.53 9
In rendering its decision, the court rejected Hernandez's argu-
ment that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel barred the hospital's
claim. 54° The hospital had no obligation to become involved in the
bankruptcy proceeding, because no one attempted to disallow or
avoid its equitable lien, and it was entitled to rely on the
assignment.5 !
3. Analysis.-It is unclear whether the court relied primarily on
the Maryland statute regarding survival of actions, or on public pol-
icy grounds in determining that the proceeds assignment was valid.
If the basis of its decision was statutory, the court apparently as-
sumed that because the cause of action would survive, it was neces-
sarily assignable. Nowhere in the statute, however, is assignability
specifically mentioned.54' In Southern Farm Bureau, the Arkansas
court addressed the enforcement of assignments based on a statute
that is silent as to assignability, yet provides that the cause of action
survives.5 4 3 That court explained that the link between assignability
and survivability began as an association of ideas, but that there are
actually distinct underlying policies.5 4 4 It also explained that the
courts did not merge the two concepts by design, but that the
merger took place without their realizing it was occurring. 54 5 The
court pointed out that contributing to the merger was the absence
of good policy reasons to restrict assignments when only property
damage was involved. 46 The court found, however, that when the
public policies against champerty and maintenance were considered
in respect to personal injury causes of action, without exception the
courts held that survivability does not carry with it assignability.547
Id. at 227, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
538. See Hernandez, 319 Md. at 237, 572 A.2d at 149.
539. See id.
540. See id.
541. See id. at 237-38, 572 A.2d at 149.
542. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-401 (1989).
543. See 248 Ark. 803, 805-06, 454 S.W.2d 69, 70-71 (1970).
544. See id. at 805, 454 S.W.2d at 70 (1970).
545. See id.
546. See id.
547. See id. at 807, 454 S.W.2d at 71. See also Sherman v. Harris, 36 S.D. 50, 153 N.W.
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Additionally, if the statute was the sole basis for the court's de-
cision, it appears that a tort cause of action itself is assignable.54 If
this is accurate, then the public policy reasons against such assign-
ments, in particular, champerty and maintenance, have not been ad-
equately addressed: the court merely dismissed champerty and
maintenance as unlikely. 549 It may be that the court implicitly dis-
tinguished assignment of a tort claim and assignment of its potential
proceeds. If so, its conclusion then would be supported by the pol-
icy reasoning expressed by the courts that made this distinction.55 0
Alternatively, the court may have based its decision primarily
on public policy grounds. It is unclear from the court's reasoning
whether these grounds support assignment of proceeds generally,
or only assignments to hospitals. The court focused almost exclu-
sively on assignments to hospitals, and found good reason to en-
force these assignments. 55 1 Because monies recovered from tort
actions are not subject to execution by judgment creditors, 52 hospi-
tals might be forced to seek prompt payment from patients, and this
could create additional financial hardships on them.553 By allowing
assignment of the expected personal injury proceeds, the hospital
would receive some security that it would recover its fees and, con-
sequently would be compelled to seek immediate action.5
4. Conclusion.-The Hernandez decision rejects the common law
rule and its underlying policies against assignment of personal in-
jury claims. Although the court did not fully articulate its reasoning,
the decision is supported by public policy considerations, as well as
the concurrence of a significant number of other courts. In conclud-
ing that such assignments are valid, the court has permitted a pay-
925 (1915), aff'd on reh'g, 40 S.D. 341, 167 N.W. 325, (1918) (overruled in Simons v.
Kidd, 73 S.D. 280, 41 N.W.2d 840 (1950)). The Sherman court stated that although as-
signability and survivability of a chose in action usually are convertible terms, the one is
not the test of the other. The test of assignability is whether the particular assignment is
contrary to law or public policy. See id. at 56, 153 N.W. at 926.
548. See supra note 532.
549. See Hernandez, 319 Md. at 235, 572 A.2d at 148.
550. See supra notes 494-505 and accompanying text.
551. See Hernandez, 319 Md. at 235, 572 A.2d at 148.
552. See MD. CTS. &Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(b)(2) (1989) (money payable in
the event of the sickness, accident, injury, or death of any person, including compensa-
tion for loss of future earnings, is exempt from execution on a judgment).
553. Hernandez, 319 Md. at 235, 572 A.2d at 148.
554. Id.; see also In re Musser, 24 Bankr. 913 (W.D. Va. 1982). Addressing the argu-
ment that assignments will result in patients receiving less than full compensation for
their damages, the court declared that this is no reason for allowing the victim to avoid
paying his debts in the manner agreed upon by him and his creditors. See id. at 922.
1342 [VOL. 50:1277
1991] TORTS 1343
ment mechanism that may benefit individuals with pending tort
claims who are unable to pay hospital or medical expenses.
The court did not define the scope of its decision. It remains to
be seen whether the decision will apply to the assignment of tort
causes of action in addition to their proceeds, or whether it will be
applied to assignments to parties other than hospitals.
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